High Court dismisses plaintiff's costs objection, awarding full costs to successful defendants on strike-out application.

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 744

Record No. 2023 3335 P

BETWEEN:

JOHN HARRINGTON

Plaintiffs

AND

SRF LIMITED, RICHARD JAMES FITZPATRICK, AHYETT ROSAPA, JOHN J QUINN, CONOR QUINN, PAULINE BRADY, OLIVER BARRY, JOHN J QUINN & COMPANY SOLICITORS LLP Defendants JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Liam Kennedy delivered on 25 June 2025

1. My 14 May 2025 judgment granted the first, second and third defendants’ (“the Applicants”) motion to strike out these proceedings against them and also struck out the plaintiff’s counter motion. Its final paragraph noted that the Applicants appeared presumptively entitled to their costs but offered both sides the opportunity to make submissions in respect of whether that or any other costs order was appropriate or concerning any other aspect of the judgment. Submissions have duly been received from both sides.

2. The plaintiff argued on a variety of grounds that he should not be ordered to pay costs. Firstly, he accused the first and second defendants of dishonesty in their dealings with him and of acting in male fides throughout the process from beginning to end, both before and during the proceedings. There is no basis for this submission. Even leaving aside the plaintiff’s implicit acknowledgment that he had no basis to resist a costs award in favour of the third defendant at least, his submission was a rehash of broad, unsubstantiated assertions unsuccessfully advanced in the proceedings and in the defence of the original application, assertions considered and dismissed in my previous judgment. For example, he complains that the first and second defendants “obtained an Order in the District Court unlawfully which is now being challenged. This is what they based their case on in the first instance”. However, my judgment dealt with that argument. The plaintiff has not established that the District Court order was obtained unlawfully. As matters stand, it must be regarded as valid and enforceable. In any event, he is not even a party to the District Court proceedings so references to those proceedings do not avail him for present purposes.

3. Secondly, the plaintiff complained that the first and second defendants had failed and refused to settle the matter. There was no obligation on them to settle the matter, nor have I seen any evidence of unreasonable behaviour on their part. The only unreasonable behaviour I have seen was on the plaintiff’s part, including his failure to discharge the bill, the issuing of these proceedings without justification and his naming of various defendants without any legitimate basis to do so.

4. Thirdly, he criticises the Applicants for seeking to strike out these proceedings in the absence of a defence, accusing them of hijacking the proceedings and obstructing the plaintiff from due process. However, the Applicants were fully entitled to invoke the Rules of the Superior Court by applying to strike out the proceedings. Their decision to do so has been vindicated by the outcome of the application. I do not accept the assertion that the Applicants had no defence or that their dismissal application can be characterised as hijacking the proceedings or obstructing due process. To the contrary any abuse of process was on the plaintiff’s part in pursuing frivolous and vexatious proceedings against multiple parties without a reasonable basis to do so, when they were devoid of legal or factual merit and bound to fail.

5. The plaintiff’s assertion that the first and second named defendants “exaggerated their claims and made up emails after defacto”, is just that, mere assertion. If there was any substance to that claim – and I have seen nothing to suggest that there is - then it would be a matter to be raised in the District Court proceedings, but the plaintiff is not even a party to those proceedings. Accordingly, even if there was substance to the allegation, it would not be relevant to the current application.

6. The plaintiff acknowledges the general rule that costs normally follow the event, but correctly points out that the Court has a discretion to reserve costs. However, I do not agree that he has shown any factual or legal circumstances which would justify a departure from the normal rule. Furthermore, an order reserving costs means that the issue is left over to the trial of the action. However, my order means that, unless my judgment is reversed on appeal, the proceedings will not go to trial so there is no logic to reserving costs in any event.

7. I have reviewed the Applicants’ submissions and entirely agree with them. There is no need for me to repeat them.

8. In the circumstances, there is no basis to depart from the normal rule. Having been entirely successful the Applicants are entitled to the costs of their successful application, to the costs of resisting the defendant’s application and to the costs of the proceedings as a whole. I will instruct the Registrar to perfect the order on foot of my judgment on that basis.