High Court dismisses costs review application as abuse of process and res judicata due to prior adjudication.

APPROVED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 700

Record No. 2024/518MCA

BETWEEN/

PIOTR SKOCZYLAS

APPLICANT

-AND-

THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on 5th December 2025

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary

1. This application arises against the background of a lengthy and complex litigation history involving inter alia Mr. Skoczylas (also referred to as “the Applicant”), the Irish Life and Permanent Group (“the ILPG”) and the Minister for Finance (“the Minister”) which arose initially from a direction order made in respect of the ILPG pursuant to the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010.

2. By way of background, during the course of this protracted litigation, costs orders had been made in favour of Mr. Skoczylas (and others) as against the Minister which included out of pocket expenses and allowable outlay.

3. On 23rd March 2012, for example, reflecting the then applicable taxation process, the High Court had awarded Mr. Skoczylas out-of-pocket expenses when taxed and ascertained of an interlocutory application. On 23rd May 2012, the High Court had made a similar order in favour of Mr. Skoczylas in respect of another interlocutory application. Further, arising from Dowling & Ors v The Minister for Finance [2017] IEHC 832, the High Court (O’Malley J.) on 1st December 2017 made an Order in favour of Mr. Skoczylas in the action which awarded him “40% of his allowable outlay to be taxed in default of agreement.”

4. This application comes before me by way of a Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 grounded on an affidavit of Mr. Skoczylas of the same date.

5. Ostensibly, the primary relief sought by Mr. Skoczylas against the Minister in paragraph (1) of this Notice of Motion is stated to be a ‘review’ pursuant to section 161 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) of what he says is a ‘determination’ made under section 161(5) of the 2015 Act by the Chief Legal Costs Adjudicator (the “LCA”) on 15th October 2024 in the context of 5 invoices which he submitted as a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 to the LCA on 27th September 2024.

6. This, he says, is without prejudice to an alternative claim that the 2015 Act does not in fact apply to the adjudication of the 5 invoices because it seeks to address “legal services and legal practitioners” and that section 27 of the Court and Court Officers Act 1995 (the “1995 Act”) applies because he is a litigant in person.

7. In addition, he asks that, if necessary, I consider referring two questions to the CJEU pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).

8. I will address the terms sought to be invoked in the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2025 later in this judgment.

9. In his opening remarks at the hearing of this application (which took place on 20th and 21st May 2025), Mr. Skoczylas indicated that the parent litigation had commenced approximately 14 years ago, in 2011, and that he was now in the concluding phase of it.

10. In reflecting on the 14 years of litigation he referred, for example, to comments of Hardiman J. in Dowling & Ors v Cook & Ors [2013] IESC 25, at paragraph 13, which were complimentary of Mr. Skoczylas.

11. Mr. Skoczylas laid considerable emphasis on the manner of his presentation of this application which included, for example, hard and soft copy material (5 lever arch folders and an e-book) with a hyperlinked book entitled “Consolidated Materials for the Hearing”, together with appropriate highlighting and hyper-links (marked with blue and red arrows) to assist in mapping through the many pages of documentation. For example, pages 7–76 of the Applicant’s e-book comprised the Core Motion Documents (Book 1); pages 77 – 1380 comprised the Evidence (Books 2, 3, and 4); pages 1381 – 2613 comprised the 9 Books of Authorities.

12. Mr. Skoczylas also indicated that his (24 page) ‘Issue Paper’ summarised his case presented in the approximately 2,600 pages contained in the five books which comprised the application, of which over 1,000 pages were exhibits.

13. Throughout his case summary (page 17 of the Consolidated Materials for Hearing), Mr. Skoczylas makes considerable use of the hyperlinks discussed above, for example, when discussing a particular exhibit in a paragraph of the case summary, an arrow containing a hyperlink to that exhibit is present beside that paragraph.

CHRONOLOGY

11. The more recent chronology in this extended and complex litigation and the judgments of the High Court (Owens J.) in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33 (unreported, High Court (Owens J.) 17th January 2023) and of the Court of Appeal in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2024] IECA 201 (unreported, Court of Appeal, Costello J. (as she then was), Faherty J., Burns J., 30th July 2024, judgment delivered by Burns J.) set out the immediate context to the reliefs which are sought to be claimed in the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

12. In summary, the current application relates to 5 out of 26 invoices. A central part of this application focuses, then, on the context in which those 5 invoices ultimately became the subject of the application sought to be made in the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

The twenty-six invoices

13. In or around 17th September 2020 (p. 537 of the e-book of materials), arising from the costs orders referred to at paragraph (3) above, Mr. Skoczylas prepared and submitted a Bill of Costs to the LCA pursuant to Part 10, Chapter 4 of the 2015 Act concerning

26 invoices which related to services that had been rendered to him by a company, Scotchstone Capital LLP (“SCLLP”) which is an English limited liability partnership. Mr. Skoczylas was a member of SCLLP and the 26 invoices related to “professional expert non-legal litigation advice and services” which were said to have been provided during the parent litigation which he claimed was allowable outlay for the provision of non-legal expertise.

14. On 18th January 2021, the LCA had directed a preliminary issue on the question of whether these services provided by Mr. Skoczylas via SCLLP, and described in detail in the 26 invoices, were recoverable pursuant to the costs orders.

15. At Exhibit PS6 to Mr. Skoczylas’ Affidavit sworn on 16th October 2024, he exhibits the directions dated 18th January 2021 from the LCA. Under the sub-heading “the Bill of Costs”, for example, the LCA refers to the amount of the total costs initially claimed which was comprised of the following categories: (a) Stamp Duty paid on various pleadings; (b) travel and accommodation expenses; (c) Attendance at court hearings;

(d) Expert opinions/advices received; and (e) Non-legal litigation advice and services and added at paragraph (6) that “The vast majority of the costs claimed relate to category (e). This category relates to advice/services provided by Scotchstone LLP, a UK Limited Liability Partnership.”

16. He confirms at paragraph (7) that “Invoices have been provided for these services”, at paragraph (8) that “In the Bill of Costs, Mr. Skoczylas has provided submissions as to why these costs are allowable on the Adjudication” observing at paragraph (9) that “The Bill of Costs is a substantial document running to some 255 pages. The accompanying booklet of vouchers runs to 701 pages.”

17. At paragraph (12) the LCA refers to the preliminary hearing in the following terms: “I indicated at the hearing that I was minded to direct that certain preliminary issues be determined prior to considering the reasonableness of amounts involved. In particular I considered that I would be required to determine whether all the various types of costs, detailed above, were included in the Orders made. It appeared to me that it would be preferable for this issue to be initially determined.”

18. The LCA then set out Mr. Skoczylas’ submissions at paragraphs (19) and (20) and the Minister’s submissions at paragraphs (21), discusses the matter between paragraphs

(22) to (39) and sets out directions at paragraph (40) as follows:

“(a) The hearing date of the 25th January 2021 be vacated

(b) The issue of whether the Scotchstone Capital LLP costs are

captured by the Court orders is to be determined as a preliminary issue

(c) Mr. Skoczylas to provide written submissions, confined to that issue, by 5.00pm Monday 1st February 2021

(d) Mr. Cooke to provide replying written submissions by 5.00pm

on Monday 15th February 2021

(e) Any material either party wishes to rely on to be lodged in

physical format with the office by 5.00pm on Wednesday 17th of

February 2021

(f) The matter to be listed for the hearing of the preliminary issue on Monday 22nd of February at 11:00 am.”

19. On 2nd June 2021, the LCA gave an interim determination (Book 4, tab 17; Exhibit PS9; p. 1244 of the Consolidated Book) which whilst inter alia acknowledging the novelty of the issues which had been raised, determined that these costs relating to the SCLLP invoices were not recoverable.

20. On 11th June 2021 (date-stamped on 14th June 2021), Mr. Skoczylas then applied for Consideration of the decision and for a determination under pursuant to section 160(1) of the 2015 Act (Book 4, tab 15G, p. 993 of the Consolidated Book).

21. On 15th November 2021, the LCA delivered a relatively lengthy ruling (44 pages) on the Consideration application (Book 4, tab 17, beginning at p. 1264 of the Consolidated Book) where, after reviewing and reconsidering his initial determination, the LCA confirmed his conclusion previously reached and disallowed the category of costs which he had earlier described in paragraph (20) as “The category of costs in dispute relate to services provided by Scotchstone Capital LLP … to the Applicant throughout the course of the litigation. These services are described in the invoices of the Company as being for “non-legal litigation services and advice/consulting in relation to the proceedings before the Court in Dublin, rec. no. 2011/239 MCA; specifically: [f.n. 9 states that “The invoices then go on to describe the particular services covered by the invoice in question”]”). The LCA stated that he did not consider pursuant to section 155(4)(b), section 157(3)(a) or paragraph 1(a) of Schedule 1 of the Act of the 2015 Act, that in all the circumstances of the case it was appropriate and/or reasonable that a charge be made for the work the subject of the application.

22. A Final Certificate of Determination signed and issued on 29th April 2022 disallowed the invoices.

23. On 6th December 2021, Mr. Skoczylas filed an application in the Central Office seeking a review of the consideration of the LCA pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 Act.

The provisions of the 2015 Act

24. Section 157 of the 2015 Act provides for the determination of applications for the adjudication of costs.

25. Section 157(1) provides that the LCA, having considered an application in accordance with section 155 of the 2015 Act shall, in accordance with this section, make a determination in respect of that application and section 157(2) of the 2015 Act provides that a determination shall, as soon as practicable after it is made, be furnished to the parties to the adjudication. Section 158 of the 2015 Act addresses the effect of a determination, with section 158(1) of the 2015 Act providing that “subject to section 160, the determination of [an LCA] is final and shall take effect 20 days after it is furnished under section 157(2) to the parties to the adjudication.” Section 159(1) of the 2015 Act provides that the LCA may, whether or not at the request of a party to an application for adjudication of legal costs, refer a question of law arising in the application to the High Court for its opinion.

26. Section 160 of the 2015 Act which allows for the ‘Consideration’ by the LCA of a determination and section 160(1) of the 2015 Act provides that “where a party to an adjudication is dissatisfied with a decision of [the LCA] under section 157 to confirm a charge, not to confirm a charge or to determine a different amount to be charged in respect of a matter or item the subject of the adjudication, he or she may, within 14 days of the date on which the determination is furnished to him or her under section 157(2), apply to [the LCA] for the consideration of the decision and the making of a determination under this section.”

27. Section 160(4) of the 2015 Act provides that for the purposes of an application under section 160(1), the LCA shall reconsider and review his determination having regard to the matters or items specified under section 160(2)(a), and sections 155 to 158 shall apply in relation to such a consideration, which amounts to a reconsideration of everything again. Once that is done, section 160(5) of the 2015 Act provides that the LCA, having considered an application under this section may decide (a) not to vary his or her determination, or (b) to make a new determination, and the determination referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) shall, subject to section 161, take effect immediately. Section 160(6) of the 2015 Act provides that the functions of the LCA in relation to an application under section 160 shall, insofar as practicable, be performed by the LCA who made the determination to which the application relates.

Review of a Determination

28. Section 161 of the 2015 Act provides for the review of a determination of the LCA, as follows:

“(1) A party to an adjudication who has made an application under section 160 may, not later than 21 days after the date on which the Legal Costs Adjudicator has made his or her determination under section 160(5), apply to the High Court for a review of the determination concerned.

(2) A review under this section shall be made by motion on notice to all other parties to the adjudication and the Chief Legal Costs Adjudicator.

(3) The court shall hear and determine the review on the evidence that was tendered to the Legal Costs Adjudicator unless the court orders that other evidence be submitted.

(4) The court shall, having heard the review under subsection (1) —

(a) confirm the determination of the Legal Costs Adjudicator, or

(b) allow the review and—

(i) remit the matter to the Legal Costs Adjudicator to determine the adjudication in accordance with the decision of the court, or

(ii) substitute its own determination for that of the Legal Costs Adjudicator.

(5) The High Court shall allow a review under subsection (4)(b) only where it is satisfied that the Legal Costs Adjudicator has, in his or her determination, erred as to the amount of the allowance or disallowance so that the determination is unjust.

(6) In this section “court” means—

(a) if the adjudication the subject of the review is in relation to party and party costs, the court that heard the proceedings to which those costs relate, and

(b) in any other case, the High Court.”

Rules of the Superior Courts 1986

29. In addition, Part VI, Order 99, rules 38(1) to (4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 (as amended) (“the RSC 1986”) provide for the ‘Review of determination of Legal Costs Adjudicator’ which essentially reflect the provisions of the 2015 Act, as follows:

“38 (1) An application to the Court under section 161(1) of the 2015 Act shall be made by motion on notice to the persons specified in section 161(2) of the 2015 Act. The notice of motion shall be filed in the Central Office and a copy thereof filed in the Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicators. The motion shall be heard and determined by the Court on the evidence brought in before the Legal Costs Adjudicator, and no further evidence shall be received on the hearing thereof, unless the Court otherwise directs. 38(2) The party seeking a review of the determination shall produce for the Court duly certified copies of the original bill of costs, notice of application for further consideration and submissions in support of that application and any replying submissions and any other material documents. 38(3) After the determination by the Court the matter shall, where necessary, be remitted to the Legal Costs Adjudicator to complete the adjudication in accordance with the decision of the Court and, where necessary, to issue a final certificate of determination.

38 (4) If the bill of costs or any part thereof is remitted to the Legal Costs Adjudicator for further adjudication, any party may upon such further adjudication apply for a consideration of the further adjudication and the provisions of this rule shall apply to such further adjudication as on the original adjudication.”

30. The provision of particular relevance when considering the suite of ‘decisions’ made in this case under Chapter 4, Adjudication of Legal Costs, at sections 154 to 161 of the 2015 Act – including the interim determination of 2nd June 2021, the Consideration of 15th November 2021, the Final Certificate of Determination signed and issued on the 29th April 2022 disallowing the invoices, the review of the High Court dated 17th January 2023 which confirmed the LCA determination, and the affirmation by the Court of Appeal dated 30th July 2024 of the High Court confirmation – is section 161(4)(a) of the 2015 Act which provides that “the court shall, having heard the review under [section 161(4)(a)] confirm the determination of the Legal Costs Adjudicator”.

31. By virtue of section 161(4)(b) and section 165 of the 2015 Act, the High Court has a limited jurisdiction if allowing and carrying out a review pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 Act.

32. This statutory review of the determination of the LCA came before the High Court (Owens J.).

33. In Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33 (unreported, High Court, Owens J., 17th January 2023), the High Court (Owens J.) confirmed, pursuant to section 161(4)(a) of the 2015 Act the determination of the LCA disallowing the amounts claimed on foot of each of the disputed 26 invoices because Mr. Skoczylas had not demonstrated that the LCA had erred in disallowing the amounts claimed in these invoices.

34. Mr. Skoczylas appealed the decision of the High Court dated 17th January 2023 to the Court of Appeal.

35. By decision of the Court of Appeal (Costello J. (as she then was), Faherty J. and Burns J.) in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201 (unreported, Court of Appeal, 30th July 2024) the appeal was dismissed with Costello J. and Faherty J. agreeing with the judgment delivered by Burns J.

36. In terms of setting out the chronology, in its determination in Skoczylas v Minister for Finance [2025] IESCDET 62, dated 12th May 2025, the Supreme Court notes that Mr. Skoczylas applied for a stay on the judgment and order of the Court of Appeal dated 19th December 2024 and which was refused by Costello P. (with whom Faherty J. and Burns J. agreed) in an ex tempore ruling shortly after the conclusion of the hearing. At paragraph 11 of the Supreme Court determination, it records that in the ex tempore ruling Costello P. noted that the proceedings were at an end, subject only to the possibility of a further appeal to the Supreme Court and that the stay was sought pending the determination of separate proceedings (which comprised, in fact, the application in the Notice of motion dated 16th October 2024 heard before me) which Mr. Skoczylas had initiated subsequent to the Court of Appeal’s judgment dated 30th July 2024. The Supreme Court determination stated that Costello P. noted that the order made by the Court was a negative order and expressed the view that the application for a stay was founded on a misunderstanding of the legal effect of the Court of Appeal judgment. The determination records that Costello P. rejected the suggestion that the judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal were contradictory and concluded that there was no basis on which the Court should refrain from perfecting its order once the issue of costs had been determined.

37. The Supreme Court determination records that it was only the order announced orally on 19th December 2024 (and perfected on 22nd January 2025) which was the subject of its determination and that the substantive judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 30 th July 2024 (and subsequent order) dismissing Mr. Skoczylas’s appeal from the decision of the High Court (Owens J) refusing his application to review the determination of the LCA was not the subject of the application and determination. Mr. Skoczylas had further exchanges with the Registry of the Court of Appeal, after its judgment on 30th July 2024, and at the hearing of this application I was referred to the subsequent rulings and decisions of the Court of Appeal on 15th January 2025 and 10th February 2025, which I address later in this judgment.

38. The Supreme Court did not grant leave to Mr. Skoczylas to appeal to it from the order of the Court of Appeal delivered orally on 19th December 2024 (and later perfected on 22nd January 2025), refusing his application that it ‘stay’ or refrain from perfecting its order (once the issue of costs had been determined). The Supreme Court noted that Mr. Skoczylas had subsequently applied to “review” inter alia the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 30th July 2024 pursuant to CA Practice Direction 14 and noted that application was due to be heard by the Court of Appeal on 2nd May 2025. (The Court of Appeal delivered a ruling on 18th November 2025 refusing the Applicant’s application).

Five of the twenty-six invoices

39. In a Bill of Costs (Record No. H:LCA:OCLA:2024.771) dated 25th September 2024 lodged with the Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicator on 27th September 2024, Mr. Skoczylas sought to have 5 of the 26 invoices – which had already been adjudicated upon and had been the subject of the interim determination of 2nd June 2021, the Consideration of 15th November 2021, a Final Certificate of Determination signed and issued on 29th April 2022 disallowing the invoices, the review of the High Court dated 17th January 2023 which confirmed the LCA determination and the affirmation by the Court of Appeal dated 30th July 2024 of the High Court confirmation – (described above) adjudicated upon again.

40. These are set out below, and are also set out in Exhibit PS7 (C) (p. 537) (the Bill of Costs in the taxation/adjudication rec. no. H: LCA: OLCA: 2020: 716) at p. 646:

EXPENSES

Item Date(s) on Description of expense Whether Claimed by For Legal Costs No. which or claimed liable to Party Adjudicator’s between VAT and entitled € Use Only which rate Notes/Amount expense disallowed (if incurred any) in respect of amount claimed in Column 5 … B.4.5 15 August Expert invoice dated 1 Yes (UK £47,525.00 to 30 December 2011 for:- VAT) not + 20% VAT November “Professional research recoverable = 2011 and advisory/consulting for a £57,030.00.

and related services; i.e. physical Claimed

non-legal litigation person 40% of the

services and above =

advice/consulting in £22,812.00; relation to the i.e.

proceedings before the €25,228.93

High Court in Dublin,

Record No. 2011/239MCA;

specifically perusing and

analysing documents,

including, inter alia, all of

the documents issued

before the

commencement of the

proceedings, Record No. 2011/239MCA (i.e.

between April 2011 and

August 2011). As well as

examining and analysing

multifaceted issues and

advising in respect of the

extremely complex non-

legal litigation issues

involved in the tightly

typed 81 page, 181

paragraph long

Grounding Affidavit with

27 Exhibits comprising

1,540 pages, which was

sworn on 25th July 2011.”

…

B.4.70 October Expert invoice dated 3rd Yes (UK £75,525.00

2011 to January 2013 for:- VAT), non- + 20% VAT

December “Professional research recoverable =

2012 and advisory/consulting for a £90,630.00

and related services; i.e. physical Claimed

non-legal litigation person. 40% of the

services and above =

advice/consulting in £36,252.00

relation to the i.e.

proceedings before the €44,954.24

High Court in Dublin,

Record No. 2011/239MCA;

specifically:-

- Conducting research,

perusing documents,

drawing up multiple

drafts (in respect of a

document structure

and non-legal

litigation matters),

extensively proof

reading, examining,

analysing and

advising on the

extremely complex

non-legal litigation

issues regarding the

multifaceted matters

involved in the 117 –

page Points of Claim

[Note: one of the key

documents in the

proceedings] issued

by Piotr Skoczylas on

2nd November 2012,

including, inter alia,

various analysis, as

well as questions for

reference to the CJEU

under Article 267

TFEU and;

- Preparing drafts of

the Grounding

Affidavit of Piotr

Skoczylas sworn on

2nd November 2012,

on which a respective

Notice of Motion

dated 2nd November

2012 was grounded

(the said application

comprising altogether

143 pages) regarding

questions for a

reference to the CJEU

under Article 267

TFEU, as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved in

said Affidavit of Piotr

Skoczylas; and

- Perusing the 32

paragraph Points of

Defence of 21

December 2012,

prepared on behalf of

the Respondent by

Mr. Barniville S.C.,

Mr. McCann S.C.,

Mr. Dunne B.L. and

Mr. McBride B.L., as

well as analysing and

advising on the

complex non-legal

litigation matters

involved therein.”

…

B.4.103 October Expert invoice dated 1 Yes (UK £177,725.00

2011 to October 2013 for:- VAT) not + 20% VAT

August “Professional research recoverable =

2013 and advisory/consulting for a £213,270.00

and related services; i.e. physical Claimed

non-legal litigation person 40% of the

services and above =

advice/consulting in £85,308.00

relation to the i.e.

proceedings before the €105,786.07

High Court in Dublin,

Record No. 2011/239MCA;

specifically:-

Conducting

comprehensive, in depth

research, perusing a

plethora of documents,

preparing multiple drafts,

extensively proof

reading, thoroughly

examining and

comprehensively

advising on the extremely

complex non-legal

litigation issues regarding

multifaceted matters

involved in the 105 page,

251 paragraph main

Affidavit of Piotr

Skoczylas sworn on 30

August 2013, including,

inter alia, various

analysis and questions for

a reference to the CJEU,

with 75 exhibits

comprising 1,950 pages,

which is to constitute a

key basis for the trial.”

…

B.4.109 February Expert invoice dated 17th Yes (UK £389,925.00

2013 to February 2014 for:- VAT), not + 20% VAT

January “Professional research recoverable =

2014 and advisory/consulting for a £467,910.00

and related service; i.e. physical . Claimed is

no-legal litigation person 40% of the

services and above,

advice/consulting in which is

relation to the proceeding £187,164.00

before the High Court in , i.e.

Dublin, Record No. €233,823.99

2011/239MCA;

specifically:-

Conducting and in depth

research, perusing

documents and preparing

multiple drafts,

extensively proof

reading, examining and

analysing issues and

comprehensively

advising in respect of the

extremely complex non-

legal litigation issues

regarding the

multifaceted matters

involving in preparing

and/or analysing the

following:-

- Drawing

up/structuring

drafts(in terms of a

cogent documents

organisation and non-

legal litigation

matters) of the first

expert Affidavit of

Professor

Wymeersch sworn by

him on 30th October

2013 (altogether 16

pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein;

- Perusing the 75 page

Affidavit of John

Moran sworn on

behalf of the Minister

on 20th November

2013, with 18

Exhibits comprising

924 (altogether 999

pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein;

- Perusing the 64 page,

176 paragraph

Affidavit of Alan

Cooke sworn on

behalf of the Minister

on 20th November

2013, with 27

Exhibits comprising

577 pages (altogether

641 pages) as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein;

- Perusing the 16 page,

36 paragraph second

Affidavit of Alan

Cooke sworn on 20th

November 2013, with

3 Exhibits

comprising 87 pages

(altogether 103

pages) as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 16 page,

58 paragraph expert

Affidavit of Dr.

Philip Lane sworn on

20th November 2013,

with 1 Exhibit

(altogether 29 pages)

as well as analysing

and advising on the

non-legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 19 page,

22 paragraph

Affidavit of Rose

McHugh, with 1

Exhibit, sworn on 21st

November 2013

(altogether 20 pages)

as well as analysing

and advising on the

non-legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 7 page,

16 paragraph expert

Affidavit sworn on 21

November 2013 by

Ivan Murphy, with 2

exhibits comprising

75 pages (altogether

83 pages) as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 18 page,

57 paragraph expert

Affidavit sworn on

2nd December 2013

by John Montgomery

with 5 Exhibits

comprising 31 pages

(altogether 49 pages)

as well as analysing

and advising on the

non-legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Drawing

up/structuring drafts

(in terms of a cogent

document and

organisation of the

second expert

Affidavit/Opinion of

Professor

Wymeersch sworn by

him on 5th December

2013) (a second 4

page Affidavit and

the second expert

Opinion of Professor

Wymeersch [47

pages] (altogether

comprise 51 pages),

as well as analysing

and advising on the

non-legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Drawing up /

structuring drafts (in

terms of a cogent

document’s

organisation and

nonlegal litigation

matters) of the first,

34- page, 96-

paragraph expert

affidavit of Prof.

Azarmi with 18

exhibits comprising

691 pages (altogether

787 pages), sworn on

5 December 2013

(filed on 13

December 2013), as

well as analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Drawing up /

structuring drafts (in

terms of a cogent

document’s

organisation and non-

legal litigation

matters), analysing,

advising on and

providing services

with regard to the

non-legal litigation

matters in respect of

Piotr Skoczylas’ 140-

page submissions

dated 8 December

2013; and

- Preparing drafts of

Piotr Skoczylas’ 30-

page, 94-paragraph

affidavit with 28

exhibits comprising

1,282 pages

(altogether 1,312

pages), sworn on 12

December 2013, as

well as analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 3-page

expert affidavit of

Fiona Power, with 3

exhibits comprising

28 pages (altogether

31 pages), sworn on

12 December 2013,

as well as analysing

and advising on the

non-legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the

supplemental, 3-page

expert affidavit of

Rose McHugh sworn

on 20 December

2013, as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 89-page,

273-paragraph

submissions on

behalf of the Minister

delivered on 20

December 2013 by

Eoin McCullough

SC, David Barniville

SC, Patrick McCann

SC, Ailbhe O’Neill

BL, Mark Dunne BL

and Anthony

McBride BL, as well

as analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 70-page,

188-paragraph

submissions on

behalf of the Notice

Parties (controlled by

and supporting the

Minister for Finance)

delivered on 20

December 2013 by

Mr Gallagher SC and

Ms Geoghegan BL,

and analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Drawing up /

structuring drafts (in

terms of a cogent

document’s

organisation and

nonlegal litigation

matters) of the

Applicant’s 5-page

Notice to Admit

Facts dated 10

January 2014, as well

as analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Drawing up /

structuring drafts (in

terms of a cogent

document’s

organisation and

nonlegal litigation

matters) of the

second, 91-page,

182-paragraph expert

affidavit of Prof.

Azarmi, sworn on 13

January and filed on

16 January 2014,

with 43 exhibits

comprising 1,427

pages (altogether

1,518 pages), as well

as analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 6-page,

13-paragraph

supplemental expert

affidavit sworn on 14

January 2014 by Ivan

Murphy, as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Preparing drafts of

the 22-page affidavit

of Piotr Skoczylas

sworn on 14 January

2014, with four

exhibits (altogether

46 pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Preparing drafts of

the 4-page affidavit

of Piotr Skoczylas

with 5 exhibits

comprising 366 pages

(altogether 370

pages), sworn on 17

January 2014 (filed

on 20 January 2014),

as well as analysing

and advising on the

non-legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 3-page

reply of the

Respondent dated 17

January 2014 to the

above-mentioned

Notice to Admit

Facts, as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 3-page

reply of the Notice

Parties (controlled by

and supporting the

Minister) dated 20

January 2014 to the

above-mentioned

Notice to Admit

Facts, as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the 4-page

supplemental

Affidavit of Philip

Lane sworn 20

January 2014, as well

as analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the affidavit

of Edurne Navarro

Varona sworn 20

January 2014, with

three exhibits

(altogether 148

pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the second

Supplemental

Affidavit of Rose

McHugh sworn 20

January 2014 (four

pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the

supplemental

Affidavit of John

Montgomery (3

pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Perusing the affidavit

of Carlos Botelho

Moniz sworn 21

January 2014, with

five exhibits

(altogether 144

pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein; and

- Preparing drafts of

the affidavit of

Clement McGann

sworn on 21 January

2014; and

- Preparing drafts of

the affidavit Finbar

Fleming sworn on 21

January 2014; and

- Preparing drafts of

the affidavit of John

Langan sworn on 21

January 2014; and

- Preparing drafts of

the affidavit of John

Moran sworn on 21

January 2014; and

- Preparing drafts of

the affidavit of

Muriel Scorer sworn

on 21 January 2014;

and

- Preparing drafts of

the replying Affidavit

of Piotr Skoczylas

sworn 21 January

2014, with nine

exhibits (altogether

304 pages), as well as

analysing and

advising on the non-

legal litigation

matters involved

therein.”

…

B 4.129 February Expert invoice dated 21 Yes (UK £87,840.00

2013 to February 2014 for: VAT), not + 20% VAT

February “Professional in-depth recoverable =

2014 research and advisory / for a £105,408.00

consulting and related physical . Claimed is

services; i.e. person 40% of the

comprehensive non-legal above,

litigation services and which is

advice / consulting in £42,163.20,

relation to the i.e.

proceedings before the €52,674.49

High Court in Dublin, rec. no. 2011/239 MCA;

specifically: Conducting

research, preparing draft

documents (in respect of

the documents’ cogent

structuring / organisation

and non-legal litigation

issues), extensively

proofreading, examining

and analysing issues and

advising in respect of the

extremely complex non-

legal litigation issues

regarding the

multifaceted matters

involved in preparing

Piotr Skoczylas’

following documents /

slides / hand-outs,

comprising altogether

362 pages, used as a basis

for his oral submissions at

the hearing between 21

January to 13 February

2014:

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 21 January

2014 (33 pages);

and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 22 January

2014 (22 pages);

and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 23 January

2014 (14 pages);

and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

oral submissions

on 24 January

2014 (6 pages);

and

- Slides used as a

basis for Piotr

Skoczylas’ oral

submissions on 28

January 2014 (35

pages); and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 30 January

2014 (25 pages);

and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 31 January

2014 (30 pages);

and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 12 February

2014 (70 pages);

and

- Slides / hand-outs

used as a basis for

Piotr Skoczylas’

oral submissions

on 13 February

2014 (106

pages).”

Copies of the above-

mentioned documents

(slides / hand-outs) are

available at the following

link: [the link to the

original Dropbox is in the

original documentation

and is removed for the

purposes of this

judgment].

41. By correspondence dated 11th October 2024, in reply to the submission of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (lodged on 27th September 2024), the LCA referred to the 5 invoices (and the amounts involved) based on the invoices issued by SCLLP to Mr. Skoczylas and inter alia stated as follows:

“You will be aware that these invoices were previously the subject of an adjudication, being included in your previous Bill of Costs at items B.4.5, B4.70, B.4.103, B.4.109 and B.4.129. They were the subject of a determination by Adjudicator Magee on the 2nd June 2021 and a consideration dated 15th November 2021. It was determined that they were not recoverable. A Final Certificate of Determination was signed and issued on the 29th April 2022 disallowing, inter alia, those invoices. That decision was the subject of a review by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Both Courts confirmed the determination of the Adjudicator. It is noted that you now contend that the judgement of the Court of Appeal entitles you re-lodge those invoices for further adjudication. If that is correct, it will be necessary for the Court of Appeal to so order. It is noted that no Order of the Court of Appeal was included with your application.

Absent an Order of the Court pursuant to S.161 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 or otherwise, the previous determination and Final Certificate of Determination stand. In light of the above, no further hearing will take place, and the previously advised hearing date of the 9th of December will not now proceed. It is noted that there is a motion listed before the Court of Appeal on the 18th of October next in relation to the appeal. We have no objection to you bringing this letter to the attention of the Court on that date”.

42. In response, on 14th October 2024, Mr. Skoczylas issued a purported Notice of Application for Consideration of a Decision and for a determination pursuant to section 160(1) of the 2015 Act.

43. The LCA responded to that by letter dated 15th October 2024, referring to its previous letter dated 11th October 2024 and stated that the issue of the Applicant’s application for a consideration of the determination of 11th October 2024 simply did not arise and that the Determination which issued in respect of the invoices in question stood until such time as a Court ordered otherwise, and absent such an order, the LCA had no jurisdiction to deal with the Bill of Costs:

“The position is fully set out in our letter to you of the 11th inst. We do not intend to repeat the contents of that letter here. The issue of your application for a consideration of the ‘determination’ of the 11th of October simply does not arise.

As explained in our letter of the 11th inst. the invoices contained in your ‘new’ bill of costs have previously been adjudicated upon and a Final Certificate of Determination issued in respect of them. That determination stands until such time as a Court orders otherwise. We note we have not been furnished with any such Court Order. Absent such an Order this office has no jurisdiction to deal with the ‘new’ Bill of Costs presented. For the avoidance of doubt, the Motion currently before the Court of Appeal is publicly listed in the Legal Diary section of the Courts Service website which we monitor. There has been no “surreptitious communication” with anyone in respect of the Motion and your allegations in that regard are unfounded.”

44. In further response, Mr. Skoczylas issued the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024, which is the subject of this judgment, in the following terms, and seeking the following reliefs:

“(1) A review and order, pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 Act, regarding the determination, which amounts to a determination under section 160(5) of the 2015 Act, made by the Chief Legal Costs Adjudicator on 15th October 2024 in the taxation/adjudication rec. no. H:LCA:OLCA: 2024.771.

(2) A decision/order that the following question be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) pursuant to Article

267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”):

- Having regard to [the] facts of the matter in this case and having regard to the fact that fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR, including inter alia Article 6(1) and Article 13 ECHR constitute general principles of EU law as per Article 6(3) TEU, must general principles of EU law, including the principles enshrined in Article 6(1) and Article 13 ECHR, be interpreted as precluding a Legal Costs Adjudicator from making decisions that amount in effect to denying an applicant, such as Piotr Skoczylas in this case, a due statutory process and in effect an access to the Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicator to adjudicate on the quantum of the respective claims, which quantum has not yet been adjudicated upon, even though that applicant has met all the legal and procedural requirements and his application is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata ?, and,

- Having regard to [the] facts of the matter in this case and having regard to the fact that fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR, including inter alia Article 6(1) and Article 13 ECHR constitute general principles of EU law as per Article 6(3) TEU, must general principles of EU law, including the principles enshrined in Article 6(1) and Article 13 ECHR, be interpreted as precluding a Legal Costs Adjudicator from denying to fulfil his “duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties” and to ensure that the tight to a fair trial is effective i.e. the parties’ “observations are actually “heard”, that is to say duly considered.”

45. The application was grounded inter alia upon the proceedings and pleadings, the case file which was before the LCA, the Notice of Motion itself (dated 16th October 2024) and the grounding affidavit of Mr. Skoczylas sworn on 16th October 2024.

46. At the end of the first relief sought – the review under section 161 of the 2015 Act - the first footnote at paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 states as follows: “Having regard to the fact that the Adjudicator’s determination amounts to a determination under section 160(5) of the … 2015 Act …, said determination is subject to section 161 of the 2015 Act, pursuant to which this application is made. This is without prejudice to my claim, which applies to the entirety [of] this application, that the 2015 Act actually does not apply to this particular taxation/adjudication, and section 27 of the Court and Court Officers Act 1995 (the “1995 Act) does apply herein, having regard to the fact that I am a litigant in person and the provisions of the 2015 Act are explicitly aimed at “legal services” and “legal practitioners” as defined in that Act (as elucidated in the Bill of Costs herein).”

47. The second footnote in the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 arises at the end of the following sentence in paragraph (2)(ii) “duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties”, and states as follows: “Cf. Van de Hurk v The Netherlands (the ECtHR Application no. 16034/90): “59. The effect of Article 6 para.1 (Art.6.1) is inter alia, to place the “Tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its

decision.””

35. The third footnote is at the end of paragraph 2(ii) immediately after the following “i.e. the parties’ “observations are actually “heard”, that is to say duly considered”, and states as follows: “Cf. the “Guide on Article 6 of the ECHR – Right to a fair trial (civil limb)” (31 December 2020): “296. An effective right: the parties to the proceedings have the right to present the observations which they regard as relevant to their case. This right can only be seen to be effective if the observations are actually “heard”, that is to say duly considered by the trial court (Donadze v Georgia, para. 35). In other words, the “tribunal” has a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties (Kraska v Switzerland, para.30; Van de Hurk v the Netherlands, para 59; Perez v France [GC], para.80. In order for the right guaranteed by this Article to be effective, the authorities must exercise “diligence.”””

36. As just mentioned, the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 was grounded on the Affidavit of Mr. Skoczylas sworn on 16th October 2024 and a substantial number of exhibits which comprised over 1,300 pages of the approximate 2,600 pages of documentation in this application.

37. Keith Smith, Solicitor of Arthur Cox LLP swore a replying Affidavit on 18th December 2024 and Mr. Skoczylas swore rebuttal Affidavit on 20th January 2025.

38. Mr. Skoczylas’ application and the Notice of Motion for a section 161 review (and Mr. Skoczylas’ argument, made in the alternative and without prejudice, that section 27 of the Court and Court Officers Act 1995 applies rather than the 2015 Act) and his application for a referral to the CJEU, were heard before me on 20th and 21st May 2025 and judgment was reserved with same being delivered today, 5th December 2025. As set out in this judgment, both parties had made detailed submissions to me inter alia on the judgment of the High Court (Owens J.) in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33 (unreported, High Court, Owens J. 17th January 2023) and the judgment of the Court of Appeal (Costello J. (as she then was), Faherty J. and Burns J.) in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201 (unreported, Court of Appeal, 30th July 2024).

DISCUSSION & DECISION

39. As set out earlier in this judgment, Part 10, Chapter 4 of the 2015 Act regulates the process of adjudication having replaced the former taxation of costs process.

40. The difficulty with this application is that the original adjudication of the LCA which disallowed the invoices, including these five invoices in the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 and the subject of the relief sought at paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024, have already been the subject of the interim determination of 2nd June 2021, the Consideration of 15th November 2021, the Final Certificate of Determination signed and issued on 29th April 2022 disallowing the 26 invoices, the review of the High Court dated 17th January 2023 which confirmed the LCA determination, and the affirmation by the Court of Appeal dated 30th July 2024 of the High Court confirmation.

41. Further, the submission of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (on 27th September 2024 with an initial hearing date given of 9th December 2024 which was then vacated by the LCA on 11th October 2024), the issuing of a purported Notice of Application for Consideration of a Decision and for a Determination pursuant to section 160(1) of the 2015 Act (in response to the correspondence from the LCA dated 11th October 2024) and the issuing of a Notice of Motion on 16th October 2024, purportedly seeking inter alia a review pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 (and in the alternative relief pursuant to section 27(3) of the Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 and if necessary, referring two questions to the CJEU) does not have the effect of conferring, vesting or creating a jurisdiction under the 2015 Act in the circumstances of this case or of circumventing the previous suite of decisions which addressed the 26 invoices (including the 5 set out above) in the interim determination of 2nd June 2021, the Consideration of 15th November 2021, the Final Certificate of Determination signed and issued on the 29th April 2022 disallowing the invoices, the review of the High Court dated 17th January 2023 where in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33 at paragraph (17) of his judgment, for example, the High Court (Owens J.) inter alia determined that as Mr. Skoczylas had not demonstrated that the LCA had erred in disallowing the amounts claimed on foot of the disputed invoices (the 26 inclusive of the 5), he was required to confirm the determination relating to those disallowances, as required by s.161(4)(a) of the 2015 Act. This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in its judgment 30th July 2024 affirming the High Court confirmation.

42. Further, insofar as the adjudication process prescribed by Chapter 4, Adjudication of Legal Costs, at sections 154 to 161 of the 2015 Act, is concerned, the letter from the LCA dated 11th October 2024 was not a ‘determination’ with respect to a Bill of Costs made pursuant to section 157 of the 2015 Act and, therefore, could not be the subject of a consideration/determination application on 14th October 2024 (in response to the correspondence from the LCA dated 11th October 2024) and in consequence, the letter from the LCA dated 15th October 2024 was not a ‘determination’ and was, therefore, not capable of being reviewed by the High Court pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 Act.

43. The error, and respectfully, the misconception in the Applicant’s approach, is reflected, for example, in inter alia paragraphs (2) to (6) of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (submitted on 27th September 2024) under the sub-heading “Important opening notes applying throughout this Bill of Costs, in light of the Court of Appeal judgment delivered on 30th July 2024” and “(A) Key facts relevant for this Bill of Costs” where Mr. Skoczylas states as follows:

“2. The costs order giving rise to this Bill of Costs was made on 1 December 2017 by O’Malley J in the proceedings rec. no. 2011/239 MCA; the order provides:

“IT IS ORDERED the Applicants be awarded as against the

Respondent a proportion of their outlay and legal costs in relation to this case in the following proportions: -Third Named Applicant 40% of his allowable outlay to be taxed in default of agreement”.

3. An important part of that order in respect of me, Piotr Skoczylas (referred to in the order as the Third Named Applicant), regarding the quantum of claims resulting from the selected five invoices issued by Scotchstone Capital LLP, has not been yet taxed/adjudicated on, as outlined in detail below. As outlined in detail below herein, contrary to determinations issued by Adjudicator Magee, the Court of Appeal judgment delivered on 30 July 2024 Neutral Citation: [2024] IECA 201 has made in effect clear that the claims the subject of said selected five invoices are indeed “captured” by the above High Court order, as long as sufficient detail is provided in this regard, as outlined in detail below.

4. In this context, this Bill of Costs deals exclusively with a distinct issue that has not yet been the subject of any taxation/adjudication, i.e. with the issue of the quantum of claims resulting from the selected five invoices issued by Scotchstone Capital LLP (the “the Company”) regarding the proceedings rec. no. 2011/239 MCA, having regard to the detailed evidence regarding the work done by the LLP, which this Bill of Costs relies on, which evidence was not provided previously as part of the interactive adjudication/taxation process rec. no. H:LCA:OLCA:2020:716, which I address below in detail.

5. The Legal Costs Adjudicator (the “LCA”) has determined in that case (rec. no. H:LCA:OLCA:2020:716): “I have found that this category of costs represents a novel claim that has, to my knowledge, never been considered previously” (see the LCA Determinations dated

2 June 2021 [§§ 21 and 94] and 15 November 2021 [§25]. This has not been impugned by either the Minister for Finance or the Courts. Indeed, the Court of Appeal (“CoA”) judgment delivered on 30 July 2024 (Neutral Citation: [2024] IECA 201) is the first judgment in Ireland to confirm the respective specific legal principles in common law in the explicit way the CoA did it. It is relevant to point out herein that the distinct issue the subject of this Bill of Costs is adjudicatable according to said CoA judgment which provides …

6. Thus, the above quoted Court of Appeal judgment has made clear that claims reflected in the invoices in question are in principle recoverable, as long as sufficient detail supporting those invoices is provided (which it has been, as per this Bill of Costs) and as long as the respective “expertise is properly required for the purpose of the litigation and the work carried out is truly expert in nature”. The Court of Appeal judgment has made clear at §44 that those principles are not limited to the cost of claimant’s employees but also extend to any third party whom the cost claimant might engage. That is reinforced in§ 46 of the Court of Appeal judgment, as per the above citation”.1 Emphasis and underlining in the original.

44. Similarly, the gravamen of Mr. Skoczylas’ position in set out in his Case Summary (comprising 24 pages). By way of example, at paragraph 1.5 of this summary, he submitted as follows:

“(1.5) Given that the Minister lost comprehensively on said “core” “real issue” in that case, it is astounding/incongruous that Mr. Smith claims in his affidavit, para.10, that “It is the Respondent’s position that the Applicant is not entitled to re-litigate and re-open a matter where the Applicant has already been unsuccessful before the OLCA, this Honourable Court and the Court of Appeal”. The Respondent impermissibly mounts a challenge attack on §45 and §55 of the 30/07/2024 CoA judgment, which determined – contrary to the LCA and the Respondent’s stance – that liability is in principle capable of arising regarding part of the claims (i.e. regarding some of the 27 invoices from Scotchstone Capital LLP), if applicable conditions are met, which gave rise to these proceedings on quantum. According to that CoA judgment (§§ 45, 55 and 59), liability (and quantum) is capable of arising regarding part of the claims, if applicable conditions are met. Accordingly, the Bill of Costs herein duly claims in respect of only five invoices in question for only the work listed in §§46-47 of the grounding affidavit herein.”

45. The difficulty with the Applicant’s contentions is that they do not correlate with the judgment of the Court of Appeal which made clear that the issue which was before the High Court and that Court was whether the actuals costs at issue or in dispute, i.e., the

26 invoices from SCLLP to Mr. Skoczylas claiming fees for services rendered during the parent litigation, (including the 5 the subject of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 and paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024), were not recoverable and it was not about the interpretation of this question as a matter of principle. Mr. Skoczylas, in the documents which I have referred to as reflecting his position, for example, appears to have conflated his interpretation of arguments of principle in relation to recoverability per se during the hearings, which were accepted by the High Court and the Court of Appeal, with the findings of the High Court in the context of the statutory review of each of the 26 invoices, (5 of which he seeks to put in issue again in this application), and Owens J. had in fact held that Mr. Skoczylas had failed to prove that those engaged in the work for SCLLP were truly expert or that the expert work was necessitated by the parent litigation, i.e., Mr. Skoczylas did not establish his case. The gravamen of Mr. Skoczylas’ application appears to be based on this misconception and hence his attempt now to address that evidential deficit.

46. In his grounding Affidavit dated 16th October 2024, for example, Mr. Skoczylas further sets out his reasoning for issuing the Notice of Motion of the same date stating inter alia that in light of the Court of Appeal judgment of 30th July 2024, he considered that the only just way forward was for him was to submit additional evidence regarding the work carried out in relation to the selected five invoices (in addition to what was described as “the enormous volume of documentation submitted”) as part of a second distinct Bill of Costs and stating his view that what he characterised as the ‘determination’ dated 11th October 2024 belied the High Court Order made on 1st December 2017.

47. Consequently, he now seeks to exhibit and rely on evidence, namely a “Consolidated summary expert report issued to Piotr Skoczylas by Scotchstone Capital LLP” dated 29th August 2013 which is described – “This export report provides and is a reflection of Scotchstone Capital LLP’s professional in-depth research/analyses and advisory/consulting and related services; i.e. non-legal litigation services and advice / consulting in relation to the High Court proceedings in Dublin, rec. no. 2011/239 MCA”, and states as follows:

“This report and its earlier drafts provide expert assistance regarding Piotr Skoczylas’ affidavit (the “Affidavit”) in reply to the grounding affidavit sworn on behalf of the Minister for Finance on 25 July 2011. Earlier drafts of this report were used to support Piotr Skoczylas’ Points of Claim in the same court proceedings, where the Points of Claim and said Affidavit are of course interrelated. As such, this report is based on and related to:

• analysing in-depth documents necessary for the LLP’s ability to conduct the subsequent analyses, including, inter alia, all the documents issued before the commencement of the proceedings rec. no. 2011/239 MCA (i.e. between April 2011 and August 2011), i.e. in particular researching, examining and analysing multifaceted issues and advising in respect of the extremely complex non-legal litigation issues involved in the tightly typed 81-page, 181-paragraph long grounding affidavit with 27 exhibits comprising 1,540 pages, which was sworn on behalf of the Minister on 25 July 2011 (see the Invoice #:

PS/2011/239MCA – 1 dated 1 December 2011); and

• conducting in-depth research/analyses, thoroughly examining,

analysing and comprehensively advising on the extremely

complex non-legal litigation issues regarding the multifaceted

matters involved in the 117-page Points of Claim issued on 2

November 2012 (see the Invoice #: PS/2011/239MCA – 10

dated 3 January 2013); and

• conducting comprehensive in-depth research/analyses,

thoroughly examining and comprehensively advising on the

extremely complex non-legal litigation issues regarding

multifaceted matters involved in said main Affidavit of Piotr

Skoczylas in the above proceedings, including, inter alia,

various analyses (the respective invoice is to be issued). Given the complexity of the matters involved and addressed herein, the LLP’s hourly charge herein is £500 + VAT. The breakdown of man-hours spent by the LLP on this report is as follows: o 55 hours between August 2011 and November 2011;

and

o 85 hours between November 2011 and October 2012;

and

o 200 hours between October 2012 and August 2013.

This report is also intended to be used going forward in the

proceedings, to be the basis for comprehensively advising on the

extremely complex non-legal litigation issues regarding

multifaceted matters involved in the proceedings. All the source materials used or referred to in this report have been made available.”

48. However, as stated, the central difficulty with this approach and in the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (submitted in 27th September 2024) and the relief sought at paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 is that these 5 invoices, which I have set out above, were previously the subject of an Adjudication in reference number H:LCA:OLCA:2020:000716.

49. This was the subject of the invocation of the statutory processes and decisions, including the interim determination of 2nd June 2021, the Consideration of 15th November 2021, a Final Certificate of Determination signed and issued on 29th April 2022 disallowing the invoices, the review of the High Court dated 17th January 2023 which confirmed the LCA determination, and the affirmation by the Court of Appeal dated 30th July 2024 of the High Court confirmation.

50. In summary, by this application and in the steps which led up to the application on 16th October 2024, including the submission on 27th September 2024 of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024, Mr. Skoczylas seeks to revisit and circumvent the ‘decisions’ which have already been determined, confirmed and affirmed that the five invoices, the subject of this application, are not recoverable, by issuing a Bill of Costs which culminates in the motion dated 16th October 2024 which purports to address the question of quantum by relying on an interpretation of the decision of the Court of Appeal which he argues has left open the question of quantum. This is incorrect.

51. The concepts of abuse of process (as that term is technically understood), issue estoppel, res judicata and the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise its implied procedural power to control its proceedings and protect its processes against abuse, comprise inter alia a suite of core principles which emphasise finality, legal certainty and the eschewment of multiplicity of actions with the common objective of preventing or ending an abuse of process (AA v Medical Council [2003] 4 I.R. 302, p.16; Geary v Property Registration Authority [2020] IECA 132 per Murray J. at paragraph 32). These concepts are, in my view, engaged by the application which Mr. Skoczylas now seeks to make as reflected in the actions taken by him after 30th July 2024 and which culminated inter alia in the submission on 27th September 2024 of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024, correspondence on 11th, 14th and 15th October 2024 and the issuing of a Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

52. In addition, as referred to earlier, the submission of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 on 27th September 2024, the characterisation of the letter from the LCA dated 11th October 2024 as a “determination”, the issuing by Mr. Skoczylas on 14th October 2024 of a purported Notice of Application for Consideration of a Decision and for a Determination pursuant to section 160(1) of the 2015 Act (in response to the correspondence from the LCA dated 11th October 2024) and the issuing of a Notice of Motion on 16th October 2024, all to seek to arrogate, and impermissibly confer or create, “the adjudication process” prescribed by Chapter 4, Adjudication of Legal Costs, at sections 154 to 161 of the 2015 Act when no such jurisdiction was created.

53. In Munnelly v Hassett [2023] IESC 29 O’Donnell C.J. explained, at paragraphs 37 and

38 of his judgment, that the principal focus of a claim of res judicata is “what” was decided by reference to the “pleadings”, rather than “how” it was decided.

54. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I consider that it is appropriate to exercise my inherent jurisdiction and refuse Mr. Skoczylas’ application as it falls foul of the principle of res judicata, issue estoppel and is an abuse of process.

55. In this regard, the application sought to be made in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 is subtended on the application of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (submitted on 27th September 2024) which now purports to revisit the costs of 5 of the 26 invoices (which are set out earlier in this judgment) but through the prism of quantum which is predicated on Mr. Skoczylas’ interpretation that the Court of Appeal’s judgment allowed, or left open, such an application.

56. As just set out, respectfully, this is incorrect as the following sequence confirms: first, the LCA, in its direction dated 18th January 2021, was entitled to deal with the issue of whether there was any legal basis on which these 26 items (including the 5 the subject matter of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024) could properly be recoverable as a preliminary step (para. 36 of the judgment of Owens J. in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33), and the parties agreed to that approach; second, the 5 invoices, as part of the 26 in total, were the subject of the interim determination dated 2nd June 2021, the consideration dated 15th November 2021 and the final certificate of determination dated 29th April 2022; third, the High Court has already carried out a review of the LCA’s determination in relation to the 5 invoices (as part of the 26) pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 Act and in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33 Owens J. inter alia confirmed that he had “examined each of the disputed invoices” (which included the 5 invoices the subject of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (submitted on 27th September 2024) and paragraph

(1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 in the application before me) and determined that as Mr. Skoczylas had not demonstrated that the LCA had erred in disallowing the amounts claimed on foot of the 26 disputed invoices, which included the 5 invoices referred to earlier, he was required to confirm the determination relating to those disallowances pursuant to section 161(4)(a) of the 2015 Act; fourth, the Court of Appeal, in their judgment dated 30th July 2024, affirmed the decision of the High Court.

57. Against this sequential background, and having regard to “what” was decided, I consider that the application which is brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 engages the related concepts of res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process and should, in the circumstances, be dismissed.

58. These principles (including the decision of Diplock LJ. in Thoday v Thoday [1964] 2 WLR 371 per Diplock L.J.) were analysed by the High Court (Dignam J.) in Curran & O’Donnell v Ulster Bank Ireland DAC [2023] IEHC 513. At paragraphs 90 and 91 of his judgment, Dignam J. referred to the ingredients of issue estoppel as defined by McDonald J. in George v AVA Trade (EU) Ltd [2019] IEHC 187, at paragraph 59, as follows: “The ingredients of estoppel in this context are well established. In this case, what must be determined is that the [prior judgment] was:- (a) A judgment given by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) A final decision on the merits; (c) The judgment must have determined a question which is now raised in these proceedings;(d) The parties to this litigation must be the same as the parties to the [previous] proceedings”. Similarly, in McCool Controls and Engineering Ltd v Honeywell Control Systems Ltd [2019] IEHC 695, the High Court (Simons J.), at paragraph 33, stated that the key criteria for issue estoppel may be summarised as follows: “(i) [t]here must be a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction which involves (ii) a final decision on the merits; (iii) the earlier judgment must have (necessarily) determined the same issue as arises in the second set of proceedings; and (iv) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same or their privies”.

59. In Delany and McGrath on Civil Procedure (Fifth Edition, Round Hall, Thomson Reuters, November 2023), the learned authors inter alia state at paragraph 16-89 that “[t]he doctrine of abuse of process is now being increasingly employed by the courts in addition to or in substitution for the doctrine of res judicata in order to strike out proceedings where a party is attempting to re-litigate an issue that has been decided (or could have been decided) in previous proceedings but a plea of res judicata might not be successful”. The authors refer to the policy basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction to strike out for an abuse of process as being very similar to the doctrine of res judicata.

60. In Morrissey v IBRC [2015] IEHC 200, the High Court (Costello J., as she then was) at paragraph 5 of her judgment, for example, observed that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of law that a party should not be entitled to re-litigate matters or raise issues which have already been determined by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction between the same parties and their privies. This is known as the principle of res judicata. But beyond the strict limitations of res judicata the courts have long recognised that there may be abuse of process outside of the relatively confined limitations of the rule and the courts have always been prepared to balance the rights of parties to have their cases heard and determined by the courts with the rights of the opposing parties to fair procedures in the conduct of litigation and, where necessary, to strike out proceedings if they amount to an abuse of process. In addition to the private rights of litigants, there is a public policy interest in ensuring finality of litigation and preventing vexatious litigants from subjecting the same parties to multiple law suits on the same issue.”

61. In Right to Know CLG v An Taoiseach [2024] IEHC 713, the High Court (Simons J.) explained, at paragraph (17) of his judgment, that the doctrine of res judicata (including issue estoppel) was directed to the conduct of the parties and the need to avoid questions, which have already been determined conclusively in earlier proceedings, from being relitigated between the same parties or their privies and that an aggrieved party should appeal that determination rather than attempt to reagitate the same question in a second set of proceedings. In this case, the Court of Appeal, by judgment dated 30th July 2024 affirmed the previous decision of the High Court (Owens J.).

62. In the circumstances of this application, to accede to the relief sought in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 would be contrary to the public interest in the finality of litigation and would offend the principles of abuse of process, issue estoppel and res judicata which seek to preclude the relitigating of an issue of fact (or law) which has previously been determined against a party in earlier proceedings.

63. In Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33, for example, the High Court confirmed that it engaged in a statutory review of the LCA’s determination (pursuant to section 161 of the 2015 Act) and that “the matter to be decided is whether [Mr.] Skoczylas is entitled to recover amounts claimed for what are described in 26 invoices submitted to the [LCA] as “professional research and advisory/consulting and related services; i.e. non-legal litigation services and advice/consulting in relation to the proceedings before the High Court””. The High Court referred to the fact that Mr. Skoczylas had submitted in the application “that the Legal Costs Adjudicator erred in disallowing this claim.”

64. The High Court confirmed that LCA had disallowed these claims and that the court had “examined each of the disputed invoices.”

65. As just set out, Owens J. carried out a review of the determination of the LCA and pointed out that Mr. Skoczylas had claimed that 26 invoices which he presented to the LCA for what are described as “non litigation and advice / consulting” in relation to the High Court proceedings were allowable outlay for provision of non-legal expertise. Five of those twenty-six invoices are the subject of the fresh Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 and the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

66. Owens J. records that Mr. Skoczylas had asserted that he was entitled to recover as party and party costs the appropriate percentage of the value claimed or of such other sum as the LCA should quantify as the proper value of the work invoiced.

67. In terms of the adjudication process, Owens J. further held that a claimant or a litigant “must present evidence to a Legal Costs Adjudicator which shows that an item is properly claimable in order to succeed in a claim to recover that item as allowable disbursement or outlay.” On the facts of Mr. Skoczylas’ application in relation to the

26 invoices which were submitted (5 of which are the subject of the fresh Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (and submitted on 27th September 2024) and the paragraph

(1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024), Owens J. observed as follows (at paragraphs (34 – 38):

“(24) … No evidence was produced which demonstrates that any of the invoices related to properly claimable expert services. The invoices on their face make claims for items which are not recoverable as party and party costs.

(35) Mr. Skoczylas complained that the Legal Costs Adjudicator did not carry out an in-depth analysis of the claims in each of the invoices. He relied on legal authorities which refer to an obligation of Legal Costs Adjudicators to engage in a “root and branch” examination of any disputed items in an assessment of party and party costs. This type of examination is not necessary where it is clear that the item claimed is not recoverable.

(36) The Legal Costs Adjudicator was entitled to deal with the issue of whether there was any legal basis on which these items could properly be recoverable as a preliminary step.

(37) The Legal Costs Adjudicator was also entitled to take the view that assertions in invoices and in submissions by Mr. Skoczylas that nonlegal expert services and consultancy were provided were not sufficient to demonstrate any stateable claim for an allowable outlay. The invoices showed that the sums billed were for some sort of expertise or professional input which assisted Mr. Skoczylas in preparing and presenting his claim. There was no bill in any of the invoices for any provision of evidence by a suitably qualified expert relevant to an issue which required expert proof.

(38) No evidence was presented which demonstrated precisely what the claimed expert non-legal “professional” services were or how they were distinguishable from the benefit of personal research using any qualifications and experience in matters of banking and capital structures of corporate entities which enabled Mr Skoczylas to understand and present his case”.

68. In a similar vein earlier in his judgment, Owens J., when stating that he had examined each of the disputed invoices – which again included the five invoices in the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (and submitted in 27th September 2024) and to which paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 seeks to refer to – explained, at paragraph (3) of his judgment how Mr. Skoczylas had not demonstrated that the LCA had erred in disallowing the amounts claimed on foot of the disputed invoices and why the High Court confirmed the LCA’s determination relating to those disallowances pursuant to section 161(4)(a) of the 2015 Act:

“(3) This Court has examined each of the disputed invoices. They contain explanations of work claimed to have been done. They claim fees for “professional” “non-legal” input which assisted Mr Skoczylas in formulating and presenting his legal claim. The invoices do not indicate what the nature of the advice and consultancy was or what professional expertise was deployed or why it was needed. Examination of these aspects would become relevant if services of the type invoiced were in principle capable of being recoverable as outlay on foot of an order for party and party costs.”

69. In terms of the actual items that were before the LCA, Owens J. held at paragraph (51) of his judgment that the LCA “was correct in his core conclusion that the items billed by the partnership to Mr. Skoczylas are not recoverable outlay. They do not come within any exception allowed by case law cited by Mr. Skoczylas to the Legal Costs Adjudicator or to this court”.

70. In the context of the statutory options which were available, in carrying out a review of the determination of the LCA pursuant to section 161(1) of the 2015 Act, Owens J. inter alia held that “the invoices showed that the sums billed were for some sort of expertise or professional input which assisted Mr. Skoczylas in preparing and presenting his claim. There was no bill in any of the invoices for any provision of evidence by a suitably qualified expert relevant to an issue which required expert proof” and that “No evidence was presented which demonstrated precisely what the claimed expert nonlegal “professional” services were or how they were distinguishable from the benefit of personal research using any qualifications and experience in matters of banking and capital structures of corporate entities which enabled Mr Skoczylas to understand and present his case”.

71. Therefore, as Mr. Skoczylas had not demonstrated that the LCA had erred in disallowing the amounts claimed on foot of the disputed invoices (which includes the

5 invoices the subject of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 and paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024), Owens J. held that he was required, pursuant to section 161(4)(a) of the 2015 Act, to confirm the determination relating to those disallowances, which is what he did, and this decision, in relation to these invoices was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 30th July 2024. The question of remittal did not arise on the facts of this case and would, in any event, only arise for consideration if the review had been allowed as provided for in the statutory scheme.

72. Accordingly, I consider that the relief sought in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 should be dismissed as it constitutes an abuse of process and falls foul of the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata and in addition, the submission of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 on 27th September 2024, including correspondence and applications submitted by the Applicant to the LCA which culminated in the issuing of the said Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 did not activate the adjudication process prescribed by Chapter 4, Adjudication of Legal Costs, at sections 154 to 161 of the 2015 Act and no such jurisdiction was created by engaging in such steps.

73. I propose, therefore, to make an order dismissing the reliefs sought in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

74. It follows, therefore, insofar as the reliefs sought at paragraph (2) of the Notice of Motion are concerned, I do not consider that there is any basis to refer the questions posited in Mr. Skoczylas’ application to the CJEU pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU. First, Mr. Skoczylas, was not denied a due statutory process or access to the Office of the LCA as alleged and his application constitutes an abuse of process and falls foul of the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata. Second, the LCA has not failed to fulfil its duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by in this case or to ensure that the right to a fair trial is effective and that the parties’ observations are actually heard, i.e., duly considered. I propose, therefore, to make an order dismissing the reliefs sought in paragraph (2) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

75. I am fortified in my conclusions in dismissing the reliefs sought in the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 when further regard is had to the Court of Appeal rulings dated 15th January 2025 and 10th February 2025 which were referred to me during the hearing of this application.

Court of Appeal Ruling dated 15th January 2025

76. In Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance [2025] IECA 5, for example, the Court of Appeal gave a ruling on 15th January 2025 on Mr. Skoczylas’ application to correct paragraph 76 of the principal judgment, which was delivered on 30th July 2024 pursuant to Part B, s. 9(2) of Practice Direction CA 14.

77. Mr. Skoczylas took issue with the sentence that “The Appellant has been unsuccessful on all grounds of appeal” and stated that his reason for seeking a correction to this sentence was because “the Minister failed in respect of the key aspect of the appeal i.e. in his main arguments regarding liability/recoverability in principle - I prevailed.”

78. In addressing this matter, the Court of Appeal stated at paragraph (4) of their ruling that “While the respondent’s stance in relation to what the common law position is regarding the recoverability of expenses incurred by a litigant with a particular expertise where that expertise is properly required for the purpose of the litigation, was contrary to what the Court ultimately found the law to be, this is not what was at issue in the appeal.”

79. At paragraph (5) of their ruling the Court of Appeal stated “As noted at paragraph 45 of Burns J.’s judgment, the High Court judge accepted the legal principle argued by the appellant (“The High Court was of the view that the law had developed to this extent in this jurisdiction (see para 4 of the High Court judgment)” and the respondent had not appealed against this determination. Indeed, the respondent’s submissions did not address the issue of law whatsoever.”

80. At paragraph (6) of their ruling, the Court of Appeal stated “What was at issue before this Court was whether the High Court was correct in deciding that the Legal Costs Adjudicator (“LCA”) did not err in determining the expenses claimed by the appellant in respect of services undertaken by Scotchstone Capital LLP for the appellant were not recoverable. The ruling of Burns J. was that the High Court did not err in making this determination, for the reasons set out in the judgment. Hence, the appellant failed on that ground of appeal.”

81. Then, of relevance to the detailed submissions which have been made by Mr. Skoczylas in this application before me, the Court of Appeal at paragraph (7) of their ruling stated, “Accordingly, what was at issue in the appeal was not what the law was in relation to the issue of costs but rather whether the LCA was correct in refusing the expenses claimed on the basis of the claim before him.” The Court of Appeal therefore refused Mr. Skoczylas’ application and stated as follows at paragraphs (8) to (10) of its ruling on 15th January 2025:

“(8) The reason the appellant seeks to have the judgment corrected does not relate to the remaining grounds of appeal in respect of which the appellant has failed on each.

(9) Therefore, paragraph (76) correctly reflects the decision of the Court on this appeal and is not an incorrect statement.

(10) A patent prejudice/bias/denial of justice or breach of the

appellant’s constitutional rights, as the appellant asserts would occur should the Court decline to make the correction sought, does not arise as paragraph (76) of the judgment is not incorrect.”

82. The ruling of the Court of Appeal on 15th January 2025 also addressed the slip rule application made by Mr. Skoczylas in relation to the ex tempore judgment delivered by Costello P. on 19th December 2024 (and referred to in the determination of the Supreme Court set out earlier in this judgment).

83. At paragraph 12 of their judgment, the Court of Appeal set out the portions (in bold below) of the paragraph of that judgment which Mr. Skoczylas sought to have amended as follows:

“Fundamentally the issue is that the evidence (assuming that there exists such evidence for the purposes of the argument) necessary to establish that the claimed costs, or some of them, were recoverable under the jurisprudence commencing with London Scottish Benefit Society was not adduced by Mr. Skoczylas before the LCA. He was given express permission to adduce this evidence (again assuming that such exists) and he failed to do so.”

84. The Court of Appeal in its ruling refused Mr. Skoczylas’ application in this regard observing, at paragraph (13) of their ruling, that he “asserts that the two references to assuming that such evidence exists, appears to be an unintentional slip as this puts in doubt “the unequivocal unopposed existence of the aforementioned evidence (i.e. the two expert reports) glaring at this Court” in exhibit PS1 to the appellant’s affidavit sworn on 27 September 2024” and then stating at paragraph (14) that “This argument misunderstands the point. The appellant has exhibited two reports but that is not to say that they establish that the claimed costs or a part of them were recoverable. The judgment makes no such finding one way or the other, hence it is appropriate to refer to the assumption that such evidence exists. The phrase is intentional and does not appear in error.”

85. At paragraphs (15) to (17) of its ruling on 15th January 2025, the Court of Appeal states as follows:

“(15) The appellant also asserts that the reference to being given express permission to adduce this evidence and failing to do so appears to be an unintentional slip as he was given a direction by the LCA on 18th January 2021, in the following terms:- “b. The issue of whether the Scotchstone Capital LLP costs are captured by the Court Orders is to be determined as a preliminary issue. c. Mr. Skoczylas to provide written submissions, confined to that issue.”

(16) This quotation omits point (e) of the LCA’s direction which provided that any material; either party wished to rely on at the hearing of the preliminary issue was to be lodged physically with the office of the LCA in advance of the hearing. It was therefore open to the appellant to put such material as he believed would support his claim before the LCA. He did not place such evidence to which the Court referred in its judgment of 30th July 2024 before the LCA. While the ex tempore judgment of 19 December is succinct, there is no error and it does not require correction under the slip rule.

(17) For these reasons the Court refuses the application.”

Court of Appeal Ruling dated 10th February 2025

86. In its ruling and judgment of 10th February 2025, Court of Appeal refused Mr. Skoczylas’ application that the Court defer perfecting its Order pending the outcome of, what transpired to be the application before (which began on 27th September 2024 and culminated in the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024).

87. The Court of Appeal inter alia confirmed that Mr. Skoczylas is incorrect in his assertion that the decision of the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court, pointing out inter alia that paragraph 9 of the judgment of the High Court should not be read in isolation.

88. In its judgment and ruling of 10th February 2025, the Court of Appeal further makes clear that there is no contradiction between the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments (also pointing out that it was relatively common for an appellate Court to uphold a decision of a Court of first instance on a different legal analysis and referred to the fundamental issue being that the Applicant had failed to establish the evidential requirements in his case:

“First, as a matter of fact there is no such contradiction between the two judgments properly read. Secondly, it is relatively common for an appellate court to uphold a decision of a court of first instance on a different legal analysis, while rejecting the basis upon which that court reached its conclusion. It does not mean that the order of the first instance court should be overturned, or that the order of the appellate court should be stayed because it will impact on the subsequent application of the judgment of the appellate court by a different court.

Fundamentally, the issue is that the evidence (assuming that there exists such evidence for the purposes of the argument) necessary to establish that the claimed costs, or some of them, were recoverable under the jurisprudence commencing with London Scottish Benefit Society was not adduced by Mr. Skoczylas before the LCA. He was given express permission to adduce this evidence (again assuming that such exists) and he failed to do so. The fact that this ultimately proved fatal to his case before this court is a matter for which Mr. Skoczylas must bear sole responsibility. It cannot afford a basis to stay the order of this court.”

89. Separately, insofar as Mr. Skoczylas posits an argument (in the alternative) in relation to Courts and Court Officers Act 1995, that simply has no application in light of my findings in relation to the relief claimed in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

90. I note, in any event, that the question was disposed of in the context of the facts which applied in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance & Ors [2023] IEHC 33 (unreported, High Court, Owens J., 17th January 2023), where the High Court (Owens J.) held at paragraph 90 of its judgment that “the definitions of “legal costs”, “contentious business”, “non-contentious business” and “bill of costs” in s.13 (8) of the 2015 Act relate primarily to fees, charges, disbursements and other costs incurred or charged relating to legal services provided by legal practitioners. However, the definition of “legal costs” includes other matters such as costs of receivers and of enquiries and of registering judgment mortgages. This inclusive definition must be given a purposive interpretation. Part 10 of the 2015 Act applies to the expenses awarded to Mr. Skoczylas in this action. These awards come within O.99 r.13(1)(a) and (f) of the Rules of the Superior Courts.” I also note that in paragraphs 74 and 75 of the judgement of the Court of Appeal in Skoczylas v The Minister for Finance [2024] IECA 201, the Court of Appeal (in the judgment of Burns J.) did not determine that question as it had no consequence for either party.

CONCLUSION

91. In this application, Mr. Skoczylas contends that there was an alleged discrepancy between the judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal and that because his legal interpretation had prevailed, he was now entitled to raise these matters, i.e., to relitigate them.

92. However, as set out above, the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal do not support his contentions.

93. The High Court and the Court of Appeal have each determined that the LCA was correct in refusing the expenses claimed in the 26 invoices on the basis of the claims before him and this includes 5 of the invoices which are the subject of the Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 (submitted on the 27th September 2024) and the relief sought in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024.

94. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the reliefs sought in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 as constituting an abuse of process and falling foul of the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata and in circumstances where the submission of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 on 27th September 2024, including correspondence and applications submitted by the Applicant to the LCA which culminated in the issuing of the said Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 did not activate the adjudication process or jurisdiction prescribed by Chapter 4, Adjudication of Legal Costs, at sections 154 to 161 of the 2015 Act.

95. I shall also dismiss the reliefs sought in paragraph (2) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 as there is no basis to refer the questions posited by Mr. Skoczylas to the CJEU pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU.

96. In light of my findings in this judgment, the alternative argument posited by the Applicant in relation to Courts and Court Officers Act 1995 does not arise.

PROPOSED ORDER

97. I propose, therefore, to make the following orders:

(i) An order dismissing the reliefs sought in paragraph (1) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 as constituting an abuse of process and falling foul of the principles of issue estoppel and res judicata and in circumstances where the submission of a Bill of Costs dated 25th September 2024 on 27th September 2024, including correspondence and applications submitted by the Applicant to the LCA which culminated in the issuing of the said Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 did not activate the adjudication process or jurisdiction prescribed by Chapter 4, Adjudication of Legal Costs, at sections 154 to 161 of the 2015 Act;

(ii) An order dismissing the reliefs sought in paragraph (2) of the Notice of Motion dated 16th October 2024 as there is no basis to refer the questions posited by Mr. Skoczylas to the CJEU pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU.

98. I shall put the matter in for mention at 10:30 on Wednesday 17th December 2025 to address the question of costs.

CONLETH BRADLEY

Friday 5th December 2025