High Court dismisses judicial review where Tribunal properly assessed credibility without procedural unfairness.

[2025] IEHC 739

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2024/1006 JR]

BETWEEN: S.G. (ALBANIA)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 19th day of December, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. This judgment concerns an application for judicial review in which the applicant seeks to quash a decision made on the 2 July 2024 by the first respondent (the Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed a recommendation made by the International Protection Office (the IPO) to the second respondent that the applicant should be refused refugee status and subsidiary protection. In accordance with the considerations underpinning section 26(1) of the International Protection Act 2015 (the 2015 Act), information that might identify the applicant has not been included or has been otherwise anonymised in this judgment.

2. The applicant is from Albania, which has been designated a safe country of origin. He sought international protection on the basis of claims that he and members of his family had been the victim of threats and assaults, including an assault in which a firearm was discharged, connected to a dispute with another family. The gravamen of the decision under challenge was that the applicant had not established that his fears were well founded in the sense that if he was returned to Albania there was a reasonable chance of persecution for a Convention reason, and that he had not established a real risk of serious harm if he was returned.

3. The decision rested on findings to the effect that core factual elements in the applicant’s claim were inconsistent, lacked plausibility or were not otherwise credible. The grounds upon which the applicant was granted leave to challenge the decision were that the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for the findings that led to the decision, and that the Tribunal failed to take proper account of submissions and representations that had been made on behalf of the applicant. In addition to those substantive issues there was an issue as to whether the applicant should have an extension of time to bring the proceedings.

4. For the reasons set out in this judgment I have concluded that the application for judicial review relief should be refused.

BACKGROUND

5. The primary evidence in the case on behalf of the applicant was set out in affidavits sworn by his solicitor, Conor Ó Briain, and in a translated affidavit sworn by the applicant himself. From those documents the following appears to be the case.

6. The applicant left Albania on the 15 January 2022 and arrived in the State on the 22 January 2022, via Italy. He applied for international protection on the 31 March 2022.

7. The applicant completed a written questionnaire on the 13 July 2022. The applicant provided personal and family details and then provided a narrative description of the circumstances in which he was seeking protection. In summary, he described a family dispute which originated in an incident where a named individual, V.R., killed his wife and mother-inlaw, who were related to the applicant’s family. According to the applicant, V.R. was imprisoned for that crime and those events seem to have triggered a form of family feud in which two identified cousins of V.R. displayed violent antagonism towards the applicant’s family. The antagonism was focussed on the applicant’s family’s cattle farming business.

8. In 2016, the applicant sought to expand his family's farm business, but this generated a conflict with V.R.’s cousins, who burnt pastures where cattle were kept and pressured his family. The applicant said there were also physical assaults. In 2019, when he started to expand the farm again, the two cousins initiated a physical altercation with the applicant and his father, which involved one of the cousins producing a knife. The applicant stated he went to the local police station and reported the incident, but that the police did took no action. The applicant believed that this was because the younger brother of the two cousins was “head of the village” where they live, and he was politically connected and was close to senior police officers. The applicant went on to describe that his brother had been beaten, and further threats were made, so the work on the farm stopped and his father decided to place his brother in college in Italy for his own safety.

9. In 2021, the applicant began working on the farm again, but on the 16 April 2021 he was confronted by three masked people, two of whom he suspected were the cousins of V.R. One of the masked persons threatened him with a handgun. The applicant stated: “…at that moment, because I was very scared, I hit the gun with my hand and the gun fell to the ground. I ran away. They also ran after me and fired in my direction, but luckily no bullet hit me. I managed to run and hide, and my father, who had heard the shots, came out of the house and was talking to me, but they turned to my father and beat him barbarically, leaving him lying on the ground, and then ran away.”

10. The applicant explained that following that incident he left home for nine months and was in hiding; he was afraid to go to the police and decided to leave Albania on the 15 January 2022. He was not happy to stay in Italy as the other family had cousins in that State.

11. Later in the questionnaire, the applicant described his belief that his life was in danger and he was afraid that if he returned the two named individuals would kill him. He stated that as a result of corruption he could not complain to the police, referring back to 2019 when he had filed a complaint, but the police took no action. The applicant also stated his belief that when V.R. was released from prison the situation would become worse. He believed that V.R. was due to be released in the near future.

12. On the 18 October 2023, the applicant was interviewed pursuant to s. 35(12) of the 2015 Act. The applicant was asked questions on a number of topics, summarised below, all of which appeared directed towards clarifying issues from his questionnaire that raised concern for the IPO. a. In the first instance, there was a query regarding an assertion that he had made that he had no family in Ireland, whereas in fact he had a cousin in Ireland and had lived with him for a period of time. In that regard, the applicant explained that he had not understood the reference to family to include cousins. b. Secondly, the applicant was questioned about a woman involved in local politics at a high level in his area in Albania. This focus seemed unusual on my reading of the report as it appears clear that, when questioned, the applicant was able to give the full name of the person in question and the party with which she is associated. c. Third, he was questioned about his travels between Albania and Italy between June 2018 and December 2019. He stated that he was visiting his sister on holidays, and he explained that he would not visit his brother in Italy because he wanted to protect his brother from potential harm. On questioning, he explained that he could visit his sister because she had nothing to do with the problem and had another family. d. Fourth, in relation to the events when a gun was produced by masked assailants, the applicant was asked why the persons in question would wear masks when they had not sought to disguise who they were before. The applicant didn't know the answer to that question but suggested that maybe it was because there were cameras around. Having said that, it was clear that he was not aware whether there were cameras in operation in the vicinity of the incident, and he had not sought to obtain any footage of the events.

THE IPO REPORT

13. On the 11 January 2024, the applicant was informed that the IPO was recommending that he should not be given a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection declaration. The reasons were set out in a s. 39 report dated the 20 December 2023. The report commenced by noting that the Minister for Justice had designated Albania as a safe country of origin, pursuant to s. 72 the 2015 Act. For the purposes of the report, the IPO accepted that the applicant was a national of Albania and went on to consider the credibility of his claim. The IPO identified the core elements in the claim as follows:

(a) The applicant's nationality and personal circumstances.

(b) He was threatened by neighbours who were cousins of a man who murdered his uncle's wife and his cousin.

(c) He could not avail of assistance locally and was forced to flee to Ireland due to intimidation and threats on his life.

14. In discussing the threats made by his neighbours, the IPO rehearsed the answers given by the applicant in his interview and concluded that the applicant's account was: “…vague and cannot be considered plausible. He speculated that the reason why the men wore masks when they had not before was that there were cameras around, however, he then went on to state that the cameras were not around his house. It is also not considered plausible that he was able to knock the gun from his assailant and make his escape without being shot, when the assailants were firing after them. It is therefore not accepted as a material fact that the applicants [sic] life was threatened by his neighbours”.

15. The applicant's account of the reasons why he would not seek protection within Albania was discussed. The IPO highlighted that in its understanding the applicant was not sure of the full name of the politician or person involved in politics who would have caused him or the authorities not to take him seriously. It was noted that the applicant didn't seem to know her full name but referred to her by the name that everyone called her. However, as noted above, from my reading of the report, it was clear from the interview that the applicant did in fact give the full name of the person involved in politics.

16. Reference was also made to the applicant's account about travelling to Italy and the fact that he had multiple entry and exit stamps on his passport for Italy in 2019 but claimed that he hadn't seen his brother on those frequent visits to Italy.

17. The IPO concluded: -

“The reason the applicant claims the police were not helpful lacks credibility and on the balance of probabilities it is not accepted that the applicant sought protection from the local police. The applicant was evasive in his questionnaire regarding his movements and his account of his movements in the months prior to his claiming International Protection in Ireland lack coherence and are therefore not seen as credible and thus are rejected. The applicants [sic] claim that he was the target of a campaign of intimidation and threats from jealous neighbours has also been rejected.”

18. In those circumstances and where multiple important elements in the applicant's account had been rejected, the IPO found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. Similarly, there was a finding that the applicant would not face a real risk of serious harm having regard to the provisions of s. 2 of the International Protection Act 2015. In particular, it was not accepted that the situation in Albania amounted to a situation of indiscriminate violence within an international or internal armed conflict. In that regard reference was made to various country of origin information sources.

THE APPEAL

19. On the 24 January 2024, the applicant's solicitor sent a notice of appeal form to the Tribunal together with a covering letter which included legal submissions and observations. The essential case made in the written submission was that there were substantial grounds for believing the applicant would be at real risk of suffering serious harm and he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Albania by reason of his membership of his family which comprised a particular social group, and their adverse dealings with the R. family.

20. The legal submission challenged the various findings that the applicant's account was implausible or lacked credibility. Due to the fact that part of the applicant’s case is that the Tribunal failed to consider the representations and submissions made on his behalf, it may be helpful to set out precisely what was said in his lawyer’s letter of the 24 January 2024.

21. Most substantially, there was a general description of the events, and I have inserted initials for names associated with the R. family: “The R. family engaged in a campaign of intimidation, including burning some of the applicant’s farmland, killing the applicant’s animals, threatening and assaulting the applicant and his family, and seizing parts of the applicant’s family farmland. This culminated for the applicant in an incident in April 2021 when three masked men, two of whom he voice-recognized as members of the R. family, one bearing a pistol, confronted him outside of his home. The applicant knocked the gun to the ground and ran into bushy terrain a few metres away, with shots being fired in his direction. The applicant then went into hiding in [identified region], with his uncle for around nine months before arranging to flee Albania and apply for international protection in Ireland in January 2022.”

22. Second, the following was said about the IPO credibility findings: “1. The IPO s.39 report at page 7 therein asserts that “The applicant’s account is vague and cannot be considered plausible.” On its own this criticism is too general to have any real weight.

2. The IPO s.39 reported page 7 proceeds more specifically to impugn by implication the applicant’s account with respect to the wearing of masks by the attackers in the April 2021 attack. The applicant cannot be expected to know why the attackers chose to wear masks and there is no warrant for impugning his credibility for not knowing why. But it is entirely plausible that in circumstances where the attack involved, for the first time (as the applicant instructs), the use of a firearm by the R. family, that the attackers saw fit to wear masks. Having proper regard to the benefit of the doubt principle there is no reasonable basis for finding the applicant’s account of the attackers wearing masks to be incredible.

3. The IPO s.39 report at page 7/ 8 then asserts that “it is not considered plausible that he [the applicant] was able to knock the gun from the assailant and to make his escape without being shot, when the assailants were firing after him”. The applicant instructs that he only had to run about three metres downhill to get into the cover of heavily bushed area. Again, there is nothing incredible or implausible about this aspect of the applicant’s account.

4. With respect to page 8 in the IPO s.39 report and the politician E., the applicant stated at interview that the politician’s name is E.R. but that he was not sure of the full version of her first name. It is of note in this regard that the answer at A66 in the s.35 interview is given as “He knows she is called E.”. The interpretation here was in reported speech (as elsewhere in the section 35 report and therefore inadequate and not reliable.

5. Page 8 in the IPO s.39 report states “The applicant was evasive in his Questionnaire regarding his movements and his account of his movement in the months prior to his claiming international protection in Ireland lack coherence and are therefore not seen as credible and thus are rejected.” We fail to see how the applicant can reasonably be said to have been evasive in his Questionnaire. It is clear from the English translation of Q.4.1 therein that he explained that he spent a few days in Italy, where he obtained a false passport to enable him to travel to Ireland. The applicant instructs that he did not feel safe in Italy because of its proximity to Albanian [sic] and the ease with which Albanians can travel to Italy. The s.39 report’s statement here is opaque and perfunctory. It does not amount to a serious criticism of the applicant’s account and cannot reasonably warrant a negative credibility finding against him. Having regard to the foregoing, the IPO s.39 report is not a reliable assessment of the applicant’s international protection needs.”

23. The submission went on to identify elements in country-of-origin information that were said to be supportive of the applicant’s account. The focus here was on the availability of effective state protection and reports of corruption within the judicial and police system.

24. Finally, there was a request for an oral hearing. This was urged on the basis that a papers-only appeal could not provide the applicant with an effective remedy having regard to the nature of the credibility findings against the applicant.

THE TRIBUNAL DECISION

25. The decision of the Tribunal was communicated to the applicant by letter dated the 5 July 2024, and the decision itself was dated the 3 July 2024.

26. The first substantial issue dealt with in the Tribunal decision is the question of whether or not there should have been an oral hearing. While this is not an issue that was the subject to the judicial review challenge, it is worth noting that the Tribunal referred to various authorities for the proposition that there was no obligation to hold an oral hearing simply because an issue of credibility arises. By reference to the observations of O'Donnell J., as he then was, in V.J. v. Minister for Justice [2019] IESC 75, the Tribunal considered that what was required was that the applicant had an opportunity to make his case, and that the applicant was able to expand on his evidence in his notice of appeal. Similarly, the Tribunal referred to decisions of the High Court in S.K. v. IPAT [2021] IEHC 781 and M.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 528 to base a proposition that in a papers-only appeal the Tribunal in assessing credibility findings can assess the entire claim and can form different views on credibility to the IPO. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant was given an adequate opportunity to set out his claim in the various processes prior to the Tribunal hearing; and that the appellant was assisted by interpreters throughout the process and had independent legal advice. In addition, the applicant had confirmed at the outset of both the initial and subsequent s. 35 interviews that the questionnaire was correct and accurate, and that at the end of his s. 35 interview he confirmed that he had explained all the reasons why he was seeking protection, and that no additional information was required.

27. In the premises, the Tribunal concluded that there were no new elements that required to be heard or any misinterpretation of any particular fact which required clarification and that the issues advanced were capable of being advanced on the papers. Hence there was a decision that no oral hearing was required in the interests of justice.

28. The Tribunal went on to summarise the case facts and documents and noted that all the information and documentation provided had been fully assessed. In a similar way to the IPO, the Tribunal accepted the applicant's accounts of his nationality and his basic personal circumstances. The Tribunal went on to consider the specific allegations in relation to the disputes that occurred between 2016 and 2021 regarding the family's lands and the disputes with the R. family.

29. As the credibility findings of the Tribunal are central to its decision and these proceedings, it is helpful to set them out as they appear in the Tribunal decision: “26. The Tribunal considers the Appellant's account being threatened over a number of years from 2016 to 2021 is generally vague and lacking specific detail which one would reasonably expect to be provided given his brother was instructed to leave the country in 2019 due to the dangerous situation the Appellant claims existed. The Tribunal considers the threats are generic and there was a lack of specific detail including how frequently these occurred, when they occurred, or how they happened.

27. The appellant claims he received a phone call on the morning of the attempted murder in 2021. The Tribunal considers this lacks plausibility that he would be told in advance, and in effect notified of this. The Appellant claims the assailants wore masks during the incident in 2021 when he was shot at. The Tribunal considers this lacks plausibility and coherence when he had been threatened over the phone that morning and the attackers told him he had been warned previously. The Tribunal considers the Appellant's account of escaping from 3 attackers who were armed and in such close proximity that the Appellant could strike the gun from their hand to the ground to lack plausibility. The Tribunal considers there is a vagueness and a lack of specific detail which one reasonably expect detailing an escape from three people, notwithstanding the gun falling to the ground, and thereafter escaping to the bushes.

28. The Appellant claims to have gone to the police who did nothing to help him because his neighbours are connected. The Tribunal considers the Appellant's account of the connections as generic and lacking in specific detail to explain the extent of the connections and why notwithstanding such connections the appellant reported the incidents. The Tribunal considers the Appellant's account of having powerful connections to be inconsistent and incoherent with his claim they were wearing masks and yet telling him he had been previously warned. Furthermore, the Appellant claims his neighbours wife was a politician however when asked to identify her, he was unable to do so. The Tribunal considers this inconsistent.

29. The Tribunal notes the Appellant claims his brother was instructed to leave due to the dangerous situation and that he did not, however in his Section 35 interview the Appellant was asked about numerous travel stamps which showed he travelled to Italy in 2019 and return to Albania. The Tribunal considers the Appellant's account of living with his Uncle for a number of months before leaving Albania lacks specific detail which one reasonably expect a person to provide when living in another location for a number of months.

30. Looking at the case in the round, and when weighing up the credibility indicators, the tribunal considers the negatives outweigh the positives.”

30. The Tribunal went on to make a finding that there was no objective basis for the applicant to fear a reasonable chance of persecution if returned to Albania or that there was a convention nexus to the claim. For largely the same reasons, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not entitled to subsidiary protection.

THE PROCEEDINGS

31. An ex parte application was made for leave to apply for judicial review on the 7 August 2024 and leave was granted on the 25 November 2024. The applicant was granted leave to apply for an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the Tribunal and also for an extension of time.

32. The legal grounds upon which leave to apply for that relief was granted were made referable to five specific findings in respect of plausibility, inconsistency and credibility of the applicant’s account. Those findings centred on three specific issues – or combinations of them:

(a) the account that the attackers wore masks; (b) the account of the applicant escaping his attackers; and (c) the account of the R. family’s political connections. In relation to each of the five impugned findings, the applicant contends, (i) that the findings were made without taking into account the representations and submissions made on behalf of the applicant, and (ii) that the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for the findings.

33. It is important to highlight that leave in this case was sought and granted on the basis of the specific claims relating to adequacy of reasons and failing to have regard to the evidence; and there was no application in this case to amend the statement of grounds. I note this because the case made at the hearing at times veered into arguments that seemed directed to the reasonableness of the findings, particularly where there was no oral hearing. That was perhaps understandable in light of certain elements in the Tribunal decision.

34. However, the court is required to adjudicate on the case in respect of which leave was granted. It is often the case that after some reflection and consideration an applicant may be advised that an application should be made to seek to introduce a new legal ground, and the court has a discretion to grant such an application in the appropriate circumstances. What is not permitted is for an applicant to press a case beyond what is reasonably contemplated by the grant of leave, particularly where such a course of action, as a matter of procedural fairness, can give rise to a material prejudice to the respondent. In those premises, while there may have been a basis to question the decision not to conduct an oral hearing in light of the credibility issues and to question whether the credibility findings reasonably flowed from the facts having regard to the approach that ought to be adopted to such matters as indicated in case law and certain of the helpful “soft law” materials, these were not matters upon which the court was asked to adjudicate.

35. A statement of opposition was filed on the 5 March 2025. The statement of opposition contains a preliminary objection that the application was made in excess of the time permitted under s. 5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act 2000, as amended. The remainder of the statement of opposition amounted effectively to a traverse of the matters set out in the statement of grounds.

36. The statement of opposition was verified in an affidavit sworn on the 4 March 2025 by John Moore, a Higher Executive Officer in the Immigration Service Delivery function in the Department of Justice. In addition to verifying the matters set out in the statement of opposition, Mr. Moore exhibited the initial application form completed by the applicant from March 2022 and a complete version of the s. 35(12) interview with the applicant.

THE ARGUMENTS AT HEARING

37. The parties agreed that the legal questions for adjudication were as follows:

(i) The Tribunal found that the applicant's claim that his attackers wore masks lacked plausibility and coherence. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account the explanation regarding this issue advanced on the applicant's behalf in his solicitor's letter dated 24 January 2024? Alternatively, did the Tribunal breached constitutional justice and section 46 (6) of the 2015 Act by failing to give adequate reasons for this finding in light of those submissions?

(ii) The Tribunal found that the applicant's account of escaping from his attackers lacked plausibility. Did the Tribunal fail to consider the explanation and representations made on the applicant's behalf regarding this issue in his solicitor's letter dated 24 January 2024? Alternatively, did the Tribunal breach constitutional justice and section 46 (6) of the 2015 Act by failing to give adequate reasons for this finding in light of the submissions?

(iii) The Tribunal found that the applicant's account of escaping from his attackers was vague and lacked specific detail. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account the representations made regarding this issue on the applicant's behalf in his solicitor's letter dated 24 January 2024? Alternatively, did the Tribunal breached constitutional justice and section 46 (6) of the 2015 Act by failing to give adequate reasons for this finding in light of those representations?

(iv) The Tribunal found that the account that the neighbours had powerful connections was "inconsistent and incoherent" with his claim that they wore masks yet told him he had been previously warned. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account the representations made regarding masks in the letter dated 24 January 2024? Alternatively, did the Tribunal breach constitutional justice and section 46(6) of the 2015 Act by failing to give adequate reasons for this finding in light of those representations?

(v) The Tribunal considered it inconsistent that the applicant claimed his neighbour’s wife was a politician but was unable to identify her. Did the Tribunal fail to take into account the explanation offered in the solicitor’s letter dated 24 January 2024 regarding this issue? Alternatively, did the Tribunal breach constitutional justice and section 46(6) of the 2015 Act by failing to give adequate reasons for this finding in light of those representations?

DISCUSSION: EXTENSION OF TIME

38. At the hearing of the application, the applicant sought to admit a further affidavit that had been sworn by his solicitor on the 31 July 2025 and delivered to the respondents shortly thereafter, in which he sought to address the extension of time issue. The respondents objected on the basis that permission had not been sought for a further affidavit, and that by that stage the parties had exchanged pleadings and submissions that, inter alia, dealt with the time issues. Counsel for the respondent, nevertheless, fairly and properly acknowledged that he would be able to argue the question of whether the affidavit set out good and sufficient reasons for extension if the affidavit was admitted. In those premises, I was prepared to admit the affidavit.

39. The affidavit explained that the Tribunal decision was sent by registered post under cover of a letter dated the 5 July 2024. The applicant informed his solicitor that he wished to challenge the decision, and counsel was contacted on the 12 July 2024. There was a slight delay due to pressure of work at the end of the legal term. On the 6 August 2024, further papers were sent to counsel, who was out of the country, and draft papers were finalised and emailed back to the solicitor on the same day. The papers were filed in the Central Office on the 7 August 2024, which was one day outside the statutory period.

40. In terms of the approach to be adopted by the court, I am satisfied that the test applicable to an application for an extension of time under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended, recently has been set out comprehensively and correctly in the judgment of Simons J. in P. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT and Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 403.

41. First, the judgment highlights the distinction between the test in other statutes and the RSC between the necessity to “show good and sufficient reason to make the application within” (my emphasis) a prescribed period, and the test under the 2000 Act, whether there is “good and sufficient reason” for extending the period.

42. Second, the court should have regard to the analogous principles for an extension under Order 84, rule 21 of the RSC, albeit mindful that the threshold under Order 84 appears slightly higher. In that regard, relevant factors may include the nature of the orders under challenge, the conduct of the parties, the effect of the decision under challenge, steps taken by the parties subsequent to the decision under challenge, and the public policy consideration that public law challenges should be prosecuted promptly. It can be noted that Simons J. identified that an important policy consideration underpinning section 5 of the 2000 Act, was to ensure that the proceedings themselves would be determined with expedition and that delay in commencing proceedings could hinder the achievement of that policy objective.

43. Having regard to the factors identified above and the manner in which the extension application was dealt with in P. (Zimbabwe) it seems to me that the applicant has set out good and sufficient reasons for an extension of time. a. First, the delay was very minimal. It is very clear that the applicant sought to progress matters with real expedition, during a court vacation, to the point that the papers were filed within 24 hours of the expiration of the relevant time period. b. Second, that minimal delay did not contribute to any delay in the listing or determination of the proceedings. It can be noted that while the papers were filed on the 7 August 2024, the formal ex parte application could only be heard on the 25 November 2024 and the opposition papers were not filed until March 2025. Hence the overall delays in the progress of the case cannot be attributed to any late start on the part of the applicant. c. Third, there was no argued or identifiable prejudice to the respondents. d. Fourth, the application for an extension was heard in tandem with the hearing of the substantive application for relief. e. Fifth, this was not a situation in which the applicant’s case manifestly was very weak or bound to fail.

44. Overall, therefore, when the court considers the application and balances the respective justices of the parties’ position, it seems to me that there is reasonable basis for granting the extension sought, and I will grant an extension of time.

SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

General principles

45. Before addressing the substantive arguments, I will note certain general principles that apply generally in judicial review proceedings and further principles that are specifically applicable to international protection claims grounded in EU law, all of which I have applied in this case.

46. It is important to acknowledge that even when adjusted to take account of the EU law backdrop, as a matter of principle the High Court’s role in determining a challenge by way of judicial review is limited. In that regard, the following matters seem well-established and applicable to this case: a. There is a general need to ensure clarity about the grounds upon which an application for judicial review has been permitted, and the court should not make decisions on grounds that were not pleaded and permitted; see A.P. v DPP [2011] 1 I.R. 729. b. The role of the High Court is to consider the lawfulness of the decision and to determine whether the decision made was one that was lawfully open to the decision maker. c. The Oireachtas has tasked the IPO and Tribunal with determining the factual issues. d. The High Court should not substitute its views for those found by the Tribunal; so long as this is done properly, it is a matter for the Tribunal to weigh credibility. e. In carrying out that task, the court should view matters in the round and avoid over-parsing or over-analysing a decision. f. The Tribunal is not required to set out each and every element in an applicant’s case and address them point by point.

Standard of review

47. The necessary adjustments to the role of the High Court in “ordinary” judicial review matters stem from the requirement that when considering a decision on international protection, a somewhat different approach is required. There is a need for a heightened scrutiny, which was described by Charleton J. in AAA v Minister for Justice [2017] IESC 80 as follows: “26. In NM, Hogan J. held that post-Meadows, judicial review was sufficiently flexible to accommodate the “thorough review” requirements of Diouf, even if the earlier “no evidence” standard required by O’Keeffe would not. …”

48. Hence the court is required to adopt a thorough review standard approach. That requirement is necessary because, among other matters, as the CJEU explained in X v. IPAT, Case C-756/21, there is a need for “vigilance and care” in carrying out the assessment of individual circumstances where there is a claim that a person has a fear of persecution since “what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the European Union …”.

Adequacy of reasons

49. In respect of the obligation to provide adequate reasons, the respondents relied on the well-known observations by Clarke C.J. in Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2021] 2 IR 752, where it was said that: “Therefore, it seems to me that it is possible to identify two separate but closely related requirements regarding the adequacy of any reasons given by a decisionmaker. First, any person affected by a decision is at least entitled to know in general terms why the decision was made … Second, a person is entitled to have enough information to consider whether they can or should seek … to bring judicial review of a decision. Closely related to this latter requirement, it also appears from the case law that the reasons provided must be such as to allow a court … reviewing a decision to actually engage properly in such … review. However, in identifying this general approach, it must be emphasised that its application will vary greatly from case to case as a result of the various criteria identified earlier which might distinguish one decision, or decision-making process, from another.”

50. In relation to the latter portion of the extract from Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála, it is clear that there are relevant features of the decision making process under the 2015 Act, which inform a consideration of the obligation to provide adequate reasons, and also which will inform any obligation to take account of relevant matters. Without prejudice to any other pertinent provisions, I consider that for the purposes of this application the following core statutory provisions of the 2015 Act are relevant. a. First, reflecting the EU law duty of co-operation, s. 61(3) makes clear that the Tribunal is to be inquisitorial in nature. b. Second, s. 27(1)(a) imposes an obligation on an applicant to submit all the information needed to substantiate his application. c. Third, by s. 28(2) the Tribunal in cooperation with the applicant is to assess the relevant elements of the application, and those elements are described in s. 28(3). d. Fourth, under s. 28(4), the assessment by the Tribunal must be carried out on an individual basis; and there is a mandatory requirement to take into account the matters set out at s. 28(4)(a) to (f). In addition, s. 46(1) sets out a list of matters that must be considered by the Tribunal in reaching a

decision. e. Fifth, s. 46(6) requires the Tribunal to communicate the reasons for a

decision to an applicant.

51. Finally, I am bearing in mind that when a Tribunal is faced with making findings relating to credibility and plausibility, the authorities make clear that the observations of Cooke

J. in I.R. v. Minister for Justice [2015] 4 IR 144 remain the touchstone for reviewing such decisions. As noted by Cooke J., the role of the High Court is confined to ensuring that the process by which such conclusions have been reached is legally sound and not vitiated by any material error of law. However, as noted by Cooke J., an assessment of credibility must be sufficiently cogent to stand up to review.

52. Cooke J. set out at para. 10 the principles that could be said to emerge from the case law as a guide to the manner in which evidence going to credibility ought to be treated and the review of conclusions on credibility to be carried out. I have set out the following elements identified by Cooke J. not because it is intended to consider the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s findings, but because they assist in understanding the nature of the reasons that could be expected to be found in a decision on credibility, if the court is to be able to conduct a thorough review. The relevant principles as found in para. 10 of I.R. are as follows. “iv) The assessment of credibility must be made by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed. It must not be based on a perceived, correct instinct or gut feeling as to whether the truth is or is not being told.

v) A finding of lack of credibility must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation and the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding.

…

viii) When subjected to judicial review, a decision on credibility must be read as a whole and the Court should be wary of attempts to deconstruct an overall

conclusion by subjecting its individual parts to isolated examination in disregard of the cumulative impression made upon the decision-maker especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person.

…

x) … there is no general obligation in all cases to refer in a decision on credibility to every item of evidence and to every argument advanced, provided the reasons stated enable the applicant as addressee, and the Court in exercise of its judicial review function, to understand the substantive basis for the

conclusion on credibility and the process of analysis or evaluation by which it has been reached.”

53. Taking all of those above matters into consideration, it seems to me that the applicant’s arguments on the adequacy of reasons were less directed to whether he was afforded a proper opportunity to know in general terms why his account and explanations were not accepted but, instead, were more focussed on an argument relating to the logic of the reasoning pathway adopted by the Tribunal. As noted above, this was not an argument in respect of which the applicant was granted leave to apply for judicial review; the reasonableness of the decision was not an issue in these proceedings. Put another way, a finding that the reasons were adequate is not the same necessarily as finding that the reasoning process pathway was rational or that the treatment of credibility issues were sufficiently thorough. Those are not matters with which this application was concerned.

54. Having considered the core reasons set out by the Tribunal at paragraphs 26 to 30 of the decision I am satisfied that the reasons given were adequate. A fair reading of the decision makes clear that the Tribunal considered that the account of the various threats between 2016 and 2021 were vague and lacking in specific detail. The Tribunal found that the account of the events in April 2021 was not plausible, vague and lacking in specific detail; and the Tribunal explained that in its view there was a disconnect between the assailants threatening the applicant on the telephone and referring to previous threats on the one hand – which I understand as meaning that the source of the threats was readily identifiable – and the claim that the assailants wore masks later in the day. Likewise, the Tribunal considered it implausible that the applicant would respond to production of a handgun by knocking it from an assailant’s hand and escaping to nearby bushes. Whether one agrees with that process of reasoning or not, it is reasonably clear what the Tribunal had decided and in general terms why it made that

decision.

55. The Tribunal considered that there was not sufficient detail in the applicant’s account of the R. family’s political connections and influence over the local police. The Tribunal considered it inconsistent that the applicant was of the view that there was no point approaching the police after the 2021 incident when he had approached the police after an earlier event. The Tribunal made a finding that the applicant was unable to identify his neighbour’s wife, who was a politician. Again, one might agree or disagree with those findings, or indeed argue that they were findings that could not have been made on the evidence or by reference to the I.R. principles. However, I am satisfied that for the purposes of an adequacy of reasons analysis, the applicant was given sufficient reasons by the Tribunal such that he would have been able to make an informed decision as to whether the Tribunal findings should be challenged.

Failing to take account of explanations

56. The second issue raised by the applicant was that the Tribunal failed to take account of the submissions made and explanations given as part of the appeal process. The applicant argued that as a matter of constitutional justice the Tribunal is required to specifically consider and assess an explanation given in response to an adverse credibility finding by the IPO. The applicant grounded that argument in a series of decisions relating to grants of leave, including Bujari v. Minister for Justice [2003] IEHC 18 and Zebry v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2005] IEHC 462; and in decisions on substantive applications such as M.G.D. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 566 and K.F.D. (Togo) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 788. The gravamen of those decisions is that a body in the position of the Tribunal is required to consider and assess explanations given by an applicant in response to an earlier adverse finding on credibility. The applicant urged, by reference to the observations of Stewart J. in K.F.D. (Togo) that this requirement is heightened where the Tribunal proceeds on a papers-only appeal.

57. The respondents argued primarily that there is no general requirement to go through a point by point response to all matters raised by an applicant, and that the Supreme Court

decision in Rana & Ali v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 provides that if there is a general statement in the decision to the effect that all materials have been considered, that will be sufficient unless there is some evidence based reason to consider that the statement is not accurate. In any event, as the respondents argued, it was clear from the decision that the matters raised on behalf of the applicant were referenced and addressed.

58. Insofar as an argument can be made that there may be a tension between the very clear statement made by the Supreme Court in Rana & Ali v. Minister for Justice and the earlier High Court authorities relied on by the applicant, I consider this is capable of being resolved. As a matter of EU law and domestic statutory law, as expressed in s. 28 of the 2015 Act, mandatory obligations are imposed on a Tribunal. First, by s. 28(2) and (3), a Tribunal must “assess the relevant elements” in the application. Those elements include the “reasons for applying for international protection”. In assessing those elements, s. 28(4) requires a Tribunal to “take account” of a variety of matters including “the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may have been … subject to persecution or serious harm” (s.28(4)(b)).

59. The mandatory requirement to “assess the elements” in the application is not discharged or satisfied by a simple statement to the effect that the Tribunal has assessed the elements in the application. The use of the word “assess”, in my view, requires a demonstrable engagement with those elements; and experience shows that this is the almost invariable approach adopted by the Tribunals and generally is reflected in the structure or layout of most decisions. On the other hand, the requirement to take account of identified matters is an obligation that may be discharged or satisfied by a statement to the effect that, for instance, the documentation submitted by the applicant has been considered. This is, as noted in Rana & Ali v. Minister for Justice, unless there is a reason to believe that such a statement should not be accepted as accurate. The applicant is entitled to understand that their case has been considered and that that the elements of the application have been assessed.

60. Such an approach reflects the well-established authorities which make clear that an applicant cannot dictate the approach to be adopted by the Tribunal to evidence or submissions by demanding a point-by-point narrative discussion of all matters raised by that applicant. A different situation obtains where a question arises as to where a tribunal has engaged properly with a core claim within an application, but it should be noted that the question of whether something is a core claim ultimately will be a matter for the court, and a matter does not become a core claim simply by the applicant so asserting.

61. In my view, the concerns reflected in cases in cases such as K.F.D. (Togo) and M.G.D. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal relate to situations in which an applicant provides explanations by way of a substantive response to first instance negative findings on credibility (which for this purpose includes issues relating to inconsistency in or the plausibility of important elements in the application) but where there is no evidence that the Tribunal actually engaged with the response. The appeal process involves a full de novo consideration of the entire application and the applicant is entitled to a “full and thorough enquiry into the … documentary evidence and submissions in respect of every point on which an appeal has been lodged”, per Charleton J. at para 14 of M.A.R.A. (Nigeria) v Minister for Justice [2014] IESC 71. It would undermine the integrity and utility of that process if there was an appearance that new information or substantive responses were not considered.

62. It should be borne in mind that in K.F.D. (Togo) it appears to have been the case that the court was satisfied that the tribunal had not provided any basis for considering that issues raised on the applicant’s notice of appeal had been considered, and that this was particularly problematic in a papers-only appeal.

63. Similarly, in M.G.D. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal, Barr J. quashed a decision of the tribunal for a number of reasons. Of particular relevance to this issue, the court found that a substantial issue arose in relation to the applicant’s account of an attack in Abyei in Sudan in May 2008. The tribunal had found that there was no mention or record of such an attack. In fact, as explained by the court, the applicant had submitted a significant amount of country-oforigin information which set out clearly that there had been prolonged fighting in the village at the time in question. The claim that this material was not referred to or properly considered in the decision was found to have been well made. Second, there was an issue in relation to the applicant’s knowledge of a new Sudanese currency. In his appeal the applicant had explained that the currency was introduced in the north of Sudan and was not used in the south of the country. The court found that the evidence was “entirely ignored” by the tribunal and this breached constitutional justice by failing to have regard to a relevant consideration.

64. To similar effect, albeit in leave applications, a tribunal decision was criticised by Finlay Geoghegan J. in Bujari v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2003] IEHC 18. In that case, an explanation of a material difference in the facts stated at an initial interview and at the oral hearing was not considered or assessed by the tribunal, where the difference was a material factor in the assessment of credibility. In the leave application in F.H.Z. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2005] IEHC 462, an issue also arose about an alleged failure to consider an explanation for a discrepancy between the materials set out in the initial interview and those set out in the questionnaire. There, Clarke J., relying inter alia on the decision in Bujari v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal, found that the absence of evidence that the decision maker failed to consider the explanation amounted to substantial grounds for a challenge.

65. In my view, the common features are that the matters in respect of which an explanation was proffered by the various applicants to the tribunals were treated as important or material to the eventual decision. In addition, while the matters were material to an assessment of the credibility of the applicant’s account, they were matters that were at least susceptible to some cogent explanation. The cases such as K.F.D. (Togo), to my mind, are therefore closely related to the category of case such as M.M. v. Chief International Protection Officer & Ors [2022] IECA 226, where there is good reason to consider that a “core claim” was not considered. They are all cases where there was good reason to believe that something objectively material to the

decision had not been considered. In turn, they can be seen as falling within the category of situations identified in Rana & Ali v. Minister for Justice where there is a substantial basis for arguing that the question of whether the Tribunal complied with the s. 28(4) obligation to take account of certain matters cannot be answered by a statement to the effect that all documents and submissions had been considered.

66. It is necessary to reiterate that these proceedings and this aspect of the applicant’s claims concern an assertion that the Tribunal acted unfairly by failing expressly to consider and assess the responses made by the applicant to the various matters that gave rise to concern in the IPO report. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances and the individual claims and responses made on behalf of an applicant. Hence it is important to recall what was actually submitted by the applicant and whether, and if so, how it was addressed by the Tribunal, and also to consider the nature of the matters that gave rise to concern in the cases relied upon by the applicant.

67. The IPO report in this case made very similar findings to those made by the Tribunal concerning the credibility of the applicant’s accounts of events involving the R. family between 2016 and 2021. In response to the IPO findings and as noted above, the applicant made written submissions. I have set out the content of those submissions above.

68. In my view, the submissions relating to the credibility issues raised very few new facts or provided any new explanation or elaboration from the applicant. For the most part the submissions appeared directed towards a reasonableness argument about the quality of the reasoning process that led to the findings, along the lines indicated in the I.R. judgment and subsequent cases. To the extent that there was new information, it largely involved some more general description of the campaign of intimidation described by the applicant and also introduced the assertion that when the applicant ran to a bushy area during the April 2021 incident, the bushes were a distance of about three metres from his assailants.

69. Turning to the Tribunal’s decision, again I have set out the relevant extract from the

decision above. The decision expressly states that the notice of appeal and all documentation referred to therein had been considered. The general factual description of the core events is set out; and in my view it is adequately summarised, given that there is no obligation on the Tribunal exhaustively to set the entirety of the applicant’s account.

70. At the hearing, counsel for the applicant emphasised that the Tribunal report does not include a reference to the fact that in his submissions the applicant instructed that he only had to move three metres from his assailants to reach the bushy area. In my view this is not sufficient to lead to an inference that the submission was not considered. As described by the Tribunal the analysis was focussed on the level of detail and specificity in the account of the incident, together with its overall plausibility. Insofar as the challenge to the findings is grounded for this part of the application on a claim that there was a failure to take account of the submissions, the reality is that the applicant’s response to the IPO findings that the claims were vague, implausible and lacking detail was to contend that the claims were not to be characterised in that way.

71. This was not a situation where the applicant provided more detail or explanation in response to the IPO concerns, but instead the applicant contended that the IPO was wrong to characterise the account in that way and that the findings were essentially unreasonable.

72. In the premises I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that the decision of the Tribunal should be vitiated by a failure to take account of the submissions. The submissions made on behalf of the applicant reasonably understood were directed (a) to contesting that the evidence before the IPO properly could be characterised as lacking credibility, and (b) that the findings in the premises were unreasonable. I consider that (a) the Tribunal considered the question of credibility and formed a view, and (b) there is no evidence to suggest that the in any material sense the submissions made on behalf of the applicant were not taken into account. The Tribunal, as required, engaged in a fresh consideration of the credibility issues and came to a conclusion. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to note that the applicant did not accept that the IPO findings were warranted, as the Tribunal was considering those issues on a de novo basis. As repeated perhaps too often in this judgment, the applicant has not sought to challenge the findings made by the Tribunal on reasonableness grounds, but, instead, grounded his claims in arguments that the decision should be quashed by reason of two specific forms of procedural unfairness.

73. In the circumstances, this application for judicial review will be refused. As the judgment is being delivered electronically my provisional view is that the respondents should be entitled to an order for their costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement. In case the parties wish to contend for a different form of order, I will list the matter for final argument before me at 10.30am on Thursday, the 15 January 2026.