High Court dismisses claim for theft, destruction, and discrimination regarding seized vehicle.

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 2025 73 CA

[2025] IEHC 698

BETWEEN

TOMASZ PYSZ

PLAINTIFF

AND

AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

DEFENDANT

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 4 December 2025

1. This case comes before me by way of Circuit Appeal.

2. The plaintiff is a litigant in person and has issued proceedings against An Garda Síochána.

3. The indorsement of claim in the civil bill filed by the plaintiff claims compensation in the sum of €70,000 and a sum of €50,000 to be paid to a charity of his choosing. This claim is founded on an allegation expressed in the civil bill as:

“Theft of a vehicle from a private property

Destruction of property

Discrimination”

4. The background to the claim is the seizure and destruction of a van bearing the registration number 09D26970 that was purchased by the plaintiff in October 2022.

5. The case proceeded before me by way of oral hearing and, while the plaintiff had filed an affidavit dated the 23rd of September 2025, he gave oral evidence and was crossexamined by counsel for the defendant.

6. Evidence was also called on behalf of the defendant, and those witnesses were crossexamined by the plaintiff.

7. It seems to be common case that the plaintiff purchased the vehicle in October 2022 for a sum in and around €2,000 and that on the 16th of October 2022, it was parked up in the car park of a residential development at a location known as Archers Wood in Blanchardstown, Dublin 15.

8. At this time, the plaintiff had not yet registered himself as the owner of the van.

9. On that date, as soon as the plaintiff noticed that the van was no longer in the place where he had parked it, he contacted An Garda Síochána and reported what appeared to him at the time to be the theft of the vehicle.

10. Members of An Garda Síochána arrived at the scene and took details from the plaintiff. Garda Craig McConnell, one of those members, gave evidence before this Court that the area was canvassed by a colleague of his for CCTV, with negative results.

11. The matter was initially investigated as a theft on the basis of the plaintiff’s report. The Garda Victim Service wrote to the plaintiff on the 17th of October 2022 informing him that the matter was being investigated.

12. It quickly became apparent from Gardaí records that the vehicle had not been stolen, but was in fact seized by another member of An Garda Síochána on the 16th of October 2022.

13. Before returning to the grievance expressed by the plaintiff and the conflict in evidence between him and the witnesses for the defendant, it is important to record what actually transpired in relation to the vehicle.

14. I heard evidence from Garda David Carson, attached to Blanchardstown Garda station, who said that at approximately 10:15am on the 16th of October 2022, he seized the vehicle from Arthurs Wood, a public place, pursuant to the provisions of section 41 of the Road Traffic Act 1994. The basis for the seizure was that the vehicle did not have evidence of tax or insurance displayed.

15. It also seems to be common case that the vehicle was not taxed or insured at that time.

16. The vehicle was then taken from the scene by Gannons City Recovery and stored at their compound in Donabate, Dublin.

17. Michael Gormley, an employee in the administration section in Gannons, gave evidence of their internal processes. Dockets were prepared by him recording the fact that information concerning the seizure, storage and possible destruction of the van was sent by letter to the registered owner of the van. The registered owner of the van was, at that time, still the person who sold it to the plaintiff.

18. The 1994 Act provides that a vehicle shall not be disposed of before the expiration of a period of three weeks from the date of its detention, or two weeks after notice of the intended disposal has been given in the prescribed manner. I have seen a sample letter that Mr. Gormley sends to registered owners outlining the effect of these provisions.

19. In circumstances where no response was received from the registered owner, as recorded by Gannons, and where those letters were not returned, the vehicle was crushed.

20. The plaintiff claims, and gave evidence to the effect, that this arose as a result of the negligence of the defendants and also as a result of discrimination and/or racism directed at him.

21. When I queried the plaintiff as to the basis of his discrimination/racism claim, he said that it was because he is a Polish national. The plaintiff also gave evidence to the effect that another uninsured vehicle, parked close to where his vehicle was parked, was not seized and said that this fact supports his claim of discrimination.

22. It seems that the plaintiff did not speak to the previous owner after the vehicle was seized.

23. To return to the evidence of Garda Carson, he said that he did not know who the registered owner of the vehicle was when he seized it. When I queried him on the matter, he confirmed that he was “oblivious” to the owner’s identity and that his sole function was to seize the vehicle. I accept that evidence. Under cross-examination, he said that he had no recollection of the other vehicle referred to by the plaintiff.

24. He also gave evidence that the location of the seizure was a public place within the meaning of section 49 of the 1994 Act i.e., including a place to which the public have access with vehicles, whether as of right or by permission, and whether subject to or free of charge.

25. While the plaintiff initially asserted that this was a private place and that a trespass had been committed, I do not think that this point was pressed in the hearing, nor could it have been. Ultimately, the plaintiff said that this “doesn’t matter.” I am satisfied that it is a public place for the purposes of the Act.

26. I also note the provisions of section 41(5) of the 1994 Act which provides that: “No action shall lie in respect of anything done in good faith and without negligence in the course of the detention, removal, storage, release or disposal of a vehicle under this section.”

27. Garda McConnell gave evidence that, having spoken to Garda Carson, he contacted the plaintiff by telephone to inform him of the position in respect of the vehicle. He said that he informed the plaintiff that the vehicle had not been stolen but had actually been impounded in Gannons. He also said that he told the plaintiff that he would have to contact Gannons in order to recover the vehicle and that it could be crushed after the three-week time period referred to above.

28. The plaintiff accepts that a telephone call took place but disputes being told about the three-week period. He accepts that he may have been told about Gannons, but he was not sure. Garda McConnell said that he had no role in tracking down the registered owner and that he only called the plaintiff because he was the person who made the complaint of theft.

29. I am satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, Garda McConnell’s account of the conversation is the correct one. The plaintiff accepts that his recollection is imperfect but, more importantly, accepts that Garda McConnell may have mentioned Gannons during the call.

30. It seems to me that the whole purpose of the phone call was to alert the plaintiff to the fact that his van was seized and that he would have to take particular steps to recover it from Gannons. In my view, it would make little sense for Garda McConnell to initiate the call for this purpose and then withhold information regarding the recovery period.

31. I am satisfied that the vehicle in this case, untaxed and uninsured, was lawfully seized pursuant to statute and that no cause of action has been identified in relation to same. Its subsequent destruction arose under unfortunate circumstances where the previous owner remained as the registered owner at the time it was secured by Gannons.

32. Any act of discrimination and/or racism on the part of anyone carrying out official duties on behalf of the State would be odious, and it would be abhorrent for any member of the public to suffer from such an act.

33. However, the charge of discrimination and/or racism can be an ugly allegation where it is not founded in evidence. I am satisfied that Garda Carson was completely oblivious to the nationality of the owner of the van when he seized it, that he was completely unaware of the identity of the plaintiff, and that nothing he did bore the taint of discrimination. I am also satisfied that there is nothing to support any suggestion that any of the subsequent steps taken by Garda McConnell were so motivated.

34. For completeness, I should record that the plaintiff called one witness, Mr. Lukasz Waliszewski. He said that he had sued Ireland arising out of an incident where he said that members of An Garda Síochána had attacked him in his home. This does not appear to have any relevance to this case, and I disregard that evidence.

35. For these reasons, I propose to make an order dismissing the claim.