High Court dismisses surrender application as no exceptional family circumstances justify refusal under Article 8.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 752

[2025 05 EXT]

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER S. 16 OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003, AS AMENDED.

BETWEEN

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

APPLICANT

AND

LUCIE BALOGOVA

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Patrick McGrath delivered on the 19 December 2025

A. BACKGROUND

1. The Czech authorities seek the surrender of the Respondent on a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in order that she might serve a sentence of imprisonment imposed in Czechia. She has already been the subject an application for her surrender on two EAWs received from Czechia and, in a judgment delivered by this Court on the 21 October 2025, ([2025] IEHC 560), her surrender was ordered thereon.

2. In this EAW, her surrender is sought to serve a sentence of imprisonment of 6 months with 183 days, 23 hours and 10 minutes remaining to be served.

3. In Section D, Box 1 is rendered in bold, stating that “Yes, the person appeared in person at the trial resulting in the decision”. No issue therefore arises pursuant to s. 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 (as amended) [‘the 2003 Act’].

4. In section F, it states that the respondent’s sentence was conditionally suspended for a period of 12 months. However, that suspension was lifted on the 2 March 2023 but she was not required to serve the sentence immediately as she then was given a further suspension to care for her child. The sentence was in fact to be reactivated on the 19 August 2023, but she did not appear as required to serve her sentence.

5. The respondent was arrested on the 13 January 2025 on foot of this EAW and brought before the High Court on the same date. She was granted bail upon hearing evidence of arrest and has remained on bail pending the outcome of these proceedings.

6. I am satisfied that the person before the court, the respondent, is the person in respect of whom the EAW was issued. No issue was raised in that regard.

7. I am satisfied that none of the matters referred to in section 22, 23 and 24 of the 2003 Act, arise for consideration in this application and surrender of the respondent is not precluded for any of the reasons set forth in any of those sections.

8. I am satisfied that the minimum gravity requirements of the Act of 2003 have been met.

The sentence in respect of which surrender is sought is in excess of four months’ imprisonment.

9. The respondent objects to surrender on the following grounds:-

(i) Surrender is precluded by under s. 38 of the 2003 Act.

(ii) Surrender is precluded by reason of interference with Article 8 ECHR rights

Correspondence

10. This is not a case where the IJA seeks to rely upon any of the categories of cases set out in Article 2.2 of the Framework Decision. Correspondence must therefore be shown.

11. Part E of the EAW describes the acts of omissions which constitute the offence are stated as follows: ‘She negligently failed to properly ensure the compulsory school attendance of her minor children Michal Balog (DOB: 26 April 2009), Milan Balog (DOB:

15 March 2007), and Hermina Demeterova (DOB: 20 June 2012) in Ceska Lipa, Liberec, or elsewhere, in the period starting from 1 September 2020 to 15 June 2021, i.e. in the school year 2020/2021, at the time when the schools were closed due to the health risks caused by the pandemic of Covid-19 in the Czech Republic. She encouraged them in an idle lifestyle, which resulted in them missing a high number of classes, while Lucie Balogova failed to cooperate with the schools, excuse her children’s absence in time and duly during the usual attendance or distant learning, prepare them duly for the lessons, and ensure that they could catch up with their classmates in the knowledge gap caused by their absence at school, therefore, by her conduct, she endangered the intellectual and moral development of the minor children, who led an idle way of life in which they did not develop habits to work regularly.’

12. On the 27 January 2025, a request was sent to the IJA made under s. 20 of the 2003 Act seeking further information as to the nature of the offence of which the respondent was convicted as follows:

‘[P]lease set out in detail the steps, if any, that are required by any statutory authority to ensure that a parent is aware of their responsibility to ensure school attendance before they may be prosecuted for an offence contrary to Section 201(1)(b) of Act No.40/2009, the Criminal Code.’

13. In their reply dated the 3 February 2025, the IJA stated as follows:

‘I hereby inform you that the District Court in Louny has communicated with the District Court in Česká Lípa, which convicted the convict Balogová in this criminal case. In cooperation with the District Court in Česká Lípa, it was established that the Lucie Balogová had been communicated with the competent authorities, namely by the probation officer of the Department for Social and Legal Protection of Children and by non-profit organisations, and had been instructed that school attendance of children is compulsory and that children must go to school. The convict Balogová was instructed that she should start communicating with the school, but the convict changed her address often and that´s why it wasn´t possible to work with family frequently. Competent authorities helped the family and the convict Balogová with their housing situation. Nevertheless, the convicted Balogová did not take care of her children's school attendance for a long time and was therefore convicted by the District Court in Česká Lípa for this offence.’

14. A further s. 20 was issued dated the 20 March 2025 which asked:-

‘Was Lucie Balogova personally served with a formal notice informing her that she is required to ensure her children’s attendance at school and, if so, was she informed that, if she failed to comply with that requirement, she would be guilty of a criminal offence and subject to penal sanctions?’

15. A response was received dated the 26 March 2025 which stated the following:-

‘…Lucie Balogova was personally served with a formal notice informing her that she is required to ensure her children’s attendance at school and she was informed that, if she failed to comply with that requirement, she would be guilty of a criminal offence and subject to penal sanctions.

The District Court in Louny decided only on the suspension of her sentence because of the birth of her child, not on the guilt itself, so we do not have all the documents. However, we have established that the child welfare authority and other organisations have repeatedly worked with the convict after her previous release from prison. In the Czech Republic, school attendance is compulsory and according to the law parents are obliged to provide it; every citizen knows that violation of this obligation is a criminal offence. The convict herself stated before the probation officer that she knew that she did not send her children to school. She was last advised on 9 February 2021 that school attendance was compulsory, yet she failed to provide it.’

16. The applicant submits that the corresponding offence is one under s. 25 of the Education (Welfare) Act 2000. Section 25 provides as follows:- ‘—(1) Subject to section 17(2), the Child and Family Agency shall, if of opinion that a parent is failing or neglecting to cause his or her child to attend a recognised school in accordance with this Act, serve a notice (hereafter in this section referred to as a “school attendance notice”) on such parent—

(a) requiring him or her on the expiration of such period as is specified in the notice, to cause his or her child named in the notice to attend such recognised school as is specified in the notice, and there to attend on each school day that the notice is in force, and

(b) informing him or her that if he or she fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (a) he or she shall be guilty of an offence.

(2) A school attendance notice under this section shall remain in force for such period as may be specified in the notice or until it is revoked by the Child and Family Agency.

(3) Before making a school attendance notice the Child and Family Agency shall, in such manner as it considers appropriate, make all reasonable efforts to consult with—

(a) the parents of the child concerned, and

(b) the principal of the recognised school that the Child and Family Agency proposes to specify in such notice, and shall, when so specifying a recognised school, have regard, as far as is practicable, to the preference (if any) expressed by the said parents.

(4) A person who contravenes a requirement in a school attendance notice shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £500, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) shall, on each day after having been convicted of such offence on which he or she continues to contravene a requirement in the school attendance notice to which that offence relates, be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £200, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.’ Submissions of Respondent

17. The respondent submits that it seems that she is being prosecuted for not having adequately home schooled her children during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic and that this does not meet the requirements of double criminality under the 2003 Act.

18. In her grounding affidavit dated 3 March 2025, the respondent says:-

[2] I am of Roma ethnicity and have suffered from extreme prejudice in all aspects of my life in Czechia. My older children, Michal Balog (15 years old)

and Hermina Demeterova (12 years old) were bullied at school in Czechia by reason of their ethnicity. They have flourished in school here in Portlaoise.

Their father is serving a custodial prison sentence in Czechia and thus has no part in their support or upbringing.

Situation at the time of the offence alleged on the EAW:

[7] I made absolutely every possible effort to ensure that my children’s education was not disrupted during the period of the COVID 19 pandemic. I lived at women’s refuges in Ceska Lipa during much of that period. My children’s education is of the highest importance to me.

[8] In the period from in or around May 2020 I resided at a mother and children’s refuge, Nabytek Jamall, in Ceska Lipa, Czechia. I stayed there for a period of in or around six months. I celebrated Christmas 2020 at a separate mother and children’s refuge, Jonas, in Ceska Lipa, Czechia. I lived with my children at Jonas Refuge for a period of in or around 6 months or so through 2021. During the majority of our time staying at Jonas Refuge, our residential accommodation was subject to quarantine rules such that we stayed on the site continuously.’

19. The respondent submits that the acts as described in the warrant do not correspond to any offence contrary to Irish law and specifically to an offence contrary to s. 25 of the Education (Welfare) Act, 2000. Submissions of Applicant

20. The applicant submits that correspondence is made out in this case.

21. It is submitted that if one overlays the requirements of s. 25 of the 2000 Act on the narrative account of the steps taken by the Czech authorities to ensure the attendance of the respondent’s children at school, close correspondence is shown.

22. The first ingredient of the offence under Irish law is that an appropriate statutory authority is “of opinion that a parent is failing or neglecting to cause his or her child to attend a recognised school”. It is said that it is axiomatic there was neglect on the part of the respondent in this regard as it is stated in the Warrant and Additional Information that the respondent “negligently failed to properly ensure the compulsory school attendance of her children”.

23. The additional information discloses that “it was established that the Lucie Balogová had been communicated with the competent authorities, namely by the probation officer of the Department for Social and Legal Protection of Children and by non-profit organisations and had been instructed that school attendance of children is compulsory and that children must go to school”. It is submitted that it is therefore reasonable to infer that the relevant enforcement authority was of the opinion that there may have been neglect.

24. The applicant further submits that it is clear that she was served with notice of the requirement that her children attend school which is the second ingredient of the relevant corresponding offence under Irish law. That may be reasonably inferred, in light of the clear statement that the respondent was informed that school attendance was compulsory, that she was notified that it was an offence on her part to fail to ensure school attendance.

25. The Minister submits that the statutory regime for ensuring attendance of children at school, inasmuch as the role of the parent is engaged and concerned are, in substance, sufficiently similar for the purpose of assessing correspondence.

26. Insofar as the respondent relies on the obiter dictum of Charleton J in People (DPP) v.

FN [2022] IESC 22 that, in short, all of the ingredients of the offence in Irish law should be met by the requirements of the law in the issuing State, the Respondent submits that all of the ingredients are present in this case: formation of the opinion by the statutory authority of an instance of neglect on the part of the parent; the non-attendance is not accepted; notice of non-compliance is served on the parent and the parent is warned that failure to comply is a criminal offence.

Discussion

27. Section 5 of the Act of 2003 provides the framework for the assessment of double criminality:

[5.] For the purposes of this Act, an offence specified in a relevant arrest warrant corresponds to an offence under the law of the State, where the act or omission that constitutes the offence as specified would, if committed in the State on the date on which the relevant arrest warrant is issued, constitute an offence under the law of the State.

28. In delivering the Judgment of Supreme Court in MJ v. Dolny [2009] IESC 48, Denham J described the process under s. 5 as follows:

[38.] In addressing the issue of correspondence it is necessary to consider the particulars on the warrant, the acts, to decide if they would constitute an offence in the State. In considering the issue it is appropriate to read the warrant as a whole. In so reading the particulars it is a question of determining whether there is a corresponding offence. It is a question of determining if the acts alleged were such that if committed in this jurisdiction they would constitute an offence.

It is not a helpful analogy to consider whether the words would equate with the terms of an indictment in this jurisdiction. Rather it is a matter of considering the acts described and deciding whether they would constitute an offence committed in this jurisdiction’

29. In MJ v. Szall [2013] IESC 7 the Supreme Court considered the issue of correspondence in the context of statutory or regulatory regimes. In that case the Court was considering whether there was correspondence between Polish and Irish offences which both essentially involved the same type of criminal act: remaining at large from prison subsequent to a permitted temporary release period – (see para. [12]–[13]). The Court noted that, in substance, each of the Polish and Irish offences involved the same criminal acts; the difference arising only insofar as the breach of the relevant statutory regimes could naturally not mirror each other, since those statutory schemes arise within different jurisdictions.

30. The court explained that once it was established that the requirements of the statutory regimes, as well as the acts involved in the breach of the regimes, were “sufficiently similar/equivalent” then on the level of principle correspondence could be demonstrated. Clarke CJ stated as follows at paragraph 40 of his judgment:-

‘ … Where, therefore, the offence specified in the relevant European arrest warrant involves the same acts or omissions by reference to a regime in the requesting state then, at least at the level of principle, correspondence can be established provided that there is a sufficient similarity between the respective regimes to justify the conclusion that the substance of the acts or omissions which amount to offences in the respective jurisdictions is the same even though the specific relevant regimes will necessarily be, as a matter of law, different, emanating as they will from the legal systems of the two separate jurisdictions.’

31. I am of the view that a comparison between the two statutory or regulatory regimes in Ireland and the Czech Republic shows sufficient similarity for the purposes of correspondence.

32. Under each regime the purpose of the legislation is inter alia to ensure that those who are responsible for the care of young children, usually parents, comply with their obligation to ensure that such children attend publicly provided school for the purposes of education.

33. Each regime provides a graduated process which ultimately can lead to the parent being prosecuted and punished for failing to ensure that a child in their care attends school.

Under both Irish and Czech law a public body or agency initially forms a view that there are concerns that the parent is not ensuring the child is attending school and thereafter makes contact with the parent and (a) informs or reminds him or her of their duty in this regard and (b) specifically warns the parent that, should he or she fail to make sure the child attends school in the future, he or she might be charged with a criminal offence.

34. The evidence in this case establishes the following:-

(i) The relevant authorities in Czechia (a probation offer in the Department for Social and Legal Protection of Children) contacted the Respondent instructing her that the school attendance of her three children was compulsory and she should begin contact with the school authorities for such purpose;

(ii) She was served personally with a notice informing her of this requirement that her children attend school and furthermore informed that, if she failed to comply with this requirement, she would be guilty of a criminal offence and subject to penal sanction;

(iii) She failed to comply with this requirement over a period of time and was subsequently convicted of the offence for which her surrender is now sought.

35. The Respondent submits that the statutory / regulatory regime in the two jurisdictions cannot be said to be ‘sufficiently similar’ in the sense explained by Clarke CJ in Szall.

The Respondent so submits on the basis that, in order to be liable under the corresponding Irish law (s. 25 of the Education (Welfare) Act, 2000 ), there must have been a failure by a parent to ensure the attendance of a child at a ‘recognised school’ and that a failure to ensure (as happened here) a child’s online attendance at school during the recent covid pandemic would not constitute an offence under Irish law.

36. Accepting that it would not be an offence in Ireland to have failed to ensure the attendance of a child at online classes, this does not in my view lead to the conclusion that the two regimes are not ‘sufficiently similar’, in the Szall sense, for the purposes of correspondence.

37. The underlying public or social policy is the same in each state, namely the regular attendance of children at state provided education. The responsibility for ensuring such attendance is put upon the primary carer of the child in each jurisdiction, usually the parent. Under each scheme a public body, having become aware that it seems the parent is not meeting these obligations, makes contact with the parent and instructs or reminds the parent of his or her obligation. Furthermore, in both Ireland and Czechia the parent is made aware in writing, not only of this obligation but also of the risk that they would be prosecuted and punished if they do not ensure the attendance of their child or children in school.

38. In these circumstances, although it may be the case that a parent could not have been prosecuted for failing to have his or her child attend online during Covid in Ireland, I am nonetheless of the view, for all the above reasons, that the two regimes are sufficiently similar and that correspondence is made out between the offence in the Czech Republic and that in Ireland, namely an offence contrary to s. 25 of the Education (Welfare) Act, 2000.

Article 8

Respondent submissions

39. It is accepted by the Respondent that, provided minimum gravity is met, the proportionality of a decision to issue a EAW is a matter exclusively within the remit of the issuing state. In this regard she refers to the following comments of MacMenamin J in Minister for Justice v Ostrowski [2013] IESC 24, at paragraph 30 of his judgment:

‘Once an EAW meets the minimum gravity test for an offence set out in the Framework

Decision and the Act of 2003, it is not for the High Court to create and apply a proportionality test to a potential sentence’.

40. The Respondent recognises that the threshold for this court to intervene on Article 8 grounds is necessarily high, as made clear in decisions such Minister for Justice v D.E.

[2020] IEHC 756 and the Supreme Court in Minister for Justice v Vestartas [2020] IESC 12.

41. The Respondent submits that, given the relatively minor nature of the offence and the position of the Respondent as the primary carer for three children – one of whom is very young, her surrender on these matters would constitute a disproportionate interference with her and her family’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention such that the Court ought to refuse surrender under s. 37 of the 2003 Act.

42. It is submitted that considering the context of Article 8(2) ECHR and the obiter statements of O’Donnell J. in MJ v. JAT No.2 [2016] IESC 17 at para. [10], the fact that the respondent’s forcible surrender is sought to serve a short sentence for a minor offence must be of some relevance.

43. Alternatively, it is submitted that were the Court to make an order in this case for surrender this is a case where postponement might be ordered on humanitarian grounds pursuant to Section 18(a) of the 2003 Act.

Applicant Submissions

44. The Applicant relies on substantially the same decisions of the Superior Courts in this jurisdiction and of the CJEU.

45. The Minister submits that the observations as to proportionality in various cases cited by the Respondent ( such as Case C566/19 PPU and C626//PPU) relate to cases where decisions to prosecute are far removed in time from the decision to issue an EAW and in circumstances where a person may, as it were, have changed their life course significantly in the intervening period.

46. No such issue arises here. The Respondent has been in Ireland for a relatively short period and indeed came here with knowledge that a sentence had been imposed upon her in the issuing state. The Minister submits that on the facts of this case, the suggestion that the issuing of an EAW (close in time following the issue of the domestic warrant) was ‘blindingly disproportionate’ does not withstand scrutiny.

47. The Applicant finally submits that the circumstances of Ms Balogova display few, if any, of the exceptional features that might persuade this court to refuse surrender on Article 8 grounds. Whilst the Respondent may suffer hardship from being separated from her children if surrendered, this is an inevitable consequence of all surrenders where a Respondent is the mother of young children.

Decision

48. There is a strong public interest in the surrender of persons accused or convicted of criminal offences to countries with which this State has extradition or surrender agreements. Delay in itself cannot ever operate as a bar to surrender. Disruption, indeed, significant disruption, of family and private life is the norm where surrender is ordered, and this cannot ordinarily justify a refusal to surrender on foot of an otherwise lawful request.

49. The ultimate question in a case such as this is whether this is one of those truly exceptional cases (though of course exceptionality is not the test) where, due to the emergence of particular family or personal circumstances in the time since the alleged offences, Article 8 of the Convention is engaged and it would be disproportionate to order surrender in the particular circumstances of this case.

50. There has been no delay in this case in either the issue of the domestic warrants underlying this EAW or indeed in the issuing of this EAW itself.

51. This is not one of those rare cases where there are exceptional features such as might persuade this court to refuse surrender on the grounds that her extradition would amount to a disproportionate interference with her family and personal rights under Article 8 of the Convention and / or Article 41 of the Constitution. She is the mother and carer of three children, but this could not of itself amount to an exceptional feature such as to justify this Court in refusing surrender. It could not be the position that, just as a person in similar circumstances in Ireland would not in effect become immune from prosecution and punishment because he or she is the primary carer of young children, the Respondent can in these circumstances avoid prosecution and punishment for the offences for which her surrender is sought in Czechia.

52. Nor, as submitted by the Minister, is this one of those cases where the decision to issue an EAW is so far removed in time from a decision to prosecute that it could possibly be said that the issuing of such warrant is ‘blindly disproportionate’.

53. Although this is a case where surrender may result in significant interference with the family life of the Respondent and her children, it is not a case where there are grounds for this Court to refuse to order surrender under s. 37 of the 2003 Act.