Section 21 of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019 applies only to consumer insurance, not commercial contracts.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 735

[Record No. 2025/4823 P]

BETWEEN

M AND ANOR.

PLAINTIFFS

-AND-

CENTRIC HEALTH PRIMARY CARE LIMITED

-AND-

CAROLINA GRISALES

DEFENDANTS

-AND-

MARIAN HAYES (PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF

MICHAEL HAYES DECEASED)

THIRD PARTY

Ex tempore ruling of Mr Justice Paul Coffey delivered on the 7th day of November 2025

1. This is a clinical negligence action in which, at a case management hearing, the first-named plaintiff has applied to this court for a direction that the first-named defendant disclose the name and address of its insurer so that the first-named plaintiff may be afforded an opportunity to avail of the statutory right of action against an insurer, conferred by section 21 of the Consumer Insurance Contracts Act 2019 (“the Act”).

2. At issue is whether section 21 of the Act is a freestanding provision extending to all insurance contracts or whether it merely modifies the law in respect of consumer insurance contracts falling within the scope of the Act.

3. The first-named defendant is an incorporated body that owns and operates over

70 GP clinics throughout Ireland. It is accepted that the first-named defendant is not a “consumer” within the meaning of the Act and that the contract of insurance between the first-named defendant and its insurer is not a consumer insurance contract as defined in the legislation. Section 1 of the Act adopts the definition of “consumer” contained in section 2(1) of the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman Act 2017, with the result that an incorporated body is excluded from that definition where its annual turnover in the previous financial year exceeded €3 million. The scope of the Act is governed by section 2(1) which provides that “except where otherwise provided, each provision of this Act applies to life and non-life contracts of insurance entered into, and variations to such contracts of insurance agreed, between an insurer and a consumer after the commencement of the provision concerned.”

4. Section 21 creates a statutory right of action for a third party against an insurer in specified circumstances, including where the insured has died, cannot be found, is insolvent, or where it appears to the court to be just and equitable to permit such an action. It also confers a related right to obtain certain information from the insured or the insurer to enable such an action to be brought. The section thus represents a legislative mechanism designed to ensure that an injured third party is not left without an effective remedy in cases where the insured cannot, or will not, engage with the claim process.

5. Section 21 of the Act provides the following: “(1) Where a person (in this section referred to as “the person”) is insured under a contract of insurance against a liability that may be incurred by the person to a third party (and such a liability is incurred) then, where either of the following applies—

(a) the person has died, or cannot be found, or is insolvent, or

(b) for any other reason it appears to a court to be just and equitable to so order, the rights of the person under the contract against the insurer in respect of the liability shall, notwithstanding anything in any enactment or rule of law, be transferred to and vest in the third party to whom the liability was so incurred.

(2) Accordingly, a third party, in the circumstances described in subsection (1), has a right to recover from the insurer, in accordance with the contract of insurance, the amount of any loss suffered by the third party even though the third party is not a party to the contract of insurance.

(3) Where a third party reasonably believes that the person has incurred a liability to which this section applies, the third party shall be entitled, by way of notice on paper or on another durable medium, to seek and obtain information from the insurer or from any other person who is able to provide it (neither of whom shall unreasonably refuse such information) concerning—

(a) the existence of a contract of insurance that covers the supposed liability or which might be regarded as covering it,

(b) if there exists such a contract, who the insurer is,

(c) the terms of the contract, and

(d) whether the insurer has informed the person that the insurer intends to refuse liability under the contract in respect of the person’s supposed liability …

(14) In this section, “the person” includes an individual, a partnership, or any corporate body.”

6. Senior counsel for the first-named plaintiff contends that because section 21 defines certain words used in that section, and in particular the word “person,” which at paragraph 21(14) is defined to include “any corporate body,” which prima facie includes a corporate enterprise with an annual turnover which exceeds the statutory threshold of €3 million that applies to consumers, an inference should be drawn that the section is a freestanding provision that applies to all contracts of insurance. This argument must be examined in the light of the principles that apply to statutory interpretation, and in particular the guidance of the Supreme Court in Heather Hill Management Company CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2022] 2 ILRM 313, where Murray C.J. stated that the words of a statute are to be given primacy and that, where context and purpose are to be wielded to displace the apparently clear language of a provision, this must be “decisively probative of an alternative construction that is itself capable of being accommodated within the statutory language.”

7. The long title of the Act reads: “An Act to reform the law of consumer insurance contracts and to provide for related matters.” On its face, this confines the scope of the legislation to consumer insurance contracts. This interpretation is reinforced by section 2(1) of the Act, which expressly provides that “each provision of this Act applies to life and non-life contracts of insurance entered into, and variations to such contracts of insurance agreed, between an insurer and a consumer”. The words “each provision of this Act” logically imply that every operative provision thereafter, including section 21, must therefore be read as applying only to such contracts unless the Act expressly provides otherwise.

8. Section 21 contains no language which expressly extends its application beyond consumer insurance contracts. There is no general extension clause permitting it to apply to non-consumer or commercial insurance contracts. In particular, it does not provide that the words “contract of insurance” when used in the section have a different meaning for the purpose of the section than that already provided for in the interpretation provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the section must be interpreted as operating solely within the framework of the Act, namely in relation to consumer insurance contracts.

9. It is also not without significance that the 2019 Act did not amend or repeal section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961. Section 62 continues to govern the circumstances in which a third party may sue an insurer directly in respect of nonconsumer insurance. The coexistence of both provisions suggests that the Oireachtas intended section 21 of the 2019 Act to operate in parallel with, rather than as a replacement for, section 62 of the 1961 Act.

10. I will therefore refuse the application insofar as it is made for the purposes of bringing an application to join the first-named defendant’s insurer pursuant to section

21 of the Act, as section 21 is of no application to the contract of insurance in this case. However, that is not the end of the matter.

11. This application arises in the context of proceedings brought by the first-named plaintiff, whose life expectancy has been estimated at twelve months from last March and whose trial is scheduled to commence in eighteen days’ time, on 25 November. The first-named plaintiff’s legal team have brought this application for the entirely worthy reason that they wish to make every effort to ensure that, if the first-named plaintiff succeeds against the first-named defendant at trial, any judgment that is obtained against the first-named defendant can be enforced during her lifetime. While the first-named defendant has, through its senior counsel, undertaken to seek recovery from its insurer in the event of an adverse outcome at trial, the first-named plaintiff’s concern remains and is heightened by the first-named defendant’s refusal to provide any assurance that either it or its insurer will satisfy any judgment obtained against it.

12. The court shares the first-named plaintiff’s concern that everything possible should be done to ensure that, if judgment is given against the first-named defendant, it will be satisfied. To that end, I will direct the first-named defendant to disclose the name and address of its insurer by close of business today so that the first-named plaintiff will be in a position to launch “oven-ready” proceedings against the first-named defendant’s insurer, pursuant to section 62 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, on foot of any judgment she may obtain, should that course become necessary for any reason. Senior counsel for the first-named defendant properly acknowledges that he cannot resist the making of this order, and I will therefore make it on that basis.