High Court quashes District Court costs award in taxi licence appeal, ruling no jurisdiction exists under LSRA 2015.

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICAL REVIEW

[2025] IEHC 754

[Record No. 2024/109JR]

BETWEEN

VARINDER SINGH

APPLICANT

AND

SUPERINTENDENT STEPHEN MCCAULEY

RESPONDENT

AND

IHRAC & ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTICE PARTIES

Approved Judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins on 1st December 2025

Introduction

1. Does the District Court have jurisdiction to award costs in an appeal from a refusal to award a taxi licence under the Taxi Regulation Act 2013? The answer to this seemingly net question requires consideration of several statutes and rules of court. It also involves an important issue of statutory interpretation as to the meaning of “civil proceedings” in ss. 168/169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (the “LSRA 2015”).

2. The respondent contends that the conferring of a jurisdiction on the District Court to award costs in licensing matters would constitute a fundamental change to the jurisdiction of the District Court and could not have been intended by the Oireachtas when enacting the 2015 Act.

3. I propose to divide this judgment into seven parts as follows:

A. Background facts

B. Relevant statutory framework

C. Summary of the applicant's submissions

D. Summary of the respondent’s submissions

E. Discussion of the meaning of “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015

F. Guidance on costs applications in licensing matters and statutory appeals

G. Conclusion

I will start with an outline of the background facts.

A. Background facts

4. The applicant, Mr. Singh, is an Indian national who came to the State in June 2010. The National Transport Authority is the “licensing authority” in respect of small public service vehicle (SPSV) driver licences within the meaning of s. 6(1) of the Taxi Regulation Act 2013 (the “2013 Act”). An Garda Síochána is the interim licensing authority and the respondent superintendent carries out the authority’s functions under the Act in the Dublin Metropolitan District.

5. In June 2012, the applicant obtained an SPSV licence, initially granted for a period of five years. It was renewed in 2017 for a further five-year period. In June 2019, the Minister for Justice refused to renew the EU residence card which the applicant had held since 2013, and revoked his previous card. Mr. Singh unsuccessfully challenged those decisions in judicial review proceedings.

6. In May 2022, the Minister for Justice granted Mr. Singh permission to remain in the State on “Stamp 4 conditions”, one condition being that he would make every effort to gain employment, set up a business or pursue a profession and not be a burden on the State. He attended at the Carriage Office and applied to the respondent for the renewal of his SPSV licence.

7. On 5th August 2022, the respondent wrote to the applicant proposing to refuse to renew his SPSV licence on the basis that he was not satisfied that he was a suitable person to hold such a licence. The reasons given included: firstly, the fact that his permission to remain in the State was revoked by the Minister for Justice; secondly, the fact that the Minister was of the opinion that his marriage was one of convenience; and thirdly, that the applicant had sought a review of this decision and on 26th June 2019 the Minister affirmed the decision to revoke his residence card.

8. The applicant appealed this refusal to the District Court under s. 13(3) of the Taxi Regulation Act 2013.

9. The appeal was heard by the late District Judge Marie Quirke sitting in the Dublin Metropolitan District on 20th April 2023. Having heard preliminary submissions, Judge Quirke informed the parties that if there were reasons to refuse Mr. Singh's application, the court would expect the documents underlining those reasons to be made available.

10. Copies of Mr. Singh's documents were provided to the respondent. They included the “Stamp 4” letter dated 13th May 2022. The respondent did not furnish any documents upon which he intended to rely further. However, when the hearing resumed, the court was informed that the respondent was no longer opposing Mr. Singh's application and was willing to grant the renewal of the licence as he had just become aware that Mr. Singh's permission to remain had been renewed by the Minister for Justice.

11. Counsel for the applicant applied for his costs in circumstances where his appeal had been successful. Judge Quirke noted that a relevant point going to the question of costs was whether the respondent's office had been provided with evidence that Mr. Singh’s permission to remain had been renewed. The applicant maintained that it was clear that such confirmation had been provided, however, this was disputed.

12. Judge Quirke then queried whether costs could be awarded, given that the appeal related to a “licence”, and the parties were directed to file submissions on the issue.

13. The costs hearing resumed on 23rd October 2023. The court said that it was “very unfortunate” that the appellant believed that he had submitted documentation which the superintendent had no record of receiving until the matter came before the court.

14. In a concise and clear ruling, Judge Quirke ultimately ruled that the court was not dealing with civil proceedings and was instead exercising a licensing jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the court did not have the power to award costs to either party. Accordingly, the judge declined “maybe with regret” to make any order.

15. In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant seeks an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the District Court of 23rd October 2023 holding that it had no jurisdiction to make an order in respect of the costs of the applicant's appeal against the respondent's refusal to renew his taxi licence. The applicant also seeks an order remitting the issue of costs to the District Court for further consideration, together with certain other declaratory relief which I need not go into now.

B. Relevant statutory framework

i) Legal Services Regulation Act 2015

16. Sections 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 are found in Part 11 of the Act under the heading “legal costs in civil proceedings”.

17. Under the heading “power to award legal costs” s. 168 reads in material part as follows: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, a court may, on application by a party to civil proceedings, at any stage in, and from time to time during, those proceedings –

(a) order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more other parties to the proceedings…

(b) …”

18. Section 169 provides as follows: “(1) A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who was not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties, including –

(a) conduct before and during the proceedings,

(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings,

(c) the manner in which the parties conducted all or any part of their cases,

(d) whether a successful party exaggerated his or her claim,

(e) whether a party made a payment into court and the date of that payment,

(f) whether a party made an offer to settle the matter the subject of the proceedings, and if so, the date, terms and circumstances of that offer, and

(g) where the parties were invited by the court to settle the claim (whether by mediation or otherwise) and the court considers that one or more than one of the parties was or were unreasonable in refusing to engage in the settlement discussions or in mediation.

(2) Where the court orders that a party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is not entitled to an award of costs against a party who was not successful in those proceedings, it shall give reasons for that order.

(3) Where a party succeeds against one or more than one of the parties to civil proceedings but not against all of them, the court may order, to the extent that the court considers that it is proper to do so in all the circumstances, that –

(a) the successful party pay any or all of the costs of the party against whom he or she has not succeeded, or

(b) the party or more than one of the parties against whom the successful party has succeeded pay not only the costs of the successful party but also any or all of the costs that the successful party is liable to pay under paragraph (a).

(4) Unless the court before which civil proceedings were commenced orders otherwise, or the parties to those proceedings agree otherwise, a party who discontinues or abandons the proceedings after they are commenced (including discontinuance or abandonment of an appeal) is liable to pay the reasonable costs of every other party who has incurred costs in the defence of the civil proceedings concerned until the discontinuance or abandonment.

(5) Nothing in this Part shall be construed as affecting section 50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000 or Part 2 of the Environment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011.”

ii) Courts of Justice Act 1924 (The “1924 Act”)

19. Section 77 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 provides as follows: “77. The District Court shall have and exercise all powers, jurisdictions, and authorities which immediately before the 6th day of December, 1922, were vested by statute or otherwise in Justices or a Justice of the Peace sitting at Petty Sessions and also (by way of addition and not of exception) the following jurisdictions: -

A. —In Civil Cases—

(i) in contract and breach of contract where the claim does not exceed £25;

(ii) in tort, (except slander, libel, criminal conversation, seduction, slander of title, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment) and claims for damages unconnected with contract where the claim does not exceed £10: Provided that no justice shall have jurisdiction when a bona-fide question of title to any land the Poor Law Valuation whereof exceeds ten pounds is in issue and the act giving rise to the proceedings before him was done bona-fide in assertion of such title; Provided also that the jurisdiction of a Justice shall not be ousted by reason of a question of title to land the Poor Law Valuation whereof does not exceed £10 being brought into issue, but in such case the

decision of the Justice shall not operate as an estoppel in or bar to a suit in any court in relation to such land;

(iii) in ejectment for non-payment of rent or overholding in any class of tenancy where the rent does not exceed such sum as amounts or might amount to £26 per annum;

(iv) in proceedings at the suit of the State or any Minister or Government Department or any officer thereof to recover any sum not exceeding £25 due to or recoverable by or on behalf of the State, whether by way of penalty, debt, or otherwise, and notwithstanding any enactment now in force requiring such sum to be sued for in the High Court or other superior court.

B. —In Criminal Cases—in any of the following cases, if the Justice shall be of opinion that the facts proved against the accused constitute a minor offence fit to be tried summarily and the accused (inquiry having been made of him by the Justice) does not object to being so tried:—

(i) in larceny, receiving, embezzlement or false pretences—jurisdiction where the money or property involved does not exceed £20 in value;

(ii) in assault—jurisdiction in assault occasioning actual bodily harm;

(iii) in indecent assault—any such case may be heard in camera and when so heard, if the assaulted person is a female, one other female person nominated by the assaulted person shall be entitled to be present in court during the whole hearing of the case;

(iv) in burglary or housebreaking or attempts at either;

(v) in riot or unlawful assembly—jurisdiction in cases in which the Justice shall be of opinion that the crime was not in furtherance of an organised conspiracy or if it was in furtherance of an organised conspiracy that such conspiracy is at an end;

(vi) in malicious damage to property—jurisdiction in cases of damage not exceeding £20: Provided that a sentence of six months' imprisonment with or without hard labour shall be the maximum sentence to be imposed in any of the said cases disposed of summarily: Provided also that any criminal cases not disposed of summarily shall be sent forward for trial (subject as is in this Act otherwise provided) if within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to the Judge of the Circuit or of one of the Circuits (to be determined by the Justice) within which the District lies, and, if not within such jurisdiction to the next ensuing Court of the High Court Circuit for the District or to the Central Criminal Court in cases within its ambit.

C. —In granting certificates for spirit and other licences—all licensing jurisdiction heretofore exercised by Justices of the Peace at Petty Sessions or at Quarter Sessions or by Courts of Quarter Sessions or by Recorders or by Justices of the Peace out of Petty Sessions except the power of granting new licences conferred on the Circuit Court by Section 50 of this Act.”

20. Section 78 of the 1924 Act provides: “78. —There shall be transferred to the District Court all jurisdiction which at the commencement of this Act was vested in or capable of being exercised by District Justices under the provisions of the District Justices (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 (No. 6 of 1923), or under any Act now in force, and also all jurisdiction which at the commencement of this Act was vested in or capable of being exercised by the Divisional Justices of the Police District of Dublin Metropolis, and also all jurisdiction which at the commencement of this Act was vested in or capable of being exercised by the Court of Conscience, or by a person acting as Justice of the Peace under the Towns Improvement (Ireland) Act, 1854 , and the provisions in Sections 21 and 22 of this Act contained shall apply mutatis mutandis to the jurisdictions by this Act vested in and transferred to the District Court.”

21. Section 91 of the 1924 Act provides: “91. —Such rule-making authority may at any time and from time to time after the passing and before or after the commencement of this Act make rules to be styled “District Court Rules” for carrying into effect this Part of this Act (except the hearing by the Circuit Court of appeals from the District Court and the hearing by the High Court of cases stated by the District Court), and may annul or alter such rules and make new rules. In particular rules may be made for all or any of the following matters, viz., for regulating the sittings and the vacations and the districts of the Justices and the places where proceedings are to be brought and the forms of process, summons, case stated, appeal or otherwise, and the conditions which a party who requires a case stated or an appellant must comply with in civil cases or in criminal cases or in licensing cases as the case may be and the practice and procedure of the District Court generally including questions of costs and the times for taking any step in the District Court, the entering-up of judgment and granting of summary judgment in appropriate cases and the use of the national language of Saorstát Eireann therein and the fixing and collection of fees and the adaptation or modification of any statute that may be necessary for any of the purposes aforesaid and all subsidiary matters.”

iii) Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 (the “1961 Act”)

22. Section 33 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 provides as follows: “33. —(1) There shall be vested in and transferred to the District Court—

(a) all jurisdiction which, by virtue of sections 77 and 78 of the Act of 1924, was, immediately before the operative date, vested in or capable of being exercised by the existing District Court,

(b) all jurisdiction which, by virtue of any enactment which is applied by section

48 of this Act, was, immediately before the operative date, vested in or capable of being exercised by the existing District Court.

(2) (a) In this subsection-

“the Act of 1890” means the Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1890 , as applied to Ireland by subsection (9) of section 12 of that Act and as amended by section 14 of the Act of 1935;

“the Act of 1935” means the Public Dance Halls Act, 1935 .

(b) Section 51 (which relates to music and dancing licences) of the Act of 1890 shall have effect as if for the references therein to licensing justices there were substituted references to the District Court.

(c) The jurisdiction vested in the District Court by this subsection shall be exercised by the justice of the District Court for the time being assigned to the district where there is situate the house, room, garden or other place in respect of which the licence under section 51 of the Act of 1890 is sought.

(d) Subsections (2) and (3) of section 2 and section 9 of the Act of 1935 shall have effect as if the references therein to a public dancing licence included references to a licence under paragraph 2 of section 51 of the Act of 1890.

(3) The District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for wrongful detention (including jurisdiction to make an order for the return of the goods claimed) where the value of the goods claimed does not exceed £50.

(4) (a) The District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action commenced after the commencement of this Act which is founded on a credit-sale agreement (within the meaning of the Hire-Purchase Acts, 1946 and 1960) where the amount of the claim does not exceed one hundred pounds.

(b) Paragraph (a) of section 53 of the Act of 1936 shall not apply to an action –

(i) in which the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation in the State, and

(ii) to which paragraph (a) of this subsection relates.”

23. Section 34 of the 1961 Act provides:

“34. The jurisdiction which is by virtue of this Act vested in or exercisable by the District Court shall be exercised as regards pleading, practice and procedure generally, including liability to costs, in the manner provided by rules of court made under section 91 of the Act of 1924, as applied by section 48 of this Act.”

24. Section 14 of the 1961 Act relates to proceedings in the Superior Courts. It provides as follows: “14. —(1) In this section “rules of court” means rules made under section 36 of the Act of 1924, as applied by section 48 of this Act.

(2) The jurisdiction which is by virtue of this Act vested in or exercisable by the Supreme Court, the High Court, the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, the Central Criminal Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal respectively shall be exercised so far as regards pleading, practice and procedure generally, including liability to costs, in the manner provided by rules of court, and, where no provision is contained in such rules and so long as there is no rule with reference thereto, it shall be exercised as nearly as possible in the same manner as it might have been exercised by the respective existing courts or judges by which or by whom such jurisdiction was, immediately before the operative date, respectively exercisable.

(3) Rules of court may, in relation to proceedings and matters (not being criminal proceedings or matters or matters relating to the liberty of the person) in the High Court and Supreme Court, authorise the Master of the High Court and other principal officers, within the meaning of the Court Officers Acts, 1926 to 1951, to exercise functions, powers and jurisdiction in uncontested cases and to take accounts, conduct inquiries and make orders of an interlocutory nature.”

25. Section 27 of the 1961 Act deals with proceedings in the Circuit Court and reads as follows:

“27. —(1) The jurisdiction which is by virtue of this Act vested in or exercisable by the Circuit Court, the Cork Local Admiralty Court and the Cork Local Bankruptcy Court respectively shall be exercised so far as regards pleading, practice and procedure generally, including liability to costs, in the manner provided by rules of court, and where, as regards the jurisdiction of the Cork Local Admiralty Court and the Cork Local Bankruptcy Court, there is no provision in such rules and so long as there is no rule in reference thereto, it shall be exercised as nearly as possible in the same manner as it might have been exercised by the former Recorder of Cork.

(2) The rule-making authority for the Circuit Court shall also be the rule-making authority for the Cork Local Admiralty Court and the Cork Local Bankruptcy Court.”

C. Summary of the applicant's submissions

26. The applicant submits that the provisions of the LSRA 2015, correctly construed, confer on the District Court jurisdiction to award costs when hearing licensing and statutory appeals. The applicant submits that his statutory appeal proceedings before the District Court come within the definition of “civil proceedings” as referenced in ss. 168/169 of the 2015 Act. There is nothing in the LSRA 2015 to suggest that “civil proceedings” was intended to exclude anything other than criminal proceedings (and disciplinary proceedings under Part 6 of the Act). There are no pointers in the Act to suggest that the Oireachtas intended to exclude statutory appeals relating to the renewal of licences.

27. The LSRA 2015 does not define “civil proceedings”. However, in several of its provisions, the Act refers to “civil proceedings” in contradistinction to “criminal proceedings”. This tends to indicate that the Oireachtas was firstly, alive to the difference between the two categories and secondly, comfortable with the idea that “civil proceedings” meant any proceedings that were not criminal. In that regard, the applicant relies on ss. 55 and 58 of the 2015 Act.

28. The applicant acknowledges that the term “civil proceedings” refers to proceedings inter partes. However, he contends that the present proceedings do constitute inter partes proceedings. The respondent was a “party” to the applicant’s appeal to the District Court. In accordance with the District Court Rules, the Superintendent was named as a respondent to that appeal – see Order 40 of the District Court Rules 2014.

29. The applicant takes issue with the respondent’s submission that the respondent could not be described as a “party” to the proceedings because he did not have a personal vested interest in the outcome. This is not what the Act provides. While s. 169(1) sets out several factors which are relevant when the court is considering whether it should make an order for costs against a party who has not been successful, the listed factors do not include the fact that one party to the litigation did not have a personal interest in the outcome.

30. Moreover, says the applicant, most if not all judicial review proceedings involve respondents/defendants who have no personal interest vested in the outcome. That does not deprive the High Court of jurisdiction to award costs against those bodies when it is appropriate to do so.

31. The applicant also addressed the respondent’s submission that the LSRA 2015 does not expressly repeal or mention ss. 14(2) or 34 of the 1961 Act. In this regard, the applicant relies upon the judgment of Murray J. for the Supreme Court in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53. The applicant refers to para. 37 of the judgment where the judge noted that the LSRA neither repealed nor amended s.14(2) of the 1961 Act. Murray J. concluded that ss. 168 and

169 of the LSRA were provisions that are best viewed as both “regulating and conferring a cost awarding power”.

32. The applicant submits that while s. 91 of the 1924 Act and s. 34 of the 1961 Act have not been repealed, it follows from the decision of the Supreme Court in Little – and by analogy with Little – that insofar as the 1924 and 1961 Acts overlap ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015, the LSRA provisions appear to alter their effect. It follows, therefore, that the source of the District Court’s costs jurisdiction in civil cases is now to be found in ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 with the earlier provisions now merely allowing the District Court Rules Committee to make rules of court regulating that power.

33. Turning to the District Court Rules 2014, the applicant submits that the rule-making body has now put beyond doubt its intention that “civil proceedings” means any proceedings that are not criminal. Mr. Singh’s appeal was self-evidently not a criminal appeal.

34. The applicant submits that the definition of “civil proceedings” was revised by the commencement of the 2014 District Court Rules. This occurred just nine months after Peart J. delivered judgment in Hayes v. Sheahan [2013] 2 IR 169 which is the principal authority relied upon by the respondent. Order 53(1) of the District Court Rules 2014 now provides: “Save as otherwise provided by statute or by these Rules, the granting or withholding of the costs of any party to civil proceedings or other proceedings in the Court in which by law the Court may award costs are in the discretion of the court.”

35. The applicant points to Schedule 1 of the 2014 Rules which inserted a new interpretation clause as follows:

“In these rules- …

…“civil proceedings” means any proceedings which may be brought in the District Court which are not criminal proceedings and includes those suits or actions at law in which jurisdiction is conferred by any enactment on the District Court in civil cases as described in section 77A of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 and in any enactment extending or amending that section either expressly or by implication, and “civil proceeding” must be construed accordingly”.

36. Based upon the wording of the 2014 Rules, the applicant submits that the rule-making body has now put beyond doubt its intention that “civil proceedings” should mean any proceedings that are not criminal.

37. Having regard to the clarity of the language of Order 53 (1) of the District Court Rules 2014, there is nothing in the Rules which is prima facie incompatible with the provisions of the LSRA 2015. In the circumstances, nothing should be read into the fact that members of the District Court Rules Committee did not consider it necessary to amend its provisions after the commencement of the LSRA 2015.

38. The rules committee, by defining “civil proceedings” in direct opposition to “criminal proceedings” for the first time in 2014, clearly intended that the expression “civil proceedings” would be a catch-all way of describing all proceedings which are not criminal, thereby including “licensing” matters and statutory appeals within its remit.

39. It is also relevant that the rule was changed in this manner after Peart J. delivered judgment in Hayes in 2013. The statutory instrument introducing the District Court Rules 2014 was promulgated on 27th January 2014.

40. The proceedings before the District Court took the form of a statutory appeal. Such appeals, in turn, are governed by Order 40D of the District Court Rules 2014. Order 40D is entitled “procedure in statutory appeals by notice of appeal to the court” and comes within the third part of the Rules entitled “civil proceedings”.

41. Furthermore, all of the District Court Rules that relate to certificates and “licensing” – Orders 63 to 83 – come under the heading “civil proceedings” in the same part of the Rules. It is reasonable to infer from this classification that applications for such certificates and licences should also be considered “civil proceedings” for the purpose of the 2014 Rules.

42. In conclusion, the applicant submits that his application for judicial review should succeed either by reference to ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 or, if not, by reference to s.

34 of the 1961 Act and the provisions of the District Court Rules 2014.

D. Summary of the respondent’s submissions

43. The respondent submits that the District Judge was correct to find that there is no jurisdiction to award costs in a statutory appeal involving licensing. The matter before the court is a statutory appeal pursuant to s. 10 of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act confers jurisdiction on the District Court to hear the appeal, but remains silent as regards costs in respect of that appeal. However, the respondent accepts that the silence of the 2013 Act on the issue of costs is not determinative of the issue before the court as per HSE v. O.A. [2013] 3 IR 287.

44. Accordingly, the court can look at alternative sources of jurisdiction. Part III of the 1924 Act establishes the District Court. In HSE v. O.A., O'Malley J. noted that in civil proceedings, the District Court derived its power to award costs from the District Court Rules in accordance with s. 91 of the 1924 Act, together with s. 34 of the 1961 Act.

45. Section 91 of the 1924 Act provides that the District Court Rules Committee may make rules to be styled “District Court Rules” on matters relating to procedure before the District Court including “the practice and procedure of the District Court generally including questions of costs.”

46. Section 34 of the 1961 Act provides that the District Court shall exercise its jurisdiction in relation to “pleading, practice and procedure generally, including liability to costs” in accordance with the District Court Rules. It is the respondent's position that none of the provisions just outlined confer the jurisdiction to award costs as contended for by the applicant.

47. It is clear that ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 apply only in the context of “civil proceedings”. It is common case that the concept of civil proceedings is not defined in the Act.

However, it is the respondent’s submission that, when viewed in its proper statutory context, and in accordance with the approach mandated by the Supreme Court in Heather Hill v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] 2 I.R. 222, the concept of civil proceedings as used in the LSRA 2015 does not extend to the licensing jurisdiction of the District Court.

48. The respondent contends that that is so for three reasons: firstly, the concept of “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015 requires a lis inter partes and licensing cases do not involve a lis inter partes. Secondly, the LSRA 2015 does not draw a binary distinction between “civil proceedings” and “criminal proceedings”. The term civil as used in the LSRA 2015 does not refer to all matters that are not “criminal”. Thirdly, the LSRA 2015 cannot be interpreted to have amended the position pertaining under the 1924 Act, as identified in the decision of Peart

J. in Hayes, and the decision of Baker J. in Mansfield v. Lucey [2017] IEHC 158 without express repeal of those distinctions. These three core points are considered further below.

49. The respondent submits that the licensing proceedings before the District Court did not involve a joinder of issues, and did not involve a situation of one “party” being “successful” (whether partially or entirely) over another “party”. Relying on these concepts, the respondent submits that it is clear there is no lis inter partes in licensing appeals.

50. Secondly, the respondent submits that the nature of deciding a licensing application is clearly not that of a lis inter partes. Rather, the respondent is simply carrying out an administrative statutory function pursuant to s. 10(1) of the 2013 Act which does not permit him to issue a licence unless positively satisfied that an applicant is “a suitable person”. These provisions are designed to ensure the safety and well-being of members of the public who may be alone or vulnerable.

51. The respondent, as the decision-maker, is simply carrying out an administrative statutory function, and indeed one where there is a “default position” that the licence is refused unless the authority is “satisfied” to grant the licence.

52. It is submitted, therefore, that the respondent should not be penalised by an award of costs (and have his budget and resources consequently impacted upon) simply because a different decision is reached on appeal, particularly where the decision may be based on different circumstances due to the progression of time.

53. Thirdly, the respondent submits that a critical further point is that an appeal against a refusal of a licensing application involves a de novo appeal. Therefore, when the District Court is deciding the issue in the administrative appeal, it is simply stepping into the shoes of the respondent to retake the decision, based on the circumstances prevailing at the time of the appeal. If the initial decision does not involve a lis inter partes, it must follow that the District Court on appeal – conducting the same exercise – cannot be regarded as engaged in determining a lis inter partes.

54. Fourthly, the respondent submits that licensing cases do not involve a joinder of issues. Sections 168 and169 of the LSRA 2015 clearly envisage that there are issues between the parties. Contrary to the suggestion of the applicant, it does not suffice for the respondent to be a “party” to the appeal.

55. That there is no lis inter partes or joinder of issues is confirmed by the limited documents filed in a licensing appeal. There is no statement of claim or summons in a licensing appeal to which a defence is filed. All that is filed is a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal is in skeletal form and does not identify any grounds of appeal or points of claim. Thus, a licensing appeal is a matter in which no issues are set out, there is no corresponding filing that disputes those issues; and it follows that there is no joinder of issues. In the absence of joined issues, it is difficult to envisage how ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 can be applied.

56. Fifthly, licensing cases do not involve the seeking of reliefs by reference to pleaded grounds and cannot therefore constitute “proceedings”. In summary, the term “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015 requires a lis inter partes and no such lis arises in a licensing appeal.

57. Moving then to the respondent’s second main submission, it is argued that the LSRA 2015 does not draw a binary distinction between “civil proceedings” and “criminal proceedings”. The term “civil” in the LSRA 2015 does not encompass all matters that are not criminal. This is obvious from s. 65 (1)(b) which draws a tripartite distinction between “disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings”.

58. Turning to the respondent’s third overarching point, he submits that the LSRA 2015 cannot be interpreted to have amended the position pertaining under the 1924 Act, as identified in earlier case law such as Hayes and Mansfield, without express repeal of those distinctions.

59. By the time of the enactment of the LSRA 2015, the High Court in Hayes had already found that licensing matters (falling under s. 77C of the 1924 Act) do not constitute “civil proceedings”.

60. Had the Oireachtas wished to bring licensing matters within the scope of “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015, it could and should have expressly stated this by providing a definition of “civil proceedings” which expressly included licensing.

61. There is nothing in the long title to the Act that suggests the LSRA 2015 was intended to confer additional jurisdiction on the District Court in respect of costs in matters such as licensing, or which suggests that it was intended to repeal the division of jurisdiction between “licensing” and “civil” as established by the 1924 Act.

62. The respondent submits that the doctrine of implied repeal would not apply in this situation and in that regard relies upon Dodd, Statutory Interpretation in Ireland (2008) paras.

4.68 - 4.76.

63. The respondent also relies upon DPP v. Grey [1986] I.R. 317 at page 325 where it was stated that, as a general rule, the courts lean against the repeal or exclusion of earlier statutory provisions by implication.

64. The respondent relies upon the rule of statutory interpretation that when parliament has provided specifically by statute for a limited set of circumstances, there is a presumption that general words in a later statute are not to be taken as overriding the earlier specific provisions, unless an intention to do so was clearly expressed. This presumption is encapsulated in the Latin maxim “generalia specialibus non derogant”.

65. This maxim of statutory interpretation also weighs against a conclusion that the term “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015 includes licensing cases. Section 77 of the 1924 Act makes specific provision for the jurisdiction of the District Court, and the High Court has found that the concept of civil proceedings insofar as referred to in the District Court Rules does not refer to licensing appeals (Hayes and Mansfield). Moreover, a general reference to “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015 cannot override the specific provisions of the 1924 Act (particularly given that the District Court is an inferior court of limited jurisdiction).

Respondent's position concerning Order 53 (1) of the District Court Rules 2014

66. Turning to the other leg of the applicant’s case, the respondent submits that, applying the proper principles of statutory interpretation as set out in Heather Hill, the definition of “civil proceedings” in Schedule 1 of the District Court Rules 2014, inserted by S.I. 17/2014, does not include licensing cases.

67. Firstly, having regard to the statutory context in which S.I. 17/2014 was enacted, the 1924 Act distinguishes between “civil cases” and “licensing” cases. Section 77C of the 1924 Act which conferred jurisdiction on the District Court in licensing cases remains on the statute books. Pursuant to s. 10 of the Interpretation Act 2005, the enactment continues to have effect unless repealed. It has not been repealed and therefore the distinction between s. 77A and C remains.

68. Section 91 of the 1924 Act, pursuant to which S.I. 17/2014 was adopted, also distinguishes between “civil cases”, “criminal cases” and “licensing cases”.

69. Secondly, with respect to the case law, the High Court previously found in both Hayes and Mansfield that licensing appeals do not constitute “civil proceedings” within the meaning of Order 51 of the District Court Rules, but involves the District Court operating its distinct licensing jurisdiction as set out in s. 77C of the 1924 Act.

70. Further, in accordance with Mansfield, when the District Court hears a licensing appeal, it is still exercising its licencing jurisdiction (see paras. 64 to 66 of that judgment).

71. Thirdly, with respect to the definition of “civil proceedings” in Schedule 1, the wording as amended by S.I. 17/2014 does not confer any new jurisdiction, but instead simply acknowledges pre-existing jurisdictions.

72. If the definition had the meaning for which the applicant contends – i.e. encompassing any proceedings that are not criminal – it would have simply defined “civil proceedings” as “any proceedings which may be brought in the District Court which are not criminal proceedings”. The additional words in the Schedule cannot be ignored. In particular, the fact that the definition does not include a reference to s. 77C (the licensing jurisdiction) – and only refers to s. 77A – cannot be ignored.

73. Fourthly, the respondent relies on s. 19 of the Interpretation Act 2005, which provides that: “A word or expression used in a statutory instrument has the same meaning in the statutory instrument as it has in the enactment under which the instrument is made.”

74. The critical point is that licensing is not included within the concept of “civil”. Moreover, while the applicant seeks to rely on s. 4 of the to 2005 Act to refute the respondent’s reliance on s. 19, such reliance is misplaced. Even if the Rules Committee did intend that the term “civil proceedings” would encompass “licensing” cases, the committee could not actually use a different definition for “civil” in the Rules to that found in ss. 77 and 91 of the 1924 Act, as such would be ultra vires. In accordance with the principle in East Donegal Co-Operative Livestock Mart Limited v. Attorney General [1970] I.R. 317, the rules should be interpreted in a manner that favours their validity.

75. Fifthly, given the pre-existing interpretation of the concept of “civil proceedings” in the District Court Rules as adopted in Hayes, had there been an intention to include all proceedings save for criminal proceedings, this definition in Schedule 1 would have been clearer. In this regard, the respondent relies on the presumption against radical changes of the law in the absence of clear language.

76. Sixthly, if the Oireachtas had intended the enactment of S.I. 17/2014 to confer jurisdiction in the District Court to award costs in licensing matters, the S.I. would have included a scale of costs for licensing matters. The absence of such a scale of costs cannot be ignored.

77. Separately, to interpret Order 53(1) as conferring a jurisdiction to award costs would be ultra vires, potentially unconstitutional and contrary to the wording and scheme of the 1924 Act.

78. Further, the conferring of a jurisdiction on the District Court to award costs in licensing matters would constitute a fundamental change to the jurisdiction of the District Court. It would involve a fundamental policy decision which would need to be made by primary legislation, failing which there would be a breach of Article 15 of the Constitution.

79. Since the clarification of the law by Peart J. in Hayes, the Oireachtas has been aware of the absence of jurisdiction on the part of the District Court to award costs in licensing matters. It has had ample opportunity to address this – if it wished to change this policy – through, for example, the Taxi Regulation Act 2013 Act or the LSRA 2015. It has chosen not to do so, and since the provision of costs is a matter for the Oireachtas rather than the courts, care should be taken not to undermine a policy through a strained interpretation of legislation.

80. For all of these reasons, the respondent submits that there is no jurisdiction to award costs in the District Court in statutory appeals concerned with licensing.

E. Discussion of the meaning of “civil proceedings” in the LSRA 2015

95. As the hearing before me progressed, the main focus turned to the second leg of the applicant’s argument concerning the impact of the LSRA 2015. Following the hearing, having considered the issues further, I raised a number of issues with the parties and requested that they file supplemental written submissions. I found these submissions helpful.

96. I agree with the sequencing suggested by the applicant that the court should firstly consider the interpretation question as to the correct meaning of “civil proceedings” in sections

168 and 169 of the 2015 Act. In carrying out that exercise, it will also be necessary to consider the respondent’s arguments concerning the continuing significance of the 1924 Act, the division of jurisdiction in the District Court effected by that Act separating “licensing cases” from “civil cases” and caselaw from the High Court indicating that, up until the enactment of the LSRA 2015, the District Court had no jurisdiction to award costs in licensing cases.

97. I propose to address the statutory interpretation question under the following headings:

(i) Framing the statutory interpretation exercise in context;

(ii) Relevant caselaw on costs in context;

(iii) The Heather Hill approach to statutory interpretation;

(iv) The judgment in Little v. The Chief Appeals Officer;

(v) Relevant pointers within the LSRA 2015 as to the meaning of “civil proceedings”;

(vi) Whether licensing cases involve a lis inter partes;

(vii) Argument that the LSRA 2015 cannot be interpreted to have amended the position pertaining under the 1924 Act as identified in Hayes and Mansfield;

(viii) Presumption against radical changes in the law in the absence of clear language.

(i) Framing the statutory interpretation exercise in context

98. Sections 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 appear in Part 11 of the Act which deals with “legal costs in civil proceedings”. Those sections are set out in material part in paras. 17 and

18 of this judgment.

99. It is clear that the power to award legal costs under the LSRA 2015 is only available in “civil proceedings”. The parties are agreed that the Act does not define what is meant by civil proceedings. The applicant’s case is straightforward - civil proceedings means any proceedings that are not criminal. On that basis, the applicant contends that since Mr. Singh’s appeal was not a criminal appeal, the District Court had jurisdiction to award costs.

100. The respondent’s case is more layered. He contends that the term “civil” in ss. 168/169 does not encompass all matters that are not criminal. Insofar as the District Court is concerned, when interpreting the meaning of “civil proceedings” in the 2015 Act, regard should be had to the critical fact that the 1924 Act distinguishes between “civil cases” and “licensing” cases. Section 77C of the 1924 Act, which confers jurisdiction on the District Court in licensing matters, remains on the statute book. Pursuant to s. 10 of the Interpretation Act 2005, the 1924 Act continues to have lawful effect. Therefore, says the respondent, the District Court has no costs jurisdiction in licensing cases.

101. At first glance, the issue of statutory interpretation presented by this case is quite net. However, on closer examination, the issues raised are knotty and complex. Much depends on where you start: Do you begin from the position that the LSRA 2015 breaks new ground, conferring a general costs power on all courts hearing civil proceedings, without distinguishing between individual courts, subject only to the principles and factors set out within the two sections? Or do you start from the position that civil cases have always been regarded as separate to licensing cases in the District Court by virtue of s. 77 of the 1924 Act?

102. As noted in Heather Hill, the modern authorities now make clear that in no case can the process of ascertaining the legislative intent be reduced to the “reflexive rehearsal of the literal meaning of words, or the determination of the plain meaning of an individual section viewed in isolation from either the text of a statute as a whole or the context in which, and the purpose for which, it was enacted”. It is of interest that the debate in the present case does not involve an over reliance on a literal meaning or the “reflexive rehearsal of the literal meaning of words” by one side over another. The differences here are more nuanced.

103. The first and obvious difficulty in interpreting the two sections arises from the fact that the Oireachtas has chosen not to define the expression “civil proceedings” in ss. 168 or 169. This legislative decision was presumably not accidental. The absence of a definition makes it difficult to gauge to what extent the draftsmen intended to create a new general power to award costs. However, it seems to me that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Little provides guidance on this important point.

104. Secondly, in establishing what appears to be a general power to award costs by statute, rather than the previous approach in earlier enactments of dealing with costs powers through ‘court-specific’ rules of court, the Oireachtas appears to have gone down a different road, conferring a stand-alone power to award costs across all courts. With the earlier enactments, the statutory authorisation for the jurisdiction to award costs came from the provisions of the 1924 and 1961 Acts permitting specific rules to be made in respect of costs. With the enactment of the LSRA 2015, rather than focusing on court-specific or subject-specific considerations, the Oireachtas appears to have chosen to confer on all courts dealing with civil proceedings a general power to award costs, conditioned only on the principles set out within ss. 168 and

169. I think this makes it harder to maintain that the newly created costs power had no impact on the earlier statutory landscape.

105. Thirdly, and related to the second point, it is difficult to measure the continuing relevance of earlier jurisprudence on the extent of the District Court’s costs jurisdiction. In cases such as Hayes and Mansfield the High Court previously found that licensing appeals do not constitute “civil proceedings” within the meaning of Order 51 of the District Court Rules but involve the District Court operating its distinct licensing jurisdiction as set out in s. 77C of the 1924 Act. It will be necessary to examine those authorities in detail to ascertain what continuing relevance they have in interpreting the meaning of “civil proceedings” within the LSRA 2015.

(ii) Relevant caselaw on the issue of costs in context

106. Before proceeding to carry out the interpretive exercise, it might be helpful to step back and attempt to place the legal issue before the court in its proper context. The first thing to be said is that questions of costs can cover a very wide spectrum and may include matters which have profound consequences for the parties. A decision on costs cannot be considered a mere matter of procedure. Rather, it is part of the administration of justice (DPP v. McGrath) [2021]

3 IR 785 per O’Donnell J (as he then was)).

107. In Sweetman v. Shell E&P Ireland Ltd. [2016] 1 I.R. 742, Charleton J. noted that an award of costs was more than merely procedural; substantive rules as to costs were in the nature of vested rights. The debate in that case was about the effects of the Environmental (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2011 and whether it could operate retrospectively. The court observed that an expectation as to the recovery of costs affected both the decision to commence a case and the necessary and legitimate prediction that it would be funded if successfully prosecuted or successfully defended.

108. In Dunne v. Minister for the Environment [2008] 2 I.R. 775 Murray C.J. stated the following at para. 26: “The rule of law that costs normally follow the event, that the successful party to proceedings should not have to pay the costs of those proceedings which should be borne by the unsuccessful party, has an obvious equitable basis. As a counterpoint to that general rule of law, the court has a discretionary jurisdiction to vary or depart from that rule of law if, in the special circumstances of a case, the interests of justice require that it should do so. There is no predetermined category of cases which fall outside the full ambit of that jurisdiction. If there were to be a specific category of cases to which the general rule of law on costs did not apply that would be a matter for legislation since it is not for the courts to establish a cohesive code according to which costs would always be imposed on certain successful defendants for the benefit of certain unsuccessful plaintiffs.”

109. More recently, in what is now the leading case on costs, the Supreme Court stated in Little v. Chief Appeals Officer that it is not necessary for the Supreme Court to revisit its own

decision in Dunne because the ratio of that case was that the court has a general discretion with regard to costs, and while that discretion must be exercised in a judicial way, there should be no a priori categorisation of cases in which the court will, as a matter of law, exercise its discretion to depart from the general approach that a successful party will usually obtain its costs (para. 80 of Little). While Murray J. was discussing the concept of “public interest” proceedings as defined in Little, it seems to me that that conclusion of the Supreme Court has significant implications for the statutory interpretation question I have to determine. I will return to Little later because in my view it is the key authority.

110. In HSE v. O.A., the HSE argued that the District Court had no power to award costs to parents in proceedings under the Child Care Act 1991 and that legislative policy leaned against awarding costs against the HSE as it might deter/ hinder it in the performance of its functions. O’Malley J. rejected this argument and held that the District Court did have jurisdiction to award costs in childcare proceedings under the 1991 Act. The court stated that legislative intervention would be required in order to establish a specific category of defendant against whom an award of costs should never be made and to set aside the general rule of law that costs normally follow the event. O’Malley J. also noted that the court had a discretionary jurisdiction to vary or depart from that general rule of law. Importantly, the judge made these findings prior to the introduction of the LSRA 2015.

111. The decision of O’Malley J. is also relevant in other important respects. The court had to interpret the meaning of “civil proceedings” in O. 51, r. 1 of the District Court Rules 1997 which provided: “Save as otherwise provided by statute or by Rules of Court, the granting or withholding of the costs of any party to civil proceedings in the Court shall be in the discretion of the Court.” O’Malley J. held that childcare proceedings constituted “civil proceedings” within the meaning of the Rule. Importantly, the court reasoned that the only distinction made in the District Court Rules 1997 was as between civil and criminal proceedings. She put the matter thus at para. 36: “… [I]t seems to me that the only distinction made in the [District Court] Rules [1997] is between civil and criminal proceedings. There does not seem to be, for the purposes of the question of costs, a distinction between public and private civil proceedings.” (emphasis added)

112. O’Malley J. went on to consider the HSE’s final argument that policy considerations required the court to refuse to grant costs against the HSE in childcare proceedings. Noting that there was no Irish authority supporting the HSE’s argument, she observed that the rule contended for by the HSE had no authoritative basis and was contrary to the statement of legislative policy in the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 (this latter point may not be available to the applicant in the present case in view of s. 28(9)(iv) of the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 which, subject to exceptions identified in the Act, precludes the granting of legal aid in certain categories of cases including licensing).

113. O’Malley J. considered the dictum of Murray C.J. in Dunne v. Minister for the Environment (referenced above) where it was stated that the rule of law that the successful party to proceedings should not have to pay the costs of those proceedings which should be borne by the unsuccessful party has an obvious equitable basis. If there was to be a specific category of cases to which the general rule of law on costs did not apply, that would be a matter for legislation. O’Malley J. held that the principle expounded by the Supreme Court in Dunne was equally applicable to the HSE’s submission that there are certain types of defendants against whom an award of costs should never be made. If the general rule, combined with the court’s discretionary power to ensure that justice is done, is to be set aside, it would, in the view of the court, require legislative intervention. On that basis, O’Malley J. concluded that the District Court did have a jurisdiction, based on statute and on the District Court Rules 1997, to award costs in proceedings under the Child Care Act 1991 and that it is not debarred from so doing by policy considerations relating to the function of the HSE under that Act. In my view, the rationale of O’Malley J.’s conclusion in HSE v. O.A. is also an important matter for the court to consider in determining the issues in the present case.

114. The applicant has advanced a fallback argument that if his primary argument, that the District Court enjoys jurisdiction to award costs, is not accepted, he seeks a declaration that the rule-making body's failure (if such exists) to make provision for the applicant to at least seek costs, constitutes a breach of his rights of access to the courts, read together with his right to earn a livelihood, and to an effective remedy in accordance with the Constitution, the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights.

115. It is fair to say that this latter argument received only light focus in the hearing before me, perhaps understandably in circumstances where the argument was comprehensively addressed, and rejected, by Baker J. in Mansfield. At para. 71, Baker J. noted that no authority had been opened to the court which might suggest that a constitutional right to costs in all classes of proceedings must exist in order to support and give concrete realisation to the right of access to the courts. Moreover, a fundamental weakness in the applicant’s ‘access to justice argument’ was the reality that no constitutional or other right to hold a firearms certificate was advanced. As noted by Baker J. at para. 77, no right to hold a gun exists in Irish law: see Charleton J. in McCarron v. Kearney [2008] IEHC 195.

116. A further practical difficulty for the ‘access to justice argument’ in the present case arises from the fact that the quantum of costs in issue here, relatively speaking, was quite modest, consisting of the costs of bringing a statutory appeal in the District Court against the respondent’s refusal to grant the taxi licence. The costs involved in the present matter are of a different order to the costs, for example, of litigation involving weeks of oral testimony from civilian witnesses, or complex expert evidence from professional witnesses and/or voluminous discovery.

117. However, while the costs involved in the District Court in the present case may not have been significant, it is recognised by the parties that the determination of the legal issues arising in this case may have a significance well beyond the immediate interests of the parties: the question as to the extent of the District Court’s power to award costs in civil proceedings is undoubtedly an issue of systemic importance and may impact a large number of cases.

118. A further issue of context to be borne in mind is that a positive finding in favour of a costs jurisdiction may actually work against an applicant’s interests. A finding that the District Court has jurisdiction to award costs may be good news for a successful applicant but bad news for a losing one. As matters stand, absent a costs jurisdiction in the District Court, an applicant for a licence has the comfort of knowing in advance that, come what may, he won’t be on the hook for costs. It could be said that the absence of a costs power in the District Court therefore operates as a shield, saving the applicant from having to pay the costs of the other side if he loses. In this way, the ‘access to justice’ point is not all one-way.

119. As noted by Baker J. in Mansfield at para. 76, equality of arms (applications for firearms certificates) was achieved in the class of application before the court because the District Court had no power, under the then District Court Rules, to order the appellants to pay the costs of the garda authorities in a case where the appeal is unsuccessful. Baker J. felt that there was nothing disproportionate from the perspective of European rights in a costs regime which does not permit the award of costs to either side in such an appeal.

120. Returning to the applicant’s main argument as to the District Court’s jurisdiction, it is important not to conflate the question of a costs jurisdiction with the separate question as to the merits of a specific costs application. In other words, just because a court may award costs does not mean that is required to do so. Cases such as the decision of the Supreme Court in McGrath and of the Court of Appeal in Galfer Filling Station Limited v. Superintendent O'Callaghan [2023] IECA 184 make clear that cases involving challenges to decisions of statutory officers or public administrators should not be viewed in the same box as private litigation between ordinary litigants. Different considerations come into play from the point of view of costs, depending on the context. In civil litigation between private parties, if a claim fails, it can generally be said that it ought not have been brought and the losing party should therefore pay the cost of the party required to come to court to defend the claim. As noted by Whelan J. in Galfer, there may also be the risk of a chilling effect on the proper discharge of a statutory officer’s functions if an order for costs could be made against him in the absence of any suggestion that he had either acted unreasonably or in bad faith (see Galfer para. 59).

121. However, it is one thing to take these important considerations into account when adjudicating on individual costs applications, and quite another thing to prevent a party altogether from even seeking his costs, no matter how strong his merits. A finding that a party has an entitlement to at least seek costs does not prevent a court in an appropriate case from having due regard to the statutory role and duties of the public officer concerned and the various other differences between private and public litigation. This point will be considered further when examining later the built-in features of ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015.

122. Having said all of the above, it is of course open to the Oireachtas, at a level of principle, to decide that in certain categories of cases, costs should not be available. That is a legislative choice which it is open to the Oireachtas to adopt in primary legislation in a given area. In interpreting the provisions of the LSRA 2015, I have to ascertain what the Oireachtas intended when conferring on all courts in “civil proceedings” a power to award costs. In fairness to the respondent’s position, he accepts that the fact the Taxi Regulation Act 2013 is silent on the question of costs is not determinative of the issues the court must decide in the present case.

123. The necessity not to conflate the merits of an individual costs application with the question of jurisdiction is reinforced by two of the judgments I have already mentioned. In McGrath, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of Appeal, holding that O. 36, r.

1 of the District Court Rules 1997 was ultra vires the delegated power granted to the District Court Rules Committee. The effect of the impugned rule was to preclude the making of an order for costs against the DPP or any member of An Garda Síochána prosecuting on her behalf. The power to award costs in the District Court in a criminal matter arose from s. 59 of the Dublin Police Act 1842, which provided in material part that it “shall be lawful for any justice who shall hear and determine any charge or complaint… to award such costs as to him shall seem meet to be paid to or by either of the parties to the said charge or complaint”. In my view, it is at the very least interesting that even on the criminal side, where one might expect the “special position of the statutory officer” point to have particular force, it is still open to a successful defendant to at least seek his costs, depending on the circumstances of the prosecution.

124. Of course, it should be borne in mind that on the criminal side, the prosecuting authority has brought the case, and the defendant has not voluntarily chosen to come to court. All things being equal, this tends in favour of a costs jurisdiction because the defendant has no choice but to come to court and defend his interests and, in principle anyway, should have an opportunity to seek his costs if he defends the criminal charge successfully. The respondent may say that this stands in contrast to the position of the present applicant who is not obliged to come to court and can decide himself whether to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court.

125. In the course of his judgment in McGrath, O'Donnell J. noted obiter that members of the Gardaí who prosecute in an official capacity, or the DPP, are performing a different social function than ordinary litigants, and that this could be acknowledged in the awarding of costs, whether by primary legislation or in an individual case. The situation could not be equated to civil litigation between private parties where, if a claim failed, it could be said that it ought not to have been brought in the first place and the losing party should therefore pay the costs of the party required to come to court to defend the claim. As O’Donnell J. notes, in many, if not all cases, a prosecutor could be said to have properly performed his/her functions even if the case did not result in a conviction. It could not be said that because the case did not result in conviction, it ought not to have been brought.

126. Similar themes are evident in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Galfer. Galfer concerned an application by the applicant filling station for an order to revive liquor licences attaching to a shop. The District Court stated a case for the opinion of the High Court on the question of whether the applicant/franchisee enjoyed sufficient interest in the premises to allow the court to grant the licence. The respondent superintendent took a neutral position in both the District Court and the case stated before the High Court. The High Court ruled that the applicant had a clear entitlement to occupy the premises and that such an entitlement was a sufficient interest in the premises necessary for the grant of the licence. The applicant sought the costs of the case stated proceedings against the Superintendent upon whom notice of the licensing application had to be to be served by law. The applicant relied inter alia on the provisions of s. 169 of the LSRA 2015 and specifically the provision that a party who is “entirely successful” in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against the party who was not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise.

127. What is interesting for present purposes is the ratio of the decision of the Court of Appeal in reversing the High Court order granting costs in favour of the applicant. The Court of Appeal held that the High Court judge gave insufficient consideration to the statutory role of the appellant and to the risk of a chilling effect on the proper discharge of the appellant’s functions, were an order for costs to be made against him ([2023] IECA 184 at para. 59). It is noteworthy that the court did not find that there was no jurisdiction to award costs, merely that the High Court judge gave insufficient consideration to the policy factors mentioned.

128. It is also of note that in the related case of Triode Newhill LHP v. Superintendent Murray [2019] 3 I.R. 112, the Court of Appeal awarded the respondent Superintendent 50% of the costs of the case stated in the High Court and 50% of the costs in the appeal in circumstances where the applicant for the licence had been unsuccessful on the substantive licensing issues. The respondent Superintendent’s submission in Triode was that costs should follow the event. In my view, it is difficult to reconcile the respondent’s recorded position on costs in Triode with the submission heavily pressed in the present case that licensing disputes can never engage the provisions of the LSRA 2015 because the respondent is “simply carrying out an administrative statutory function” and because the “nature of deciding a licensing application is clearly not that of a lis inter partes” (paras. 51 and 52 of the respondent’s supplemental submissions). I will return to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Galfer later in this judgment as it is one of the main authorities relied upon by the respondent on the interpretive question.

(iii) The Heather Hill approach to statutory interpretation

129. As to the approach to adopt in interpreting the 2015 Act, the court takes its guidance from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Heather Hill. The court’s essential task is to construe the words of sections 168/169 of the LSRA 2015 by having regard to the purpose and context of the sections, the Act in which the sections appear, the pre-existing legal framework and the objectives of the legislation.

130. As noted by Murray J. at para. 214 of Heather Hill, the words chosen by the Oireachtas are the first port of call in interpreting the sections of an Act and the onus is on those contending that a statutory provision does not have the effect suggested by the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature to establish this.

131. In the present case, the respondent highlights the emphasis in Heather Hill on the “preexisting relevant legal framework” as a necessary element within the overall approach to the statutory interpretation exercise. The respondent stresses that the 1924 Act remains on the statute book, which preserves the distinction between civil cases and licensing cases in the District Court. Since the 1924 Act remains the law of the land, the respondent says the court should start from the position that “civil proceedings” does not include licensing matters. In order to assess this issue, I have to view the Act in context and consider whether there are any pointers within the legislation that shed light on what the Oireachtas intended.

132. A good place to start is the long title to the 2015 Act: “An Act to provide for the regulation of the provision of legal services, to provide for the establishment of the legal services regulatory authority, to provide for the establishment of the legal practitioners disciplinary tribunal to make determinations as to misconduct by legal practitioners, to provide for new structures in which legal practitioners may provide services together or with others, to provide for the establishment of a roll of practising barristers, to provide for reform of the law relating to the charging of costs by legal practitioners and the system of the assessment of costs relating to the provision of legal services, to provide for the manner of appointment of persons to be Senior Counsel, to provide for matters relating to clinical negligence actions, and to provide for related matters.” (emphasis added)

133. The 2015 Act is divided into 15 parts and consists of 221 sections. Part 10 is headed “Legal Costs” and is divided into 5 chapters. It deals with the office of the Legal Costs Adjudicator and other matters. Part 11 is headed “Legal Costs in Civil Proceedings” and contains ss. 168 and 169. The sub heading above s. 168 indicates that it is concerned with the “Power to award legal costs”. Similarly, the sub heading above s. 169 indicates that it concerns “Costs to follow event”. The latter expression does not appear in the text of the section.

(iv) The judgment in Little v. The Chief Appeals Officer

134. As mentioned already, a case of particular importance for the statutory interpretation exercise that I have to consider is the decision of the Supreme Court in Little. Two judgments were delivered: the main judgment by Murray J. and a shorter concurring judgment by Hogan

J. It is important to acknowledge from the outset that in Little, the Supreme Court was not considering the position of costs in the District Court. Nor was it considering any costs rules peculiar to licensing applications or statutory appeals. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the judgment provides essential guidance to the court on several issues relevant to the statutory interpretation exercise the court has to perform.

135. Towards the start of his judgment at para. 9, Murray J. states that in the period since Dunne, there have been a number of legal developments relevant to the context in which decisions on where costs should fall are made. Most obviously, the principles governing the award of such costs, and the criteria to be taken into account in doing so, have, for the first time, been expressed comprehensively in primary legislation in ss. 168 and 169 of the 2015 Act. Murray J. goes on to analyse in considerable detail the caselaw and principles of law applicable to “public interest” proceedings and provides a definition of that term at para. 34 (a) to (d).

136. In part II of the judgment, commencing at para. 12, Murray J. starts his consideration of the precise legal basis upon which the courts today award costs, the extent to which that jurisdiction demands that costs should be awarded in favour of the party who has succeeded in a suit, and the parameters of a court’s discretion to depart from any such rule. Murray J. observes that, today, these questions fall to be analysed first and foremost against the terms of the LSRA 2015. However, he notes that the LSRA 2015 falls to be considered in light of (a) the general regime governing the awarding of costs in legal proceedings immediately before its enactment, and (b) the particular approach to the costs of public interest actions at that time.

137. Murray J. states at para. 13 that a careful consideration of the history of the costs jurisdiction of the Irish Courts prior to the coming into effect of the LSRA 2015 shows both a surprising doubt around the precise source of the power to award costs, and a notable discordance between practice, and the terms of the governing legal provisions.

138. Murray J. then carries out a comprehensive analysis of the source of the legal power to award costs in the Superior Courts. At paras. 37 and 38 under the heading “The power to award costs today” he states the following: “37. The power to award costs is expressed in ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA and the amended provisions of O. 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts introduced to give effect to those sections. Relevant parts of these provisions are set forth in the Appendix to this judgment. The provisions of the LSRA took effect in October 2019, and the amended version of O. 99 in December of that year. The LSRA neither repealed nor amended s. 14(2) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, and indeed the LSRA did not itself purport to give the power to the Superior Courts Rules Committee to promulgate Rules of Court generally governing costs. Noting that as the law presently stands the courts have no inherent jurisdiction to award costs, this means that there are two principal candidates for the legal source of the cost awarding power: s. 14(2) of the 1961 Act and ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA. If Bell is wrongly decided, s. 14(2) can be removed from that list, and s. 53 of the 1877 Act put in its place. And, as I have already observed, s. 94 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 has never been repealed, and thus arguably continues to provide a basis for the award of costs in a jury action, albeit in a context in which its relationship with ss. 168 and 169 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 is unclear. This is patently unsatisfactory and unfortunate: the source of a power as centrally important to the day-to-day administration of justice in the State as the jurisdiction of the courts to award costs should be absolutely clear.

38. While it might be argued that s. 168(1) assumes a pre-existing power of the courts over costs, and that the purpose of it and the immediately succeeding section is to describe and condition that power, I am of the view that these provisions are best viewed as both regulating and conferring a cost awarding power. Thus, s. 168(1)(a) (‘a court may … order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more other parties to the proceedings’) confers a jurisdiction, the incidents of which are described in s. 168(2)(a)-(e). While the discretion conferred by s. 168(1)(a) (and O. 99 R. 1(1)) is general – and wide – it is conditioned by s. 169(1)

in one critical respect. That condition demands that where a party is ‘entirely successful in civil proceedings’ that party is ‘entitled’ to their costs ‘unless the court orders otherwise’. The power to order ‘otherwise’ must be exercised ‘having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties’, a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be taken into account being thereafter iterated. One of these is ‘whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest one or more issues in the proceedings’.” (emphasis added)

139. Then at para. 41, Murray J. makes the following important statement: “41. On this analysis, the LSRA may have altered the effect of s. 14(2) of the 1961 Act. If that provision was once the sole source of the general power to award costs, it no longer confers that power. Instead, the effect of the LSRA is to render s. 14(2) an entirely enabling provision, merely allowing the making of Rules of Court further regulating the power to award costs subject, of course, to those Rules not being inconsistent with ss. 168 or 169. That, I think it fair to say, is how the provision most naturally reads…” (emphasis added)

140. The applicant in the present case relies upon the fact that Murray J. refers to s. 22 of the 1924 Act and s. 14 of the 1961 Act respectively as provisions that provided for the costs jurisdiction of the Superior Courts until the commencement of the LSRA 2015. On that basis, says the applicant, it is legitimate to compare those provisions with equivalent provisions relating to the costs jurisdiction of the District Court. Section 22 of the 1924 Act (providing that costs in the Superior Courts were to be regulated by rules of court) is very similar to s. 91 of the 1924 Act (providing that the practice and procedure of the District Court generally including questions of costs were to be regulated by rules of court). Moreover, s. 14(2) of the 1961 Act (extending the power to regulate these matters by Rules of Court in respect of the new Superior Courts established in 1961) is, in turn, very similar to s. 34 of the 1961 Act (extending the jurisdiction vested in the District Court Rules Committee to make rules for the new District Courts that were also established in 1961).

141. The applicant submits that similarly, while s. 91 of the 1924 Act and s. 34 of the 1961 Act have not been repealed, it follows from the decision in Little – and by analogy with the logic of the Supreme Court's decision - that insofar as the older provisions overlap ss. 168 and

169 of the LSRA 2015, the 2015 provisions appear to have altered their effect. It follows that the source of the District Court’s costs jurisdiction in civil cases is now to be found in ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015, with the earlier provisions now merely allowing the District Court Rules Committee to make Rules of Court regulating that power.

142. In my view, while it does need to be kept in mind that Murray J.’s analysis of the issues in Litle was carried out from the perspective of the costs position in the Superior Courts, the logic of Murray J.’s analysis must have implications for the source of the legal power to award costs in the District Court. Arising from the in-depth analysis carried out by the Supreme Court in Little, it appears clear that it was the intention of the Oireachtas in enacting the 2015 Act to confer on all courts a general power to award costs in civil proceedings.

143. At para. 24, Murray J. states that by the time of the enactment of the LSRA, the courts were inclining towards a more flexible and pragmatic analysis of their costs power, using formulae that equated “the event” to a broader conclusion as to: which party was really “the winner”; “who, as a matter of substance and reality, had won?”; or whether the plaintiff had “anything of value which he could not have won without fighting the action through to a finish” (Roache v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [1998] E.M.L.R. 161, Bingham MR at p. 162).

144. Murray J. notes that that formulation in Roache was cited with approval by McKechnie

J. in Godsil v. Ireland [2015] 4 I.R. 535 at para. 54. Murray J. states that the judgment of McKechnie J. frames the modern law at the point of enactment of the LSRA. What he described as the “costs follow the event” rule was rooted by McKechnie J. in O. 99 r. 1(3) and (4) RSC, and related to two principles: the equity that a person who institutes or defends proceedings to establish rights, assert entitlements or defend unmeritorious claims to that effect should be entitled to an expectation that they will, if successful, not have to suffer costs in so doing; and the need to dissuade and punish “exploitative conduct and unprincipled parties”.

145. The next part of the judgment in Little focusses primarily on an issue that is not directly relevant to the present case, namely the criteria for public interest proceedings and the circumstances in which public law challenges in the Superior Courts may warrant neutral or even positive costs orders in favour of an applicant, even if unsuccessful in the substantive proceedings. While not directly relevant to the jurisdictional question I have to decide, Murray J.’s analysis of the public interest litigation criteria illustrates the flexibility of the 2015 Act insofar as it builds in a facility for departing from the strong default rule that costs should go to the successful party, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to two key grounds: the nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties.

146. The statement that the LSRA 2015 may have altered the effect of the 1961 Act is important in my view. If it was once thought to be the source of the general power to award costs, it no longer confers that power. According to the Supreme Court, the effect of the LSRA is to render the provisions of the 1961 Act entirely enabling provisions, merely allowing the making of rules of court further regulating the power to award costs, subject to those rules not being inconsistent with ss. 168 and 169 of the 2015 Act.

147. On any view, the comprehensive analysis carried out by the Supreme Court in Little of the origins and extent of the power to award costs in civil proceedings breaks new ground. So too does the court’s examination of the effects of the 2015 Act on the earlier enactments. Of necessity, this reduces the force of the respondent’s arguments based around the Acts of 1924 and 1961.

(v) Relevant pointers within the LSRA 2015 as to the meaning of “civil proceedings”

148. The approach to statutory interpretation mandated in Heather Hill requires the interpreting court to consider the objectives of the Act and examine other sections within the Act in order to identify any pointers as to the meaning of the sections under discussion. In that regard, having reread the entire Act, and reviewed several times the provisions of ss. 168 and 169, it seems to me the following observations can be made:

(i) It is clear that ss. 168/169 apply only in the context of “civil proceedings”.

(ii) The Act of 2015 does not define what that expression means.

(iii) The Act does define what the phrase “legal costs” means in s. 138. The definition of legal costs in s. 138 is extremely broad: ““legal costs” means fees, charges, disbursements and other costs incurred or charged in relation to contentious or non-contentious business, and includes –

a) the costs of or arising out of any cause or matter in any court,

b) …

c) …

d) costs that arise from an inquiry, investigation or other proceeding conducted under an enactment, and

e) …”

(iv) The word “court” in ss. 168/169 is not defined but it is common case between the parties that it includes the District Court, as well as the Circuit Court and the Superior Courts.

(v) In creating a general power to award costs, the Oireachtas did not distinguish between the different courts, either as to court level or subject matter. Rather, the power to award costs created by ss. 168/169 is a power conferred upon “a court”.

(vi) There is no indication in the 2015 Act that the meaning of the expression “civil proceedings” should vary depending on the particular court. It appears, therefore, that the meaning of “civil proceedings” in the High Court should be the same as “civil proceedings” in the District Court. In a general sense, I agree with the applicant’s submission that from first principles, it does not appear possible for a term within an Act to hold two separate meanings at the same time.

(vii) If the respondent’s argument is correct, and “civil proceedings” in the District Court excludes licensing matters and statutory appeals, such matters should also presumably be excluded from “civil proceedings” in the High Court. That would give rise to a surprising state of affairs because significant tranches of the High Court’s jurisdiction would be carved away. I regard this as a frailty in the respondent’s argument which has not been sufficiently addressed.

(viii) A conclusion that all licensing matters are excluded from “civil proceedings” on grounds of lacking a joinder of issues, or the seeking of reliefs by reference to pleaded grounds, would mean that no court hearing a statutory appeal or licensing matter would have any power to award costs under the 2015 Act.

(ix) Again, this would give rise to a surprising state of affairs because the High Court hears a broad range of statutory applications and appeals, the procedures for which are set out in Order 84C of the Rules of the Superior Court's (see S.I. 14/2007 – Rules of the Superior Courts (Statutory Applications and Appeals) 2007).

(x) By the same token, the Circuit Court has an extensive licensing jurisdiction, for example under the Licensing Acts 1833 - 2003 and the Registration of Clubs Acts 1904 - 2000. Moreover, the High Court has jurisdiction under various statutes to hear licensing applications of one sort or another e.g. applications pursuant to s. 64 of the Property Services (Regulation) Act 2011.

(xi) On careful review of the statute, there appears to be nothing in the 2015 Act which expressly excludes the jurisdiction of “a court” to award costs in a statutory appeal or a licensing matter. Stripping out the parts that are not germane, s. 168 in material part simply provides: “… a court may, on application by a party to civil proceedings… order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of… one or more other parties to the proceedings.”

(xii) There is nothing in the 2015 Act which indicates a distinction being made between public and private civil proceedings. I make this observation having regard to the

decision of O’Malley J. referenced earlier, in HSE v. O.A. where it was noted that the only distinction made in the District Court Rules 1997 was between civil and criminal proceedings, and that there did not seem to be, for the purpose of the question of costs, any distinction between public and private civil proceedings.

(xiii) The various references to “a party” or “parties” in ss. 168/169 indicate that the Oireachtas intended that civil proceedings should involve proceedings inter partes. Both parties agree on this. The two provisions focus on whether there is a party who has been “successful” (whether partially or entirely) or “not successful”.

(xiv) In the present case, the respondent was a “party” to the applicant’s appeal to the District Court. In accordance with O. 40D of the District Court Rules 2014, he was named as a “Respondent” to the applicant’s appeal. The facts of the present case do not involve the complication of whether costs can be awarded against a judge.

(xv) The 2015 Act uses the broad term “party” throughout both sections, rather than more specific terms such as plaintiff/defendant or applicant/respondent. Without overstating this point, it may be said that this is consistent with the Oireachtas intending that “civil proceedings” should extend beyond private law proceedings between ordinary litigants.

(xvi) The reference in s. 169 to costs being granted to a party who was “successful” in civil proceedings and against a party who was “not successful” in those proceedings, suggests that it was envisaged that the entitlement to costs would arise whenever one party was successful in the proceedings, either partially or entirely. Where, as a matter of fact, there is no successful or unsuccessful party, costs under the section may not arise (as was adjudged to be the case in Galfer).

(xvii) There appears to be nothing in the Act to indicate that it was intended to exclude a costs jurisdiction where one or other party to the proceedings was pursuing a private personal interest. Nor is there anything to indicate that costs orders should only be granted against a party pursuing a private personal interest. (xviii) I do not find the respondent’s argument under this heading to be persuasive. Most judicial review applications involve respondents who have no vested interest in the outcome of the administrative process being challenged. That does not deprive the High Court of jurisdiction to award costs against such bodies when it is appropriate to do so. I accept the applicant’s point that it is in the nature of administrative

decision-making that the decision-maker does not have a personal interest in the outcome.

(xix) Nor is there anything in the Act to indicate that it was intended to exclude a costs jurisdiction where one party was carrying out an administrative function or exercising a public duty under legislation. That is not to say that the last two points will not be relevant when it comes to determining the merits of a costs application, as distinct from the question of jurisdiction.

(xx) The Oireachtas was careful to stipulate in s. 169 two broad grounds upon which it may be appropriate for a court to depart from the default position of granting costs to the successful party. These broad grounds are firstly, the nature and circumstances of the case and secondly, the conduct of the proceedings by the parties.

(xxi) As noted in Little, the list of factors (a) to (g) set out within s. 169(1) that may be considered by a court when considering whether to depart from the default position of granting costs to the successful party is not exhaustive.

(xxii) The above factor suggests that in a disputed costs application, it may be open to a respondent seeking to resist costs to point to the potential undesirability of awarding costs against public officials who are exercising administrative statutory functions and not pursuing private personal interests. Important policy considerations such as these, referenced in cases such as McGrath and Galfer above, could be advanced as relevant factors to be taken into account under s. 169(1) as factors going to the nature and circumstances of the case and/ or as factors relevant to the conduct of the proceedings by the parties. (xxiii) A conclusion that the wording of the two provisions is sufficiently broad so as to allow a party to raise policy considerations along the lines of those mentioned in McGrath and Galfer reduces the force and appeal of the respondent’s jurisdictional arguments based upon such policy considerations.

(xxiv) With respect to parts of the 2015 Act, a binary distinction appears to be made between “civil proceedings” and “criminal proceedings”. On any Heather Hill analysis, this may be an important consideration. For example, within several subsections of s. 58 of the Act reference is made to complaints which consist of acts or omissions which were the subject of “civil proceedings or criminal proceedings”. This binary distinction appears in s. 58(4)(b), s. 58 5(b), s. 58(6)(a) and s. 58(6)(b).

(xxv) Section 211 of the 2015 Act substitutes a new s. 17 into the Courts Act 1971. The section deals with the right of audience of solicitors. It provides in summary that a solicitor who is acting for a party “in an action, suit, matter or criminal proceedings” in any court shall have a right of audience. While not in any sense determinative of matters, this language (which also featured in the original s. 17 of the 1971 Act) is also suggestive of a binary distinction between civil and criminal.

(xxvi) These references tend to indicate, in a general sense without overstating the point, that this binary distinction between civil and criminal was to the forefront of the minds of the framers of the two sections. (xxvii) For completeness, I should mention s. 65 of the Act which refers to “disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings”. Section 65(1) in material part provides that no answer or statement made, in the course of attempting to resolve a complaint in the manner specified in ss. 60, 61 and 64 of the Act by the complainant or the legal practitioner the subject of the complaint, may be used in any disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings. (xxviii)It seems to me, however, that the above reference to a tripartite (as opposed to a binary) distinction in s. 65(1) does not advance to any extent the debate as to the meaning of “civil proceedings” under the Act. The section is intended to create an incentive for complainants or legal practitioners who are the subject of complaints to seek to resolve complaints by mediation or other informal means. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the prohibition on using answers given in the course of attempting to resolve complaints by mediation would extend to “disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings”. Viewed in this way, it seems to me that s. 65 does not assist us one way or the other in ascertaining what the Oireachtas meant by “civil proceedings” in ss. 168/169.

(xxix) More important in my view is the structural decision by the Oireachtas in ss. 168/169 to confer a general costs power on all courts across the courts system, and not to do so by reference to the individual jurisdiction of each court level. This feature of the legislation, in a general but important sense, supports the applicant’s interpretation of “civil proceedings” over that of the respondent. In my view, the language and text of the two sections is suggestive of a parliamentary intention that there should be an equalizing of the costs power across all courts dealing with civil proceedings.

(xxx) The absence from the two sections of any reference to s. 77A of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 or indeed any limiting of the power to award costs based on individual subject-matter or areas of jurisdiction, also tends against the respondent's argument.

(xxxi) In my view, had it been the intention of the Oireachtas to limit the power of the District Court to award costs under the sections to only those matters set out within section 77A of the 1924 Act, that could quite easily have been achieved by the insertion of suitable wording. (xxxii) Separately, insofar as the approach mandated by Heather Hill permits the interpreting court to have regard to other enactments using the same wording as possible indicators of the legislature’s intention, it is noteworthy that in statutes both pre-dating and post-dating the LSRA 2015, the Oireachtas used the expression “civil proceedings” to denote any proceedings other than criminal proceedings (in other words, the applicant’s interpretation). (xxxiii)Examples of such provisions include s. 73 (1) of the Mental Health Act 2001 and s.

10 of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020. I consider these further below. While it is always necessary to be cautious about drawing any inferences from separate legislation, this fact at the very least tends against a conclusion that the applicant’s interpretation is in some way extreme or farfetched.

149. Without finally deciding the issue, it seems to me that all of these factors, individually and cumulatively, and in a general sense, point in favour of the applicant’s interpretation of the expression “civil proceedings” in ss. 168 and 169. However, before coming to a concluded view on the issue, I want to address further some of the respondent’s key arguments on the statutory interpretation question. I will start with the argument that licensing cases do not involve a lis inter partes.

(vi) Whether licensing cases involve a lis inter partes

150. The respondent submits that the Act assumes a joinder of issues and that absent such joinder of issues, there is no lis inter partes. The respondent says that in the absence of joined issues, it is difficult to envisage how ss. 168/169 can be applied. In my view, this argument is strained and inconsistent. The fact that proceedings may turn on a single key issue does not alter the nature of those proceedings, or turn it into something that it is not. If we take the simple example of an action for damages for personal injuries arising from a road accident, there may be a single issue between the parties where quantum of damages is agreed, subject to liability. The issue in dispute might be who had the green light in his favour when travelling through the junction. The fact that the proceedings may involve a single net issue does not take from the character of the proceedings as being “civil proceedings”. The same applies in my view to proceedings involving licencing matters or statutory appeals. Such proceedings may involve a single net issue, such as whether the applicant is a suitable person to hold a licence, or a series of issues or sub-issues, depending on the licensing or statutory scheme in question.

151. Secondly, the mere fact that s. 169(1) lists several factors ((a) to (g)) that may be taken into account when considering whether to depart from the default rule that costs should go to the successful party, does not mean that all of these factors must be engaged in order for the proceedings to constitute “civil proceedings” within the meaning of the section. Some cases may involve a multiplicity of issues, some may not. Some cases may involve exaggeration, some may not. Some cases may involve a payment into court, some may not. Merely because a proceeding may not tick all of these boxes, does not take from its character as “civil proceedings”.

152. Thirdly, as a matter of logic, it is difficult to see how the sparseness or brevity of an appeal document or pleading should affect whether a licensing matter or statutory appeal comes within the definition. Provided the proceedings involve both a justiciable claim that is not criminal in nature and a party/parties who can be adjudged successful or not successful, the sections of the Act would appear to have application such that the court will have jurisdiction to consider the question of costs.

153. Fourthly, the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Galfer was that the High Court judge’s decision on costs was legally unsound, not because there was no jurisdiction to award costs against the Superintendent of An Garda Síochána in a case stated involving a licensing matter in the District Court, but because the High Court had given insufficient consideration to the policy considerations concerning the respondent’s statutory role, non-involvement as a partisan player in the proceedings, the absence of any private personal interest in the outcome and the potential “chilling effect” of an adverse costs order on the respondent’s functions.

154. The fact that the Court of Appeal upheld an order of costs in the related case of Triode further supports this conclusion. In my view, Galfer stands as an authority more in favour of the applicant’s position than against it. The key fact in Galfer that determined the outcome was the High Court’s finding that the respondent had remained neutral and had not entered the fray. Therefore, it could not be said the respondent was “not successful” in the proceedings.

155. Nobody is saying that proceedings involving licensing matters or statutory appeals are one and the same as civil proceedings between two private litigants. They are not. But that is not the issue. It is not the law that proceedings involving public bodies may not be characterised as civil proceedings. What can be said, however, is that the fact that a public body exercising statutory functions may be a party to proceedings may potentially give rise to an argument on costs, including an argument for departing from the default position of awarding costs to the successful party. That will ultimately be a matter for the judge hearing the costs application to determine, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties.

(vii) Argument that the LSRA 2015 cannot be interpreted to have amended the position pertaining under the 1924 Act as identified in Hayes and Mansfield

156. This argument has greater substance in my view. The issue of the jurisdiction to award costs in licensing matters arose in two separate cases prior to the commencement of the 2014 District Court Rules. In Hayes, the applicant successfully appealed to the District Court against the refusal of the respondent to grant him a firearms certificate. The District Judge stated a case to the High Court on the question of whether the District Court had jurisdiction to award costs. The Firearms Acts were silent on the question. Peart J. held, answering the case stated in the negative, that O. 51 of the District Court Rules 1997 did not give the District Court Judge jurisdiction to award costs on an appeal under s. 15A of the Firearms Acts 1925 to 2009. Secondly, he held that while the definition of “civil proceedings” in the District Court Rules 1997 used the word “includes” with regard to the civil cases described in s. 77A of the 1924 Act, that did not mean that the definition was all encompassing and was so wide as to cover an appeal under s. 15A of the Firearms Acts.

157. Subsequently in Mansfield, Baker J. considered the jurisdiction to award costs in appeals to the District Court brought by applicants seeking firearms certificates. Baker J. reviewed the judgments of Peart J. in Hayes and O’Malley J. in HSE v. O.A. While she agreed with O’Malley J.’s conclusions, she felt that the analysis of Peart J. was more in point. Baker

J. concluded that licensing cases such as those before the court fell outside the definition of “civil proceedings” in the District Court Rules 1997. Baker J. followed Peart J.’s analysis as to the division of subject-matter in the District Court in s. 77 of the 1924 Act into three categories of cases: A: Civil Cases; B: Criminal Cases; and C: matters pertaining to certificates and licences.

158. The respondent relies on these two cases in support of his argument that the expression “civil proceedings” in ss. 168/169 excludes licensing cases. He submits that as a matter of context, by the time of the enactment of the LSRA 2015, the High Court in Hayes had already found that licensing matters falling under s. 77C of the 1924 Act do not constitute civil proceedings. Moreover, the respondent contends that nothing in the 2015 Act was intended to confer additional jurisdiction on the District Court in respect of costs in matters such as licensing or was intended to repeal the division of jurisdiction between “licensing” and “civil” as established by the 1924 Act.

159. The respondent also submits that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Little does not assist the court in the interpretation question because Little was clearly only considering the Rules of the Superior Courts. Moreover, the respondent relies upon the presumption against radical changes of the law in the absence of clear language.

160. I think the ‘prior statutory landscape’ aspect of the respondent’s argument has greater force. This is one of the reasons why the statutory interpretation question in this case is quite complex. I will begin by considering the respondent’s reliance on Hayes and Mansfield for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of “civil proceedings” in ss. 168 and 169.

161. The first point to be made is an obvious point of simple timing: neither case relied upon considered the LSRA 2015. That is important. Moreover, the wording under interpretation in Hayes was the definition of “civil proceedings” contained within the DCR 1997 which expressly referred to “civil cases as described in section 77A of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924” (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, Peart J. concluded that that definition in the 1997 Rules did not cover licensing matters described in s.77C of the 1924 Act. However, that is not the issue that I have to decide. I am not interpreting the wording of District Court Rules. Rather, I am concerned with the meaning of “civil proceedings” as that expression appears in ss. 168/169 of the LSRA 2015. It follows that neither Hayes nor Mansfield is determinative of the issue I have to decide.

162. Secondly, insofar as the respondent relies on the fact that the 1924 Act has not been repealed, it is necessary to step back and consider precisely what that Act says. It is correct that the 1924 Act divides the work of the District Court into the three areas (A, B and C) mentioned. However, the 1924 Act neither establishes nor outlaws a costs jurisdiction in category “C” dealing with licensing cases. Instead, the power to award costs under the earlier enactment is addressed in rules of court, rather than the Act itself. It follows that a finding that the LSRA 2015 confers a costs jurisdiction on the District Court in licensing cases would not, in and of itself, offend any express provision within the 1924 Act. The District Court’s areas of jurisdiction are not being disturbed. The furthest the respondent can put the matter is to say that there is nothing in the 2015 Act to suggest that it was intended to repeal the distinction in s. 77 of the 1924 Act between “licensing” and “civil” cases.

163. The respondent also relies on the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant and cites DPP v. Grey in that regard. This rule of statutory interpretation provides that, when Parliament has provided specifically by statute for a limited set of circumstances, there is a presumption that general words in a later statute are not to be taken as overriding the earlier specific provisions, unless an intention to do so is clearly expressed.

164. In my view, the respondent’s arguments under this heading overlook a number of important points. Firstly, in creating the general power to award costs in civil proceedings across all courts, the Oireachtas has undoubtedly broken new ground. It is not necessary to repeat Murray J.’s comprehensive analysis in Little tracing the origin and development of the costs power in the Superior Courts and declaring the effects of the LSRA 2015 on the 1924 and 1961 Acts. Secondly, in conferring the general power, the 2015 Act does not distinguish between jurisdictions or subject-matter. The new costs jurisdiction created by the Act is conferred on “a court”. The entitlement to seek costs is conferred on “a party to civil proceedings” by s. 168. Therefore, the boundary or remit of the new costs jurisdiction extends to parties in “civil proceedings” across all courts.

165. Thirdly, the distinction between “licensing” and “civil” in the 1924 Act (which in any event refers to “Civil Cases” and not “civil proceedings”) is not expressly carried over.

166. Fourthly, there is no indication in the 2015 Act that the meaning of “civil proceedings” should vary, depending on the particular court. In fact, I regard as a significant weakness in the respondent’s overall thesis the absence of any suggested meaning for the expression as it applies across all courts. That is to say, the respondent has suggested a meaning for “civil proceedings” in the District Court, but has not put forward a meaning for the expression as it applies elsewhere in the courts system.

167. The parties addressed a question from the court on this specific issue in their supplemental submissions. The applicant submitted that there is nothing in the LSRA 2015 which indicates that it was intended that, for the purposes of ss. 168 and 169, the meaning of the term “civil proceedings” would vary depending on the jurisdiction involved. The respondent’s submission was that it was not being contended that the term “civil proceedings”

in ss. 168 and 169 had a different meaning depending on the particular court. However, at a level of principle, according to the respondent, the application of the Heather Hill approach to statutory interpretation “could result in a general concept (such as “civil proceedings”) having a different meaning in a different court, depending on the particular statutory framework.” I do not regard this argument as sustainable, notwithstanding the ingenuity of the wording. I think the applicant is correct that from first principles, it does not appear possible for a term within an Act to hold two separate meanings at the same time.

168. Fifthly, it is difficult to reconcile the respondent’s argument that “civil proceedings” should have the same meaning as “civil cases” in s. 77A of the 1924 Act, with O’Malley J.’s

conclusion at para. 36 in HSE v. O.A. with respect to the District Court Rules 1997 that “[t]here does not seem to be, for the purposes of the question of costs, a distinction between public and private civil proceedings”.

169. The respondent’s reliance on the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant is misplaced. The maxim does not operate to limit the meaning of “civil proceedings” in the 2015 Act. The 1924 and 1961 Acts deal with the substantive jurisdiction of courts generally whereas ss. 168/169 of the 2015 Act deal specifically with the creation of a power to award costs in all courts. No part of this judgment declares that the earlier enactments have been repealed. Nonetheless, it is clear from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Little that the 2015 Act may have altered the effects of the earlier enactments.

170. In my view, the argument as to the non-repeal of the 1924 Act and as to the distinction drawn in s. 77 between “civil” and “licensing” cases, is being left to carry too great a load in the respondent’s overall argument, particularly in circumstances where neither the 1924 Act or the distinction drawn within s. 77 is anywhere mentioned in the two sections under discussion.

171. Insofar as the respondent relies on s. 19 of the Interpretation Act 2005 to argue that the expression “civil proceedings” in the 2014 District Court Rules should be defined as having the same meaning as the expression “Civil Cases” in s. 77A of the 1924 Act, I do not think this avails the respondent. In the first instance, as mentioned already, the expression “civil proceedings” is clearly not the same as the expression “Civil Cases”. In a general sense, transplanting meanings from earlier enactments is not permissible where different language has been used. Moreover, since 1924, many other jurisdictions in diverse areas of the law have been conferred on the District Court by statute. Those jurisdictions include the power to make childcare orders under the Child Care Act 1991, and O’Malley J. held that child care proceedings were “civil proceedings” within the meaning of Order 53’s predecessor, Order 51 of the 1997 DCR.

(viii) Presumption against radical changes in the law in the absence of clear language

172. The respondent also relies upon the presumption against radical changes in the law in the absence of clear language and references the significant implications which would flow from a finding that the 2015 Act confers a jurisdiction on the District Court to award costs in licensing matters. The respondent says this would constitute a fundamental change to the jurisdiction of the District Court.

173. It is correct that from the outset of their studies, students are taught that the common law moves incrementally, in small steps. That is an important principle. It bears repeating, however, that the exercise the court is engaged in here is to interpret the meaning of legislation enacted by the Oireachtas. As the democratically elected representatives of the people, the Oireachtas can pass an Act to change the law. The change may be modest, or the change may be radical. That is a matter for the legislature. The court’s task is not to write the law, but to interpret and apply it. Since the Oireachtas has chosen not to define what was meant by “civil proceedings”, it falls to the court to do its best to interpret the meaning.

174. In the course of his judgment in Heather Hill at para. 164, Murray J. referenced the presumption against radical amendments and stated that he cannot but think that the principle is sometimes now applied beyond its proper limits. He stated that: “One would expect that every statute ‘changes’ the law, and the limitations of language are such that it often happens that it can be said a law lacks clarity. Few statutes do not in some shape or form impinge upon rights (and in particular property rights) or effect alterations to the general law that cannot be described from someone’s perspective as significantly departing from the pre-existing legal assumptions. There is no presumption against any of this. What there is, as the quoted passage [from Henchy

J. in Minister for Industry and Commerce v. Hales [1967] IR 50 citing Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (11th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 1962)] shows, is a presumption that imprecise language will not be interpreted so as to impose significant changes to the pre-existing law particularly ‘where the change is contrary to the actual objects of the Act’ . To that might be added a related presumption that legislation will be strictly construed when it interferes with vested rights”. (emphasis added)

175. In my view, it cannot be said that the language of ss. 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 is imprecise. The sections very clearly confer a statutory power to award costs. They confer that power on “a court”. The respondent accepts, correctly, that that includes the District Court. The only area of debate identified is the one we have been discussing, namely the boundary of “civil proceedings”. For the reasons I have already outlined, I do not believe that by preferring the applicant’s interpretation of “civil proceedings” in ss. 168 and 169 over that of the respondent, the court is introducing a change that is contrary to the 1924 Act, the 1961 Act or the LSRA 2015. Nor is the court by a side wind “repealing” the earlier enactments. The dividing of the jurisdiction of the District Court into the three areas mentioned in s. 77 of the 1924 Act remains undisturbed. The District Court continues to have jurisdiction in the areas described.

176. I also take into account that the meaning of “civil proceedings” suggested by the applicant is more consistent with the meaning used in modern enactments. I have mentioned already s. 73 of the Mental Health Act 2001 which provides that no civil proceedings shall be instituted in respect of an act purporting to have been done in pursuance of the 2001 Act save by leave of the High Court and such leave shall not be refused unless the High Court is satisfied:

a) that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or b) that there are no reasonable grounds for contending that the person against whom the proceedings are brought acted in bad faith or without reasonable care. The section was considered by the Court of Appeal in E.C. v. Ireland and the AG [2025] IECA 55 where Collins J. stated at para. 27: “On their face, the words “civil proceedings” encompass all justiciable claims that are not criminal in nature, including those that raise issues of public law: the title of Robertson, The Law and Practice of Civil proceedings by and against the Crown and Departments of the Government (London, 1908) refers”. This judicial definition seems to me to be consistent with the applicant’s interpretation.

177. Another modern definition of “civil proceedings” is provided by s. 10 of the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 where the expression is defined as including “any cause, action, suit or matter, other than a criminal proceeding, in any court”. Again, while great care needs to be taken when extrapolating from other legislation concerned with completely different areas of the law, this meaning of the phrase as laid down by the Oireachtas is also, broadly speaking, consistent with the meaning contended for by the applicant.

178. The applicant’s interpretation is also, in a general sense and at a level of principle, consistent with a litigant’s right of access to the courts, as protected by Article 40.3 of the Constitution. I have already referenced the statement of O’Malley J. in HSE v. O.A. where she noted that costs are an aspect of the right of access to the courts and the statement of O’Donnell

J. in McGrath that costs are part of the administration of justice. Baker J. also noted in Mansfield at para. 73 that the possibility of obtaining an award of costs may be one aspect of the right of access to the courts, and that this was clear from the judgment of Finlay P. in Henehan v. Allied Irish Banks Limited (Unreported, High Court, Finlay P. 19th October, 1984) wherein he said that it was “part of the ancillary machinery associated with the access of citizens to the Courts”. Also relevant in this regard is the statement of Murray C.J. (well before the LSRA 2015) in Dunne that the rule of law that the successful party to proceedings should not have to pay the costs of those proceedings which should be borne by the unsuccessful party, has an obvious equitable basis.

Applicant’s reliance on the subpoena and discovery powers of the District Court

179. The applicant has identified several procedural powers under the District Court Rules which the applicant argues would be unavailable if the respondent’s interpretation of “civil proceedings” is accepted. Order 45B, rule 3(3) of the DCR provides that an application for discovery “relating to any matter in question in the civil proceeding” may be made to the District Court. Order 45B provides that the Court may order the production of documents in “civil proceedings”. Order 46, rule 1 provides that a witness summons may be issued in “civil proceedings”. The applicant contends that none of these procedural powers are separately provided for in cases involving “licensing” and/or statutory appeals, presumably because the definition of “civil proceedings” in the “Interpretation of Terms” section includes such cases. The applicant contends that if those cases are not considered to be “civil proceedings”, then the District Court would have no power to make an order for discovery, to produce documents or to compel the attendance of witnesses when hearing the matter in question.

180. The respondent has raised an objection to the court considering this aspect of the applicant’s argument in circumstances where the issue only arose in reply on the final day of the hearing, and was only fleshed out in detail in the supplemental submissions requested by the court. The respondent also contends that, had these issues been properly pleaded and leave obtained to advance them, they could have been fully addressed by the respondent in evidence and in the pleadings.

181. Since the respondent has not had an opportunity to respond to these arguments by way of oral submissions, I am inclined to the view that I should not have regard to these issues when arriving at my decision in the case. However, since the case may be the subject of an appeal, I am mentioning these issues so that they can be fully addressed by both sides, should that be considered appropriate.

182. In the same context, I will mention again the decision of Baker J. in Mansfield which, according to the respondent’s argument, is authority for the proposition that when the District Court is hearing a licensing appeal, it is still exercising its licensing jurisdiction. In other words, it is immaterial that s. 77C of the 1924 Act refers to “granting certificates for spirit and other licences”, because Mansfield established that this goes further than drinks licences. It seems to me that on Worldport principles (Worldport Ireland Limited (In liquidation) [2005] IEHC 189) I should follow Baker J. on that discrete issue. In saying that, I don’t wish in any way to be taken as differing from Baker J.’s view, merely that an appellate court will be free to depart from that view, if considered appropriate.

183. Returning to the core issue for determination, drawing these various points together, it seems to me that there are sufficient pointers within the 2015 Act to indicate that, when conferring upon all courts a power to award costs, it was not intended to differentiate between licensing and civil proceedings. I have come to the view that the meaning of “civil proceedings” contended for by the applicant - namely any inter partes proceedings not including criminal proceedings - constitutes the plain meaning of the words chosen by the Oireachtas. The applicant’s definition is readily understandable by lawyers and non-lawyers alike, is supported by the language and purpose of other sections, is supported by the text of the statute when viewed in its proper context, and is consistent with the objectives of ss. 168 and 169 to establish a wide and general power to award costs in civil proceedings across our system of courts.

184. It follows therefore, in my view, that the learned District Judge was incorrect to conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant costs in the applicant’s taxi licence appeal. It need hardly be said that no criticism whatsoever can be made of the District Judge in the circumstances, who did not have the benefit of the additional materials with which I was provided, particularly with respect to the LSRA 2015, or the supplemental written submissions which I found of considerable assistance.

185. My conclusion on the statutory interpretation question regarding the LSRA 2015 makes it unnecessary for the court to address more fully the applicant’s second argument concerning the import of rules of court made in 2014 under s. 91 of the 1924 Act and s. 34 of the 1961 Act, or the applicant’s fallback argument regarding the suggested denial of his right of access to justice or an effective remedy.

F. Guidance on costs applications in licensing matters and statutory appeals

186. If I am correct in my conclusion that the District Court does enjoy a costs jurisdiction in licensing matters, it may be helpful if I reiterate some points by way of general guidance for any judge who has to deal with such an application. Obviously, the first port of call is the statute itself which provides in ss. 168 and 169 the criteria to be applied. Secondly, judges will have the guidance of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the two provisions in Little to assist them. I don’t wish to say anything that might risk cutting across that guidance.

187. Thirdly, as I mentioned at the beginning of my analysis, the mere fact that there may be a power to award costs in licensing matters does not mean that costs should be awarded in any given case. It will be a matter for the individual judge dealing with the costs application in each case to decide whether, having regard to the overall circumstances of the case, including any policy considerations that may be relevant on the facts, costs should be awarded and, if so, in what proportion.

188. Murray J. states at para. 38 of Little that, while the discretion to award costs conferred by s. 168(1)(a) is general and wide, it is conditioned by s. 169(1) in one critical respect. That condition demands that where a party is “entirely successful in civil proceedings” that party is “entitled” to their costs “unless the court orders otherwise”. The power to order “otherwise” must be exercised “having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties”. The section then sets out a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be taken into account in that regard at s. 169(1)(a) to (g).

189. Arising from this, where a judge is considering whether to depart from the default rule of granting costs to the party who has been “entirely successful” in the proceedings, the two areas the judge must have regard to are “the particular nature and circumstances of the case” and “the conduct of the proceedings by the parties”. These appear to be broad considerations that give a degree of latitude to a judge in an individual case to decide what specific factors coming within those parameters should weigh in the costs calculus. A judge may also, of course, take into account the specific factors identified in the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in s. 169(1)(a) to (g).

190. A judge will also have the benefit of relevant caselaw including the decision of the Court of appeal in Galfer where Whelan J. identifies the policy considerations that may be relevant in a costs dispute relating to a licensing application. The costs in question in that particular case were the costs of the Case Stated proceedings in the High Court, but it seems to me, nonetheless, that the judgment is helpful in identifying policy considerations that may be of relevance in a costs dispute in a licensing case in the District Court.

191. Amongst the factors considered by Whelan J. on the facts of that case in declining to grant costs against the respondent Superintendent were:

• whether it could fairly be characterised that the respondent was “not successful” in the proceedings within the meaning of s. 169(1);

• whether the respondent had confined his role to remaining neutral or had acted as legitimus contradictor;

• the statutory role of the respondent in licensing applications;

• the risk of a “chilling effect” on the proper discharge of the respondent’s statutory function of an adverse costs order;

• the risk of prejudice to the public interest on the facts of a given case;

• whether the respondent had acted unreasonably or in bad faith;

• whether the respondent was pursuing a private interest in the litigation or its outcome; At the end of the day, the question of whether to grant costs, and in what proportion, will be a matter for the discretion of the individual judge in each case to be exercised in accordance with the principles set out within ss. 168 and 169 of the 2015 Act.

G. Conclusion

192. In the circumstances, I propose to grant an order of Certiorari quashing the decision of the learned District Judge, holding that the District Court had no jurisdiction to grant costs in the applicant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal to renew his taxi licence. I will hear the parties on the terms of the final orders and on the question of remittal.

Signed: Micheál O’Higgins

Appearances: For the applicant: Rosario Boyle SC and Marie Flynn BL instructed by Thomas Coughlan & Co. Solicitors For the respondent: Catherine Donnelly SC and Kilda Mooney SC instructed by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office