Supreme Court refuses mandamus for Local Area Plan due to statutory repeal rendering relief futile.

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

THE SUPREME COURT

[2026] IESC 12

Record No. 2025/48

Dunne J. Woulfe J. Hogan J. Collins J. Donnelly J.

BETWEEN/

PROTECT EAST MEATH LIMITED

Applicant/Appellant

-and-

MEATH COUNTY COUNCIL

Respondent

RULING of the Court delivered on the 19th day of February 2026

1. The appellant applied for judicial review seeking, inter alia, an order of mandamus in circumstances where it asserts that the respondent (the “Council”) failed to commence the process of making a Local Area Plan (“LAP”) for an area in County Meath known as East Meath, pursuant to ss. 19(1)(b) and (c) of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (the “2000 Act”). The previous East Meath LAP 2014-2020 was adopted in July 2014, and expired in October 2020. Under s. 19(1)(c) of the 2000 Act, a planning authority is required to publish a notice of a proposal to make or amend an LAP at least every six years after the making of the previous LAP. The Council failed to commence the statutory process within the time stipulated.

2. In his judgment ([2026] IESC 1), with which all members of the Court agreed, (Collins

J. delivered a concurring judgment considering the discretionary nature of mandamus) Woulfe J. identified the issue arising in the appeal as whether the Court should go further than the judgment of the High Court and grant an order of mandamus compelling the Council to make an LAP. He outlined that there is a constitutional imperative imposed on local authorities to discharge their functions under Article 28A of Bunreacht na hÉireann. He noted that in this case, the law has clearly been prescribed the Oireachtas, and the Council was under a statutory obligation to prepare an LAP rather than having a statutory discretion under the 2000 Act.

3. Woulfe J. addressed the Supreme Court judgment in Brady v. Cavan County Council [1999] 4 I.R. 99 where the applicant in that case sought an order compelling the Council to discharge its duty to repair a road. It is stressed that mandamus, like other public law remedies, is a discretionary remedy. Taking into account the numerous developments since Brady, Woulfe J. noted that one of the discretionary bars to relief is that an order will not normally be made if it is clear that it would be impossible of performance by reason of circumstances that the performance of the act would involve a contravention of law, or if the defendant has not the means of complying with the order.

4. Having reviewed Brady in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning orders dealing with the care of troubled children, Woulfe J. held that it must be viewed as an exceptional case where the Council could not realistically have been expected to have discharged its statutory duty, having regard to the funds at its disposal and the sheer scale of the task of repairing hundreds of roads with which it was confronted. However, he held that not regarding same as exceptional would compromise the capacity of the courts to enforce statutory obligations imposed on public bodies, and would in turn compromise the rule of law and the democratic identity of the State as reflected in the Constitution. Woulfe J. distinguished the present case from Brady in that the Council does not in terms say that it could not comply with any court order, and has taken delayed steps to comply with its statutory duty. He noted that staffing issues have not deterred this Court in the past from making a mandatory order, he holds that the present case cannot be said to fall into the exceptional category of cases such as Brady where something close to impossibility was established. Furthermore, no other discretionary bar to relief was established by the Council.

5. Woulfe J. went on to note a post-hearing development whereby subsequent to the hearing of this appeal, the Court was notified that the Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage made the Planning and Development Act 2024 (Commencement) (No.5) Order 2025 (S.I. No. 633 of 2025). The order repealed, inter alia, ss. 19 and 20 of the 2000 Act, as of the 31st December, 2025. The repeal raises the question as to whether the making of an order of mandamus might in such circumstances now be regarded as inappropriate or futile, and the parties were invited to make submissions on this issue in light of the recent development. The Court expressed its provisional view that in light of the post-hearing development, no order for mandamus should be made and the appellant should be entitled to its costs. This approach was supported by Collins J. in his concurring judgment.

6. The parties have provided correspondence to the Court post the hearing. Meath County Council has agreed with the provisional view of the Court. In correspondence with the County Council, which has been provided to the Court, solicitors for the appellant have re-iterated their view that the Council should consent to making an order for mandamus notwithstanding the commencement of the legislation as set out above. It is contended that despite the changes brought about by the new legislation, the obligation to prepare a LAP remains as the changes under the new legislation are in substance the same. It appears that the appellant is seeking to require Meath County Council “to commence the statutory process for the preparation of an Urban Area Plan for BLMD by giving notice under section 75(5) of the 2024 Act within 6 weeks of the date of this letter”. There is no evidence before the Court that Meath County Council is in any default in terms of preparing an “Urban Area Plan” under the 2024 Act. It appears that the appellant is now inviting the Court, to make an order in respect of an “Urban Area Plan” as provided for in the new legislation but that was not the relief sought in these proceedings.

7. The Court is not satisfied that the position put forward in correspondence on behalf of the appellant is correct. It is noted that despite an invitation to provide written submissions to the Court setting out why the provisional view of the Court was incorrect, it did not do so but relied on its correspondence with Meath County Council.

8. The Court is satisfied that in the circumstances of this case, for the reasons set out above, that the making of an order for mandamus would be futile and inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court refuses to make such order.

9. Finally, the appellant is entitled to an order for the costs of the proceedings.