Appeal dismissed; litigant in person rebuked for scandalous allegations and abuse of privilege during judicial review appeal.

APPROVED

NO REDACTION NEEDED

THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Appeal Number: 2024/221

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] IECA 17

The President

Allen J. Owens J.

BETWEEN

ANGELA HEAVEY

APPELLANT

– AND –

AN COIMISIÚN PLEANÁLA

RESPONDENT

AND

FINGAL COUNTY COUNCIL

NOTICE PARTY

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Allen delivered on the 20th day of February, 2026

Introduction

1. This is an appeal by Ms. Angela Heavey – a litigant in person – against the judgment and order of the High Court (Holland J.) delivered and made on 2nd August, 2024 ([2024] IEHC 480) refusing Ms. Heavey’s ex parte application for leave to apply by way of judicial review for an order of certiorari quashing a decision of An Bord Pleanála, as it then was, made on 28th May, 2024 to confirm a compulsory purchase order made by Fingal County Council authorising the compulsory acquisition of Ms. Heavey’s property at 17 and 17A North Street, Swords, County Dublin.

2. Ms. Heavey’s property lies on the eastern side of North Street and is adjacent to the eastern wall of Swords Castle. At the time the compulsory purchase order was made, it was the last property in private ownership on the eastern side of North Street. Previously, Fingal County Council had bought the other properties voluntarily.

3. The declared purposes of the Fingal County Council Compulsory Purchase (17 &17A North Street, Swords, Co. Dublin) Order 2022 – made on 7th November, 2022 – were:-

(a) The protection, conservation and enhancement of the historic site and views of Swords Castle, a national monument, and its environs,

(b) The development of Swords Castle as a major amenity, tourist attraction and cultural hub for Swords,

(c) The development of Swords Castle as a cultural feature of an enhanced and improved public realm and urban space of Swords Town Centre, improving connectivity and accessibility between and around Swords Castle, Swords Town Centre and Swords Town Park,

(d) The development of the Swords Cultural Centre, including a new County Library, Theatre, Arts Centre, civil spaces, and public realm improvements as the key development within the Swords Cultural Quarter.

4. In accordance with the relevant legislation, Fingal County Council applied to An Bord Pleanála for confirmation of the CPO. Ms. Heavey objected. An oral hearing was conducted by a Board Inspector on 2nd April, 2024. The Inspector reported to the Board on 8th May, 2024; and the Board Order was made on 28th May, 2024.

The judicial review leave application

5. Ms. Heavey was aggrieved by the Board Order and on 16th July, 2024 filed her papers for the purposes of an application for leave to apply for judicial review.

6. Section 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 provides insofar as is material that:- “(2) a person shall not question the validity of any decision made or other act done by – …

(b) the Board in the performance or purported performance of a function transferred under Part XIV … otherwise than by way of an application for judicial review under Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (S.I. No. 15 of 1986) (the ‘Order’) …

(6) … an application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Order in respect of a decision or other act to which subsection 2(a) applies shall be made within the period of 8 weeks beginning on the date of a decision or, as the case may be, the date of the doing of the act by … the Board, as appropriate.”

7. Section 50A PDA 2000 provides insofar as is material at this point that:- “(2)(a) An application for section 50 leave shall be made by motion ex parte and shall be grounded in the manner specified in the Order in respect of an ex parte motion for leave. …

(3) The Court shall not grant section 50 leave unless it is satisfied that –

(a) there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision or act concerned is invalid or ought to be quashed, (b)(i) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter which is the subject of the application …”

8. At the hearing of the appeal Ms. Heavey was adamant that her application was not an application pursuant to s. 50 PDA 2000. Section 50, she said “was not in the conversation”. Her central thesis was that the interests of natural justice prevail over express statutory provisions. In that, Ms. Heavey was fundamentally mistaken. The only means by which Ms. Heavey might have questioned the validity of the Board Order was by way of an application for section 50 leave – within the time limited by s. 50(7) and grounded in the manner required by s. 50A(2)(a) – and, critically, as I will come to, subject to the limitation on her right to appeal provided by section 50A(7). There was no challenge to the validity of the s. 50 having regard to the Constitution.

The High Court judgment on the section 50 leave application

9. Ms. Heavey’s leave application was heard by the High Court (Holland J.) on 30th July, 2024. On the following day, Holland J. decided that Ms. Heavey’s application must be refused. He then said that he would give his reasons later: which he did, in writing, on 2nd August, 2024.

10. Ms. Heavey’s statement of grounds ran to 42 pages and her grounding affidavit to 19 pages. Altogether her papers ran to upwards of 250 pages which were unpaginated, untabbed, and – in the electronic format – unsearchable. Holland J. read and considered the papers which had been submitted and heard from Ms. Heavey at some length.

11. I pause here to recall that in the High Court, as well as on the appeal, Ms. Heavey repeatedly complained that she was not being afforded the time that she wanted to make her oral submissions. Court time is a scarce resource. In principle litigants are entitled to be afforded sufficient time to present their cases but that entitlement carries with it a corresponding obligation to be prepared and focussed, and to avoid repetition. Litigants are not entitled to demand that they be afforded a particular length of time, and then to complain if their demand is not acceded to.

12. In his judgment of 2nd August, 2024, Holland J. identified his jurisdiction to deal with the application in s. 50 PDA 2000. He found that Ms. Heavey met the requirement in s. 50A(3)(b)(i) that she should have a sufficient interest in the matter which was the subject of the application, before moving on to consider whether she met the requirement in s. 50A(3)(a) that the court should be satisfied that there were substantial grounds for contending that the decision or act concerned was invalid or ought to be quashed.

13. In considering “The Impugned Decision, the CPO and the Property” Holland J. first noted that the only intended respondent was An Bord Pleanála and that the only decision impugned was the decision of the Board of 28th May, 2024. Starting at para. 23, Holland J. winnowed out of Ms. Heavey’s papers and oral submissions a number of allegations against Fingal County Council, which he found were unsupported, insufficiently particularised, and in any event did not disclose any legal basis on which a challenge might be mounted to the

decision of a different statutory body – the Board.

14. Part of the case which Ms. Heavey made was that the Board was precluded from affirming the 2022 CPO because it had previously, in 2004, annulled a CPO made by Fingal County Council in 2003. Holland J. concluded that he could not find in that a substantial ground for contending that the impugned Board Order was invalid or ought to be quashed.

15. Another part of the case which Ms. Heavey made was that a planning application which she had made in respect of the lands in 2005 for the construction of a five-storey commercial development had been refused by the Council and, on appeal by the Board. Holand J. did not find anything in what was said as to the refusal of that application any legal basis on which a challenge could be maintained to the Board Order of 2024.

16. Starting at para. 36, Holland J. addressed “The Impugned CPO Process.” Ms. Heavey, he said, clearly found that the oral hearing held on 2nd April, 2024 and the resultant Inspector’s report which resulted in the impugned decision unsatisfactory: but she had given no particulars of any substance in that regard. While she had exhibited some of the witness statements and correspondence in relation to the oral hearing, she had not exhibited the Inspector’s report.

17. The judge’s finding – at para. 38 – that “Ms. Heavey has – she says consciously – chosen not to exhibit the Inspector’s report to the Board” is abundantly borne out by the transcript. At the sitting of the court on 30th July, 2024, the judge endeavoured to explain to Ms. Heavey the parameters of his jurisdiction. He could not, he said, consider the merits of the issue of compulsory purchase, but only whether there were legal flaws. He suggested that he might benefit in understanding the case which Ms. Heavey would make from seeing the Inspector’s report which – he said – would ordinarily give a history of the events and of her objections. Asked, and later pressed, to say whether the Inspector’s report was among the jumble of papers which she had exhibited, she said:- “I deliberately and consideredly [sic.], after a lot of consideration and reflection, omitted the actual Inspector’s report in this because what I am challenging is the

decision making that An Bord upheld 20 years ago An Bord did the opposite and there’s very little changed on the street. It is still about visibility, accessibility and, what’s the other word, visibility, accessibility and connectivity.”

18. Thus, while Ms. Heavey complained that the oral hearing on 2nd April, 2024 and the later Inspector’s report had been unsatisfactory, the ground on which she sought to impugn the Board Order of 2024 was that the Board, in considering the confirmation application in respect of the 2022 CPO, was bound by its decision in 2004 on the earlier application to annul the 2003 CPO. Not only had she not exhibited the Inspector’s report, she was clear that she was not relying on it, or on any asserted shortcoming in it, as part of, or in support of, her challenge to the Board Order. As she put in at the hearing of the appeal, Ms. Heavey “… didn’t come in about the Board’s Inspectors.”

19. Having considered the material which Ms. Heavey had exhibited in connection with the oral hearing, Holland J. concluded that there was no basis for a conclusion that she had been materially disadvantaged in her presentation to the Board of her objection to the CPO. For all the reasons which he gave, Holand J. found that there were no substantial grounds on which the impugned decision might be quashed and refused leave to seek judicial review. The order refusing the s. 50 leave application was perfected on 6th August, 2024.

The application for leave to appeal

20. It is necessary at this point to return to the PDA 2000. Section 50A(7) provides that:- “The determination of the [High] Court of an application for section 50 leave or of an application for judicial review on foot of such leave shall be final and no appeal shall lie from the decision of the Court to [the Court of Appeal] in either case save with leave of the Court which leave shall only be granted where the Court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the [Court of Appeal].”

21. On 26th August, 2024 Ms. Heavey filed a notice of appeal against the judgment and order of Holland J. When the appeal – or purported appeal – came into the directions list on 15th November, 2024, counsel for the Fingal County Council intervened to remind the list judge – as it happens, the President – that s. 50(A)(7) precluded an appeal, unless by leave. Ms. Heavey took umbrage that the President allowed counsel for the Council to address the Court on what she insisted was an ex parte appeal. In fact the Council could have been confident that the President would have seen from the papers that the notice of appeal – to put it at its lowest – was irregular but, in my view, the Council was entitled to be concerned that Ms. Heavey was well off piste. The appeal was put back to allow Ms. Heavey to make a leave application, which she did on 29th November, 2024. Apparently at the request of Holland J., the leave application was dealt with by Humphreys J.

22. On 2nd December, 2024 Humphreys J. directed that the leave application be made on notice and joined Fingal County Council as a notice party. He also then stayed the CPO, pending the hearing of the application for leave to appeal. Following a fairly protracted exchange of documents and a number of listings for mention, the leave application was heard over two days, commencing on 12th and resuming on 20th May, 2025, when judgment was reserved.

23. I pause here to say that the stay appears to have been granted without any application by Ms. Heavey – certainly without any formal application or notice – and was granted before there was any consideration as to whether there were arguable grounds of appeal nor were the Board or the Council on notice or afforded an opportunity to argue the contrary before the order was made. The judgment of Humphreys J. shows that the Council later objected to the continuation of the stay but there was no issue on the appeal as to the granting or continuation of the stay.

24. The judgment of Humphreys J. shows that Ms. Heavey was assisted with her leave to appeal application by a Mr. Andrew Carberry, a chartered surveyor, described by Ms. Heavey as an expert witness. In what was described as a supplemental affidavit sworn by Ms. Heavey on 20th December, 2024 she exhibited a report dated November, 2024 written by Mr. Carberry which described itself as a “Precis of Evidence … in respect of the Compulsory Purchase of 17/17A North Street, Swords.” The report, at para. 4.8, recorded that Mr. Carberry was instructed in October, 2024 to consider the decisions made by both the Council and the Board and to comment on whether or not he believed that “this CPO is an abuse (i.e. an incorrect use) of the statutory power … and to provide a fact based and objective assessment of the loss to the appellant should the CPO be permitted to proceed.” Leaving aside any issue as to Mr. Carberry’s want of qualifications to comment on the correctness of the exercise by either the Council or the Board of their statutory powers, and any issue as to whether the correctness of the exercise of statutory powers is a matter for evidence as opposed to submission, it is clear that the report was largely directed to the merits of the CPO. There was no reference at all to the judgment of Holland J.

25. At the risk of stating the obvious – and with no disrespect to Mr. Carberry – Mr. Carberry’s report did not address the sole issue for consideration: which was whether the judgment of Holland J. involved a point of law of exceptional public importance such that it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to this Court. Moreover, it sought to challenge the making of the CPO by the Council as well as the Board Order, which had never theretofore been part of Ms. Heavey’s case.

26. The judgment of Humphreys J. shows that when the matter appeared in the list for mention on 13th January, 2025 it was put into the list to fix dated on 3rd March, 2025 on the basis that in the meantime Mr. Carberry would extract from his report questions that could be the basis of legal questions for a proposed appeal. That, it seems to me, was a hopeless exercise. There were no questions in the report which could have been extracted as legal questions for a proposed appeal. Humphreys J., at para. 40, acknowledges a lack of clarity on his part as to the parameters of the exercise but, with respect, appears to have been distracted from what was before him by his quest to get greater clarity as to Ms. Heavey’s points. Specifically – and again, respectfully – there appears to have been a drift away from whether the judgment of Holland J. involved a point of law towards a general assessment as to whether there might have been substantial grounds – other than those which had been advanced and assessed by Holland J. – upon which Ms. Heavey might have challenged either or both of the making and confirmation of the CPO.

27. It is only fair to counsel for the Board and the Council to record that this drift occurred notwithstanding their submissions that Ms. Heavey was impermissibly seeking to reformulate and reargue points which had been rejected by Holland J.; impermissibly attempting to litigate the merits of the impugned decision; and impermissibly seeking to agitate issues which had not been raised in the statement of grounds and not been addressed in the judgment of Holland J., and so could not possibly be said to arise from the judgment of Holland J.

28. On 14th March, 2025 Ms. Heavey filed a document entitled “Application for a Certificate for Leave to Appeal – Points of Law at issue in this Case” which appears to have been prepared by Mr. Carberry – probably with input from Ms. Heavey, tempered by the author – and signed by Mr. Carberry. I pause to say that while it is perfectly permissible that an applicant should have assistance in seeking to formulate any proposed question of law, it is undesirable that McKenzie friends should be permitted to file documents in their own name. This document identified the points of law to be examined as “Abuse of CPO Power”, “Contravention of the Development Plan”, “The Constitutional Right of the Owner”, “The Court is misguided about the reasons for the CPO”, “Section 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000”, and “The Presumption of Validity of Administrative Decisions Prejudices the Applicant.” It is neither necessary nor useful to dwell on the detail but I cannot let what was said about s. 50 go without comment. The document recalled that Holland J. had dealt with the leave application pursuant to s. 50 PDA 2000 but suggested that s. 50 did not apply because Ms. Heavey (1) had appealed the matter to the Supreme Court, and (2) Ms. Heavey’s constitutional rights as an absolute property owner had been “impinged” by the incorrect use of the CPO powers conferred on the Council. The submission then quoted the text of s. 50A(7) before concluding that:- “There are no questions to be considered in this regard as it is a matter of fact upon which the Court must adjudicate.”

29. The submission that s. 50 did not apply was plainly wrong, but the submission – effectively – that the judgment of Holland J. did not involve any point of law of exceptional public importance such as would warrant leave to appeal was correct.

The High Court judgment on the application for leave to appeal

30. The High Court judgment on the leave to appeal application was delivered on 30th May, 2025 ([2025] IEHC 311).

31. Humphreys J. commenced his 32 page judgment by observing that Ms. Heavey “… unfortunately did not open the inspector’s report to the court when seeking leave, so the refusal was impeccable on that basis or on any other basis that I can see.” With respect, the suggestion that Ms. Heavey did not “open” the inspector’s report is not entirely accurate. As I have already said, she not only did not exhibit it but pointedly declined to engage with it in any way. If, for the sake of argument, there might have been something in the inspector’s report which could have established substantial grounds for contending that the Board Order was invalid or ought to be quashed, it might be said that it was unfortunate from Ms. Heavey’s point of view that she had made a mistake: but on her own case, her failure to exhibit it was not an oversight but was deliberate and conscious. If – as Humphreys J. found

– the refusal of leave was impeccable, I find it impossible to see how it could have involved a point of law, still less a point of law of exceptional public importance such that it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to this Court. See Kenny v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) [2001] 1 I.R. 704.

32. Holland J. had summarised the principles to be applied in dealing with cases presented by lay litigants; the nature of judicial review and pleadings in judicial review; and the criteria applicable to judicial review of planning decisions. Beyond the transparently incorrect insistence that the leave application was not one to which s. 50 applied, there is no suggestion that Holland J. erred either in his identification or application of the relevant principles of law: and I take Humphreys J.’s finding that the judgment of Holland J. was impeccable as extending to Holland J.’s identification and application of the principles of law.

33. Ms. Heavey – said Humphreys J. – then sought leave to appeal and endeavoured in that context to rectify her earlier omission. In other words, Ms. Heavey hoped to make an entirely different case on the leave to appeal than she had on the s. 50 leave application. That – said Humphreys J. – would be viewed as totally impermissible in relation to a final order in inter partes litigation “… but the special context of refusal of an ex parte application unavoidably raises the procedural question as to the extent to which a moving party can mend their hand subsequently in relation to that specific type of application.” The problem with this, with respect, is that it fails to take account of the clear and unambiguous provision of s. 50A(7) that the determination of the High Court of an application for s. 50 leave – in this case, the decision of Holland J. – shall be final. It further would open the possibility of an application for s. 50 leave well beyond the statutory eight-week time limit.

34. Moreover, as counsel for the An Coimisiún and Fingal County Council point out, the jurisdiction of this Court on an appeal pursuant to s. 50A(7) is expressly delineated or articulated by s. 50A(11) PDA 2000 which provides that:- “(11) On an appeal from a determination of the Court in respect of an application referred to in subsection (10) , the Court of Appeal shall –

(a) have jurisdiction to determine only the point of law certified by the Court under subsection (7) and to make only such order in the proceedings as follows from such determination …”

35. If – as it is – the determination of the High Court of an application for s. 50 leave is final, there can logically be no question of the moving party later mending his or her hand. If the availability of an appeal is limited to decisions which involve a point of law of exceptional public importance, it follows that the point of law must arise from the determination the subject of the leave application. As was submitted by counsel in the High Court, a point which had not been raised in the statement of grounds and had not been addressed in the determination of the s. 50 leave application could not possibly be said to be a point involved in the decision.

36. Ultimately, Humphreys J. granted leave to appeal and certified three questions of law, to which I will shortly come. Having somehow obtained from Humphreys J. a certificate pursuant to s. 50A(7) which she had submitted that she did not need, Ms. Heavey pushed back against a ruling I made when sitting as the list judge that she would need to amend her notice of appeal to reflect the permitted grounds if it was to survive a motion on behalf of An Coimisiún and the Council to strike it out as an abuse of process. Faced with an order that unless she filed and served a notice of appeal setting out the three certified questions, she eventually did so, but persisted in attempting to agitate all of her grievances with the CPO and the process leading to its confirmation. While the amended notice of appeal set out the text of the three questions, there was no attempt to engage with them. Nor were the certified questions addressed in Ms. Heavey’s written or oral submissions.

37. The gravamen of what Ms. Heavey had to say was that her property rights as the owner of a freehold title going back upwards of one hundred years were antecedent to positive law; that the interests of justice prevailed over statute law; that there was nothing right about the decision to compulsorily acquire her property; that the draconian powers of the Council and the Board were available only for big projects – which this was not; that the CPO was a toxic mulberry bush; that the business opportunity to demolish the buildings and develop the site belonged to her; that the proposed development by Fingal County Council was undesirable; that the acquisition and demolition of her property was not necessary to achieve visibility of the wall; and that there was already sufficient visibility of the wall – which was not a castle wall but the wall of an episcopal manor, and not worth looking at anyway – from North Street, and it could be seen in its entirely from the inside.

38. The submissions on behalf of An Coimisiún and the Council addressed each the certified questions but focussed on the first. The core argument was that the premise of each of the questions – that this Court might entertain a fresh application based on new evidence, the amendment of pleadings, and the consideration of matters which had not been before the High Court – was wrong.

The questions certified

39. The first question certified by Humphreys J. was set out at para. 77 of his judgment:- “Insofar as (a) the making of an ex parte application on appeal a fresh application such that an applicant is entitled to introduce new evidence on such an application, albeit evidence that might with reasonable diligence have been available originally, and/or to apply to amend pleadings for the purpose of such a fresh application and/or (b) O. 86A r. 4(b) RSC has the effect that the right to submit further evidence in an interlocutory matter is not conditional on the evidence being unavailable initially and/or (c) an appellate court has the right to admit further evidence, albeit available originally, on a discretionary basis, can leave to seek judicial review be granted on appeal from a refusal of an ex parte application if the grant of such leave is dependent on either an amendment being sought and/or regard being had in determining a pleaded point to matters not put before the court dealing with the leave application, and if so can the High Court evaluate a leave to appeal application in respect of refusal of an ex parte application through the prism of having regard to that possibility?”

40. The reference to O. 86A, r. 4(b) is a typographical error. The intended reference was obviously to O. 86A, rule 4(c).

41. This very complex question propounds three variously alternative and cumulative propositions of law as to the introduction of new evidence on an appeal, before first contemplating what an appellate court might have jurisdiction to do, and then asking whether the High Court – before granting leave to appeal – is entitled to guess or assess what the appellate court might do in the event that leave were to be granted and then, presumably, decide whether or not to grant leave to appeal by reference to the likely outcome. Humphreys J., at para. 77, recognised that this question would not meet the test for certification in isolation but suggested that it was a necessary ancillary question to the other two questions, each of which, he said, would only arise if the answer to the first was in the affirmative.

42. What the first question boils down to, it seems to me, is a proposition that an unsuccessful applicant in the High Court might be permitted by this Court in an appeal brought pursuant to s. 50A(7) PDA 2000 to make a case which was not made below.

43. Before formulating the first question, Humphreys J. first identified the overall question as being whether the leave to appeal criteria should be more flexible in the case of an ex parte application to the extent than an appeal from an ex parte refusal is a fresh application as opposed to a review for error. He looked at a number of authorities in relation to additional evidence and the standard of review, including the judgment of Hogan J. in Arnold v. McCarthy [2017] IECA 303. In Arnold Hogan J. identified a possible difference between the standard of review by the Supreme Court of High Court decisions made ex parte

– in O. 58, r. 13 of the Rules of the Superior Courts - and review by the Court of Appeal under O. 86 and 86A, but found that it did not arise in that case on the facts and so it was not necessary to decide it. Counsel for An Coimisiún and the Council focussed their arguments on s. 50A(7) but went on to contrast an appeal against a refusal of a s. 50 leave application with an appeal against a refusal of an “ordinary” judicial review leave application. It seems to me, however, that to engage with an exercise in contrasting would introduce unnecessary complexity.

44. Section 50(7) PDA 2000 applies to the determination of the High Court of an application for s. 50 leave as well as an application for judicial review on foot of such leave. If it is conceptually difficult to contemplate that a refusal of a s. 50 leave application on the grounds that the applicant has not identified substantial grounds might involve a point of law of exceptional public importance – Kenny v. An Bord Pleanála (No. 2) – the terms of the Act are clear.

45. On the plain terms of s. 50A(7) the determination of the High Court of a s. 50 leave application is a final order, save by leave. The order is not subject to review on appeal, whether for error or by way of de novo hearing. An appeal against a refusal of a s. 50 leave application lies only where the High Court grants leave to appeal on a point of law of exceptional public importance involved in the decision. The confinement of the possibility of an appeal to a point of law precludes any question of adducing additional evidence – whether as of right or by leave. This is underlined by s. 50A(11) which precludes this Court from doing anything other than deciding the point of law certified by the High Court. If there was any room for doubt as to the jurisdiction of this Court on an appeal pursuant to s. 50A(7) it could not have survived the judgments of the Court in Cooper v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 278 and Dublin City Council v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IECA 155.

46. Thus, the first of Humphreys J.’s alternative or cumulative propositions – that an appeal pursuant to s. 50A(7) is a fresh application – is erroneous. Leaving aside the fact that any appeal against a refusal of a s. 50 leave application is confined to a certified point of law, the power conferred on the Court of Appeal by O. 86A, r. 4(c) to admit further evidence on an appeal against a final judgment or order is expressly subject to the provisions of the Constitution and of statute. Thus, the second of Humphreys J.’s propositions is erroneous. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is limited by s. 50A(11) to determining the point of law certified and to making only such order in the proceedings as follows from such determination. Thus, Humphreys J.s third proposition that an appellate court has jurisdiction to admit further evidence on a discretionary basis does not apply to a s. 50A(7) appeal.

47. The confinement of any appeal from a refusal of an application for s. 50 leave to a point of law involved in the decision also rules out any possibility that the substance of the

decision might be revisited by reference to an amendment of the statement of grounds to introduce any new ground, or the introduction further evidence to transform merely asserted point to substantial grounds.

48. Strictly speaking, the first of the questions formulated by Humphreys J. does not arise out of the decision of Holland J. but in the terms in which it is formulated, I would answer it by saying that leave to seek judicial review pursuant to s. 50 PDA 2000 cannot be granted on appeal from a refusal of an ex parte application if the grant of such leave is dependent on either amendment being sought and/or regard being had in determining a pleaded point to matters not put before the High Court dealing with the s. 50 leave application.

49. The alternative arguments advanced on behalf of An Coimisiún and the Council based on the fact that Ms. Heavey did not adduce or seek leave to adduce additional evidence and did not apply for any amendment of her statement of grounds do not arise.

50. The premise of the second and third questions was that this Court, on appeal, might have jurisdiction to entertain a fresh application. It follows from the fact that the Court has no such jurisdiction that the second and third questions do not arise but in deference to counsels’ careful analysis, I will deal with them briefly.

The second question

51. The second question formulated by Humphreys J. was:-

“Subject to the answer to the first question, does significant reliance by the inspector and board, in confirming a CPO, on the status of a property being acquired as being the sole oasis of land (inferentially being adjacent to a monument) not controlled by the acquiring authority, give rise to a substantial ground to seek judicial review of the CPO where another property adjoining the monument is also not so controlled?”

52. This is a question which has its origins in the Inspector’s report. As I explained at the when examining the judgment of Holland J., the Inspector’s report was not in evidence before him and Ms. Heavey then disclaimed any reliance on it or any challenge to it. Holland J. – as he had made clear in the course of the hearing on 30th July, 2024 that he would – had no regard to it. In the course of the application for leave to appeal, Ms. Heavey exhibited Mr. Carberry’s report but did not exhibit the Inspector’s report. In the first instance, there is no jurisdiction for the High Court – even on the (erroneous) theory propounded by Humphreys J.

– after it has refused to grant leave to seek judicial review, to permit an applicant to adduce new evidence for the purposes of supporting an application pursuant to s. 50A(7) for leave to appeal. Therefore, the court ought not to have permitted Ms. Heavey to file any further affidavits. Despite the fact that Ms Heavey was wrongly permitted to file further affidavits, the Inspector’s report was not in evidence before Humphreys J. Humphreys J., however, took the view that because the report was a record of a public body it was “well within the scope of matters of which judicial notice can be taken without formal proof .” I am bound to say that I am not immediately convinced that the report was something of which judicial notice could have been taken but more to the point, it was not a document which had been relied on for the purposes of the s. 50 leave application. I would not disagree with Humphreys J. that making sense of the history of the matter would have been difficult without it – Holland J. said as much when dealing with the s. 50 leave application – but the only issue before Humphreys J. was whether the decision of Holland J. involved a point of law of exceptional public importance such that it was in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to this Court. To deal with that issue he did not need to have regard to the report and indeed there was no legal basis for him to do so on the s. 50A(7) application when it was not already in evidence.

53. Moreover, when Humphreys J. came to look at the Inspector’s report, he appears to have done so without affording the Board the opportunity to explain it or comment on it. By reference to the material which had been exhibited and an analysis de bene esse of the Inspector’s report shows that the question was based on a misunderstanding of the report and the proposed development.

54. The Inspector, at para. 7.6.4, reported that the subject site could be described as the last remaining “oasis” – his parenthesis – of land not controlled by the Council. The judge inferred that this meant the last property adjacent to Swords Castle and identified that there was another property adjoining the monument which was not so controlled. The subject site was on North Street, on the eastern side of the castle. The other property was a public house called The Pound & The Attic. It does adjoin the castle, but on the south side.

55. The subject property was required for the purpose of a proposed development which had been the subject of an application and approval under Part 8 of the Planning and Development Regulations 2001. The site of the proposed development was shown outlined in red on a map which had been exhibited and which did not include The Pound & The Attic. The focus at the oral hearing was the impact of the buildings on the subject property on the view of eastern castle walls. It was the last oasis of privately owned land in the area of the proposed development. The Inspector’s report shows (at para. 7.5.8) that at the oral hearing Ms. Heavey’s agent queried why the Pound Pub was not included in the CPO, to which the answer was that it lay outside the scope of assessment.

The third question

56. The third question formulated by Humphreys J. was:-

“Subject to the answer to the first question, does significant reliance by the inspector and board, in confirming a CPO, on the benefits of the overall project of acquisition and works of which the CPO forms part including in particular enhanced public views of a monument, give rise to a substantial ground to seek judicial review of the CPO where some of the benefits and particularly the enhanced views concerned are not dependent on the confirmation of the CPO?”

57. The origin of this question is to be found in a plan prepared by the Council in 2015 called the “Swords Castle Architectural Masterplan”, which was prepared soon after the inception of what was called the Swords Cultural Quarter Project in 2014. This non-statutory plan was referred to in the Inspector’s report and was noted (para. 7.2.8) to have “subsequently fed into a comprehensive design brief being worked up.” As originally formulated in 2015 the masterplan contemplated the replacement of the buildings along the eastern side of North Street with new buildings. However, it is clear that the possibility envisaged in 2015 that new buildings might be erected on the subject site was overtaken by the “comprehensive design brief” and that the proposed development the subject of the Part 8 consent was that the land between the eastern castle wall and North Street would be open space. It was common case – as Ms. Heavey put it – that her property was required “for grass and trees”. By the time the CPO came to be made in 2022 and came before the Board for confirmation in 2024 there was no question of erecting new buildings on the site of Ms. Heavey’s demolished property. Accordingly, the question that the focus on opening up views of the castle from North Street by reference to the possibility that new buildings might be erected on the subject property simply did not arise.

Form of order

58. I would dismiss the appeal.

59. Formally, the answer to the first of the certified questions is “No”, and the answer to the second and third questions is that they do not arise.

Admonition

60. Holland J. had occasion to admonish Ms. Heaney for levying baseless scandalous allegations against numerous public officials. He observed that, as a barrister, she must have appreciated the strictures against leadings and accusations of that kind without reasonable evidence to support them. Regrettably, Ms. Heavey took no notice of that admonition or of the President’s exhortations on the hearing of the appeal that she should not abuse her privilege. Ms. Heavey is entitled to feel aggrieved that her property has been compulsorily acquired and she is entitled to feel disappointed that her efforts to prevent it have failed. She was not, however, entitled to abuse first the officials involved in the process and later the lawyers acting for An Coimisiún and the Council.

61. I would formally rebuke her for the manner in which she conducted her appeal.

Costs

62. Provisionally, it seems to me that An Coimisiún and the Council, having been entirely successful on the appeal, are entitled to their costs of the appeal. Provisionally, the proceedings do not appear to be proceedings to which s. 50B PDA 2000 applies. I would allow An Coimisiún and the Council a period of two weeks to file short written submissions – not to exceed 1,500 words – in support of any application for costs, in which event Ms. Heavey should have two weeks to file respond, similarly limited to 1,500 words.

63. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, the President and Owens J. have authorised me to say that they agree with it and with the orders proposed.