High Court allows father's appeal to remove supervised contact restrictions on children due to exceptional circumstances.

APPROVED

REDACTED

FOR PUBLICATION

[2025] IEHC 743

THE HIGH COURT

CIRCUIT APPEAL

FAMILY LAW

MIDLAND CIRCUIT COUNTY OF ROSCOMMON

IN THE MATTER OF THE JUDICIAL SEPARATION AND FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1989 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT, 1995 AND IN TH EMATTER OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, 2018 AS AMENDED

Record No. 2024/22 CAF

BETWEEN:

Y.Y.

APPLICANT

AND

Z.Z.

RESPONDENT

Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 11th December 2025:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a most difficult case. The parties married in 2008, and they have three children who are now aged 16, 14 and 12 years. The parties separated in 2016, and it is not to overstate matters to say that they have engaged in robust litigation since that time. The number of court appearances is countless. There have been three separate expert assessors involved, each providing reports to the various courts. Access has been ceased, curtailed and supervised. Earlier supervision reports were prepared by Core but were not provided to me. I did see more recent supervision reports prepared by Ms. Marie Louise McGovern. While the parties were previously legally represented, and a variety of problems have arisen and been alleged in that context, the parties appeared before me as litigants in person.

2. This was not without challenge for them both and for the progression of the hearing due in part to the lack of understanding of evidential presentment, in part due to the difficulties of examination and cross examination as between parties encumbered by years of acrimony and litigation fatigue and, in no small part, due to the anger and constant allegations of the Appellant (father), expressed in most strident terms. Many of these allegations had little relevance to the issue before me and related to complaints which the Appellant sought to level against third parties. This was distracting and unhelpful.

3. During the course of the hearing, the Appellant sought that I would recuse myself from hearing this appeal. He did so on the bases (a) of a perceived bias on my part due to the prior involvement of solicitors employed by the Legal Aid Board in representing the parties herein in circumstances in which I had a prior governance role in the Legal Aid Board and (b) due to his frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the Irish judiciary generally. I heard this application and refused the relief sought in a judgment given during the course of the hearing herein. The Appellant has continued to level these accusations including after the conclusion of the hearing, so communicating with court personnel. This is a matter which I have previously determined and to which I do not intend to return.

HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS1

I had very limited documentation provided to me in terms of pleadings and previous Orders. Certain of the uncontroversial factual information relating to the timeline of events is derived from the judgment of the Circuit Family Court.

4. The proceedings currently before me commenced in 2017 with the Respondent (mother) seeking a Decree of Judicial Separation and ancillary reliefs in that context.

The substantive Judicial Separation proceedings were heard and determined by the Circuit Family Court on the 20th February 2020 and a Decree was granted together with ancillary reliefs. These reliefs included, inter alia, that the Appellant (then Respondent) had permission to “re-enter custody application in respect of the three children subject to the attendance of Ms. Sheila Hawkins, Dr. David Green and Dr.

Ignazio Graffeo at the hearing of the Custody application.” Notice of Appeal was served by the Appellant in respect of the said Orders of the 20th February 2020. The Appeal came on for hearing before this Court (O’Connor J.) on the 16th July 2021 at which time issues of access were dealt with and the balance of matters adjourned to another date. This Order provided for supervised access, supervision to be provided by Core Services or other similar supervision provider. There were other conditions imposed also. The hearing of the appeal from the substantive determination of the Circuit Family Court in the Judicial Separation proceedings was resumed before this Court (O’Connor J.) on the 20th December 2021 and judgment was delivered on the 22nd February 2022. The Orders pertaining to the children made by this Court on the 16th July 2021 further provided

“Leave to be granted to either or both parties to apply with at least 14 days written notice to the next sitting of Roscommon Circuit Court for more definitive access directions for each of the three children with reports as their legal adviser obtained pursuant to their clients instructions.”

In the context of this Order, the matter was re-entered before the Circuit Family Court in or about March 2023. It is the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023 in the context of such re-entry which is now under appeal.

5. This is an appeal to be heard, pursuant to the provisions of section 38 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936, by way of de novo (new) hearing. Sub-section (2) of section 38 states:

“(2) Every appeal under the section shall be heard and determined by one judge of the High Court and shall be so heard by way of a rehearing of the action or matter in which the judgment or order the subject of such appeal was given or made.”

6. The issue before me is a single one - what are the appropriate arrangements for the children in terms of contact with the Appellant? It is unfortunate that the Appellant could not focus on this issue and the relevant proofs concerning it. The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964 (as amended) (‘the 1964 Act’) authorises a court to make directions in relation to child arrangements - custody and access. The parents in this instance were married and therefore they are and will remain joint guardians of the children during their minorities. As to appropriate rules to be applied in determining custody and access arrangements, the 1964 Act is likewise clear. The test to be applied is the best interests of the children. Section 3 of the 1964 Act states:

“3.— (1) Where, in any proceedings before any court, the—

(a) guardianship, custody or upbringing of, or access to, a child, or

(b) administration of any property belonging to or held on trust for a child or the application of the income thereof,

is in question, the court, in deciding that question, shall regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.

(2) In proceedings to which subsection (1) applies, the court shall determine the best interests of the child concerned in accordance with Part V.”

(underlining added)

7. The tests and factors to be applied in determining best interests are set down in section 31 of the 1964 Act which section states:

“31. (1) In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in the best interests of a child, the court shall have regard to all of the factors or circumstances that it regards as relevant to the child concerned and his or her family.

(2) The factors and circumstances referred to in subsection (1) include:

(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with each of his or her parents and with the other relatives and persons who are involved in the child’s upbringing and, except where such contact is not in the child’s best interests, of having sufficient contact with them to maintain such relationships;

(b) the views of the child concerned that are ascertainable (whether in accordance with section 32 or otherwise);

(c) the physical, psychological and emotional needs of the child concerned, taking into consideration the child’s age and stage of development and the likely effect on him or her of any change of circumstances;

(d) the history of the child’s upbringing and care, including the nature of the relationship between the child and each of his or her parents and the other relatives and persons referred to in paragraph (a), and the desirability of preserving and strengthening such relationships;

(e) the child’s religious, spiritual, cultural and linguistic upbringing and needs;

(f) the child’s social, intellectual and educational upbringing and needs;

(g) the child’s age and any special characteristics;

(h) any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering, including harm as a result of household violence, and the protection of the child’s safety and psychological well-being;

(i) where applicable, proposals made for the child’s custody, care, development and upbringing and for access to and contact with the child, having regard to the desirability of the parents or guardians of the child agreeing to such proposals and co-operating with each other in relation to them;

(j) the willingness and ability of each of the child’s parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent, and to maintain and foster relationships between the child and his or her relatives;

(k) the capacity of each person in respect of whom an application is made under this Act—

(i) to care for and meet the needs of the child,

(ii) to communicate and co-operate on issues relating to the child, and

(iii) to exercise the relevant powers, responsibilities and entitlements to which the application relates.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(h), the court shall have regard to household violence that has occurred or is likely to occur in the household of the child, or a household in which the child has been or is likely to be present, including the impact or likely impact of such violence on:

(a) the safety of the child and other members of the household concerned;

(b) the child’s personal well-being, including the child’s psychological and emotional well-being;

(c) the victim of such violence;

(d) the capacity of the perpetrator of the violence to properly care for the child and the risk, or likely risk, that the perpetrator poses to the child.

(4) For the purposes of this section, a parent’s conduct may be considered to the extent that it is relevant to the child’s welfare and best interests only.”

8. My focus in this case and in this judgment will be exclusively on the statutory provisions and the evidence and representations which I have heard concerning the factors set out in the statute. I do not intend to address the many complaints of the Appellant about issues not before me and not relevant to the best interests of the children. It would be contrary to statute and contrary to the jurisdiction currently being exercised by me to do otherwise.

EXPERT ASSESSMENT

9. Before addressing the relevant facts as proved before me (and I cannot overstate the extent to which I believe there was an almost complete deficit of focus on such facts in favour of extraneous grievances) I wish to address the expert reports which I received, and the evidence heard from Ms Marie Louise McGovern and Prof Sheehan. I would note that there was a third assessor involved at an earlier stage in these proceedings, namely Ms. Sheila Hawkins, but I did not have, and I was not provided with, a copy of her report. I do wish to express my gratitude to the assessors who were involved when the matter was before me. Their commitment and engagement were of considerable assistance.

10. Ms McGovern’s involvement as a section 32 assessor preceded the case coming before me. She remained involved as an assessor and also as a facilitator of supervised access. I heard evidence from her. Her involvement was one of diligence and commitment although I do accept that her professional responsibilities precluded her from sustaining the level of involvement required. I have received four reports from Ms. McGovern. These are dated the 10th July 2023, 17th February 2025 and 30th June 2025 (x 2). The first report and one of the reports of the 30th June 2025 are pursuant to section 32(1)(a) and (b) of the 1964 Act. The other two are access observation reports. The first report recommended supervised contact with the two younger children, the option of access to remain open to the eldest child subject to her wishes. This access, it was recommended, should be on the basis that the Appellant refrain from “speaking negatively about the children’s support network in their presence”. A three-month review was recommended. Therapeutic interventions for both parents were recommended. Particular reference was made to the negativity involved in unhelpful comments made by the Appellant to the children about the Respondent. Unmonitored online contact between the Appellant and the children, it was recommended, should cease. The second statutory report (30th June 2025)

recommended that access should occur in accordance with the wishes of the children as recorded in the report. It should be noted that the expert assessor had supervised a small number of access visits in the months immediately prior to the report. The eldest child did not wish to have access. The middle child expressed very positive disposition towards her father and access. She indicated that the visits were “good”

and “work well” and were “going pretty fine”. Importantly, she expressed the view that she thought “it would be the same if another person wasn’t there”. Indeed, she was of the view that without supervision, the visit might be “less formal”. She wished visits (which had been for one hour) to be a little longer and more often. She expressed the wish for the involvement of her father in sporting events. Importantly, she did not wish engagement between her parents at such events. She indicated that she did not have telephone or email contact which transpired to be untrue. The views expressed relating to her paternal grandmother were also positive. This child was alert to inter parental conflict. The youngest child expressed the wish to get to know his father, acknowledging that he did not know him very well. He seemed to wish engagement with his father in the context of sports activities. He referenced his father talking about the past and that he was nervous. He also described his father as being funny. He did not express any particular desire for supervision but acknowledged sometimes feeling uncomfortable during visits. There was no particular sense of negativity rather a sense of not really knowing his father very well, consistent with his age and the very limited contact they have had over many years.

11. I considered the access observation reports which I consider to be of particular importance relative to the conduct of the Appellant towards the children during visits.

The first related to two such visits with the younger two children. The eldest child did not attend in accordance with her wishes. There is no evidence of any inappropriate behaviour or conversation occurring. Engagement between the children and their father seemed positive in nature. The second visit was described as relaxed, “with a natural flow of reciprocated conversation”. The expert noted greater engagement by the children in this visit than the previous. The expert indicated that her observations concluded that the Appellant “is capable of providing a safe, warm atmosphere for the children” but that a continued period of testing, with continuing supervision, would be desirable. The small number of visits was due to curtailments based upon the availability of the supervisor. However, further such visits occurred on the 9th March 2025 and on the 24th April 2025 and these were the subject of the report of the 30th June 2025. The report was, again, positive. It concluded that “the children were becoming increasingly comfortable in the presence of their father.” Most importantly, there was no inappropriate behaviour or conversation by the Appellant.

12. The first report of Ms McGovern was in excess of a year old when the case first came before me and, in this context, mindful of constitutional mandates and the ages of the children, I believed it necessary to hear their voices.2 Professor Sheehan interviewed the children to this end and provided a helpful report and evidence to the court. His

At this point, it was not envisaged that Ms. McGovern would be further involved. This further involvement arose in the context of her willingness to facilitate access through supervising visits during late 2024 and 2025.

expression of the wishes of the children (in a report of the 2nd December 2024)

corresponded with that reported by Ms. McGovern as recorded above although at that time the middle child referenced supervision, something which was not referenced by her in the report six months later.

13. At a late stage in the proceedings, it emerged that there was ongoing email correspondence between the Appellant and one of the children. This was an understandable cause for concern for the Respondent having regard to the secrecy involved and the fact that this was in breach of the extant order of the Circuit Family Court. However, while the Respondent raised some concerns about the substance of these communications, by and large I did not find them inappropriate and they demonstrated a desire for contact on the part of the child, aged 13 years for most of the period of such communication. I was most concerned that access/contact not be encouraged, facilitated or forced to occur in a furtive or secret manner, and about the impact on children if this contact was not addressed. In this context, I determined to offer all of the children an opportunity to speak/communicate with me directly. The eldest child decided that she wished to write to me but not to speak with me. The two younger children expressed the wish to speak with me. These visits were organised and carried out in accordance with the principles expressed by Collins J in DK v PIK [2023] IECA 7.

14. The information obtained in such context is not evidence but is obviously a circumstance to which I can have regard.

15. Having heard from these children directly, I can vouch for their being truly lovely children. The letter was appropriate, moderate, reasoned and clear. The visits to me by the children were most useful, insightful and relevant. The parents must be aware of the pressures which the prolonged litigation and acrimony have had on the children.

16. One of the children was clearly finding the navigation of her attachment to both parents difficult. She wished to have the decision concerning contact made for her rather than having to make a decision herself. I formed the view that she wished to maintain a relationship with her father but that expressing this might be perceived as disloyalty to her mother. I did not form the view that the mother was exerting any active influence but that, mindful of disharmony between parents, the child felt a pressure of such perceptions. The youngest child displayed a curiosity concerning his father and expressed a common interest in sporting activities which he would like to pursue with his father. I was impressed by the very real continued presence of their father in the children’s minds notwithstanding the very considerable interruption in contact which had occurred. He remained very much in their minds and this presence was positively expressed.

17. There had been an event where the Appellant sought physical contact during an outing which one of the children was having with friends. I formed the view that this event had caused anxiety and disruption, linked to a fear of unpredictability. Such incidents MUST not recur. They are unfair, disruptive and discombobulating for the children.

EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES

18. I intend only to outline relevant evidence which was adduced before me.

19. The children’s ages and stages were outlined to me by the Respondent. The older two children are in secondary school and the youngest still in primary school. The Respondent is gainfully employed, and this employment is compatible with her parenting responsibilities. The children have no additional educational needs. The children engage in extra-curricular activities as is appropriate and they all have sporting and other recreational involvements. A useful pencil sketch of their personalities was provided by the Respondent. I understand from the Respondent’s evidence and from my discussions with the children that they have a close relationship with their maternal grandparents. The Respondent referenced a previous relationship with their paternal grandmother and her efforts in this regard, but that contact had reduced over time and ultimately ceased. The cessation seems to have been related to expressions of support for the Appellant which the Respondent found difficult to accept in the context of her (the Respondent’s) efforts to maintain contact between the children and the Appellant’s mother. I heard evidence about remoter relatives (aunts and uncles) also. There has been contact between the children and their paternal aunt, instigated by the Respondent and reciprocated by the aunt.

20. The Respondent referenced “uncompromising behaviours and effectively abusive behaviours” on the part of the Appellant which led to the ending of their relationship.

Evidence of cannabis usage was given. The Respondent gave evidence of things being broken by the Appellant and of volatility and verbal abuse on his part. She expressed the view that the children had benefitted from the separation of the parties.

She referenced that the children were exhausted with being talked to and assessed.

21. Evidence of supervised access visits was given and the Respondent indicated that these had concluded because the Appellant was abusive of staff members of the service. I was unclear if this was done directly or via email in the context of visits which had taken place. There was no evidence of negative behaviours on the part of the Appellant towards the children during these visits. The Respondent demonstrated a keen awareness of the onerous responsibilities attaching to being the primary caregiver. She said, “So it’s like you can’t do right for doing wrong.” The Respondent expressed the view that Professor Sheehan’s report had gone beyond the mandate contained in section 32(1)(b) (voice of the children report). She questioned his mandate to make recommendations. The Respondent expressed the view that her primary concern is safeguarding the emotional safety of the children. She referenced verbal abuse experienced by her and members of her family.

22. The Appellant took issue with the use of the term “abusive” and derivatives of this term. He stated that this was not acceptable or suitable. He challenged the evidence of the Respondent as being untruthful. These challenges related to her allegations of his behaviours during and at the end of the parties’ relationship. He challenged her account of his cannabis usage during the relationship. The Appellant referenced the first assessment report and the wishes of the children for extensive contact therein.

He alleged physical abuse experienced by him at the hands of the Respondent which she denied.

23. Much of the evidence related to historic events which occurred during and at the end of the marriage or in the most volatile aftermath of separation. Much of the evidence related to the extremely poor relationship between the parties.

24. The Appellant continuously expressed a sense of grievance about contact with the children being denied him and the failure of third parties, in particular the courts, to address this. His evidence was that contact between the children and him was discouraged by the Respondent, that she did not wish contact to occur and that she had failed to facilitate contact. The evidence of the Appellant was that the children were being negatively influenced against him by the Respondent.

25. The Respondent expressed concerns about breaches of orders in terms of persons attending at the family home and contact with the children. She expressed the view that the Appellant was unprepared to accept the responsibilities of parenting.

26. There was evidence of a most unfortunate and regrettable incident at a school event involving confrontation between the Appellant and his father-in-law. There was considerable conflict between the parties in relation to this event which appeared to involve the youngest child, which event, most inappropriately, was witnessed by other children. My assessment of this incident is that it ought to have been better handled by all involved. The ultimate outcome was a breakdown in access which the Respondent says occurred due to the children being devastated by the incident at the school event.

27. I was provided with a number of documents by the parties. These included:

(a) The emails between the middle child and the Appellant.

(b) GP medical reports and a counselling report relating to the Appellant of some antiquity. These related to drug testing and mental health. No issues of concern emanated from them;

(c) Some articles relating to parental/children’s rights and parental alienation;

(d) Documents pertaining to a criminal prosecution arising from the incident at the school event. These included a DAR transcript relating to a public order prosecution which was dismissed before the District Court.

(e) Transcript of an access application hearing before the District Court in 2019.

I considered all of these documents.

ANALYSIS

28. In the context of section 31 of the 1964 Act and the obligation upon me to have regard to all circumstances (over and above those listed in sub-section (2) of that section), I must express my very considerable concern about the unrelenting, obsessive and aggressive behaviour of the Appellant. I accept that family litigation is emotionally onerous and that this is all the more so when such litigation has been ongoing over many years with outcomes which are unsatisfactory from the Appellant’s perspective. However, he appears to have little understanding, insight or willingness to comprehend the impact of his ire on those against whom it is directed. I must express the strong desirability that the Appellant would seek some form of appropriate counselling or support in respect of these matters but, given the duration, frequency and complexity of the litigation herein, I intend to make no directions in this regard. It is a matter for the Appellant to address and I would hope he would do so as

I believe that a diminution in his sense of grievance would assist his relationship with his children in terms of retrieval and improvement.

29. I have set out the applicable legal principles. My focus must at all times be on the best interests of the children. I now attend to apply same in the context of the facts of this case. Referrable to section 31(2) of the 1964 Act:

(a) I find that, subject to appropriate conditions being imposed and adhered to, the children in this case wish to have and will benefit from having a relationship with their father and paternal family. For this to be meaningful, the Appellant must be sensitive to the children’s needs and to shielding them from exposure to the acrimony which has accompanied the breakdown of his marital relationship. The visits as described by Ms. McGovern demonstrate that he can do this. From the reports and my own conversations, the two youngest children wish to know their father. I believe that the middle child misses him and the youngest is curious about him.

(b) The views of the children have been set out. Having spoken with them, I have formed the view that the children want decisions made by those responsible rather than having to repeat previous assessments. My impression is that the middle child wishes to have contact, but she is keenly experiencing the challenges of loyalty. The youngest child wants to have some limited and appropriate contact.

(c) The safety and security of the children is most important. Their physical and emotional security is important. I have not heard evidence of physical security concerns. In relation to emotional security, I was concerned by the secretive contact via email which emerged. Contact must be transparent. I do not believe that secretive or furtive contact is in the interests of these children. I am fearful that such secrecy is facilitated or encouraged if clear arrangements are not provided for. I must clearly state, however, that my interview with the children indicated that surprise visits or meetings were distressing for them. I do not consider that the Appellant would wish to cause his children distress so there must be no repetition of such instances.

(d) I have had regard to the history of this matter.

(e) I do not believe that anything particular arises in relation to religious, spiritual, cultural or linguistic upbringing.

(f) The Appellant was a keen and successful sportsman in his youth. The children have considerable interest in sports activities. These are interests which they express the wish to share with him. The children are intelligent and curious.

Their father is likewise. I believe that there can be a communality of interest in this context also. In this regard, I note the wide-ranging topics discussed between the Appellant and the children at the later, more recent supervised access visits, including politics, sport and social/global events.

(g) I have had regard to the ages and maturities of the children.

(h) There is a background of acrimony. The cessation of the relationship of the parents involved negative behaviours. The behaviour of the Appellant, as evidenced in the course of this hearing, was aggressive and lacking insight. I must examine this through the lens of child welfare and children’s best interests. I do not consider these behaviours, when viewed in the context of the Appellant’s attitude towards his children, dictate access suspension. They do dictate access limitation and conditionality which I have imposed.

(i) This provision does not arise.

(j) and (k) The children clearly express the view that their mother will support and facilitate contact with the Appellant. The Respondent so informed me during the hearing. I find, however, that she is exhausted from the years of acrimony and litigation. I believe she will find encouraging a continuing relationship most difficult. The Appellant is lacking insight and believes that a multiplicity of circumstances have conspired against him. Both parents need to continue to engage in their own therapies to attempt to continue to recover from the huge challenges which have gone on for far too long. However, I believe that they both have a commitment to and deep love for their children. Having considered the evidence, especially of the experts, I consider that the parents are both capable of sublimating their own concerns and to have the welfare of the children rank in priority.

30. I made an interim order while judgment was being awaited. This interim access order provided for email contact and digital video-link contact. Regrettably, this did not result in a resumption of contact. It is difficult to understand why Facetime (or equivalent) contact did not occur since my interviews with the children did not indicate any fear of the Appellant and did indicate a curiosity about him and a desire that he would have a role in their lives.

31. Having regard to the best interests of the children, the reports received, the evidence heard and the voices of the children, I am making the following orders:

A. ACCESS

32. I will make the following access orders in respect of contact between the Appellant and the children pursuant to section 11 of the 1964 Act:

(i) In relation to the eldest child – having regard to her age, maturity and consistently expressed wishes in recent times, I have determined to make no order relating to her, but she should feel free to join access events with her younger two siblings if she wishes to.

(ii) Regarding the younger two child, I will order access with the Appellant as follows: -

(a) once per calendar month, on a Saturday of his nomination, the Appellant to have contact by bringing the children for a meal in a hotel restaurant of his choosing in Carrick on Shannon for a two-hour period. The mother should deliver the children to the restaurant and pick up at the same venue at the end of the twohour period. The Appellant and the children are to remain within the hotel for the duration of access. In addition to a meal, the Appellant may wish to engage in board/card games with the children during this period. This to apply for the winter months of October to February inclusive. Nomination of the Saturday date to be by email to the Respondent with no less than two weeks in advance save Christmas 2025 when seven days’ notice is to be given by the Appellant. The timing to be compatible with children’s activities.

(b) during summer months (March to September inclusive), on one Saturday each calendar month, the children to meet with Appellant for sporting activity of their nomination followed by a meal in a public restaurant. The Saturday is to be of the Appellant’s nomination with no less than two weeks’ notice. Such access is to be for a four-hour period. Delivery and collection by the Respondent to the sports venue and from the restaurant.

(c) unrestricted email contact of reasonable volume (from the Appellant to the children and vice versa) subject the Respondent being copied on all emails.

(d) weekly (Sunday) video call with Appellant of half an hour duration. I am making this an order as I believe that the children do not want to have to decide whether to do this or not.

33. While not part of this Order, I would encourage the involvement of the paternal grandmother on these calls whether she is in the physical company of the Appellant or as a participant in a group call. I consider it important that the children be afforded opportunities for continued involvement in their wider paternal family. The Respondent has sought to promote this through contact with a paternal aunt.

However, the children have not had contact with their paternal grandmother for some time. I would encourage such involvement in the context of videocalls but also in the context of in person access visits as provided for above should the paternal grandmother be in a position to travel for such visits.

34. Neither party is to in any manner disparage the other to the children. There is no need for the toxic relationship of the parties to be further imposed on the children. They deserve absolute protection from this. Neither party is to in any manner disparage the wider family members of the other to the children. In this regard, in particular, I recognise that the children have a close relationship with their paternal grandparents.

This should not be negatived in any manner.

35. The Appellant must not be under the influence of any intoxicant during access visits.

36. These terms are subject to strict adherence to these provisions and no other contact is to occur. I will give liberty to apply to both parties for a six-month period or such further period as the court may subsequently direct in the exceptional circumstances of this matter. I will also list the matter for mention on the 21st March 2026 at 11 am so that progress may be addressed and Orders modified as is required by the best interests of the children. This matter comes before me by way of appeal from the Circuit Family Court. The circumstances in which it is appropriate for me to retain seisin having determined the appeal are strictly limited in nature. The authorities are clear in this regard.

37. The jurisdiction vested in this court as an appellate court to deal with matters other than by way of final order, is considered in paragraphs 21 - 24 of White J’s judgment in LT v JT [2012] IEHC 588:

“21. A discretion always rests with the court dealing with custody and access disputes pursuant to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, to retain seisin of a case for the purposes of reviewing orders already made, once it reserves its position by either granting liberty to apply, indicating that it will retain seisin or indicating that it will review certain matters or deal with certain matters in default of agreement

22. Any court however in exercising its jurisdiction to consider an application to vary a custody or access order, at all times having the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration must be careful to ensure that fair procedures are followed, and the jurisdiction of the court is not abused.

23. Where possible a party dissatisfied by an order of substance, should have a right of appeal.

24. Discretion must rest with the court of final appeal, in this case the High Court on appeal from the Circuit Court, to accept jurisdiction to re-open matters it has recently decided.”

38. White J. was sitting as an appellate judge from the Circuit Court in the case in question. The jurisdiction which I now exercise in relation to retaining seisin and review is based on the jurisdiction clearly envisaged by this court in LT v JT

decision. I believe the legally exceptional circumstances where this should happen to be justified on the extreme facts of this case.

39. OTHER ORDERS

(i) I will affirm the Order at 1. of the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023 save that I will not restrict written contact between the Appellant and the children (by way of letter or card or parcel) save that such correspondence must be sent by ordinary post and not otherwise delivered by the Appellant or any third party on his behalf.

(ii) I will affirm the Order at 2. of the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023.

(iii) I will affirm the Order at 3. of the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023.

(iv) I will affirm the Order at 4. of the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023.

(v) I will affirm the Order at 5. of the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023. In this context, I re-iterate that neither party is to disparage, demean or otherwise negatively reference the other party or their families of origin to the children.

(vi) I will affirm the Order at 6. of the Order of the Circuit Family Court of the 13th November 2023.

(vii) I will grant liberty to apply.

(viii) I will list the matter for mention and, if necessary, review on the 21st March 2026 at 11 am.

(ix) I will make no Order as to costs.

40. I was left with an overwhelming sense of the love both parties have for their children.

The mother has had opportunity to manifest this through daily care. Her commitment in this regard shows in the wonderful children these children are. The Appellant I have no doubt loves his children. He has had little opportunity to demonstrate this, and I believe his resentment concerning this has caused other grievances to become intermingled with this love. He is being given opportunity to rebuild contact. He can avail of this in a manner consistent with his deep affection for the children or continue to conflate his relationship with the children with conflict with third parties. I urge him to and hope he will adopt the former route.