High Court rejects surrender objection to European Arrest Warrant despite respondent's absence from trial.

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 2025 291 EXT

[2026] IEHC 101

BETWEEN

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

AND

ROBERT JAKUBCIK

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 20 February 2026

Introduction

1. This is an application for the surrender of the respondent to the Czech Republic to serve the remaining part of an eight-year term of imprisonment, that remaining part being seven years and nine days.

2. The respondent’s surrender is sought pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (“the warrant”) dated the 22nd of December 2023.

3. The term of imprisonment was imposed by way of a judgment of the Regional Court in Brno dated the 23rd of March 2023, with the final and absolute resolution of the High Court in Olomouc dated the 16th of November 2023.

4. The respondent appeared before the High Court on the 12th of November 2025 following his arrest on foot of an SIS Alert on the 11th of November 2025, pursuant to section 14 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003, as amended (“the 2003 Act”).

5. The respondent was subsequently remanded in custody. The warrant was duly produced before the High Court on the 20th of November 2025 and the relevant directions were made in accordance with section 14(4) of the 2003 Act.

6. The respondent applied for and was granted bail on the 12th of December 2025.

7. The respondent is a Czech national and objects to his surrender. He has filed points of objection pursuant to Order 98, Rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended.

8. The points of objection include a general reservation of rights and an indication that the respondent awaits proof of all matters necessary to ground an order for surrender.

9. Two substantive points of objection are raised. Firstly, that the warrant does not comply with section 11 of the 2003 Act and secondly, that the proposed surrender of the respondent is not in compliance with section 45 of the 2003 Act.

10. A request for further information from the issuing authority pursuant to section 20 of the 2003 Act was made on the 15th of December 2025 and a response was received on the 2nd of January 2026. The matter came on for hearing before me on the 15th of January 2026 and a second request for further information from the issuing authority was made. The response to the second request was received on the 22nd of January 2026. The hearing resumed and concluded on the 10th of February 2026.

Background

11. The warrant is a conviction type warrant signed on behalf of the issuing judicial authority by the presiding judge Mgr. Ing. Dagmar Bordovska, sitting at the Regional Court for Brno.

12. It appears that prior to the issuance of this warrant, a warrant had previously issued on the 7th of March 2023 at a time when the respondent was sought as an accused. This warrant was cancelled and the current warrant, the subject of these proceedings, issued after his conviction.

13. Part B of the warrant clearly discloses that the order for surrender is to serve a sentence of imprisonment, which became final on the 23rd of March 2023.

14. Part C of the warrant indicates that the custodial sentence imposed was one of eight years with the remaining sentence of seven years and nine days to be served, having taken into account a period spent in custody by the respondent.

15. The warrant refers to three offences as follows:

(i) Felony of unauthorised production and other disposing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and poisons;

(ii) Misdemeanour of damage to property of others;

(iii) Felony of unauthorised production and other disposing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and poisons.

16. The offences are described at Part E of the warrant as contrary to specific provisions of the Criminal Code of the Czech Republic.

17. Part E of the warrant also provides a detailed description of the circumstances in which the offences were committed. The offences are said to have occurred on several dates between 2015 and 2017 where the respondent, together with other named people as members of an organised group which had been operating since 2013, jointly intended and in various ways participated in organising and securing the means for the production of methamphetamine and its subsequent production and distribution.

18. In relation to the ‘tick box’ offences as provided for under the European Arrest Warrant Framework decision, the warrant shows that the offence ticked is “illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.”

19. Part D of the warrant states that the respondent did not appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision.

20. In this regard, the warrant also states that the respondent was not personally served with the decision but that he will be personally served without delay after the surrender. Further, when served with the decision, the respondent will be expressly informed of his right to a retrial or to an appeal, in which case he would have the right to participate and the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, would be examined, which may lead to the original decision being reversed.

Discussion

21. As noted above, the respondent raised two substantive points.

22. The respondent submits that the warrant does not comply with section 11 of the 2003 Act in circumstances where no apparent distinction has been made in relation to how the sentence is comprised. It was submitted that the sentence is referred to as “cumulative” but without explanation as to the penalties that accumulate resulting in the sentence imposed.

23. The respondent also emphasises that the offences are said to have taken place over two separate and distinct periods in 2015 and 2017.

24. In this regard, the respondent relies on Minister for Justice and Equality v. Ludwin [2018] IEHC 220 in relation to the approach to be taken in respect of a cumulative sentence comprising individual penalties.

25. The respondent also seeks to argue that there is a related correspondence infirmity in the warrant where the ‘tick box’ offence could not incorporate the criminal offence of damage to property of others.

26. The respondent argues that the issuing state did not confirm the existence of any factors that would ensure the fair trial rights of the respondent, who was tried in absentia. The argument advanced is that the wording of the warrant continues to cast the conviction as “final and absolute” and is suggestive of a conflict with section 45 of the 2003 Act.

27. I also note that the applicant, in an application for bail, filed an affidavit which contained the following averment: “I say that I had been released in 2018 in Czechia and the matter was adjourned for a period of three years approximately. I say that I heard nothing further in relation to my case and that after this period of years I suffered a heart attack in 2021 and underwent surgery with the insertion of stents. I say that thereafter, having heard nothing further in relation to the within charges that I left the country and came to Ireland to try and make a better life.”

28. These legal arguments and the sworn evidence of the respondent will have to be considered in light of the additional information provided by the issuing authority on the dates referred to above.

29. The applicant submits that any difficulty in particularisation in accordance with section

11 of the 2003 Act is negated by the options available to the respondent and should not operate as a bar to his surrender for offences which correspond to offences in this jurisdiction.

30. In relation to the section 45 argument advanced by the respondent, the applicant submits that it is clear that the respondent purposely left the Czech Republic and settled in this jurisdiction in order to hide from the authorities and avoid an arrest.

31. The applicant relies on Minister for Justice and Equality v. Zarnescu [2020] IESC 59 where the Supreme Court cited with approval the decision of Donnelly J. in Minister for Justice and Equality v. Skwierczynski [2016] IEHC 802. In Zarnescu, Baker J. said at paragraph 56: “Donnelly J. was satisfied that s. 45 of the 2003 Act was neither obscure nor ambiguous, but came to the conclusion, however, having regard to the fact that as the 2003 Act was enacted to implement the 2009 Framework Decision, and in the light of the decision of the Court of Justice in Dworzecki, that a literal interpretation of s. 45 would lead to an absurdity, would fail to give effect to the plain intention of the legislature, and would fail to achieve a harmonious interpretation of precisely the same language in the Framework Decision which is implemented and because the concepts are autonomous European Union concepts: ‘102. […] the plain intention of the Oireachtas in enacting s. 16 and s. 45, and taking into account the entirety of the Act, was to give effect to the Framework Decision. This optional ground for refusal to surrender a requested person was transposed almost entirely in accordance with the wording of the relevant article in the Framework Decision. The Act of 2003 also requires this Court to refuse to surrender if his ECHR rights or constitutional rights will be violated on surrender. The plain intention of the Oireachtas is that surrender must take place if the Court can be assured that the surrender of the person concerned does not mean a breach of his rights of defence.

103. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that it must give a construction which reflects the plain intention of the Oireachtas. That intention is plain from the sections and the Act as a whole. This is a section which is reflects the concepts set out in the Framework Decision. Those concepts are autonomous concepts of E.U. law to be interpreted uniformly throughout the European Union. The plain intention of the Oireachtas is that surrender is not to be refused simply on the basis that the requested person's situation does not come within one of the exceptions set out in the Table to s. 45 provided that the High Court can be assured that his surrender does not mean a breach of rights of defence.’”

32. In determining that the approach of Donnelly J. was correct, Baker J. went on to say at paragraph 65: “This means that if the person sought to be returned under an EAW appears in person at the relevant hearing, that person is to be returned. If that person has not appeared in person or through nominated lawyers at the relevant hearing, but the circumstances meet those expressly identified in s. 45, equally no impediment exists to return. This case concerns the third possible scenario, where the circumstances of the trial giving rise to the request for return do not fit within those expressed in the exceptions contained in s. 45. Return may still be ordered, but only if the court is satisfied having made an appropriate inquiry that the rights of defence of the requested person have been met. As will be apparent then, the analysis of the facts must have as its aim the objective of ascertaining whether the rights of defence are sufficiently protected.”

33. The applicant also relies on Minister for Justice and Equality v. Minierski [2022] IEHC

634 wherein Biggs J. held at paragraph 88: “This Court finds that the respondent unequivocally waived his rights to attend that appeal hearing, and that he did so in circumstances where he made himself unavailable for service. However, he unequivocally waived his rights in circumstances where he had given a mandate to a lawyer to represent him at the hearing.”

34. The principles set out in Zarnescu were examined and applied by the Court of Appeal in Minister for Justice and Equality v. Szamota [2023] IECA 143. Collins J. held at paragraphs 28-29: “It is also relevant in this context that in LU & PH itself the CJEU was clear that the executing judicial authority may take into account other circumstances that enable it to satisfy itself that the surrender of the person concerned does not entail a breach of his or her rights of the defence and thus surrender that person to the issuing Member State, including (inter alia) ‘the conduct of the person concerned, in particular the fact that he or she sought to avoid service of the information addressed to him or her or to avoid any contact with his or her lawyers’ (my emphasis). That language, which picks up on statements made in TR, suggests that, for the purposes of Article 4a of the Framework Decision, the right to be present at one’s trial may, in certain circumstances, be effectively waived even where the person concerned was not aware of the date and place of his or her trial (because they had taken steps which prevented notice of their trial being served upon them).

It may therefore be the case that the concept of waiver in this context must be understood more broadly than the Supreme Court’s decision in Minister for Justice and Equality v Zarnescu [2020] IESC 59 would appear to suggest. As Baker J made clear (at para 65), return may still be ordered even where the case does not fit within any of the exceptions to non-surrender set out in section 45 ‘but only if the court is satisfied having made an appropriate inquiry that the rights of defence of the requested person have been met.’ However, the court went on to read the ECtHR jurisprudence as requiring, as a condition of an effective waiver, that it be established unequivocally that the accused person ‘was aware of the date and place of trial and of the consequences of not attending’ (see para 90(g) as well as 90(m)). With respect, that may put the matter too far. The Strasbourg jurisprudence certainly appears to identify knowledge of the criminal proceedings as a pre-requisite to an effective waiver but it does not appear to make knowledge of the date and place of trial a necessary condition for waiver in all circumstances: see the authorities referred to in IR, §53, as well as ECtHR 13 September 2018, MTB v Turkey (Application no. 47081/06), §47 and following and the authorities referred to there. Zarnescu was, of course, decided before the CJEU’s decisions in TR, IR and LU & PH, all of which appear to espouse a relatively broad approach to the issue of waiver, subject always to respect for the rights of defence.” (Emphasis in the original.)

35. Collins J. also noted that a broad approach to waiver was evident in the case law from England and Wales.

Further Information Pursuant to Section 20

36. The further information provided by the issuing authority on the 2nd of January 2026 pursuant to section 20 of the 2003 Act contained the following salient facts:

• The respondent was originally arrested on the 10th of June 2017 in relation to the offences for which the warrant was issued;

• He was taken into custody in the “pre-trial proceeding in the criminal matter within which he was sentenced” and in respect of which the warrant issued on the 22nd of December 2023;

• Custody was ordered by the District Court in Brno on the 12th of June 2017 and the custodial period was backdated to the 10th of June 2017;

• The respondent was taken into custody pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Czech Republic because there were concerns that he might escape or hide to avoid criminal prosecution, and that he would reoffend in the same manner;

• On the 1st of June 2018, the respondent was released from custody under the supervision of a probation officer with the condition that he visit the officer thereafter on a regular basis;

• The respondent met with the probation services on the 17th of January 2022 but did not attend a further consultation on the 2nd of March 2022. An arrest warrant then issued for breach of conditions of release;

• In computation of the sentence imposed, the respondent was given credit for the period of time he spent in custody;

• The issuing authority says that the averment of the respondent in his bail application is untrue and that there was no three-year adjournment of the case following his release;

• After the release of the respondent, the pre-trial proceedings continued. An indictment was submitted on the 3rd of January 2020 and a trial subsequently took place where evidence was heard. Judgment was pronounced on the 23rd of March 2023, becoming “final and absolute” on the 16th of November 2023;

• The respondent was aware of his obligation to visit the probation officer and that he could be taken into custody again if he did not comply. He was also aware that the investigation into the crime was ongoing;

• The respondent was aware that the indictment was submitted on the 3rd of January 2020 and personally attended his trial on the 10th of June 2021. It appears that in respect of two further trial hearings in September and October 2021, he provided a proper basis to be excused;

• The issuing authority acknowledged receipt of a medical report in November 2021 which made no reference to any heart attack and further states that the respondent’s medical condition did not prevent him from actively taking part in the trial;

• The respondent was once again summoned for trial on the 11th of January 2022 but did not attend. His counsel suggested that he had received a positive antigen Covid-19 test but a later PCR test proved negative;

• The respondent was summoned for trial again on the 1st of March 2022 but did not attend. No excuse was proffered, and counsel for the respondent claimed to have had no communication with him;

• The decision to proceed in abstenia was made on the basis of a decision by the Regional Court that the respondent was aware of the criminal proceedings and that he was deliberately avoiding them;

• The warrant for the respondent as a convicted person replaced the earlier warrant which referred to the respondent as a defendant in accordance with statutory provisions;

• The phrase “final and absolute” is explained as meaning that an ordinary appeal cannot be lodged against the said judgment. However, the issuing authority stated that the respondent has the right to seek, within eight days of service of the judgment upon him, for the Regional Court to set aside the judgment and then court proceedings can be held again. If such a request is made, the Court is obliged to grant it and therefore the respondent has, after his transfer, an “unconditional right” to a new hearing of the case;

• The Regional Court in Brno reached its decision after considering the evidence, which was heard in the presence of counsel for the respondent, and the judgment was affirmed in appeal proceedings that had been lodged by counsel for the respondent;

• While the offence of criminal damage does not come within the ‘tick box’ offence, it was damage caused to property belonging to another in which the methamphetamine was being produced to a total value of CZK 200,000.00

37. The further information provided by the issuing authority on the 22nd of January 2026 pursuant to section 20 of the 2003 Act clarified that in relation to the penalty imposed for the offences, a cumulative sentence was imposed. It stated that under the Criminal Code of the Czech Republic “if the court sentences an offender for two or more criminal acts, it shall impose a cumulative sentence on him according to the provision which applies to the most severely punishable criminal offence out of them.”

38. The issuing authority also said that in the present case, a cumulative sentence was imposed for the offence of unauthorized production and other disposing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and poisons because that offence was the most severely punishable of the three offences for which the respondent was convicted. The range of penalty applicable to this offence was between 8-12 years.

Decision

39. While complaint is made about the requirements of section 11(1A)(g)(iii) of the 2003 Act, there seemed to be little dispute about the other requirements of section 11 that must be met before an order for surrender could be made.

40. I am satisfied that the name and nationality of the respondent is clearly set out on the face of the warrant.

41. I am satisfied that the name and address of the judicial authority that issued the warrant and its telephone number, fax number and email address are set out on the face of the warrant.

42. Section 11 requires that the offence to which the relevant warrant relates be set out, including the classification of the offence concerned under the law of the issuing state. I am satisfied that Part E of the warrant states that it relates to the three offences and that it describes the facts underpinning the offences in significant detail. The classification of these offences under the law of the issuing state is also clearly set out in Part E of the warrant.

43. I am unable to agree that Ludwin supports the criticism regarding the cumulative sentence in this case nor that it is unclear as to how the sentence is constructed. The sentence imposed is at the lower end of the available penalty under the Criminal Code of the Czech Republic. There is no lack of clarity having regard to the further information furnished by the issuing authority.

44. The respondent contends that correspondence cannot be demonstrated as the warrant had a ‘tick box’ offence which could not incorporate criminal damage. I am satisfied that correspondence is made out having regard to the further information provided in relation to that offence and that there is clear correspondence with the offence of criminal damage contrary to section 2 of the Criminal Damage Act 1991. It is clearly set out that the property, in which the controlled drug was being manufactured, was damaged during that process and that a monetary value was capable of being placed on that damage.

45. Part B of the warrant confirms that it is based on a criminal sentence ruled by the Regional Court on the 23rd of March 2023 in conjunction with the final and absolute resolution of the High Court dated the 16th of November 2023.

46. I am satisfied that Part C of the warrant confirms that this sentence remains enforceable.

47. The eight-year sentence clearly meets the minimum gravity requirement as provided for by section 38(1)(a)(ii) of the 2003 Act.

48. The offence occurred in the issuing state, and no question of extraterritoriality arises.

49. Furthermore, no issue arises in relation to the limitation period for the prosecution of these offences.

50. I am satisfied that the argument advanced by the respondent in relation to section 45 of the 2003 Act is unsustainable. It is submitted that the terminology used in the warrant casts his conviction as final and absolute, and if those words are given their ordinary meaning, section 45 is “infringed.”

51. Section 45(1) of the 2003 Act provides: “The High Court may refuse to order the surrender of a person under this Act if he or she did not appear in person at the proceedings resulting in the sentence or detention order in respect of which the European arrest warrant or the Trade and Cooperation Agreement arrest warrant, as the case may be, was issued, unless in the case of a European arrest warrant, the warrant indicates the matters required by points 2, 3 and 4 of point (d) of the form of warrant in the Annex to the Framework Decision as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA … as set out in the table to this section.”

52. Part D of the warrant indicates that the respondent did not appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision and further confirms that the respondent was not personally served with the decision.

53. However, the warrant goes on to say that he will be personally served with the decision without delay after his surrender and when served with the decision, he will be expressly informed of his right to a retrial or to an appeal, in which he has the right to participate and the merits of the case, including fresh evidence, would be re-examined, which may lead to the original decision being reversed. It also states that he will be informed of the time frame within which he has to request a retrial or an appeal, which will be eight days.

54. Furthermore, that issuing authority has clarified that he has a right, within eight days after service of the judgment upon him, to seek for the Regional Court to set aside the judgment and then court proceedings can be held again. If such a request is made, the Court is obliged to grant it and therefore the respondent has, after his transfer, an “unconditional right” to a new hearing of the case. The use of the phrase “final and absolute” has to be understood in that context.

55. The further information provided also demonstrates that the respondent was well aware of the prosecution. He was released from custody on a conditional basis and subsequently breached those conditions. It is clear that he participated in an earlier part of the trial before absenting himself, and that he was represented by counsel who lodged an appeal on his behalf. The evidence put before the High Court for his bail application demonstrably lacks credit. There can be no doubt that he took a deliberate decision to avoid the proceedings.

56. I am satisfied that all of the respondent’s rights are adequately protected, and that section 45 is not a bar to surrender.

57. I am satisfied pursuant to section 16(2) of the 2003 Act that the respondent is the person in respect of whom the warrant was issued and that his name, date and place of birth are clearly set out. No issues were raised by the respondent in respect of the SIS Alert and I am satisfied that no issue as to identity arises.

58. I am satisfied that I am not required to refuse the respondent’s surrender under sections 22, 23 or 24 of the 2003 Act. I am also satisfied that I am not required to refuse surrender for any other reason under Part 3 of the 2003 Act.

Conclusion

59. For the reasons set out above, I reject the points of objection raised by the respondent to his surrender. I therefore propose to make an order for his surrender to such person as is duly authorised to receive him on behalf of the issuing state.

60. I will hear the parties on the issue of postponement if it arises under section 18 of the 2003 Act.