Judicial review leave granted against Coroner for inquest fairness; refused against Housing and Solicitors for alternative remedies.

THE HIGH COURT

2025 No.1183 JR

[2025] IEHC 741

BETWEEN:

ANGELA REDIC

APPLICANT

AND

THE COMMISSSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA, CORK CITY CORONER,

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF CORK CITY COUNCIL, SOPHIA HOUSING

ASSOCIATION COMPANY and CANTILLONS SOLICITORS

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on 19th December, 2025

1. Introduction

1.1 This application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings arises out of tragic circumstances. The Applicant’s daughter died in September of 2025 and an inquest was held. For reasons outlined below, the application is allowed insofar as it relates to the Coroner and refused insofar as it relates to the other Respondents as there are alternative and more appropriate remedies.

1.2 In summary, the Applicant claims that: Mary Redic died in suspicious circumstances, there was an insufficient investigation into the circumstances of her death and the various proposed Respondents were at fault in different ways, some of which led, or contributed, to Ms. Redic’s untimely death. The Applicant seeks disclosure of various records and, primarily, of CCTV footage, which she seeks from both the first and the third Respondent.

1.3 The Applicant was not given leave to continue this action against Sophia Housing or Cantillons Solicitors, the fourth and fifth Respondents, on the basis that neither one is a public body. The other Respondents were directed to indicate whether they opposed the application for leave. All but the second Respondent opposed leave and he, the Coroner, took a neutral stance on the granting of leave but filed an affidavit, nonetheless. The Coroner will oppose the granting of any remedies in the substantive action, if leave is granted.

2. Delay in Filing and Serving Responses

2.1 The Applicant argued strongly that all of the Respondents were so late in filing their affidavits and submissions that the Court should simply grant the reliefs sought as the Respondents had ignored procedural rules and court directions. The Applicant was understandably frustrated by the late filing of papers, as was the Court. There is a balance to be struck in such a case, however. The allegations made are very serious, the background to the case is tragic and it would not do justice to the parties to proceed to judgment without considering their various arguments solely because papers were filed late.

2.2 The law in relation to extending time and the consequence of delay is set out in numerous cases. One of these is Gokul v Aer Lingus plc [2013] IEHC 432, where Hogan J. considered whether the failure to enter an appearance within eight days gave rise to a jurisdictional bar to a defence of the proceedings or whether he had the power to extend the time for the entry of a late appearance. Hogan

J. noted that Order 12, rule 2A of the Rules of the Superior Courts was in mandatory terms. However, having regard to the constitutional right of access to the courts, he considered that a time limit that acted as a jurisdictional bar could only be imposed by primary legislation enacted by the Oireachtas. He was satisfied that the High Court had the power to extend time for the entry of an appearance. Similarly, this Court can extend the time for completion of any such step in proceedings, including delivery of pleadings and submissions. This is not an appropriate case in which to strike out the responses due to lateness, although it was disappointing that papers were filed and served late.

2.3 The main purpose of time limits is to ensure efficiency, insofar as possible. When there are delays, the first recourse of the courts is to make so-called “unless orders”, providing that specified orders will follow unless papers are served or filed before a certain date. The solution to tardy filing is not to strike out a party’s case (unless the delay is egregious or causes demonstrable prejudice to the other party), it is to take measures to move the case along. All the parties involved in every case are entitled to access to justice, which should not be denied lightly or restricted without compelling reasons to do so.

3. The Law: Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

3.1 The law in relation to leave applications is very well established. The Applicant must establish that the facts as set out in her affidavit would be sufficient, if proven, to support a stateable ground for the relief she seeks. The Supreme Court confirms that: “It must be a case that has a prospect of success (otherwise it would not be an arguable case) but does not require more than that”, per O’Donnell C.J., para. 39 in O’Doherty v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 IR 488.

3.2 The Applicant must also show that the only effective remedy on the facts of the case is judicial review. If another remedy is available, the applicant must show that the more appropriate remedy is judicial review. Murray J. summarised this aspect of the law in Chubb European Group SE v. The Health Insurance Authority [2020] IECA 91: “[If there is] an alternative remedy … relief should be refused unless that remedy is not in fact adequate or there is a particular exigency in the interests of justice which requires otherwise.” The burden of proof is on the Applicant, who must establish both an arguable case and that she has no alternative remedy.

3.3 More fundamentally, judicial review allows the Court to examine actions and decisions of public bodies for procedural and fundamental fairness and, in appropriate cases, to compel those bodies to perform a clear public duty.

4. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána

4.1 The deceased, Ms. Mary Redic, had been in regular contact with members of An Garda Síochána in the days leading to her death. The Applicant begins her main grounding affidavit by referring to this action as a “criminal case” and this may explain why several reliefs are sought which cannot be granted in these proceedings. This is a judicial review case and, as such, a limited number of remedies is available. All judicial review remedies, by definition, relate to a specific decision or conduct by a public body. Here, the Applicant alleges criminal conduct or negligence leading to the death of her daughter. Even if there is support for such a conclusion, which is not yet apparent from the papers filed, the response to such grounds for relief is very clear: if the Applicant alleges negligence or criminality against any such body, judicial review is not the appropriate remedy as it is not a vehicle for testing evidence.

4.2 In judicial review proceedings, the Court can review prior processes but it does not embark on an investigation, order disclosure and arrange for witness evidence to be taken and tested. These are all the hallmarks of a plenary action. The other alternative is to complain to the appropriate statutory body.

4.3 In respect of the first named Respondent, the Applicant has made a complaint to Fiosrú, the body with statutory responsibility to investigate allegations of negligence or misconduct (including that which amounts to criminality) and that is the appropriate body to investigate, not the High Court. If the Applicant seeks damages against a party who has caused her harm by committing a wrong, the remedy is a plenary action, not judicial review. Occasionally, declaratory relief is appropriate in judicial review cases, even in the absence of a claim for certiorari [to quash an order] or mandamus [to compel performance of a duty]. But the core of this case, insofar as all but one of the Respondents is concerned, is fact finding and allegations of wrongdoing, rather than assessing fair procedures. This being the case, it is not appropriate to grant leave to seek the remedies claimed against the first Respondent.

4.4 The Applicant seeks CCTV footage and other materials from the first named Respondent. These reliefs are characterised as requests for mandamus, but they amount to requests for information, disclosure or discovery. Unless there is a valid claim for relief, the application must be refused.

4.5 If a public body has made a decision or carried out its functions in a way that was procedurally or fundamentally unfair, the Court can quash that decision and remit the issue to the body for re-consideration or, if the body has a duty to carry out some action but did not do so, the Court can compel the body to perform that action or declare that an action was unfair, for instance. Here, the core case pleaded amounts to allegations of wrongdoing, not of procedural unfairness. The reliefs sought against the first Respondent are not in the form of any kind of review but comprise requests for information.

4.6 The application for leave to compel the first named Respondent to disclose material is misconceived. This Respondent has no duty to produce CCTV footage, or any other document or information, to any member of the public save as a data subject. The Court cannot grant disclosure of information on a standalone basis at the outset of a proposed judicial review, as requested here.

4.7 In any event, this Applicant has pursued an alternative statutory remedy. The Applicant has complained to Fiosrú, which body has the necessary powers to find and review relevant documents or evidence. The Respondent has submitted evidence to the effect that there is no relevant CCTV footage in this case. This Court is making no finding of fact in that regard but is satisfied that the remedy of applying to Fiosrú is the appropriate remedy. Leave to seek judicial review is refused in respect of the only relief sought in the statement of grounds against the first named Respondent.

5. Scandalous Averments

5.1 The Rules of the Superior Courts provide that a court may strike out portions, or all, of an affidavit if the court is satisfied that it is scandalous. This term means irrelevant in relation to the issue to be determined, gratuitous and vexatious, such that it amounts to an abuse of the privilege attaching to evidence given in litigation. An affidavit is not scandalous simply because it contains hearsay evidence or even serious allegations, if those allegations are relevant to the issues in the proceedings. See Delany and McGrath on Civil Proceedings, 5th Ed, 21-96 to 97, Goode Concrete v. C.R.H. plc [2011] IEHC 310 and Dublin City Council v Marble and Granite Tiles Ltd [2009] IEHC 455.

5.2 Here, the sole relief sought against the first Respondent is that of disclosure of CCTV footage. There is no claim in these proceedings against this Respondent which requires evidence of historical wrongs, nor is evidence of motivation or mala fides on the part of individual gardaí relevant to such a claim. Quite apart from seeking a remedy which is not available in judicial review proceedings, the Applicant has made a series of statements on affidavit that could not be relevant to the question of whether the Respondent is obliged by law to furnish her with the CCTV footage sought.

5.3 Many of the averments made by the Applicant amount to allegations that named individuals are responsible for the murder or manslaughter of Ms. Mary Redic. As such, the averments are scandalous within the meaning of O. 40 r. 16 in that they are irrelevant to the specific relief sought, they are gratuitous in the sense that there is no need to mention these suspicions in order to make the claims made, and they are vexatious in the sense that they must cause distress to the named individuals which is unnecessary in a claim to disclose CCTV footage. In at least one case, the letters exhibited by the Applicant suggest that one of those now accused was helpful to her rather than obstructive. There is no evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the papers filed to date.

5.4 I have considered the argument that the Applicant, being convinced of the truth of the allegations, may believe that there is a conspiracy to hide the relevant footage in order to cover up a crime. The first named Respondent has filed an affidavit averring that there was no relevant material on CCTV. I do not consider that a litigant who believes that there is a conspiracy against her is therefore entitled to make whatever claims she chooses against a State body on the basis that the most unlikely allegations might be both true and relevant if the conspiracy theory is born out by a future investigation.

5.5 It is scandalous to set out suspicions of wrongdoing as facts in an affidavit, no matter how firmly the Applicant believes what she has averred. These allegations are the substance of the complaints made to the appropriate investigative body. Until they are investigated by Fiosrú, it is incorrect to present them, as the Applicant does in her affidavit, as factual conclusions. While the Applicant insists that the claims are correct, it bears repetition that she has not exhibited support for the allegations, save her own beliefs and claims that are put forward as information which came, originally, from her daughter, who is now deceased and who cannot confirm any such information.

5.6 Finally, several of the allegations made amount to allegations of theft. These refer to the removal of property from the premises where Ms. Mary Redic’s body was found. The property in question was returned to the Applicant. There is no basis for these allegations of theft in the circumstances.

5.7 Paragraphs 26, 27, 34, 35, 44, 47(b), 47 (c), 47(d), 48, 51, 53, 55, 56, and 63 of the first affidavit of the Applicant will be struck out. In circumstances where the application against the first Respondent will not continue, it is appropriate that these averments be struck out as they cannot be addressed at a later hearing. This also confirms the parameters of the full hearing, which will be limited to the relief sought against the second Respondent, as set out below, and will not include allegations of criminal wrongdoing, made without evidential bases.

6. Cork City Coroner

6.1 The second Respondent did not oppose the application for leave but indicated that he intended to file a statement of opposition if leave was granted. Given that the issues in this regard will be ventilated at a full hearing, this ruling will state only briefly the grounds on which leave has been sought and granted.

6.2 The Applicant claims that the inquest was short, that she was not given notice as to who would give evidence, that certain key witnesses were missing and that she was not given an opportunity to question all the witnesses, even those who did attend. This claim was substantiated to some extent by the papers filed, including the exhibits which confirmed the contents of statements of some of the witnesses, some of which were simply read into the record.

6.3 There is an arguable case, in the sense set out in Doherty above, on the basis of the overall description of the inquest, that the Applicant had insufficient opportunity to question relevant witnesses.

6.4 This leave is not being granted in respect of all reliefs claimed, however. The Applicant seeks a declaration that the inquest was void on various grounds, an order quashing the verdict [certiorari] and remitting the matter for re-hearing, and an order compelling disclosure of documents from this Respondent.

6.5 In respect of the last order sought, this Respondent argues that there is no entitlement to disclosure of all documents held by a coroner in respect of an inquest. The second Respondent described those documents which had been furnished to the Applicant and argued that these were sufficient to ensure fairness to the Applicant in the inquest. In his affidavit, this Respondent confirmed that the witness statements, all relevant letters and the postmortem report were disclosed to the Applicant. The Applicant has not pointed to any legal authority underlying her claim that she is entitled to disclosure of every document the Coroner holds which is relevant to the inquest. Leave is refused to challenge the scope of the disclosure made by the second Respondent. Leave is granted to challenge the procedures adopted at the inquest.

7. Cork City Council

7.1 The third named Respondent is the relevant City Council. No specific relief under Order 84 is sought against this Respondent and no wrongdoing is alleged against this entity. All the orders sought relate to disclosure of documents. The height of the allegation made against this Respondent is that it has control over the Coroner and, or alternatively, over Sophia Housing. The latter administers the apartment block in which Mary Redic resided.

7.2 While this Respondent pays the Coroner’s salary and offers administrative support to that office, it has no control over his functions: he is an independent office holder under the Coroners Act of 1962. Insofar as the claims against this Respondent refer to the Coroner’s functions, they must be refused. Leave to seek some remedies claimed against the Coroner are granted, as set out above.

7.3 As regards Sophia Housing, while funding is provided by this Respondent, the only relevant relief sought in this respect is, again, the disclosure of CCTV footage. The claim for disclosure from Sophia Housing is, in reality, a subject access or data request. There is no public law duty on that body to provide this footage. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Applicant is not entitled to the reliefs sought against the third Respondent (or indeed against Sophia Housing) as such requests must be dealt with under the correct statutory regime as set out in the Freedom of Information and Data Protection Acts, including the right of appeal if the Applicant is not satisfied with the level of information available. These claims are not appropriate for judicial review and leave to seek any remedy against the third Respondent is refused.

8. Conclusions

8.1 The Applicant is granted leave to seek judicial review remedies against the second named Respondent only. The form of relief which may be sought is not declaratory relief nor will it be framed in terms of “dubious” decisions or an “alleged inquest”.

8.2 The Applicant is granted leave to seek:

(i) An Order of certiorari quashing the verdict delivered at the inquest held on 1st May, 2025 on the basis that the Applicant was not given an adequate opportunity to test the evidence presented at the inquest and

(ii) An Order remitting the matter to the Coroner in order to convene a new inquest.

8.3 If the Applicant is not satisfied with this decision, her remedy is to appeal it. If she does not appeal, the judicial review hearing will continue as against the second Respondent only and on the limited basis outlined.

8.4 The Respondents in respect of whom leave was refused sought costs against the Applicant and made written submissions in that regard. The case was listed on Monday 19th January when the parties made oral submissions. The Applicant submitted that it was an ex parte application and that the Respondents should not have been there. She submitted that it was offensive for them to make the application and that they were late with all their papers.

8.5 Three Respondents were put on notice of this application as the Court required assistance in determining the leave application. The Court might have simply refused leave in respect of the third named Respondent as no relief was specifically claimed against the Council, nonetheless, the complexity of the case was such that it was appropriate to hear from that body. The second named Respondent had to be heard in respect of the specific claims made, but not substantiated, in the case. The Respondents undertook not to enforce costs orders if the Applicant did not appeal the order refusing leave. They argued that it was disproportionate not to award costs where the application had failed in its entirety on the basis that documents were filed after the date directed.

8.6 The Applicant did not offer sufficient reasons as to why costs should not follow the event. In light of the undertaking not to enforce the order if the substantive

decision is not appealed, costs were awarded to both Respondents. There are insufficient grounds to justify a departure from the normal rule regarding costs.