Supreme Court refuses extension of time for leave to appeal interlocutory order due to lack of compelling reason.

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

THE SUPREME COURT

Court of Appeal Record no.: A:AP:IE:2023:000196

High Court Record no.: 2021 No. 341 MCA

O’Donnell C.J. Dunne J. Charleton J.

IN THE MATTER OF IRISH LIFE AND PERMANENT GROUP HOLDINGS

PLC AND IN THE MATTER OF IRISH LIFE AND PERMANENT PLC

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CREDIT INSTITUTIONS

(STABILISATION) ACT, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF AN

APPLICATION BY THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE FOR A

DIRECTION ORDER IN RELATION TO IRISH LIFE AND

PERMANENT GROUP HOLDINGS PLC AND IRISH LIFE AND

PERMANENT PLC PURSUANT TO SECTION 9 OF THE CREDIT

INSTITUTIONS (STABILISATION) ACT 2010 AND ANCILLARY

ORDERS AND IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR A REVIEW

PURSUANT TO S. 161 OF THE LEGAL SERVICES REGULATION

ACT 2015 OR PURSUANT TO SECTION 27 (3) OF THE COURTS

AND COURT OFFICERS ACT 1995 IN RESPECT OF A COSTS

TAXATION / ADJUDICATION REC. NO. H:LCA:OLCA:2020:716

BETWEEN/

PIOTR SKOCZYLAS

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE

RESPONDENT

RULING of the Court as to an application for extension of time to bring application for leave to appeal, delivered electronically on the 5th of February, 2025.

1. By email of Thursday 23rd of January 2025 Mr Piotr Skoczylas (“Mr Skoczylas”) sought to make an application for an “extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court”. The application enclosed was described as an interlocutory order in an appeal before the Court of Appeal in Appeal Record No. 2023/196 made on the 19th of December 2024 and perfected on the 22nd of January 2025. The stated basis for the application to extend time is that the appeal proper has not yet concluded, and that Mr Skoczylas anticipates that he will be making an application for leave to appeal in the appeal proper and that “it would not serve justice – and it would not be logical and orderly – to file two separate applications for leave to appeal regarding the two orders”. It is said that the two matters are interrelated, although the Court, not having sight of the proceedings, and only having a copy of the order of 19 December is not in a position to makes its own judgment in that regard.

2. Mr Skoczylas also contends that there are other relevant matters which still have to be resolved by the Court of Appeal including costs, an ongoing application under Order 28 Rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and an application under Court of Appeal Practice Direction CA 14 to review a final decision of that Court. In the event, such an application has, it appears, been filed.

3. This is an unusual application. As was pointed out to Mr Skoczylas by the Supreme Court Office, it is normal that any application for an extension of time is made in conjunction with an application for leave to appeal and in circumstances where time has elapsed. Where time has not yet run, it is normally a counsel of prudence to lodge an application for leave to appeal within the time limited by the Rules and Practice Direction SC 19 and permit the Court to deal with any related matters together, if it should consider it appropriate. Where it is clearly sensible to defer an application for leave to appeal, the consent of the other party may be sought, and if forthcoming, then a party could have a high degree of comfort that an application could be deferred, but if in any doubt could take the course of lodging an application.

4. Furthermore, there is, at present, no application for leave to appeal in being, and therefore no proceeding before the Supreme Court in relation to which this application can be made. However, the Court wishes to avoid further procedural complexity and will accordingly treat the application as an application in relation to an intended application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and assuming without deciding that there is a jurisdiction to do so.

5. Leaving to one side, therefore, the fact that there is no extant application by reference to which this application for a prospective extension of time can be attached, this remains an unusual application for a number of reasons:

(1) The Court does not know and has not been informed about the substance of the underlying appeal, and still less the interlocutory proceedings, and

decision which it is sought to appeal, other than what can be gleaned from the contents of the order submitted;

(2) Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is governed by the Constitution itself. It is not a matter of right, and the Court must be persuaded in every appeal that it has been demonstrated that the constitutional test established by Article 34.5.3, namely, that the individual decision involves a matter of general public importance or that it is in the interests of justice, that there should be an appeal to the Supreme Court;

(3) It is, in the nature of things, unusual that an interlocutory appeal will be capable of satisfying this test unless it raises issues of general public importance extending normally to the impact of any decision on the law more generally. Manifestly no attempt has been made to explain why this proposed application for leave, or the anticipated appeal in the substantive appeal, could meet this standard.

(4) It does not follow that, because an appeal in relation to a final determination of a case satisfies the constitutional standard, any appeal of interlocutory matter in relation to the same appeal will also satisfy that test;

(5) Accordingly, every application for leave to appeal of any order of the Court of Appeal (or where appropriate the High Court) must be addressed on its own merits and the Court must be satisfied that it reaches the constitutional threshold;

(6) It is not apparent why it is anticipated that the intended applicant will also be the subject of an adverse order in the “final” order of the Court of Appeal, and in a position to apply to this Court for leave to appeal, or why this Court should anticipate any such outcome and proceed in advance of any decision of the Court of Appeal. In those circumstances, it is not clear why an application for leave to appeal in relation to an interlocutory order should be postponed to await that contingency;

(7) It is not clear why it should be assumed that there is a commonality of issues between the interlocutory order and the final order. However, if there is such a commonality of issues and if the interlocutory order will be subsumed in the final order of the Court, then a successful appeal of the final order should be capable of providing a sufficient remedy for an appellant. If, however, they raise or could raise separate issues, which each meet the constitutional threshold, then there is no clear basis for postponing an application for leave to appeal of the interlocutory order. This, however, is all speculative in the absence of more concrete information, which itself counsels against making any unusual order at this point.

6. In those circumstances, the Court can find no compelling reason to accede to the application. In circumstances of such uncertainty and lack of clarity, it is preferable to abide by the general rule that where a party contends that an order has been made by the Court of Appeal (or where appropriate, the High Court) and which it is sought to appeal to the Supreme Court where it is contended that the constitutional threshold has been reached, then an application for leave to appeal may, and should, be made within the time limit after perfection of the relevant order. Where there are related matters, that can be brought to the attention of the Court at the same time and the Court can then decide how it should deal with the application and indeed any appeal, if leave is granted. Accordingly, the Court refuses the application.

7. This application has been an unnecessary detour. Litigants and/or their advisors ought to be able to make prudent decisions on whether or not to lodge an application for leave to appeal and should be aware of the time limits for doing so, and the risks of failing to comply with those limits. The Court does not consider that there is any reason why the intended appellant in this case could not have made an application for leave to appeal within time, and if it was considered appropriate or necessary to do so, brought to the Court’s attention the possibility of a further related appeal. The Court does not consider that the intended appellant was entitled to refrain from advancing any application for leave to appeal because of this unusual, and in the event misconceived, application. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, and in the interests of advancing the matter without further contention, the Court will extend the time for an application for the intended application for leave to appeal to this Court, by a further week, so that the expiry of the period will be extended from the 12th of February until 4.00 p.m. on the 19th of February 2025.