High Court dismisses applicants' challenge to aviation authority inspections, ruling inspectors had jurisdiction over the pilot in command.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 723

[Record No. 2022/844JR]

BETWEEN

IRISH SKYDIVING CLUB CLG & EOIN NEVIN

APPLICANTS

AND

IRISH AVIATION AUTHORITY DAC

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Barr delivered electronically on 19 December 2025.

Introduction.

1. The first applicant is a company limited by guarantee. It operates as a club involved in the sport of skydiving and parachuting. The club charters two G8 Airvan planes from a company called Artificial Horizon Limited for use by the club. These planes are registered in the United Kingdom. These are small planes that can hold a pilot and approximately six parachutists. The club operates from an airfield in County Kilkenny, which is owned by a company called Skydive Ireland Limited. The club has been in existence since in or about 2010.

2. The second applicant is an electrician. He holds a private pilot’s licence issued by the respondent. He is a certified parachutist. He is a director of the first applicant. He also holds the position of administrator within the club.

3. The respondent is a statutory undertaking established pursuant to s. 11 of the Irish Aviation Authority Act 1993. Its function is to regulate the aviation industry and aviation operations within the State. The respondent is the competent authority for the purpose of EU regulations.

4. In these proceedings the applicants seek to impugn the legality of two inspections that were carried out by representatives of the respondent at the airfield on 26 August 2022 and 16 September 2022. The applicants seek orders setting aside the findings and corrective actions imposed by the respondent’s representatives in the course of these inspections.

5. The legality of the inspections has been contested on many grounds. These will be outlined in detail later in the judgment; they include allegations that the inspections were carried out without legal authority; that the inspectors lacked competence to carry out the inspections; that the inspectors acted unlawfully and in breach of fair procedures in the manner in which they carried out the inspections; that the findings made by the inspectors were unlawful and unreasonable in the legal sense; and that the actions taken by the inspectors on foot of their findings were unreasonable and unlawful.

6. The respondent denies that it lacked jurisdiction to carry out the inspections on the dates in question; it denies that its representatives acted unlawfully or in breach of the rights of the applicants; it denies that the findings made, or the actions taken by its representatives consequent thereon were unlawful, oppressive, or in breach of the rights of the applicants; it denies that the applicants are entitled to any of the reliefs sought against it.

Issues.

7. These proceedings have generated a considerable volume of paper, running to some sixteen lever arch files. The hearing took five days, with cross examination of the deponents of the main affidavits. There were also extensive legal submissions made orally and in writing.

8. Having considered all this material, the court is satisfied that the following are the core issues that have to be determined in these proceedings:

(a) Did the respondent have jurisdiction to carry out the inspections on 26th August 2022 and 16th September 2022?

(b) If so, did the fact that the respondent had been in discussion with the first applicant concerning its operations manual and other matters in the period July 2021 to May/June 2022, limit or prevent the respondent carrying out the inspections?

(c) If the respondent was entitled to carry out the inspections in August and September 2022, did its representatives do so in a lawful manner?

(d) Was there evidence which entitled the respondent’s representatives to make the findings that they did in the course of the inspections?

(e) Did the respondent’s representatives act lawfully in grounding the aircraft G– VANC on 16 September 2022?

(f) Did the respondent act lawfully in suspending the second applicant’s pilot’s licence on 23rd September 2022?

(g) Did the respondent act unlawfully in the manner in which it responded to a request for information about the second applicant as put to it by the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK?

Background.

9. It was accepted by the parties that the operations carried on by the first applicant club, constituted non-commercial operations. This was due to the fact that the people participating in the parachute jumps would become members of the club. While they would pay a subscription for this membership, the funds generated by the company were not distributed outside the company but were used solely to cover administration and other costs and to advance the sport of skydiving and parachuting. It was also accepted that the two aircraft chartered by the first applicant were what is termed “non-complex aircraft”, meaning that they were relatively simple aircraft that did not have complex machinery thereon, such as retracting wheels.

10. The G8 Airvan planes are quite small. They have a single propeller at the front and a rigid wing running across the top of the cabin. They have one wheel at the front and two wheels at the centre beneath the cabin, all of which are fixed in position. As already noted, the plane can take eight passengers when there are seats. However, for skydiving and parachute operations the passenger seats are removed. Usually the plane would fly with a single pilot and six parachutists. These parachutists may be single parachutists in that they would have a parachute each, or they may be novices who are undertaking a parachute jump with a very experienced parachutist, known as a task specialist. The novice would be attached onto the task specialist by a harness. The task specialist would operate the parachute that would be used by both of them. Where the seats have been removed, the precise number of occupants is determined by the cumulative weight of those travelling in the aeroplane.

11. The fact that this was a non-commercial operation and that the aircraft was a noncomplex aircraft, is relevant from the point of view of the applicable regulations. This will be dealt with in detail later in the judgment.

12. Upon the final departure of Great Britain from the European Union, as and from 1st January 2021 the respondent became the competent authority in respect of the operations carried on by the first and second applicants, notwithstanding that their aircraft remained registered in the UK. On 27th July 2021, a representative of the respondent, Mr. Robert (otherwise Bob) Linehan contacted the first respondent through the portal on its website. The purpose of his communication was to introduce himself to the first respondent. He indicated that he would like to visit them at Kilkenny aerodrome to view the Irish Skydiving Club operations at first hand. He gave his contact details in that communication.

13. At 16:22 hours that day, Mr. Linehan received a somewhat frosty response from the second applicant as director of the first applicant. He complained that the club had not had any contact from the respondent in the previous six years. He stated that if Mr. Linehan wished to visit the club's premises, they would require any such request by the respondent to be made formally in writing. In addition, the respondent and Mr. Linehan were asked to confirm the following: the lawful basis and scope of the jurisdiction giving the respondent safety oversight of the club; the reasons why the club had had no contact from the respondent in the previous six years; the reason which prompted the respondent after such period to want to visit the airfield; the nature, purpose and scope of the respondent’s intended visit to the airfield; the names of the respondent’s representatives who would be visiting the airfield; and whether or not the respondent had received any complaint concerning the club. The email went on to state that as soon as the club was formally furnished with that information, they should be in a position to consider the request made by Mr. Linehan to visit the airfield. The letter concluded by stating that the club had a low level of trust and confidence in the respondent based on its acts and omissions in the past.

14. Mr. Linehan responded by email at 16:49 hours on 28th July 2021. In that email he gave the link to the relevant EU regulation, being Regulation (EU) 965/2012 (as amended). He went on to give a synopsis of the provisions of Art. 5 thereof. He also referred to the provisions set out in annex VII thereto. He concluded by stating that the scope of the respondent's proposed visit was to establish a relationship with the club and to observe the operations carried on by it. He requested that the second applicant would forward the dates and times when the club would be operational during the period Sunday 1st to Sunday, 8th August 2021 so that they could agree a time and date that would be mutually convenient for a visit.

15. That email prompted a lengthy response from the second applicant by email dated 5th August 2021. In his email he took issue with the provisions and the regulations that had been referred to by Mr. Linehan. He also set out in greater detail the information or questions that would have to be answered prior to any visit to the premises being permitted. He stated that the applicants required and expected to have all their concerns addressed in a constructive manner prior to any meeting occurring between the respondent and the club. He concluded by repeating that as soon as they were formally furnished with answers to the questions that they had raised, they should be in a position to properly consider the request by the respondent to visit the premises and would endeavour to advise the respondent of their position as soon as practicable.

16. Mr. Linehan replied by email dated 12th August 2021, pointing out that as the club was not licensed or certified by the respondent, it was not regulated by it. However, he pointed out that the regulations provided that the pilot in command was the aircraft operator for the purpose of the regulations. He repeated that the respondent was the competent authority with responsibility for oversight of third country aircraft in Ireland, which in this case referred to the two aircraft chartered by the first applicant. The respondent was responsible also for oversight of the NCO.SPEC Operations (meaning non-commercial specialist operations) carried out using these aircraft in Ireland. Mr. Linehan confirmed that the respondent had not received any complaints regarding the first applicant or its operations. He concluded by stating that he would be available to review the compliance of NCO.SPEC Operations in Kilkenny from Monday, 23rd August 2021 on any weekday or weekend of the following weeks until 6th September 2021. He requested the second applicant to let him know his availability so that they could arrange a suitable time for a meeting.

17. By email dated 26th August 2021, the second applicant replied pointing out that the first applicant was a separate legal entity and was incapable of piloting an aircraft. He noted that by its own admission, the respondent had no jurisdiction over the operations of the club. He stated that it seemed therefore, based on the above matters, that the respondent had addressed its correspondence to the wrong entity. He stated that since the respondent considered the pilots to be the operators, the respondent ought to write to each and every pilot who is resident in this jurisdiction who it believes might operate aircraft for parachute dropping pursuant to NCO.SPEC.100. The email concluded by thanking the respondent for confirmation that it had not received any complaints regarding the club’s aircraft or its operations. It noted that the respondent continued to omit to address several important matters that had been raised by the club. In light of this, the club reserved its position concerning the matters discussed to date with the respondent.

18. By email dated 27th August 2021, Mr. Linehan informed the second applicant that subsequent to his email of 26th August 2021, he had received a telephone call from the second applicant's colleague, Mr. David Byrnes. He stated that they had had an informative exchange of views. A provisional arrangement had been made that Mr. Linehan and a colleague would visit Kilkenny airfield on the weekend of 18th/19th September 2021. However, he had discovered that he had a conflict with those dates. He stated that he would make contact with Mr. Byrnes in the following week to explore other possible dates for a visit. By further email dated 30th August 2021, Mr. Linehan confirmed that he and another colleague, Mr. Mike Dowd, would visit the airfield on Saturday 4th September 2021 to learn how parachute operations were run at the airfield. He stated that this would be a learning exercise for Mr. Dowd and him from which they hoped to build a constructive engagement with the second applicant and with his other pilot in command colleagues.

19. It appears that the visit went ahead on 4th September 2021, because by email dated 6th September 2021, Mr. Linehan sent an email to the applicants stating that it had been beneficial to discuss with Mr. Byrnes and with the second applicant, the regulatory structure within which they flew parachute operations as pilots in command. The relevant regulatory provisions being Annex VII part NCO, parts A – D and in particular part E NCO. SPEC and section 4 NCO.SPEC.PAR. He stated that he and Mr. Dowd looked forward to viewing firsthand how their procedures would comply with the requirements of the regulations. He stated that he and Mr. Dowd would be available to offer guidance and answer any questions that might arise regarding the regulations.

20. On 21 October 2021, Mr Linehan and Mr Dowd again visited the applicants’ airfield in Kilkenny. The meeting is described in detail by Mr Linehan in his affidavit sworn on 11th May 2023 at paras. 24 et seq. It is not necessary to set out what took place during that visit, save to note that Mr Linehan and Mr Dowd observed several matters that were of concern to them from a safety point of view. These are set out at para. 29 of the affidavit. It also appears that Mr David Byrnes arrived while the visit was ongoing. Mr Linihan states that Mr Byrnes assured them that he was willing to engage with the respondent to ensure regulatory compliance. However, he stated that Mr Byrnes presented his own interpretation of what the regulations required. That view was not in accordance with their views in relation to the regulatory requirements. Mr Linehan stated that during the meeting Mr Byrnes and the second applicant had informed them that they already had an "Operations Manual" that they assured him satisfied all the regulatory requirements in question. They agreed to forward a copy of the manual to him. He stated that they did not receive any documentation until the second applicant sent an extract from the operations manual via email on 12 February 2022.

21. Mr Linehan stated that after the parachuting operations closed for the winter, he continued to engage with Mr Byrnes and the second applicant with a view to assisting the pilot in command operators to ensure that flight operations would be conducted in accordance with the applicable regulations prior to the Spring 2022 reopening of the parachuting season. To that end, Mr Linehan sent an email on 3 November 2021, requesting the applicants to forward the operations manual to him for review. He also requested that they would forward to him the contact details of any other pilots in command that they would anticipate would use the club for parachute operations.

22. On 25 November 2021, Mr Linehan forwarded to the applicants and to Mr Byrnes recent documentation that he had received from the European Aircraft Safety Agency (hereinafter "EASA") which set out details of issues encountered by SPO and the PIC operators throughout Europe. He also forwarded further documentation explaining the regulations. He requested that they would inform him of dates when they would be available for a remote meeting via Teams or Zoom.

23. On 21 December 2021, Mr Linehan sent the applicants and Mr Byrnes a link to the EASA Sunny Swift Programme that dealt with, amongst other things, parachute operations. Not having heard anything further from the applicants, Mr Linehan sent a further email on 14 January 2022, requesting that the club’s pilots would make themselves available for an online meeting on Teams in either January or February to discuss regulatory issues. When no response was received thereto, Mr Linehan sent a further email on 19th January 2022 asking Mr Byrnes when he could take a call to clarify NCO and NCO.SPEC regulatory requirements.

24. Not having received a response thereto, on 1 February 2022, Mr Linehan sent Mr Byrnes and the second applicant an invitation to a remote Teams meeting for Saturday, 5 February 2022 between 14.30 and 15.30 hours. He also sent emails to them confirming that he had forwarded a Teams invitation to them. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the regulatory requirements arising under part NCO of the regulations. He requested that they would let him know if the proposed time did not suit them for the Teams meeting. He pointed out that he had yet to receive the operations manual that had been requested.

25. On 12 February 2022, the second applicant sent Mr Linehan an email attaching the relevant chapter from the club's operations manual. In the email the second applicant stated that Mr Linehan would note that “the development of the checklist and associated matters is under review”.

26. The Teams meeting was held remotely on 12 February 2022. At that meeting Mr Linehan and Mr Byrnes and the second applicant discussed the issue of a risk assessment and the standard operating procedures/documents that had been provided.

27. Mr Linehan stated that after the remote meeting held on 12 February 2022, he reviewed the chapter from the operations manual that had been forwarded to him. He concluded that while it was an impressive document in certain respects, it required further work in order to comply with the regulations. He inserted comments into the document which identified the areas that he felt required further work. He stated that he had done that so as to assist the second applicant and Mr Byrnes in this endeavour. In an email sent by Mr Linehan on 17 February 2022, he stated as follows: “Mike and I plan to visit with you and other PIC's at your airfield on your pre-season training day to complete the OPS audit. Following completion and acceptance of all elements of the audit, we will write to close the audit and confirm regulatory compliance with part NCO, NCO.SPEC and NCO.SPEC.PAR.” He ended the email by stating that following that, they would remain available as a resource for them and the other PIC's at the club to use so as to maintain best practice in compliance and flight operations.

28. Mr Linehan stated that he spoke by telephone with Mr Byrnes on 3 March 2022, at which it was agreed to arrange a Teams meeting to review the changes that he and the second applicant had made to the relevant chapter of the operations manual and to review in particular, risk assessments and standard operating procedures for pilots in command who were engaged in parachute operations. That phone call was followed up by an email to Mr Byrnes sent on the following day.

29. It appears that a Teams meeting was held between Mr Linehan, Ms Sarah–Louise Gibbons, another agent of the respondent, and Mr Byrnes and the second applicant on 22 March 2022. At that meeting, Mr Byrnes produced a further draft of the relevant chapter from the operations manual. Mr Linehan has stated that he considered that the revised document did not provide a risk assessment or address certain other regulatory requirements. Also under discussion at that meeting were the calculations for take-off performance from the grass runway at Kilkenny Airfield. He stated that neither Mr Byrnes nor the second applicant were able to produce any of the documentation required by the regulations in this regard. He stated that he brought them through the regulations that covered the calculations required and the corrections for grass and wet grass for take-offs and landing. He stated that the issue of mass and balance (aircraft load sheet) of the aircraft before take-off was also discussed.

30. Mr Linehan stated that on the following day he sent an email to Mr Byrnes summarising the issues that had arisen at the meeting in relation to the shortcomings in the document that had been produced. The email made certain suggestions as to how those issues could be addressed.

31. Mr Linehan stated that when he had not received any response thereto from Mr Byrnes, he sent an email to him on 30 March 2022, stating that he and another colleague would be in attendance at the airfield on 1 April 2022, at which time they hoped to address the issues in relation to risk assessments and standard operating procedures in relation to parachute operations.

32. The visit to the airfield went ahead on 1 April 2022, when Mr Linehan was accompanied by his colleague, Ms Gibbons. Mr Byrnes was not present at that meeting, but the second applicant was. Mr Linehan stated that one additional mass and balance document was provided to him by the second applicant, but the second applicant was unable to produce a risk assessment or checklist consequent thereon as required by the regulations; nor could he address any of the previously identified non-compliance issues. He stated that he reminded the second applicant that they had to be in compliance with the regulations before resuming parachuting operations for the new season. He stated that he also reminded the second applicant of his responsibilities as pilot in command.

33. On 7 April 2022, the second applicant sent Mr Linehan a sample load sheet that had been prepared. However, that did not address the issues in relation to risk assessments or standard operating procedures.

34. It appears that the club had resumed parachute operations without satisfying the respondent that they were acting in compliance with the relevant regulations. Mr Linehan emailed the second applicant and Mr Byrnes on 19 April 2022, advising them that he had not received any further documentation to support compliance with part NCO and asking them to let him know when they planned to submit the required regulatory elements as outlined in his email dated 23 March 2022.

35. When he did not receive a response to that email, Mr Linehan sent a reminder email to Mr Byrnes and to the second applicant on 27th May 2022. While he did not receive a reply to that email, Mr Linehan spoke with the second applicant on the telephone towards the end of June 2022. He stated that the second applicant told him that he hoped to provide documents to him demonstrating compliance with Regulation 965/2012 within two weeks. On 29 June 2022, Mr Linehan sent a further email to the second applicant and to Mr Byrnes reminding them that they had yet to comply with the regulations. He requested them to forward the relevant documentation. He reminded them that he and his colleagues were available to assist them if required.

36. Neither the respondent, nor Mr Linehan, received any further correspondence or communication from the applicants, or from Mr Byrnes.

37. While that is a somewhat lengthy summary of the communications that passed between Mr Linehan and the applicants and Mr Byrnes in the period July 2021 to June 2022, it is relevant in relation to the contested events which took place later in 2022.

The Ramp Inspection on 26 August 2022.

38. To begin it is necessary to explain what is meant by the term "ramp inspection". Ramp inspections are one means by which the respondent regulates the aviation industry. They are spot checks of aircraft while they are on the ground. Ramp inspections are, in effect, unannounced safety assessments of the aircraft, its crew, and its operation in the live operational environment. Such inspections usually entail physical inspections of facilities, equipment and aircraft for compliance with standards, specifications and regulations. Ramp inspections can be either announced or unannounced inspections.

39. There is no real divergence of evidence between the parties as to what occurred during the ramp inspection on 26 August 2022. The court has had the benefit of hearing testimony from the second applicant and from Mr Byrnes and also from two of the respondent’s representatives who carried out the ramp inspection that day, being Mr Donnelly and Mr Linehan. The court did not hear from the third representative of the respondent, being Mr Dowd, as he was working in the Middle East when the matter came on for hearing. The court has also had the benefit of listening to part of what occurred that day, which was recorded on the second applicant's mobile phone. The court has had the benefit of a transcript of that recording.

40. The events of 26 August 2022 can be summarised as follows: three representatives of the respondent, being Mr Donnelly, Mr Linehan and Mr Dowd, arrived at the airfield in Kilkenny at 14:00 hours. They were wearing high visibility jackets, which had the respondent's logo on the back. They also had lanyards with their identification badges.

41. When one of the aircraft landed, which was being piloted by the second applicant, they spoke to him when he alighted from the aircraft. Mr Donnelly took the lead in relation to the inspection. He did almost all the talking on behalf of the respondent's representatives. He requested the second applicant to produce his licence and medical certificate and the aircraft’s certificates. The second applicant duly furnished these documents.

42. Mr Donnelly then requested the second applicant to produce the checklists that are required under the regulations when using the aircraft for parachute operations. The second applicant stated that he had a checklist for parachuting operations, but that he did not have it with him in the aircraft because it was in the process of being updated. The second applicant then went to the hanger and returned with a single page document which he stated was the relevant checklist. He handed this to Mr Donnelly, who took a copy of it.

43. Mr Donnelly stated that when he and his colleagues reviewed this document, they were of the opinion that it did not comply with the regulatory requirements for a checklist either in relation to the carrying on of normal flight activities, or more particularly, for the carrying on of the specialist activity of parachuting. He stated that he was satisfied that the checklist that had been presented to him was entirely unsatisfactory. He informed the second applicant that he could not fly the aircraft for parachuting operations until a suitable checklist had been formulated and presented to the respondent for review. To that end, he showed the second applicant a number of template documents which he had downloaded onto his iPad and which he offered to the second applicant as an assistance in compiling the required checklist. This offer was declined.

44. During the course of the ramp inspection, the second applicant had referred to the fact that he was in possession of the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) that had been issued by the aircraft manufacturer. He stated that that was in a satchel attached to the pilot’s chair in the plane. This document was reviewed by the representatives of the respondent.

45. Another matter of concern that arose during the inspection was the fact that the flight charts that were on board the aircraft were not up to date. The second applicant stated that he had used up-to-date charts in digital format, which he had available to him on his mobile phone via the "Sky Demon" app.

46. The respondent's representatives were of the view that this was not sufficient compliance with the regulation, which provided that there must be up-to-date flying charts available on the aircraft when in use.

47. Finally, the respondent's representatives noted that the decal markings on the exterior of the plane concerning the door opening mechanism were considerably faded and were barely visible.

48. In the course of the inspection a strange thing occurred. The second applicant made contact by mobile phone with Mr David Byrnes, who instructed the second applicant to record the interaction between him and the respondent's representatives on his mobile phone. On a separate mobile phone, another unidentified man held the phone up in close proximity to Mr Donnelly. Through this phone Mr Byrnes spoke via the speaker to Mr Donnelly. He stated that he wished Mr Donnelly to address his questions to him as the second applicant’s legal advisor. In this regard it should be noted that Mr Byrnes is a barrister, having been called to the Bar of Ireland in 2019. He stated that he had instructed the second applicant not to participate further with the inspection and not to sign any inspection report form that might be proffered to him.

49. The court has had the benefit of listening to this portion of the inspection that was recorded on the second applicant's phone. It also had the benefit of a transcript of that recording. It is clear from the recording and from the transcript that Mr Byrnes was demanding from the respondent's representatives, and from Mr Donnelly in particular, under what precise provisions of the EU Regulations he was purporting to carry out the ramp inspection. In response, Mr Donnelly outlined in general terms the EU regulation that he was proceeding under and the parts thereof concerning checklists for planes that are engaged in parachute operations.

50. As a result of the ramp inspection, the respondent's representatives made the following findings as recorded on the Proof of Ramp Inspection form: No checklists available for type of operation (parachuting) as required by NCO. SPEC. PAR .100 ; unapproved checklist in use by PIC; out of date aeronautical chart on board (1: 500,000); markings and/ or placards missing or unreadable. The inspectors determined that the second applicant should have a category three finding (CAT 3) against him for flying the aircraft while he did not have an adequate checklist governing parachute operations on board the aircraft, as required by the regulations. A category two finding (CAT 2) was made in relation to the adequacy of the checklist that was provided insofar as it was deemed that the checklist was insufficient in two respects, in that it did not cover with sufficient detail or clarity both the flying of the plane for normal operations in normal, abnormal and emergency situations; nor did it comply with the regulations in relation to the flying of the aircraft for the specialist operation of parachuting in normal, abnormal and emergency situations.

51. A category two finding (CAT 2) was also made in respect of the fact that the second applicant had flown the aircraft without having up-to-date charts on board. Finally, a category one (CAT 1) finding was made in relation to the illegibility of the decal markings on the exterior of the plane.

52. When Mr Donnelly proffered to the second applicant a copy of the of the Proof of Ramp Inspection form outlining the findings that had been made and having invited the second applicant to sign a copy of the report form, the second applicant declined to sign it or to accept it. In these circumstances, Mr Donnelly left a copy of the form on the pilot's seat of the aircraft. The respondent’s representatives then departed from the airfield.

Letter from the Applicants’ Solicitor dated 31 August 2022.

53. The ramp inspection carried out on 26 August 2022 and the findings made consequent thereon, prompted a letter to be sent on behalf of the applicants by their solicitor on 31 August 2022. This was a lengthy letter running to some ten pages. It was highly argumentative, setting out the applicants’ case that the respondent's representatives had not had jurisdiction under the relevant regulations to carry out the ramp inspection, nor to make the findings that they had done, in particular in relation to the adequacy of the checklist that was provided.

54. The letter pointed out that under the EASA guidance material, it was stated that on-thespot assessments could not substitute for proper regulatory oversight. It was alleged that the respondent had not engaged in proper regulatory oversight of the activities carried on by the first applicant. The letter stated that the respondent had attempted to circumvent the exercise of proper and lawful regulatory oversight of the applicants pursuant to the requirements of part NCO of the regulation and had instead tried to utilise a summary procedure for an improper purpose.

55. The letter took issue with the finding that the checklist that had been provided was not sufficient. It stated that the applicants had furnished the respondent with a checklist which was compliant with the regulatory requirements. It went on to state that the respondent had no power of approval in relation to their client’s checklists. The letter stated that the second applicant had pointed out to the respondent that the GA8 Aircraft Flight Manual/Pilot Operating Handbook had contained the manufacturer’s approved checklists.

56. The letter stated that the respondent may have been abusing the serious statutory power of ramp checks as an impermissible invention to conduct an audit or approval process where no such power existed. It stated that that was a most serious abuse of statutory powers. The letter called on the respondent to immediately confirm that the ramp inspection report would be withdrawn. The letter stated that if that was done, their clients were willing to meet with the respondent by appointment at an agreed venue to rationalise any documentation that the respondent may wish to have implemented, so long as that was communicated in a lawful, respectful and professional manner.

57. The letter stated that the respondent should direct all further communications to the solicitor and should refrain from any further visits to Kilkenny Airfield without express notice to the solicitor’s office. It stated that the solicitor should be copied on any authorisations that may govern any further inspections.

58. The letter concluded by stating that the solicitor had received instructions from their clients to commence judicial review proceedings in relation to the inspection that had been carried out. The letter stated that they required a substantial reply by close of business on Friday, 2 September 2022, failing which they would initiate judicial review proceedings on behalf of their clients.

The Ramp Inspection on 16 September 2022.

59. The court has had the benefit of reading the affidavits of those involved in this inspection, together with the cross examination of some of the deponents, and on this occasion, the court has had the benefit of seeing an audio and visual recording of portion of the interaction between the second applicant and Mr Donnelly. The court has also had the benefit of a transcript of that recording.

60. The events of the ramp inspection carried out on Friday, 16 September 2022 can be summarised as follows: the respondent's representatives, being Mr Donnelly, Mr Linehan and Mr Dowd, made a decision to travel to the airfield in Kilkenny to conduct a second ramp inspection. They arrived at the airfield at approximately 12.15 hours. Again, they were wearing high visibility jackets and had their identification badges on lanyards. They observed one of the club’s aircraft, G–VANC, being landed at the airfield. The second applicant emerged from the plane. He had been the pilot of the plane.

61. When the second applicant approached the respondent's representatives, he was holding what appeared to be a Go–Pro camera in his hand. He informed the respondent's representatives that he was making a video and audio recording of what was taking place. The respondent’s representatives stated that they were not consenting to any recording of them being made. However, the second applicant continued with the recording.

62. The second applicant informed the respondent's representatives that he would not be participating in the inspection until his legal representative, Mr David Byrnes, arrived at the airfield. He stated that this would occur in approximately one hour's time.

63. Mr Donnelly commenced the inspection by asking the second applicant to produce his licence and the aircraft documents, to which he responded that the inspection could not proceed pending the arrival of his legal representative. The second applicant then walked away to another part of the airfield.

64. Mr Donnelly discussed with his fellow inspectors the fact that the second applicant had refused to participate in the inspection. By so doing, he had also refused the inspectors to have access to the aircraft. In these circumstances, the respondent's representatives formed the view that they would have to ground the aircraft because it had not been shown that it was being flown with adequate checklists in respect of normal operations or parachuting operations, which had been directed as being required consequent upon the previous ramp inspection.

65. Mr Donnelly stated that because it was feared that the second applicant and others at the airfield may react badly to the grounding of the aircraft, it was decided that they should call in the gardaí to be present when this decision was communicated to the second applicant as pilot in command. To that end, Mr Donnelly made a phone call requesting the presence of the gardaí.

66. A short time later, two uniformed gardaí arrived in a patrol car. At this stage, the respondent's representatives walked over to the second applicant and informed him that as a result of what had occurred at that inspection they had issued an order grounding the plane bearing markings G-VANC. At this stage Mr Byrnes was again addressing Mr Donnelly through the speaker on the second applicant’s mobile phone. When the second applicant refused to take a copy of the ramp inspection report and the grounding order, they were left in the plane. When that had been done, the inspectors and the gardaí left the airfield at approximately 13.45 hours.

67. The findings recorded on the proof of ramp inspection form following that inspection were as follows: Pilot in command did not produce his licence on request by an authorised officer and refused to cooperate further with the inspection. This was deemed as a refusal to grant access in accordance with ORO.GEN.140. Grounding order issued to pilot in command Mr. Eoin Nevin.

68. While not particularly relevant to the proceedings herein, there is one small addendum to the events that occurred that day. It appears that Mr Byrnes arrived at the airport approximately fifteen minutes after the inspectors and the gardaí had departed. On his way home, he pulled into a petrol station on the N9 motorway. He saw the three inspectors emerging from the shop/cafe area. He approached them and stated that he would like to discuss the ramp inspection that had just been completed. He informed them that he was recording their interaction. The three representatives of the respondent refused to participate in any discussion with Mr Byrnes. That concluded their interaction with him.

69. Finally, further to an announced ramp inspection that was carried out of the aircraft bearing markings G-VANC in March 2023, when it was inspected by different representatives of the respondent; and having been afforded access to the aircraft, it was deemed airworthy for normal operations. The grounding order was lifted following that inspection.

The Law.

70. In certain respects, the law in this area is difficult to follow. This is due to the fact that the EU regulations and the Irish regulation are attempting to set down harmonised rules that can apply to the regulation of aviation operations across a wide spectrum, ranging from very large commercial airline companies, down to small privately owned planes which are not commercially operated.

71. A useful starting point is regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EC, Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002 and Directive 2004 36/EC (hereinafter “the 2008 regulation”). As the recitals to the regulation make clear, the purpose of that regulation was to establish a uniform level of protection for European citizens in relation to civil aviation by the adoption of common safety rules and by measures ensuring that products, persons and organisations in the community comply with such rules and with those adopted to protect the environment.

72. Article 10 of that regulation provided that the member states, the commission and EASA shall cooperate with a view to ensuring compliance with the regulation and its implementing rules. It further provided that for the purposes of the implementation of para. 1 of Art 10, member states shall in addition to their oversight of certificates that they issue, conduct investigations, including ramp inspections and shall take any measure, including the grounding of aircraft, to prevent the continuation of an infringement.

73. While the 2008 regulation was replaced by a regulation in 2018, the existence of the 2008 regulation is of relevance in relation to the provisions contained in the regulation that was enacted in 2012, to which I will now turn.

74. Commission Regulation (EU) No. 965/2012 of 5th October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter “the 2012 regulation”), provides in Art. 3 (1) that member states shall designate one or more entities as the competent authority within that member state with the necessary powers and allocated responsibilities for the certification and oversight of persons and organisations subject to regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 and its implementing rules.

75. Article 3 (3) provides that member states shall ensure that the competent authority has the necessary capability to ensure the oversight of all persons and organisations covered by their oversight programme. Article 3 (5) provides that personnel authorised by the competent authority to carry out certification and/or oversight tasks shall be empowered to do the following: examine records, data, procedures and any other material relevant to the execution of the certification and/or oversight tasks; take copies of or extracts from such records, data, procedures and other materials; ask for an oral explanation on site; enter relevant premises, operating sites or means of transport; perform audits, investigations, assessments, inspections, including ramp inspections and unannounced inspections; and take or initiate enforcement measures as appropriate.

76. Annex VII to the 2012 regulation deals with non-commercial air operations with other than complex motor powered aircraft. Under the heading General Requirements, it sets out at NCO.GEN.100 - Competent Authority, that the competent authority shall be the authority designated by the member state where the aircraft is registered. If the aircraft is registered in a third country, the competent authority shall be the authority designated by the member state where the operator has its principal place of business, is established, or is residing.

77. In the same annex under the heading NCO.GEN.105 - Pilot in Command Responsibilities and Authority, it is provided that the pilot in command shall be responsible for the safety of the aircraft and of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board during aircraft operations as referred to in 1.c of annex IV to the 2008 regulation. The pilot in command (PIC) is also responsible for the initiation, continuance, termination or diversion of a flight in the interest of safety; ensuring that all operational procedures and checklists are complied with as referred to in 1.b of Annex IV to the 2008 regulation; and with only commencing a flight if he/she is satisfied that all operational limitations referred to in 2.a.3 of annex IV of the 2008 regulation are complied with.

78. In section 4 of the annex under the heading NCO.SPEC.PAR.100 - Checklist, it is provided that the checklist for parachuting operations shall contain: (a) normal, abnormal and emergency procedures; (b) relevant performance data; (c) required equipment; (d) any limitation; and (e) responsibilities and duties of the pilot in command and if applicable crew members and task specialists.

79. Finally, annex VII of the 2012 regulation provides for regulation of specialised commercial operations. These operations include the use of aircraft for activities such as agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation and patrol, aerial advertisement, or maintenance check flights. It also provides that for certain specialist operations, such as parachute dropping, which are carried out by non-commercial specialised operations with other than complex motor powered aircraft, they shall comply with the provisions of annex VII (Part

– NCO).

80. As already noted, the 2008 regulation was replaced by Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (“the 2018 regulation”). The parts referred to above in the 2008 regulation were repeated in the 2018 regulation. In particular, Art. 62 (2)(c) of the 2018 regulation provides that the competent authority will undertake investigations including, inter alia, ramp inspections. It provides as follows:

“To ensure compliance with this Regulation and with the delegated and implementing acts adopted on the basis thereof, the Agency and the national competent authorities shall… (c) conduct the necessary investigations, inspections, including ramp inspections, audits and other monitoring activities to identify possible infringements by legal or natural persons subject to this Regulation of the requirements set out in this Regulation and in the delegated and implementing acts adopted on the basis thereof.”

81. Finally, EASA has provided guidance in the form of a ramp inspection manual which provides as follows:

“Ramp inspections are part of a European union safety programme and should be performed in a harmonised and a standardised way by all EASA PS and all States with which EASA signed a working arrangement (participating states)… SANA inspections should follow, as far as possible, the same principles as applied to SAFA and SACA inspections in accordance with part ARO.RAMP.”

82. That concludes a very brief overview of the relevant regulations governing this area. It has to be said that the regulation of non-commercial operations where they are using noncomplex aircraft, is difficult to follow because the specific requirements are spread across a number of different annexes to the 2012 regulation.

Conclusions.

83. Having considered the evidence in this case, to include the affidavit evidence and exhibits, the cross examination of the relevant deponents, the audio and visual recordings of the inspections and having considered the written and oral legal submissions of counsel, the court has reached the following conclusions on the issues that arise for determination. The first issue is: did the respondent have jurisdiction to carry out the ramp inspections on 26 August 2022 and 16 September 2022? I am satisfied that having regard to the respondent's role as the competent authority for the regulation of aviation within the state, it had the power to carry out unannounced ramp inspections when it felt it appropriate to do so.

84. That the respondent as competent authority has a wide power to carry out such inspections is provided for in the 2008 Regulation, wherein Art. 10 provided that the competent authority in each member state of the EU shall have the power to undertake investigations, including ramp inspections and the grounding of aircraft. As already noted, while the requirements imposed by the 2008 Regulations are now enshrined in the 2018 Regulation, the provisions of the 2008 Regulation are of relevance in relation to understanding the effect of the 2012 Regulation

85. Article 3 (5) of the 2012 Regulation confers wide-ranging powers on personnel authorised by the competent authority to conduct certification and oversight tasks, including the performance of audits, investigations, assessments, inspections, including ramp inspections and unannounced inspections

86. The broad power conferred upon the respondent under Art. 3(5)(e) of the 2012 Regulation entitles the respondent’s personnel to conduct ramp inspections in the performance of its certification and oversight tasks. That power incorporates and applies to its oversight function under the headings of Safety Assessment of National Aircraft (SANA), Safety Assessment of Community Aircraft (SACA) and Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft (SAFA).

87. The court also notes that the EASA guidance document provides that ramp inspections are a part of the European Union safety programme and should be performed in a harmonised and standardised way by all EASA participating states and all states with which EASA has signed a working arrangement. The guidance also provides that SANA inspections should follow, as far as possible, the same principles as applied to SAFA and SACA inspections in accordance with Part ARO. RAMP.

88. The applicants have sought to argue that the duty to have an oversight programme cannot be complied with by the respondent by carrying out ramp inspections. In this regard they rely on a statement in the EASA guidance document to the effect that such inspections should not be carried out instead of having a comprehensive oversight programme. While that is correct insofar as it goes, that guidance statement does not prevent the respondent utilising its power to carry out ramp inspections wherever and whenever it deems it appropriate to do so.

89. The regulation of aircraft safety and aircraft operations is so important having regard to the often fatal consequences of a departure from the highest standards of safety in aviation operations, that it is difficult to envisage any impediment to the respondent as competent authority carrying out ramp inspections as and where necessary.

90. Accordingly, I hold that the respondent had the power under Regulation 965/2012 to carry out the ramp inspections on 26 August 2022 and 16 September 2022.

91. The second issue is: did the communications and interaction between Mr Linehan on behalf of the respondent and the second applicant and Mr Byrnes in the period July 2021 to June 2022, limit or remove the power of the respondent to carry out the ramp inspections in August and September 2022?

92. I hold that as a matter of law, the interaction that had taken place between Mr Linehan and the second applicant and Mr Byrnes in that period did not limit or prevent the respondent carrying out the impugned ramp inspections.

93. It was submitted on behalf of the applicants that the respondent, through Mr Linehan, had agreed to carry out an audit of operations carried on by the first applicant. It was submitted that having given an undertaking to do that, the respondent could not go back on that representation and could not carry out the ramp inspections which it purported to do in August and September 2022.

94. I have read the exchange of emails between Mr Linehan and the second applicant and Mr Byrnes during this period. That correspondence has been summarised above. I am satisfied that this correspondence was written by Mr Linehan in a genuine attempt to collaborate with the representatives of the first applicant with a view to ensuring compliance with the requirements of the applicable regulations.

95. In particular, there had been considerable work done towards agreeing an operations manual on behalf of the club that would comply with the regulations. To that end, a draft document had been sent to Mr Linehan for his comments. He had made it known that he viewed the draft document as being insufficient to comply with the requirements of the regulations. He had made several suggestions as to the areas where the document needed to be amended.

96. That exchange of views ended when the applicants through the second applicant and Mr Byrnes disengaged from the process by failing to reply to the correspondence that had been sent by Mr Linehan. That disengagement occurred in about May/June 2022. Thereafter, there was no further engagement by the applicants.

97. I do not accept the submission made on behalf of the applicants that this correspondence by email showed that the respondent had undertaken to carry out an audit of the operations of the first applicant's club. While there had been mention of an audit by Mr Linehan, he was not stating that the first respondent would not take steps to ensure that an appropriate checklist or operations manual was in being.

98. Mr Linehan was actively engaging with the representatives of the first applicant during this period with a view to helping them to compile an operations manual that would comply with the applicable regulations.

99. I find that while Mr Linehan had stated that he would carry out an audit of the operations carried on by the first applicant, he had not given any undertaking that no other regulatory steps would be taken by the respondent until the terms of reference for such an audit had been agreed between him and the applicants, which was a matter upon which the applicants were insisting before they would agree to any audit being carried out.

100. The submission that Mr Linehan had given any such undertaking and was therefore constrained in what steps could be taken by the regulator thereafter, is indicative of a mistaken view on the part of the applicants that they, as the entities carrying on the operations, and in the case of the second applicant being the person regulated by the respondent, could dictate when and how they should be regulated.

101. That is not how regulation works. The entity charged with regulating an industry or an activity, has the powers that are given to it by statute and by law to regulate the relevant industry or activity. The entity is entitled to exercise their regulatory powers within the parameters set down by the relevant legislation and governing laws. It is not the persons being regulated who can choose when and in what manner they shall be regulated.

102. I hold that the existence of the communications between Mr Linehan and the applicants in the period July 2021 to June 2022 did not remove or limit the power of the respondent to carry out ramp inspections whenever it deemed it necessary to do so.

103. In argument at the Bar it was conceded on behalf of the applicants that it was not necessary for there to be any accident, complaint, near miss or any other trigger event before the respondent could carry out an unannounced ramp inspection. I hold that there was no legal impediment to the respondent carrying out the ramp inspections on 26 August 2022 or 16 September 2022 in relation to aircraft flown at the airfield in Kilkenny.

104. The third issue is: did the respondents representatives carry out the ramp inspections in a lawful manner? This is one of the few cases where the court has been able to view or listen to part of the ramp inspections in real time. To deal with the ramp inspection on 26 August 2022 first, I find as a fact that the representatives of the respondent behaved lawfully and appropriately during this inspection.

105. I am satisfied that the respondent's representatives identified themselves to the second applicant on that occasion. They had their high visibility vests on, which had the respondent's name or logo on the back. They had their identification cards on lanyards. In addition, both Mr Linehan and Mr Dowd were already well known to the second applicant.

106. I am satisfied that Mr Donnelly, who took the lead role on the inspection, made it clear that they were carrying out a ramp inspection to check for compliance by the second applicant as pilot in command with the regulations and in particular, with the requirement to have a checklist for parachuting operations on board the aircraft. He made it clear that the ramp inspection was being conducted under the applicable European regulations.

107. I find as a fact that the second applicant was aware of the nature of the inspection and of the requests that had been made of him. He produced his pilot's licence when requested to do so.

108. When requested to produce the checklist governing parachute operations that should be carried on the aircraft, the second applicant stated that it was not in the aircraft as it was being updated. He went to the aircraft hangar. He returned with a one-page checklist, which he handed to Mr Donnelly. Mr Donnelly made a copy of this document.

109. The second applicant accepted in cross examination that he did not direct the respondent's representatives to the pilot operating handbook as containing the relevant checklist. In these circumstances, I find it was reasonable for Mr Donnelly to have accepted the one-page document that was given to him by the second applicant as being the only checklist that the second applicant, as pilot in command, was relying on as complying with the regulations.

110. I find that during the ramp inspection it was put to the second applicant that he did not have up-to-date charts on board the aeroplane, to which the second applicant replied that he had relied on the Sky Demon app for the provision of up-to-date charts.

111. In the course of that inspection the inspectors had also made findings that the checklist that had been produced was insufficient in relation to its level of detail concerning normal operations in which the plane would be used, meaning flights which were not used for parachute purposes. It had also made a finding that the checklist was insufficient as regards the specialist operation of skydiving and parachute operations. Finally, the inspectors had made a finding that the decal markings on the outside of the plane concerning the exterior door opening mechanism were faded to such an extent that they were almost illegible.

112. I find that towards the end of the inspection, Mr Byrnes was placed on speaker from a second mobile phone which was held by an unidentified male. At the same time, the second applicant was recording the interaction on his mobile phone. I find that the respondent's representatives had not consented to such recording.

113. During the interaction between Mr Byrnes and Mr Donnelly, it was made clear that the second applicant would not sign the ramp inspection report form. For that reason, Mr Donnelly left it on the pilot’s seat of the aircraft. The respondent's representatives then departed.

114. I find as a fact that Mr Donnelly explained the findings that had been made as a result of that ramp inspection to the second applicant. He clarified to the second applicant that a CAT

3 finding had been made against him for flying the plane without a checklist on board. The second applicant was told that he could not fly the plane for parachute operations until he had submitted a revised checklist, which was to be approved by the respondent as complying with the requirements of the regulations.

115. I am satisfied from the evidence given by Mr Donnelly and Mr Linehan, which is corroborated by the sound recording, that at all material times during the inspection Mr Donnelly carried out his duties in a calm and polite manner. That he managed to do that in the face of persistent interruptions down the phone from Mr Byrnes, is a testament to his professionalism in carrying this ramp inspection.

116. While Mr Donnelly did not specify the precise sections of the regulations under which the inspection was being carried out, I am satisfied and find as a fact that he had sufficiently identified the applicable EU Regulations to the second applicant before the recording started and did so again in a general manner during his conversation with Mr Byrnes on the phone.

117. I hold that as long as regulators make known the general provisions under which they are acting and the nature of the matters into which they are enquiring, that is sufficient when carrying out an unannounced ramp inspection. They are not obliged to engage in a detailed legal debate with the person being regulated, much less with his legal adviser at the other end of a telephone, when they are attempting to carry out a ramp inspection.

118. That Mr Donnelly acted reasonably during this ramp inspection is demonstrated by the fact that he offered to download a template checklist for the assistance of the second applicant. That offer was refused.

119. For these reasons, I find that the respondent's representatives acted reasonably and lawfully during the first ramp inspection. They did not act oppressively or in breach of the rights of either of the applicants.

120. In relation to the second ramp inspection, I find that the inspectors again acted lawfully and reasonably. That they did so in the face of audio and visual recording to which they had clearly not consented, demonstrates the professional manner in which they carried out this ramp inspection.

121. On this occasion it was made clear that the second applicant would not cooperate with the inspection until his legal adviser, Mr Byrnes, was present. The respondent's representatives were informed that that would be in approximately one hour. The second applicant effectively refused access to the aircraft until his legal adviser was present. I hold that in so doing, the second applicant refused to co-operate with the inspection.

122. People who are arrested by the gardaí are entitled to invoke the right to silence. They are entitled to consult a solicitor and to have him or her present during questioning by gardaí while under arrest.

123. In certain circumstances people who are facing statutory investigation and who must answer questions under compulsion as part of a formal investigation or a hearing, may be able to invoke the right to silence, otherwise known as the right against self-incrimination, if the answers to the questions might expose them to a risk of trial on a criminal charge.

124. In certain circumstances, a person who is facing a disciplinary inquiry either at his place of work or before a professional body, may have the right to be legally represented at such hearing or inquiry. The exact parameters of this right will vary depending on the nature and gravity of the hearing or inquiry being undertaken. However, if these rights arise at all, they do so in the context of a formal investigation or hearing.

125. I hold that when a regulatory body is conducting an inspection in the nature of an onthe-spot check or unannounced inspection, those being regulated do not have the right to defer or suspend the inspection until their legal adviser should attend.

126. If regulators in general, and the respondent in particular, had to await the arrival of a pilot's legal adviser before they could carry out a ramp inspection, it would make such inspections almost impossible to undertake in any practical sense. That would be contrary to the interests of the general public in maintaining safety in aviation operations.

127. In McMahon v Irish Aviation Authority [2014] IEHC 431 Hogan J noted that the law affords considerable latitude to a regulatory body such as the respondent to act speedily and decisively in the interests of public safety; see dicta at paras. 57 & 58.

128. I hold that the respondent's representatives were not obliged to await the arrival of Mr Byrnes before conducting the ramp inspection on 16 September 2022.

129. Insofar as the second applicant sought to suggest in his affidavit that he had the right to consult his lawyer because he felt himself to be under arrest, I hold that if he held that belief, it was irrational. The respondent's representatives do not have a power of arrest. They never purported to exercise such a power. Such mistaken belief as may have been harboured by the second applicant at the time, did not give rise to any substantive right on the part of the second applicant to refuse to cooperate until his lawyer was present.

130. Criticism has been made of the fact that the respondent's representatives had contacted the gardaí in advance of the inspection and had called them in during the inspection held on 16 September 2022 when the decision had been made that it would be necessary to ground one of the aircraft.

131. I find that having regard to the circumstances of the previous inspection on 26 August 2022, when the second applicant had recorded the proceedings; and when an unidentified male had followed Mr Donnelly while holding a mobile phone through which Mr Byrnes was speaking in a tone that can only be described as hectoring; and having regard to the fact that the respondent's representatives knew that they might have to ground the aircraft if the checklists were not in order; it was reasonable and prudent for them to have put the gardaí on standby.

132. The fact that they did not arrive with the gardaí in tow at the start of the second inspection, but only called them in when the second applicant had insisted on recording the proceedings without their consent and had refused to co-operate with the inspection; and when they had made the decision that they would have to ground the aircraft; shows that they were not using the presence of the gardaí to intimidate the second applicant, but only used them to ensure their safety having regard to the grounding order that they had to make.

133. I find that in enlisting the assistance of the gardaí in the manner in which they did, the respondent’s representatives acted reasonably.

134. Having regard to all the circumstances of the second inspection, I find that the respondents acted lawfully and reasonably. They did not act in breach of the second applicant's rights to fair procedures. Given his blanket refusal to engage with them until his lawyer should arrive, they had little option but to proceed in the way that they did.

135. The fourth issue is: was there evidence which entitled the respondent to make the findings that were made in the two ramp inspections? The short answer to this question is, yes. In relation to the first ramp inspection, Mr Donnelly was entitled to come to the conclusion that the single page checklist did not comply with the requirements of the regulations. That was the only checklist presented to him.

136. He and his colleagues were entitled to come to the view that it did not cover in sufficient detail the issues that could arise in the normal, abnormal and emergency conditions that could arise either during normal operation of the aircraft, or during specialist operations, such as parachuting operations.

137. In particular, it did not show any evidence of having been drawn up following the carrying out of a risk assessment that was specific to parachuting operations being carried on at Kilkenny airfield. The respondent’s representatives were entitled to form the opinion that the checklist that was presented to them by the second applicant did not comply with the applicable regulations.

138. The applicants have argued that the respondent's representatives were directed to the pilot operating handbook in the aircraft, where the eighth supplement thereto had a checklist catering for parachuting operations. However, the respondent’s representatives were not directed to that part of the document for the checklist. The second applicant admitted in cross examination that he had not directed the respondent's representative specifically to that portion of the document as containing the required checklist. I find as a fact that the only checklist that was produced to the respondent's representatives at the first ramp inspection was the single page document that was handed by the second applicant to Mr Donnelly.

139. In evidence, Mr Linehan stated that even if they had been directed to the relevant supplement in the pilot operating handbook, it would not have been sufficient as a checklist, as it did not contain any specific measures that would be mandated by the specific conditions at Kilkenny airfield.

140. As already stated, I find that the only checklist that was presented to Mr Donnelly on

26 August 2022 was the one-page checklist. He was entitled to reach the decision that it was deficient. He was entitled to form the view that it did not comply with the requirements of the regulations to have a checklist specifically dealing with parachuting operations at the specific location.

141. Mr Donnelly was also entitled to make a finding that the checklist presented to him was also deficient in terms of the normal, abnormal and emergency conditions that might arise during normal operation of the aircraft. He was entitled to make a CAT 2 finding in this regard.

142. Mr Donnelly was entitled to find that the charts on board the aircraft were out of date. That was not seriously challenged by the second applicant, who said that he used the Sky Demon app for up-to-date charts. Mr Donnelly was entitled to find that this did not constitute compliance with the regulations, particularly as the app itself states that it should not be used as a substitute for up-to-date charts. He was entitled to make a CAT 2 finding in this regard.

143. The final finding concerned the decal markings on the outside of the plane in relation to the door opening mechanism. These are important from the point of view of first responders who may need to access through the door in an emergency. In view of the fact that the arrow showing the direction of opening of the door handle was just visible, he made a CAT 1 finding in this regard. He was entitled to make that finding.

144. These are judicial review proceedings. This is not an appeal from the findings made by the inspectors. The court is only entitled to interfere with findings made by a decision-maker if they are unreasonable in the sense in which that term is used in judicial review proceedings, meaning that no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion, or where the findings have been reached in breach of the rules of natural justice. I hold that the findings that were made by Mr Donnelly were open to him on the evidence that was before him. They were not unreasonable in the legal sense.

145. The same applies to the findings made as a result of the second ramp inspection held on 16 September 2022. By refusing to cooperate with the inspection, there was no evidence that the second applicant had addressed the open CAT 3 finding from the previous inspection. There was no evidence before the respondent's representatives that the applicants had addressed that matter by drawing up a proper checklist for parachuting operations that was based on a risk assessment which complied with the regulations. In these circumstances, it was open to Mr Donnelly to make a finding that the second applicant had refused access to the aircraft the subject matter of the inspection. He had also refused to present his licence when asked to produce it on that occasion.

146. I hold that in these circumstances, the respondent through its agents was entitled to make the findings that they did following that ramp inspection, to the effect that a CAT 3 finding had to be made against the second applicant for his refusal to permit access to the aircraft and his refusal to produce his licence. The precise terms of the findings made have been quoted above.

147. The fifth issue is: was the respondent through Mr Donnelly entitled to ground the aircraft, G-VANC, on 16 September 2022? I find that where Mr Donnelly had been effectively refused access to the aircraft and where there was no evidence that a checklist complying with the regulations was on board the aircraft, he was entitled to make the order grounding the aircraft bearing marking G–VANC. In the absence of any evidence that the checklist had been drawn up in compliance with the regulations, as had been directed in the previous ramp inspection, it was appropriate to ground the aircraft until this was established.

148. I hold that the respondent’s representatives had the legal authority to ground the aircraft pursuant to Art. 6 of the Irish Aviation Authority (Operations) Order (S.I. 61/ 2006). The authorised officers of the respondent were permitted under this provision to ground an aircraft if the aircraft “ has been, is intended to be or is likely to be flown from any place within the state in such circumstances that the flight... was or would be a cause of danger to persons or property therein or elsewhere.” I am satisfied that in the circumstances of the second ramp inspection, the respondent’s representatives were entitled to fear that the requisite checklists and up-to-date charts may not have been on the aircraft; thereby rendering it unsafe to fly the aircraft. Accordingly, I hold that the grounding order was justified and was within the competence of the respondent’s representatives on that occasion.

149. The sixth issue is: did the respondent act lawfully in suspending the second applicant's pilot's licence subsequent to the second ramp inspection? This issue was dealt with by Mr Simon White in his affidavit sworn on 9 May 2023 and in his evidence on cross-examination. In his affidavit, Mr White stated that he was aware that as a result of the ramp inspection held on

16 September 2022, the second applicant had failed to provide any evidence that he had addressed the category three finding which had arisen as a result of the first ramp inspection held on 26 August 2022. He was also aware that he had failed to produce his licence when asked to do so at the second ramp inspection. He noted that the second applicant had refused to cooperate with that ramp inspection. Mr White stated that these matters were all serious matters of concern. He made a decision on 23 September 2022 to provisionally suspend the second applicant’s licence pending enquiry into these issues.

150. To that end he wrote to the second applicant on 23 September 2022 notifying him of the decision and inviting him to make representations in writing.

151. When the second applicant did not submit any response, nor forward his licence to the respondent as required, Mr White wrote to him again on 14 October 2022. That letter had issued to the second applicant’s solicitors as requested. The second applicant was invited to a meeting to discuss the issues that had arisen.

152. Mr White stated that he did not receive any response to his correspondence. However, he was aware that the second applicant’s solicitors had written to the respondent's solicitor on

5 December 2022 making a range of allegations against the respondent and against him. In the events which transpired, the solicitors acting for the second applicant requested that any investigation into the suspension of the second applicant’s licence should be suspended pending the conclusion of the proceedings herein. That request was acceded to by the solicitors acting on behalf of the respondent.

153. I hold that in view of the findings that had been made as a result of the two ramp inspections, and in particular, the refusal of the second applicant to co-operate with the second inspection and his continued refusal to present his licence to the respondent; the respondent, through its agent Mr White, acted lawfully in provisionally suspending the second applicant's licence on 23 September 2022. The second applicant was given an opportunity to make representations and to attend a meeting to discuss the issues that had led to the suspension of his license. He did not take up either of those invitations.

154. That no further investigation of the issues leading to the provisional suspension of the second applicant's licence had been held, was largely due to the fact that when the second applicant’s solicitor complained about such investigation being carried on while the present proceedings were pending before the High Court, the respondent through its solicitor agreed to pause the investigation pending the determination of the within proceedings. In these circumstances, the second applicant cannot complain about the fact that the issues concerning the suspension of his licence have not been finalised.

155. The seventh and final issue is: whether the communications between the respondent and the Civil Aviation Authority in the UK (hereinafter “the CAA”) concerning the second applicant’s licence was lawful or appropriate?

156. The second applicant had applied to the CAA for a pilot's licence. He knew that in investigating his application, the CAA would make enquiry of the respondent in relation to the pilot’s licence that he held from them. In so doing, he consented to disclosure of his personal data by the respondent to the CAA.

157. In the course of considering his application for a licence, the CAA had asked the respondent whether there were any past or pending enforcement actions against the second applicant in relation to his licence. The respondent had replied “yes” in respect of that query. They had explained that as follows: “The individuals PPL(A) is currently provisionally suspended and ongoing enforcement actions by the authority are the subject of legal proceedings.” The applicant complains that this answer gives a misleading impression of the situation concerning the provisional suspension of his licence. I do not accept his submission in this regard. I am satisfied that the answer furnished by the respondent to the enquiry made by the CAA, was accurate in all respects. Accordingly, the second applicant has no cause for complaint in this regard.

158. There are two further minor issues that can be dealt with briefly; during the hearing and in the documentation submitted complaint is made by the applicants of a lack of competence on the part of the representatives of the respondent who carried out the ramp inspections in August and September 2022. The court has had regard to the statements made by Mr Donnelly and Mr Linehan in their affidavits concerning their qualifications and expertise. The court does not intend to recite these herein. The court is satisfied that these men were more than qualified to carry out the ramp inspections in August and September 2022.

159. The second issue concerns whether the first applicant was the “operator” of the aircraft for the purposes of the regulations, rather than the second applicant. It is important to note that the first applicant is not licensed or certified by the respondent in respect of the operations that are carried on by the club.

160. While the term “aircraft operator” is defined broadly in the 2018 regulation to capture “any person operating or proposing to operate one or more aircraft”, the regulation has defined the concept of an operator broadly in view of the wide spectrum of persons and organisations this umbrella term might apply to depending on the circumstances.

161. The court accepts the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the first applicant being a club in the form of a company limited by guarantee, where all people engaging in parachute operations, whether as a novice or as an experienced parachutist, are members of the club; and where that entity is not licensed by the respondent; it is not realistic to regard the club as being the operator of the aircraft that it charters for use by its members.

162. This issue is rendered of little significance, given the fact that it is abundantly clear in the 2012 regulation that the pilot in command must comply with the requirements imposed in Annex VII in relation to safety, checklists and procedures, including those specifically relating to parachute operations

163. Accordingly, I hold that the second applicant, being the pilot in command of the aircraft on the date of both inspections, was under a duty to comply with the requirements of the 2012 Regulation. I hold that as PIC he was the operator of the aircraft for the purposes of the regulation. That being the case, the respondent’s representatives were entitled to require of him the information and production of documents that they requested in the course of the two ramp inspections.

164. Finally, the court is concerned by the fact that the second applicant refused to cooperate with the second ramp inspection on 16th September 2022, thereby effectively refusing the inspectors access to the aircraft. For a pilot in command to refuse the representatives of the regulatory body access to his aircraft when they are carrying out what is effectively a safety inspection, is truly shocking. It demonstrates a serious lack of understanding on the part of the second applicant of the nature and purpose of safety inspections.

Proposed Final Order.

165. For the reasons set out herein, the court is not satisfied that the applicants are entitled to any of the reliefs sought in their notice of motion or in their amended statement of grounds.

166. It is proposed that the final order should be to refuse the reliefs sought by the applicants in their notice of motion dated 8 March 2023 and in their amended statement of grounds.

167. As this judgment has been delivered electronically the parties shall be allowed four weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions of not more than 1000 words on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise.

168. The matter will be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 28 January 2026 for the purpose of making final orders.