High Court dismisses judicial review application against IPAT decision on asylum claim lacking substantial grounds.

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Record No. 2025 1683 JR

[2025] IEHC 703

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION ACT 2015, AND IN

THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (DUBLIN SYSTEM) REGULATIONS

2018

BETWEEN

D.E.M.

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND INTEGRATION

RESPONDENTS

EX TEMPORE RULING delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 5 December 2025

1. The applicant is a national of Zimbabwe, born on the xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, who made a claim for protection under the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) to the Minister for Justice on the 31st of May 2023.

2. The International Protection Office (“the IPO”) recommended in a section 39 report that he should not be declared a refugee or be eligible for subsidiary protection. This

decision was communicated to the applicant by letter dated the 3rd of September 2024.

3. A notice of appeal against this recommendation was submitted to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“the IPAT”) on the 7th of September 2024, claiming errors of fact and law.

4. On the 1st of October 2025, the Tribunal notified the applicant that it had affirmed the IPO recommendation and set out its basis for same in a decision made under section 46 of the 2015 Act dated the 30th of September 2025.

5. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review challenging the IPAT

decision.

6. The applicant seeks leave to apply for an order of certiorari in respect of that decision. He also seeks leave to apply for an injunction and declaratory relief. The application was moved on the 1st of December 2025.

7. It is accepted that the applicable threshold in this case is one of ‘substantial grounds’ pursuant to the provisions of section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000.

8. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the material factual issues of the applicant's claim could be divided in two: that the appellant was abducted (“material fact one”)

and that the appellant was summonsed, convicted and fined before a court in Zimbabwe (“material fact two”).

9. The Tribunal made a credibility assessment that was adverse to the applicant in respect of both grounds. The applicant is not seeking leave to challenge the finding in respect of material fact two.

10. In relation to material fact two, I note that the summons in question was produced by the applicant for the first time in the course of his appeal, that the Tribunal regarded this as not just a revision of his claim, but a completely new claim, and that his explanation in respect of it was “implausible.”

11. While it must be accepted that an adverse credibility finding on one ground does not necessarily lead to an adverse credibility finding on another ground, I note that the Tribunal concluded that the applicant had not established his “general credibility.”

12. In relation to material fact one, the applicant seeks to challenge the findings in respect of an incident where he claims to have been abducted from his home and beaten by four men. The background to that incident was said to be his involvement in a controversy about the teaching of the majority language in local schools.

13. It is argued that the Tribunal misconceived his evidence in relation to this incident, resulting in an erroneous conclusion. It is argued that the Tribunal acted in breach of its duty to give clear, intelligible reasons for rejecting the “credence” of the applicant. It is also argued that the Tribunal acted irrationally in respect of its findings and that it made findings with no evidential basis.

14. It seems to me that the substantial grounds threshold in relation to legal error has not been crossed, and that the Court is in effect being asked to second-guess factual assessments on credibility, which are for the Tribunal to make.

15. In G.L. v. IPAT [2025] IEHC 185, Phelan J. expressed the substantial grounds test in the following way: “The substantial grounds test for leave to proceed by way of judicial review which applies by virtue of s. 5 of the 2000 Act was as set out in McNamara v. An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 ILRM 125 and approved in In Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] 2 IR 360 at 395, where the word ‘ substantial’ was interpreted as being equivalent to ‘ reasonable’, ‘ arguable’, and ‘ weighty’ and the Court held that such grounds must not be ‘ trivial or tenuous’ applies.”

16. The IPAT’s reasoning on this aspect of the applicant’s claim is set out in paragraphs 17-32 of its decision. It seems to me that the basis for the applicant’s claim was carefully considered, to include taking into account the country of origin information submitted.

17. It is clear that the Tribunal took into account, as it was entitled to, discrepancies in the accounts given by the applicant during the course of his application. The applicant had filled out a questionnaire on the 31st of May 2023 and was interviewed on the 22nd of June 2024 pursuant to section 35 of the 2015 Act.

18. The reasoning includes a finding that the applicant was vague about the alleged abduction and did not give the kind of detail or specificity that would reasonably be expected from someone who suffered such an incident.

19. The Tribunal found that the claim of torture and abduction was vague and lacked detail, and that the country of origin information submitted did not support a claim of abduction and torture for those in dispute in relation to the language issue.

20. The Tribunal found that the applicant was vague about the identity of a local politician said to be involved in the controversy, and that it was not plausible that he would be targeted for abduction, assault and torture for raising his views on the language issue with the local politician and a school.

21. The Tribunal rejected the claim that the applicant had been targeted with abduction, assault and torture.

22. It seems to me that a substantial ground has not been identified to support a claim that the IPAT decision is misconceived, irrational, unreasoned or lacks an evidential foundation.

23. I also note that an extension of time would be required in relation to the issuance of these proceedings, which were filed on the 7th of November 2025 in respect of the IPAT

decision communicated on the 1st of October 2025. The basis for that is set out in paragraph 5 of the affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor. I am unconvinced that this is a good and sufficient reason as required under the 2000 Act but, in circumstances where I am not granting leave, I do not have to decide that question.

24. I therefore refuse the application for leave to apply for judicial review.