High Court dismisses defendant's motion to transfer debt dispute to Chancery jurisdiction and stay proceedings.

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 2017 2044 S

[2025] IEHC 721

BETWEEN

EVERYDAY FINANCE DESIGNATED ACTIVITY COMPANY

PLAINTIFF

AND

PAUL FARRELL

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 18 December 2025

Introduction

1. This is an application brought by the defendant, by way of notice of motion, in the proceedings taken against him by the plaintiff seeking summary judgment.

2. The defendant is a litigant in person.

3. The motion seeks the following reliefs:

• That the proceedings be heard exclusively under the inherent equitable jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery;

• That enforcement of any judgment or statutory action be stayed pending the equitable determination of the claim;

• That the statement of claim and evidentiary record in equity be admitted as filed and served;

• Such further or other relief as the Court shall deem just.

4. The grounds upon which the motion is made are stated in the following terms:

• The defendant has established standing in equity as the executor and principal of the PAUL EDWARD FARRELL estate/trust;

• The alleged obligations in dispute have been lawfully settled and discharged by promissory note and supporting instruments, which were served with full notice and no rebuttal received;

• The equitable doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence applies, as the plaintiff has failed to contest settlement;

• The High Court of Chancery retains exclusive jurisdiction in matters involving trust and fiduciary duties, equitable discharge and settlement, estoppel and good conscience relief.

5. The issued motion bears two dates, the 16th and 20th of June 2025.

6. The summary judgment proceedings and a second set of proceedings bearing the title ‘Everyday Finance DAC v. Paul Farrell 2017/458S’ have yet to be heard.

Procedural Irregularity

7. The notice of motion filed by the defendant bears the record number of these proceedings and the record number of the second set of proceedings referred to above. It is unclear to me why this was done. During the course of the hearing, it was confirmed that the motion for my determination was solely in the proceedings bearing the record number 2017/2044S.

8. The notice of motion is entitled: “BETWEEN:

PAUL FARRELL

CLAIMANT

-AND-

MR BRENDAN KEOGH OF EVERYDAY FINANCE DESIGNATED ACTIVITY

COMPANY

MR KENNETH TYRELL OF PWC

RESPONDANT

NOTICE OF MOTION

(Equity Jurisdiction & Stay)

NOTICE OF MOTION (INTERLOCUTORY) IN THE HIGH COURT OF

CHANCERY REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

BETWEEN:

Paul-edward, a living man, Claimant

Executor and Principal of the PAUL EDWARD FARRELL Estate/Trust

AND:

Mr Brendan Keogh of Everyday Finance DAC, Respondent

AND: Mr Kenneth Tyrell of PWC, Respondent.” (Emphasis in the original.)

9. It will be readily apparent that a defendant to summary proceedings is not entitled to issue a motion recasting himself as a ‘claimant’ in the same proceedings. It is also inappropriate to name two individuals as respondents to the motion, where those individuals are not parties to the proceedings.

10. It also appears that the defendant has filed what is described as a ‘statement of claim’ bearing the same title and record numbers as the motion.

11. This document seeks a declaration that all alleged debts or claims have been lawfully settled and discharged. It also seeks an “Order of Estoppel by Acquiescence” permanently barring any further claim or enforcement action.

12. I am satisfied that, as a defendant in these proceedings, Mr. Farrell is not entitled to deliver a statement of claim. It would also be inappropriate to consider orders of that type on an interlocutory basis.

13. The defendant purports to bring his application as “Paul-edward, a living man, Claimant, Executor and Principal of the PAUL EDWARD FARRELL Estate/Trust.”

14. Mr. Farrell is being sued in a personal capacity on foot of loans advanced pursuant to contractual arrangements, and has entered an appearance to those proceedings. He is not being sued in any other capacity.

15. The defendant also filed an affidavit dated the 18th of June 2025. This affidavit appears to speak to the matters sought to be advanced in the statement of claim, rather than the motion.

16. I am of the view that the prudent course is for me is to refrain from commenting on the detail in the affidavit and on what was opened in Court by the defendant, as these are matters which, for the reasons expressed below, may be advanced in due course in these proceedings.

17. I do comment on some of these matters, insofar as they are relevant, in another judgment delivered on today’s date in proceedings entitled ‘Everyday Finance Designated Activity Company v. Paul Farrell 2025/85CA [2025] IEHC 722.’ That case is a Circuit Appeal taken by Mr. Farrell against an order for possession.

Discussion and Decision on Reliefs Sought

18. In relation to the first relief, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877 effectively abolished the High Court of Chancery as a stand-alone entity and brought common law and equitable jurisdictions together in a unified structure in the High Court of Justice. Equitable jurisdiction has been exercised in modern times by the High Court as contemplated by Article 34 of Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 and as provided for pursuant to the provisions of the Courts (Establishment and Constitution) Act 1961.

19. It is unclear what the defendant wishes to achieve by seeking this relief but insofar as he wishes to invoke an equitable jurisdiction and/or principle, it is clear that this Court exercises equitable jurisdiction and that no order to that effect is necessary.

20. The second relief seeking a stay is entirely premature as no order or entry of summary judgment has been made. As I understand it, the defendant is contesting the case brought by the plaintiff and has sworn affidavits setting out his position. Whether he has a bona fide or stateable defence to those proceedings is a matter for argument and determination.

21. There can be no question of a stay without an order being made.

22. If what is contemplated by the defendant is an order ‘staying’ the application for summary judgment itself, this is entirely misconceived. He is entitled to seek to defend those proceedings within the proceedings. He is also entitled to advance his arguments on equitable principles or otherwise. He cannot, however, derail those proceedings by suggesting that they be frozen pending determination of what he purports to be his ‘claim.’

23. The third relief sought, that “the Statement of Claim and evidentiary record be admitted as filed and served”, is connected to the procedural irregularity identified above. There is something circular in the defendant’s approach to this and, in my view, it is an impermissible attempt to circumvent applicable procedures.

24. The defendant claims that the debt is not due and owing on the basis that the debt has been lawfully settled and discharged. He is seeking to advance this argument through his statement of claim and affidavit on the basis that a promissory note was issued, notarised and delivered to the plaintiff to settle all alleged obligations.

25. The defendant is entitled to seek to defend the applications for summary judgment and has already filed affidavits in respect of his position. Affidavits have also been sworn on behalf of the plaintiff.

26. The plaintiff is entitled to have their application determined in the ordinary way and if they fail to show that the defendant has no defence or a bona fide defence is established by him, the matter will be remitted for a full hearing. What the defendant cannot do is issue what purports to be a statement of claim in order to defeat the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

27. For these reasons, I refuse the reliefs sought and direct that the plaintiff’s case proceeds in the usual way to hearing through the non-jury list.