Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against five-year sentences for demanding money with menaces, upholding severity despite mitigating factors.

AN CHÚIRT ACHOMHAIRC THE COURT OF APPEAL APPROVED – NO REDACTION NEEDED Court of Appeal Record Number: CCAOT0024/2025 Bill Number: DUDP0214/2021 Neutral Citation Number: [2026] IECA 26

Kennedy J. Collins J. Owens J.

BETWEEN/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

RESPONDENT

- AND -

DYLAN MANGAN

APPELLANT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT delivered by Mr. Justice Anthony

M. Collins on the 20th day of February 2026

I. Scope of the Appeal

1. This is an appeal against the severity of two concurrent sentences of five years imprisonment that Dublin Circuit Criminal Court (His Honour Judge Martin Nolan, hereafter ‘the Court’) imposed on Dylan Mangan (hereafter “the appellant”) for two offences of demanding money with menaces, contrary to s. 17 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 (Counts 1 & 3).

2. The outline written submissions filed on the appellant’s behalf contend that the Court failed (a) to identify a headline sentence, or implicitly identified one that was excessive in the circumstances; (b) to have regard to the principle of parity in arriving at the sentence it imposed; and (c) to give adequate weight to mitigating factors. At the hearing of the appeal, Senior Counsel for the appellant focussed on the second of these grounds.

II. Evidence before Dublin Circuit Criminal Court

3. The appellant pleaded guilty to Counts 1 & 3 and was sentenced on 28 January 2025. On 20 March 2020, an individual arrived at a business premises in Dublin City Centre in the mid-afternoon. He asked a member of staff whether a certain employee was there. He was not. After asking a number of further questions he left. Later that afternoon, that same individual returned with another man. They asked for the manager of the business by his first name. He spoke with them. They told him that the employee, for whom they had asked earlier, owed them money. The individuals then threatened the manager and claimed that he owed €20,000 which they demanded be given to them when they returned the following day. The manager asserted he did not owe them money. One of them said to him: “We know where you live” and correctly stated his home address. One also said: “I'll fucking slit your kid's throat”. After they left, the manager called his employee who had no knowledge of any such debt.

4. Later that afternoon, the manager received a phone call. The caller identified himself as one of the men who had visited earlier and demanded that he be given the money that night. The manager stated that he had spoken to his employee who had told him that he would take care of the debt. The individual insisted the manager owed him the money he claimed was due that night and threatened him. The manager explained that he was unable to give them the money because he did not have it. The individual replied: “You have a business and you've a great house and you've a car”. The individual stated he would keep ringing the manager and the phone call ended. The manager received five more phone calls that night from a number he did not recognise. He answered none of them.

5. It transpired that on that day the same two men arrived at the employee’s late mother’s house which was then vacant. His sister was checking it routinely when she encountered them in the front garden. She told them it was unoccupied, of which fact they seemed to be already aware. They left a note on the front door. It stated that they sought a relative of the employee who owed them €40,000, half of which they demanded be given to them that day. If they did not receive it, the note said, they would burn the house to the ground.

6. The note contained two phone numbers. The employee called one of them. The man who received the phone call identified himself as one of the individuals who had visited his workplace. He stated that the employee’s relative owed €20,000 that was due that night and he threatened the lives of the employee and the manager. That evening, the employee received further phone calls during which the individual demanded the money be given to him the next morning, otherwise he would slit the employee’s child’s throat and burn his house down with his wife in it. The employee insisted he did not have the money. Another man picked up the phone and shouted at the employee that he would kill him if he did not have the money. The phone call ended. The employee was called later that evening but did not answer.

7. The matter was immediately reported to An Garda Siochána, which gathered CCTV footage from the business premises which identified two individuals of whom the appellant was one. That night Gardaí arrested him at his home. While there, they observed that he appeared nervous about a mobile handset that they had found. They called one of the phone numbers contained in the note and that mobile handset rang. The appellant was arrested and detained. He made no comment to the questions put to him at interview.

8. The Court heard that Dublin Circuit Criminal Court (Her Honour Judge Orla Crowe) had sentenced Des Smyth (hereafter “the co-accused”) to four years imprisonment with the final eighteen months suspended on his entry into a bond in connection with this matter. The Court heard that Judge Crowe had been advised that the co-accused’s role in the commission of the offences was of a lesser degree than the appellant’s involvement. The Court was informed, inaccurately as it transpired, that at the time he was sentenced, the co-accused had seven or eight previous convictions, including one for blackmail.

9. The Court was informed that the appellant had eighteen previous convictions, including theft, burglary, obstruction of a police officer, possession of drugs for sale or supply, and violent behaviour in a garda station. On 21 March 2024 he was sentenced in respect of a separate offence of blackmail he had committed on 18 October 2022. In March 2020 he was charged with the blackmail offences before the Court. The appellant was thus serving a sentence in respect of a different conviction for another offence of the same type when he came before the Court. This was brought to the Judge’s attention as an aggravating factor.

10. Evidence was given that the appellant’s father had not been present during his childhood and his mother died when he was eighteen years old, after which he began to engage in criminal behaviour. He had worked for three months before he went into custody in March 2024 and will be able to continue to do so upon his release. Whilst he had problems with gambling, he was not addicted to drugs. His aunts provide a support network for him and he has a three-year-old daughter towards whose maintenance he contributes. The Court heard that the appellant’s demands that the money be given promptly indicated that he was under pressure at the time, which his counsel represented would not be the case upon his release. Finally, the appellant proffered a letter in which he expressed remorse for his actions.

III. Judgment of the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court

11. The Court outlined the facts of the case and the serious threats the appellant and the co-accused had made to the injured parties. The appellant pleaded guilty after the trial date had been set, but before the trial was scheduled to take place. Whilst the Court took note of the fact that the co-accused had been sentenced, it represented that its principal focus was on the evidence before it of the appellant’s crime. The Court repeatedly stated that that evidence showed the crime was “very serious”. It observed that a sentence of fourteen years imprisonment was the maximum that it could impose for the offences. In mitigation, it took account of the appellant’s guilty plea, the remorse he had shown and his difficult personal circumstances. It also considered his ability to work and the fact that he had done so prior to his incarceration. It observed that the appellant seemed to wish to change his ways. The Court remarked upon the menacing and frightening impact of the offences upon the injured parties, neither of whom had anything to do with the monies being demanded, and their insidious and serious nature. The Court sentenced the appellant to two terms of five years imprisonment to run concurrently from that day with credit for the periods of time that he had served in custody relating to the matters before it.

IV. Ruling on the Appeal

(a) Failure to identify a headline sentence

12. The appellant accepts that the Court was under no obligation to nominate a headline sentence. He nevertheless claims that its failure to do so requires this Court to identify a notional headline sentence that it would have nominated so as to allow it to arrive at the sentence it imposed. The appellant submits that “a headline figure in excess of seven years can reasonably be inferred”, which figure is, in his view, excessive, notably by reference to the judgment of this Court in People (DPP) v. Doyle [2023] IECA 80.

13. We observe that the maximum penalty that may be imposed for the offence of demanding money with menaces contrary to s. 17 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 is a term of imprisonment of fourteen years. Considering a sentence imposed in respect of an offence against that provision, para. 39 of the judgment in People (DPP) v. Doyle observed that:

We are satisfied that the headline sentence of six years that was nominated by the sentencing judge in this case was not an error.

It was perhaps at the severe end of her margin of appreciation but we do not consider that it was outside the range of her discretion. The significant considerations in this case are that this was a crime committed with premeditation.

14. It is a trite, but true, observation that the facts of each case are different. The Court characterised the evidence before it as constituting the commission of a “very serious” crime, which finding this Court has recently held justified headline sentences of between eight and nine years for the offence of demanding money with menaces: e.g. People (DPP) v. Fitzsimons [2025] IECA 246: People (DPP) v. Kelly [2025] IECA 253. This Court may disturb the

decision of the sentencing court only where it is persuaded that it fell into error in principle. The observation in People (DPP) v. Doyle that a headline sentence of six years imprisonment for the offence of demanding money with menaces was perhaps severe, but not outside of the range of discretion of the sentencing judge in that case, if anything shows that, in the light of the evidence before it and it having reached the conclusion that the offences committed were of a

“very serious” nature, the Court remained within its range of discretion when it imposed the sentences of five years imprisonment under appeal.

15. We therefore reject this ground of appeal.

(b) Failure to have regard to the principle of parity

16. In People (DPP) v. Daly [2012] 1 I.R. 476, 500 – 501, McKechnie J. held that:

The parity rule is essentially a reflection of the notion of equal justice which is inherent in any rational system of law which citizens are subject to. As such, the underlying basis for the principle is rooted in justice being equal, in equal circumstances. Rarely will that be found to exist without some adjustment; but if correction can legitimately be made the rule will apply. Therefore co-accused whose personal circumstances, such as age, background, antecedents, etc, are similar and whose legal liability for the crime under sentence is relative, should normally receive comparable sentences….

17. Compliance with this rule does not, however, oust the application of the fundamental principles of sentencing. As McKechnie J. went on to observe later in that same judgment at 504

– 505:

… it is important to remember that the parity rule is not a rule of law which requires co-accused be given the same sentence, even if no distinction can be established between them. This principle was established in Lowe v. R. (1984) 54 ALR 193 and has not been doubted since. Parity, when in play, is a factor which must be considered by the court, as many others must also be. Where possible, equality should be achieved but not regardless of principle or context. It is wrong to think that it is more important that sentences should be proportionate to one another than they should be proportionate to guilt (R. v. Robson and East [1970] Crim LR 354 at p 355). It must be recognised that the rule is not omnipotent and that it cannot be utilised to distort other fundamental principles of sentencing. Those principles include judicial discretion, which is the lynchpin of that part of the trial process, and the judge's overriding obligation to impose an appropriate sentence in the context of the particular circumstance. The end result should always be a fair sentence for that person who has committed that crime. This is the first principle of sentencing, which all other principles are designed to support.

18. The first aspect to consider when applying the principle of parity is whether the sentence under appeal is proportionate to the appellant’s guilt. The evidence before the Court records that Counsel for the appellant accepted that his level of involvement in the preparation for, and commission of, the offences was greater than that of his co-accused and that the appellant was the principal perpetrator. The appellant had been acquainted with the employee’s half-brother, who was alleged to have sold drugs for him. The appellant was also aware that a house in the ownership of the employee’s family was vacant due to a bereavement. Upon his arrest by An Garda Síochána, the appellant was in possession of a mobile phone used to contact the victims. There was thus a rational basis upon which the Court was entitled to decide that the appellant’s culpability in the commission of the offences charged was significantly greater than that of the co-accused.

19. The appellant’s criminal history, described at para. 9, above, was more substantial than that of the co-accused. Contrary to the indication given to the Court, the co-accused had three previous convictions: two for extortion related crimes and one under s. 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.

20. The appellant had experienced difficulties with gambling, had been working prior to his incarceration in connection with other offences and would be in a position to continue to do so upon his release. Although the co-accused had suffered from serious issues with drug use, evidence was adduced before the court that sentenced him that, whilst in prison, he had become drug free and had successfully completed a number of courses.

21. The appellant and the co-accused are of the same age. Both of them had lost a parent in their teens. They are both fathers of a single child. They each expressed remorse for their actions to the Court.

22. Whatever the similarities of their age, background and personal circumstances, when it passed sentence on the appellant, the Court was entitled to take account of the clear distinction between his level of participation in the commission of the offences charged and the level of the co-accused’s involvement. The Court was also entitled to take account of the clear disparity in their respective criminal histories notwithstanding that the appellant and the co-accused shared the same age. In the presence of these objective differences in the appellant’s and the co-accused’s involvement in the commission of the offences and their criminal histories, the difference between the sentences of two terms of five years imprisonment to run concurrently and of four years imprisonment with the final eighteen months suspended that were imposed on them respectively do not constitute an error in principle capable of warranting this Court’s intervention.

23. As McKechnie J. observed in the passage from People (DPP) v. Daly cited at para. 17, above, the overriding obligation upon a court passing sentence and this Court on appeal is to impose an appropriate sentence in the context of the convicted person’s particular circumstances, with a view to ensuring that the end result is fair. Parity does not require a court to reduce the severity of a sentence by reference to one that might have been too light: People (Attorney General) v. Poyning [1972] I.R. 402, 408 – 410, per Walsh J., cited at People (DPP) v. Daly [2012] 1 I.R. 476, 502. Having regard to all of the material before this Court, and without reference to the length of, and the conditions imposed upon, the sentence that was passed on the co-accused, we are of the view that the appellant’s circumstances fully merited the sentences of five years imprisonment that the Court imposed.

24. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

(c) Failure to give adequate weight to mitigating factors

25. The appellant represents that the following factors furnished a basis upon which the Court could have suspended part of the sentence and/or given greater credit by way of mitigation: his age, his difficult start in life, the fact that he had been working prior to his incarceration on another offence, his child of three years of age whom he supported, his earlier difficulties with gambling, his letter of apology to the Court, the support of his aunts and evidence of his remorse and his wish to change. It is contended that the Court erred by not structuring the sentence in such a way as to reflect those factors adequately.

26. The respondent submits that the elements in mitigation the appellant advanced were unexceptional. The appellant pleaded guilty at a very late stage. He made no admissions and his expression of remorse had come late in the day. He furthermore provided no evidential basis upon which the Court could have imposed a suspended sentence with a view to incentivising such efforts as he may have made towards rehabilitation.

27. In imposing sentence, the Court set out the elements in mitigation upon which the appellant relies. The case advanced on his behalf under the rubric ‘failure to define a headline sentence’ is to the effect that the Court implicitly identified a headline sentence of between seven and eight years imprisonment. The Court ultimately imposed a term of five years imprisonment. That would represent a discount of between 25% and 29% on the notional headline sentence that the appellant claims to have identified. A discount of that size could not be said to constitute an error in principle. It follows that, even on the appellant’s own case, the discount the Court allowed in mitigation was well within its range of discretion and thus did not constitute an error in principle.

28. The Court also agrees with the respondent’s submission that since no evidence of the appellant’s rehabilitation was adduced before the Court, it was entitled not to suspend any part of the sentence it imposed: see People (DPP) v. Doyle, per Edwards J. at para. 43 where he held that “[t]his court has emphasised on a number of occasions that while it is a legitimate objective of sentencing to seek to rehabilitate an offender and to incentivise rehabilitation, a sentencing judge is not required to do so in every case. Rather, it is a matter of discretion and there requires to be a sound evidential basis for the exercise of that discretion.”

V. Conclusion

29. For the reasons given in Part IV, above, the Court dismisses this appeal.