High Court dismisses judicial review of IAPT refusal of refugee claim based on blood feud credibility issues.

[2025] IEHC 686

THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW Record No. 2024/507 JR

BETWEEN

MT Applicant -and-

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL and THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY Respondents

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Sara Phelan delivered on the 4th day of December 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 2

Factual Background................................................................................................................. 2

Procedural Background .......................................................................................................... 4

Discussion.................................................................................................................................. 7

Extension of Time ................................................................................................................. 7

Substantive Issues ............................................................................................................... 15

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 34

Costs ........................................................................................................................................ 34

Introduction

1. This judgment concerns an immigration application by MT (“the applicant”) for firstly, refugee status, secondly, subsidiary protection and/or thirdly, permission to remain in the State on the grounds that if returned to his country of origin, Georgia, he would face persecution due to a blood feud.

2. The applicant is seeking an order of certiorari quashing the first-named respondent’s finding that his claim to be at risk of being a victim of a blood feud was not credible. And, if successful in that regard, the applicant also seeks relief as against the second-named respondent (“the Minister”), being certiorari of a deportation order and certiorari of a permission to remain (“PTR”) refusal.

3. For the reasons set out hereunder, the reliefs sought are refused.

Factual Background

4. The applicant is a 23-year-old man whose claim for international protection on 12 December 2022 was grounded on his assertion that:

- if returned to Georgia he would face persecution and serious harm arising from circumstances where in or around 2018 his father was involved in a road traffic accident and one of his passengers died. Albeit that the autopsy stated that the passenger died as a result of a heart attack, rather than any injury sustained in the accident, the passenger’s brother and son sought to kill the applicant in revenge for his father’s actions, owing to the prevailing culture of blood feud in Georgia;

- he was of Chechen ethnicity where tradition dictated that he be killed in revenge, and for the family of the deceased not to seek revenge would be seen as dishonouring and shaming their family;

- immediately following the car accident, he was aware that he was at risk of being killed because of this blood feud, and as a result he was always careful and cautious, and he avoided very public places;

- he attended university in Tbilisi from 2018 until 2022. He lived, initially, in Tbilisi and returned home during the holidays. However, from the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in spring 2020, his classes moved to online classes, and he then gave up his accommodation in Tbilisi and returned home permanently;

- he was able to stay in Georgia for so long following the accident because the family members of the deceased who were seeking revenge in 2022 had been previously living in Russia. They only returned to Georgia due to the outbreak of the war with Ukraine as they were avoiding forced military service in Russia;

- there were no time limits on when revenge could take place, he remained in fear he would be killed by the family of the deceased and despite multiple efforts to negotiate with the family of the deceased, they would not relent;

- on 30 September 2022, the deceased’s brother and son forced him (the applicant) to stop his car in the middle of the road and they beat him. They had guns, and were intent on killing him, but the presence of his mother and her intervention prevented them from doing so at that time since their culture does not permit such violence in front of women;

- following the attack on him, he went into hiding and decided to leave Georgia. He left on 29 November 2022 and travelled through Turkey, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland, and the UK before arriving in Ireland on 12 December 2022.

5. In applying for international protection, the applicant was provided with an interpreter to assist in completing the requisite questionnaire on the date of his arrival in Ireland and he attended for interview pursuant to s.35 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“the Act of 2015”) (“the s.35 interview”) with an International Protection Officer (“IPO”) on 12 January 2023. By letter dated 27 February 2023, the applicant was informed that the IPO recommended that he should not be given either a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection declaration. The basis for the recommendation was negative credibility findings and a finding that substantial grounds had not been shown for the applicant’s claim that he faced a real risk of

serious harm if returned to Georgia. Further, the applicant was informed in the same letter that the Minister had decided to refuse him PTR in the State.

6. The applicant submitted a notice of appeal dated 10 March 2023 against the recommendation of the IPO and on 06 September 2023, and again on 12 December 2023, the applicant’s appeal was heard – by way of audio-visual hearing on both occasions – and the applicant gave evidence on oath, with the assistance of an interpreter, and he was represented by counsel. The first-named respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), affirmed the recommendation of the IPO in a decision dated 08 February 2024 (“the impugned

decision”) and such decision was communicated to the applicant under cover of letter dated 14 February 2024. Separately, and upon a PTR review (in accordance with s.49(7) and s.49(9) of the Act of 2015), the Minister communicated to the applicant by letter dated 28 February 2024 that such review was not in the applicant’s favour.

7. In the context of these judicial review proceedings, the applicant takes issue with certain findings of the Tribunal and these findings are discussed in greater detail hereunder.

Procedural Background

8. The applicant applied ex parte for leave to issue judicial review proceedings on 22 April 2024 and, although the matter was not fully opened to the Court on that date, the ‘clock was stopped’ for the purpose of the limitation period within which such application must be made. Leave was subsequently granted on 17 June 2024, whereupon a notice of motion was issued by the applicant, returnable for 08 July 2024. A statement of grounds was filed on 11 April 2024 and an amended statement of grounds was filed on 17 June 2024, seeking – in addition to the reliefs previously sought – certiorari firstly, of a deportation order made on 04 April 2024 and secondly, the refusal of PTR.

9. The applicant swore an affidavit in support of his application on 10 April 2024 (“the applicant’s affidavit”). It is of note that in this affidavit the applicant averred at §6 that his appeal “was set down for an audio-visual hearing on the 6th September, 2023 but did not proceed because [he] had difficulties when appearing on [his] phone. A further date was set for the 12th December, 2023, on which occasion [his] appeal was heard, with [him] giving [his] evidence on oath” and further reference is made to this averment at §2626 hereunder. Further, the applicant’s solicitor swore an affidavit on 24 May 2024, for the purpose of compliance with Practice Direction HC81 and as regards the fact that the judicial review application was not made ‘within time’ and reference is made to this affidavit hereunder. Thereafter, a statement of opposition was filed on 04 November 2024, supported by an affidavit sworn on behalf of the respondents on

29 November 2024. Insofar as they are relevant to this judgment, the matters relied upon by the applicant and the respondent in the respective statements are discussed in more detail below.

10. Separately, it was clear from the papers before me that the services of an interpreter were relied upon by the applicant:

- firstly, for the completion of the application for international protection questionnaire on 12 December 2022, albeit that the initials of the interpreter are not included on the questionnaire of which I have had sight;

- secondly, for (part of) the s.35 interview on 12 January 2023, albeit that in this interview the applicant stated that he spoke English; and

- thirdly, for the Tribunal hearing on 12 December 2023.

Notwithstanding his having previously availed of the assistance of an interpreter, the applicant swore his affidavit to ground the judicial review application in English, averring at §3 of that affidavit that he had “sufficient English for the purpose of understanding and swearing in these proceedings” and at §10, that he had “sufficient command of the English language for the purpose of swearing this affidavit” but notably, and given that the applicant had previously benefitted from the assistance of an interpreter, this averment was not substantiated or explained in any way. The applicant’s solicitor also averred in her affidavit sworn on 24 May 2024 that the applicant was “sufficiently proficient in English” but again no context was provided in this affidavit. In those circumstances, I requested (during the course of the judicial review hearing) further confirmation as to the applicant’s proficiency in English and I was directed to an undated, typed and unsigned letter from the applicant setting out that he had been attending English classes since 05 September 2023.

11. The foregoing was the extent of the information available to me at hearing as regards the applicant’s proficiency in English and upon my direction, the applicant’s solicitor filed an affidavit on 13 June 2025, setting out that:

- the applicant had “always communicated with [her] office by phone, by email and in meetings in English and without the assistance of an interpreter”;

- the applicant had completed his IPO questionnaire in English;

- part of the s.35 interview was undertaken in English;

- an interpreter had been requested for the Tribunal hearing “in light of the quasi Court environment of the Tribunal”;

- she was in a position to make the averment above referred to in her affidavit sworn 24 May 2024 given her “communication and interactions with the Applicant over the preceding 13 months”; and

- as of 13 June 2025, “the Applicant [had] a C1 level in English [certificate dated 05 June 2025], according to the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) and that is considered an advanced level of English proficiency. At this level individuals can demonstrate fluency and accuracy in all four language skills – reading, writing, listening, and speaking.”

These details satisfied me that the applicant was sufficiently proficient in English, such that a foreign language affidavit (see RSC O.40, r.18) was not required.

12. Further, it was clear that the applicant sought leave to issue judicial review proceedings out of time – the time limit applying in this case being 28 days from the date of notification of the impugned decision, in accordance with s.5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (“the Act of 2000”) as amended by s.34 of the Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014 (“the Act of 2014”) – and the order of Hyland J made 17 June 2024 granting leave to apply for judicial review explicitly stated that such leave was without prejudice to the respondent taking issue with the leave application being out of time. An extension of time was sought by the applicant in his notice of motion, was opposed by the respondent, and must be adjudicated upon by me.

Discussion

13. I had the benefit of written and oral submissions from counsel for both parties and it is clear that the following substantive issues fell to be determined by me, in line with the legal grounds as set out in the amended statement of grounds:

a. whether the Tribunal erred in law in so far as its findings at §4.1 of the impugned decision, as set out hereunder, were irrational in the legal sense and/or whether the Tribunal failed to have regard to the relevant country of origin information (“COI”) which might bear upon the issue?

b. whether the Tribunal erred at §.4.2 of the impugned decision, again as set out hereunder, by the manner in which it assessed the applicant’s documentary evidence of his hospitalisation following the attack in September 2022?

c. whether the Tribunal erred in law insofar as its findings at §4.3 of the impugned decision, as set out hereunder, were irrational in the legal sense?

d. whether the doctrine of severability in administrative law should apply in the event that any of the identified findings were successfully impugned?

14. Each of these grounds are discussed in turn below (with the complaints as regards §4.1 and §4.3 being discussed – since irrationality is claimed in respect of both of these grounds – prior to the complaint as regards §4.2), but firstly I must turn to:

a. the question of time and whether an extension of time for the issue of the proceedings ought to be allowed, in the particular circumstances of this case, and b. the averment in the applicant’s affidavit (see §9 above) that the appeal did not proceed on 06 September 2023.

Extension of Time

15. Section 5(2) of the Act of 2000 as amended by s.34 of the Act of 2014 states: “An application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Order in respect of any of the matters referred to in subsection (1) (hereafter in this section referred to as an ‘application’) shall be made within the period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the person was notified of the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or making of the order concerned unless the High Court considers that there is good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made, and such leave shall not be granted unless the High Court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or order is invalid or ought to be quashed.”

And I note that the purpose of this time limit is to ensure the prompt resolution of immigration matters, rather than the penalisation of applicants.

16. The fact of the respondent objecting to an extension of time was raised as a preliminary objection in the statement of opposition and, at hearing, counsel for the applicant drew my attention to the applicant’s solicitor’s affidavit sworn 24 May 2024, which said affidavit set out a timeline between receipt of the impugned

decision on 14 February 2024 and the filing of papers in the Central Office on 11 April 2024. Specifically, §4 of the affidavit stated:

“ … these proceedings are being filed approximately 4 weeks out of time. I say that once the decision was received on the 14th February, 2024, we immediately received instructions from the Applicant to challenge it. The file was forwarded to Counsel for an opinion on same. There was correspondence with Counsel in relation to the matter on the 14th February, 2024, the 6th March, 2024, the 14th March, 2024 and the 4th April. Counsel returned draft papers on the 6th April, 2024. There was further consultation and clarification required and the papers were then finalised on the 8th April, 2024. Arrangements were made to swear the [sic] and the Applicant attended to this on the 10th April, 2024. The papers were filed in the Central Office on 11th April, 2024. I pray this Honourable Court to grant an extension of time to the Applicant who is not at fault for the delay that has arisen.”

17. Counsel for the applicant submitted that what was required in accordance with the authorities (relying on S v. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2002] IESC 17; [2002] 2 IR 163 and CS v. Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2004] IESC 44; [2005] 1 IR 343 in written submissions) was not ‘good and sufficient reason for the delay’, but rather ‘good and sufficient reason for the extension of time’ and that further, I should take the merits of the case into account (relying on GK v. IPAT & ors [2022] IEHC 204 in oral submissions), in addition to the fact that the applicant had certainly formed an intention to appeal within the requisite 28-day period. Counsel submitted that in a case such as this, the availability of a remedy in damages would not assist the applicant in terms of the reliefs sought pursuant to the Act of 2015 – such as was considered by Finnegan J in the High Court in GK v. Minister for Justice & ors [2001] IEHC 29; [2002] 1 ILRM 81, where the Court distinguished a case in which fundamental human rights may not be vindicated if an extension of time were not granted (similar to the present case) from a case in which a litigant whose case was struck out for delay may be in a position to claim damages from his/her solicitor – and that a generous/flexible approach should be adopted where there is merit to the case.

18. From the respondents’ perspective, the issue of time was dealt with not only in the statement of opposition but also by way of written and oral submissions and that, of note, at the time of the leave application on 11 April 2024, the mere filing of a papers for an application for judicial review in the Central Office did not ‘stop the clock’ for the purposes of the time limit and the application for leave had to be opened before the High Court (per Donnelly J in Heaney v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123, from §44 onwards). The now current rules deeming an application for judicial review to have been made (or, in other words, that time has stopped running) once papers are filed in the Central Office did not come into effect until 26 April 2024 – in line with SI No 163/2024, Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 84) 2024 – some 15 days post the application for leave in the present case and thus, the applicant was not four weeks and one day (29 days) late, but rather five weeks and five days (40 days) late in applying for leave.

19. Counsel for the respondent also relied upon the decisions as mentioned at §17 above and it is of note that in S and in CS (both cases concerning applications for refugee status) the extension of time applied for was in the region of two weeks and the Supreme Court upheld the extension of time in both cases. However, in S, Denham J held at §11 that “[i]n general, delay by legal advisers will not prima facie be a good and sufficient reason to extend time. Circumstances must exist to excuse such a delay and to enable the matter to be considered further” and in that case, the Court took cognisance of the facts that the applicant already had leave to apply for judicial review of the impugned decision; that the extent of the delay was short (a matter of weeks); that the case straddled a time of transition in the law (with the Act of 2000 coming into effect following the making of the impugned

decision); that the reasons for the delay were largely the culpability of legal advisers; and that the State was not prejudiced by the delay.

20. However, more recently, in GK, Barr J refused to extend time in circumstances where the applicant’s counsel accepted responsibility for a 51-day delay, noting at §57 that “[i]f the court were to grant an extension on the basis of the explanation given by the applicant in this case, it would render the legislative time limit near ineffective, as any applicant could claim that their counsel had ‘other commitments’ to attend to” whilst also refusing the substantive relief sought. And in M v. Chief International Protection Officer [2024] IEHC 623, Heslin J declined to grant an extension of some 49 days, holding that the affidavits filed by the applicant did not disclose good and sufficient reasons to grant an extension of time, and (at §96) simply recorded a chronology of the steps taken to issue the proceedings, noting at §77-§78 that:

“ … when presented with no more than a list of steps and the dates these steps were taken, this court cannot infer that difficulties must have arisen which resulted in delay, when no difficulty whatsoever is averred to have occurred, still less said to have caused the statutory deadline to be missed.

Where all necessary steps were not taken within the 28 day statutory time limit, the reason why must be evidenced. Without this evidence, this court cannot assess whether good and sufficient reason exists.”

21. Similarly, in the present case, the applicant’s solicitor’s affidavit sworn 24 May 2024 does no more than provide a narrative of the chronology of the delay, without providing specific reasons for the delay, and in my view no ‘good and sufficient reason for the delay’ has been provided.

22. More recently, the decision of Barr J in GK has been considered inter alia by Heslin J in M, by Phelan J in IT v. Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 40 and by Simons J in P (Zimbabwe) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors [2025] IEHC

403 and it follows therefrom that the following factors must be considered by me when exercising my discretion to extend, or not extend, time:

a. the length of the delay;

b. the reasons offered for the delay and the extent to which such reasons both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for it, noting that delay on the part of an applicant’s legal advisors is not necessarily to be considered in an applicant’s favour;

c. all relevant facts and circumstances, including the decision sought to be impugned, the nature of the claim made that it is unlawful or invalid and any relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the parties;

d. whether the time limit is imposed by statute or under the rules of court; and e. the interests of justice, including the question of prejudice to the respondent (e.g., whether the failure to comply with the time-limit appears to have made any contribution to the delay in the substantive judicial review coming on for hearing, thereby frustrating the legislative intent that any legal challenge to the implementation of an immigration decision, which meets the leave threshold, be heard and determined promptly).

23. In addition to the plain wording of s.5(2) of the Act of 2000, the Court of Appeal in Heaney, per Donnelly J at §94, stated that a Court must also consider whether there is ‘good and sufficient reason for the extension of time’ and that, to this end, the merit of the judicial review application must be considered in line with the

decision of the Supreme Court in GK v. Minister for Justice & ors [2001] IESC 205; [2002] 2 IR 418 where, per Hardiman J at p.423:

“ … the use of the phrase “good and sufficient reason for extending the period”

still more clearly permits the court to consider whether the substantive claim is arguable. If a claim is manifestly unarguable there can normally be no good or sufficient reason for permitting it to be brought, however slight the delay requiring the exercise of the court’s discretion, and however understandable it may be in particular circumstances. The statute does not say that the time may be extended if there were “good and sufficient reason for the failure to make the application within the period of fourteen days”. A provision in that form would indeed have focussed exclusively on the reason for the delay, and not on the underlying merits. The phrase actually used “good and sufficient reason for extending the period” does not appear to me to limit the factors to be considered in any way and thus, in principle, to include the merits of the case.”

24. Also of relevance in this regard is the decision of the Supreme Court in MO’S v.

The Residential Institutions Redress Board & ors [2018] IESC 61; [2019] 1 ILRM

149 where Finlay Geoghegan J held, albeit against an entirely different factual and legal background, at §60 that:

“ … the jurisdiction which the court is to exercise on an application to extend time is a discretionary jurisdiction which must be exercised in accordance with the relevant principles in the interests of justice. It clearly requires an applicant to satisfy the court of the reasons for which the application was not brought both within the time specified in the rule and also during any subsequent period up to the date upon which the application for leave was brought. It also requires the court to consider whether the reasons proffered by an applicant objectively explain and justify the failure to apply within the time specified and any subsequent period prior to the application and are sufficient to justify the court exercising its discretion to extend time … The case law makes clear that the court must also have regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances, which include the decision sought to be challenged, the nature of the claim made that it is invalid or unlawful and any relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the parties, and must ultimately determine in accordance with the interests of justice whether or not the extension should be granted. The decision may require the court to balance rights of an applicant with those of a respondent or notice party … The court, in an application for an extension of time, is exercising a discretionary jurisdiction and in the words of Denham J. in De Roiste, “[t]here are no absolutes in the exercise of a discretion. An absolute rule is the antithesis of discretion. The exercise of a discretion is the balancing of factors – a judgement.” ”

25. Taking all of the foregoing into account and, in particular the fact that I have not found in the applicant’s favour on the substantive issues – which said decision is discussed in greater detail hereunder – I am of the view that an extension of time is not appropriate in this case. That said, if the substance of the applicant’s claim had found merit with me, I may well have been prepared to forgive the delay and the reasons offered since firstly, the respondent did not claim any prejudice in this particular case and secondly, and in the words of Simons J in P (Zimbabwe) at §19:

“ … where the application for an extension of time has been heard in tandem with the substantive judicial review. It would be artificial for the trial judge, having heard the proceedings in full, to close his or her mind to the underlying merits of the case. It would be disproportionate to refuse an application for judicial review in immigration proceedings, which the court has determined to be well founded on the merits, on the basis that the leave application was outof-time by a number of weeks. The disbenefit to the applicant, i.e. the loss of an opportunity to a proper determination of their claim for international protection, would be out of all proportion to any benefit to the public interest in the expeditious resolution of legal challenges. This is especially so where the time-limit expired during the long vacation and the non-compliance did not cause any actual delay.”

Separately, whilst the decision in P (Zimbabwe) was delivered post the hearing in the present case, I do not think it alters the pre-existing jurisprudence to such an extent that further submissions from the parties were warranted prior to this judgment being delivered.

Duty of Candour

26. The averment contained at §6 of the applicant’s affidavit bears repeating, and that is that his appeal “was set down for an audio-visual hearing on the 6th September, 2023 but did not proceed because [he] had difficulties when appearing on [his] phone. A further date was set for the 12th December, 2023, on which occasion [his] appeal was heard, with [him] giving [his] evidence on oath” (emphasis supplied).

On any reading of it, the implication of this averment is that no hearing took place before the Tribunal on 06 September 2023. However, following the hearing of these judicial review proceedings and when perusing the impugned decision in detail for the purpose of preparing this judgment, it appeared from the contents of §4.3-§4.4 of the impugned decision that the hearing must have proceeded to at least some extent on 06 September 2023. In particular, §4.3 contains a statement that “[d]uring questioning by the Presenting Officer the Appellant claimed he could try to get documents relating to this court case. No such documents were submitted at the resumed hearing or subsequently” (emphasis supplied). Further, §4.4 of the impugned decision reads “[a]t the first hearing date, the Appellant claimed to have submitted a document relating to his father’s hospital treatment following the accident … At the resumption of the hearing …” (emphasis supplied).

27. Given this anomaly, the parties were recalled before me and it was accepted on behalf of the applicant on that occasion that the hearing before the Tribunal proceeded on 06 September 2023 to the extent that the applicant had given his evidence in chief and was in the process of being cross-examined. Counsel for the applicant accepted that the inaccuracy in the affidavit was his (counsel’s) ‘mistake’ but could not assist me in terms of how far into cross-examination the appeal had proceeded on 06 September 2023. Having regard to the specific argument which arises in the present proceedings, it is sufficient to the purpose to know that the immigration appeal had been heard to a significant extent on the first date. This fact undermines the applicant’s averment. It is not necessary to know the precise stage of cross-examination at which the hearing had to be abandoned because of technical issues.

28. Separately, it should be observed that if in another case a material factual dispute arose as to what happened at a Tribunal hearing, this may preclude the same counsel acting in both the immigration appeal and the judicial review proceedings, if such counsel were not attended by an instructing solicitor at the Tribunal hearing.

This is because, unless there is an accurate contemporaneous note of the Tribunal hearing, which would generally be taken by an instructing solicitor, counsel may be a witness of fact, in any subsequent proceedings. However, it is not necessary to say further to resolve the present proceedings as it is now common case that the hearing on 06 September 2023 had been to advanced stage.

29. Whilst much of the jurisprudence on the duty of candour in judicial review concerns itself with the duty which the respondent owes (per Phelan J in A v.

Minister for Justice & Ors, B v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2024] IEHC 183, at §283), the duty of candour in judicial review is one which is owed by all parties. It is incumbent upon the applicant, as much as it is upon the respondent, to put any relevant information or material fact before the Court, and to do so in a manner of utmost accuracy. This is especially so in the context of an ex parte application for leave to apply for judicial review where there will, by definition, be no legitimus contradictor. Whilst Phelan J held in A at §287 that “the relevance of the non-disclosed matter to the [substantive] issues in the proceedings is the key consideration”, it cannot be gainsaid that where an applicant seeks to impugn a decision based on some irrationality on the part of the

respondent, then such applicant should not, by sworn testimony, create an impression of the process which is fundamentally inaccurate.

30. The sanctions available for a lack of candour range from the refusal of substantive relief, which would otherwise have been available, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, on the one hand, to a costs penalty, on the other. In K (Aged Out Child)

v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] IEHC 470, the applicant’s affidavit created a mistaken impression that he had ceased any criminal activity and was “attempting to move on with” his life. At §79 Simons J held that this nondisclosure amounted to a breach of the duty of candour which the applicant owes to the Court and noted that this conduct is “of a type to which regard may be had in determining the incidence of legal costs.”

31. Ultimately, taking the applicant’s conduct into account in determining costs in the present case is a moot point, given that I am not prepared to grant the applicant the reliefs sought on judicial review. It follows that a costs order is likely to be made against him – see also §75 below – irrespective of any lack of candour, i.e., having regard to the default position under the LSRA 2015. It should be emphasised, however, that the reliefs sought have been refused on the merits for the reasons as set out hereunder, rather than because of lack of candour in this particular case.

Whilst such lack of candour can be said to be careless and frustrating, it was not of such material import to have any bearing on the outcome of this particular case.

Further, the respondents did not raise any objection in this regard.

32. Against this backdrop, I must now proceed to consider the substantive issues as set out at §13 above.

Substantive Issues

General Principles

33. A number of general principles apply to the consideration of the applicant’s case and these are, briefly: a. the applicable standard of proof governing a claim for international protection is the balance of probabilities, coupled with (where appropriate), the benefit of the doubt (see ON v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & ors [2017] IEHC 13, §63 and, more recently, G&M v. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors [2025] IECA 208, per Butler J for the Court of Appeal); b. the ‘benefit of the doubt’ is set out on a statutory basis in the Act of 2015, which provides at s.28(7) that:

“Where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation where the international protection officer or, as the case may be, the Tribunal, is satisfied that –

(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her application,

(b) all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given,

(c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case,

(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so, and

(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.”

and, in this regard, an applicant must cumulatively satisfy the conditions as set out in s.28(7)(a) to (e) above, if such applicant is to be entitled to the benefit of the doubt for those aspects of their claim that are not supported by documentary or other evidence (see AH v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 84, per Ferriter J at §77). Further, if an applicant fails to meet the criteria set out at s.28(7)(a) to (e), such applicant cannot avail of the general concept of the benefit of the doubt, as provided for under the UNHCR Handbook concerning the application of the Geneva Convention – and which has been codified by Directive 2004/83/EC and s.28(7) of the Act of 2015 – wherein it is specified at §204 that the benefit of the doubt is only to apply where the decision maker is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility (see MZ v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2023] IEHC 637, per Hyland J at §51); c. the credibility of an applicant, on judicial review, is to be assessed in line with the principles as set out by Cooke J in IR v. Minister for Justice [2009] IEHC 510; [2015] 4 IR 144, approved by the Court of Appeal in RA v.

Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297, and these principles are set out at §3535 below;

d. the test for unreasonableness is as set out in Meadows v. Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3; [2010] 2 IR 701, where Murray CJ noted at §55-§57:

“[55] In reviewing the rationality or otherwise of the decision it remains axiomatic that it is not for the court to step into the shoes of the decision maker and decide the issue on the merits but to examine whether the

decision falls foul of the principles of law according to which the decision ought to have been taken.

[56] In doing so the court may examine whether the decision can be truly “said to flow from the premises” as Henchy J., put it in The State (Keegan)

v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 If not it may be considered as being “fundamentally at variance with reason and common sense”.

[57] In examining whether a decision properly flows from the premises on which it is based and whether it might be considered at variance with reason and common sense I see no reason why the court should not have recourse to the principle of proportionality in determining those issues.”

Safe Country of Origin

34. Of note, the applicant is a national of Georgia and it is clear from the impugned

decision that the fact of the applicant’s nationality was accepted, on the balance of probabilities, by the Tribunal. This is relevant since, at all material times, Georgia was and is a designated Safe Country of Origin under the International Protection Act 2015 (Safe Countries of Origin) Order 2018. The precise import of this designation is that, in accordance with s.33 of the Act of 2015, Georgia must be considered to be a safe country of origin in relation to the applicant’s claim for international protection unless the applicant submitted serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his particular circumstances and in terms of his eligibility for international protection. Owens J, in PP v. IPAT & anor and VS v. IPAT & anor [2025] IEHC 134 held, at §15 of his judgment, that s.33 conferred a legal presumption that designated safe countries of origin are ‘safe’ for applicants who have come from those countries and that such presumption applied in circumstances where an application for protection failed to cross the “not submitted any serious grounds for considering” threshold set out in s.33(b) of the Act of 2015. Further, Owens J went on to state at §16-§17 that “A valid decision that an applicant has failed to submit “any serious grounds for considering” covering the matters referred to in sub-para. (b) of s.33 of the 2015 Act preserves a legal presumption, rather than an evidential presumption.

If a decision-maker concludes that an applicant from a designated safe country of origin “has not submitted serious grounds for considering” then that

decision-maker is bound to conclude that the claim for international protection is unfounded. If that decision-maker concludes that an applicant has “submitted serious grounds for considering” then the enquiry shifts to whether or not the Tribunal is satisfied that protection “can be provided” by that applicant’s country of origin and is “effective”, as set out in s.31(1) and (2) of the 2015 Act.”

Credibility

35. As mentioned above, IR is the leading case on the manner in which evidence going to credibility ought to be treated and at §10, having reviewed the existing jurisprudence, Cooke J set out inter alia the following principles which must be considered when reviewing the impugned decision:

“ 1) the determination as to whether a claim to a well founded fear of persecution is credible falls to be made under the Refugee Act 1996 [now, the International Protection Act 2015] by the administrative

decision maker and not by the court. The High Court on judicial review must not succumb to the temptation or fall into the trap of substituting its own view for that of the primary decision makers;

…..

3) there are two facets to the issue of credibility, one subjective and the other objective. An applicant must first show that he or she has a genuine fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The second element involves assessing whether that subjective fear is objectively justified or reasonable and thus well founded;

4) the assessment of credibility must be made by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed. It must not be based on a perceived, correct instinct or gut feeling as to whether the truth is or is not being told;

5) a finding of lack of credibility must be based on correct facts, untainted by conjecture or speculation and the reasons drawn from such facts must be cogent and bear a legitimate connection to the adverse finding;

…..

7) a mistake as to one or even more facts will not necessarily vitiate a

conclusion as to lack of credibility provided the conclusion is tenably sustained by other correct facts. Nevertheless, an adverse finding based on a single fact will not necessarily justify a denial of credibility generally to the claim;

8) when subjected to judicial review, a decision on credibility must be read as a whole and the court should be wary of attempts to deconstruct an overall conclusion by subjecting its individual parts to isolated examination in disregard of the cumulative impression made upon the

decision maker especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person;

9) where an adverse finding involves discounting or rejecting documentary evidence or information relied upon in support of a claim and which is prima facie relevant to a fact or event pertinent to a material aspect of the credibility issue, the reasons for that rejection should be stated; and 10) nevertheless, there is no general obligation in all cases to refer in a

decision on credibility to every item of evidence and to every argument advanced, provided the reasons stated enable the applicant as addressee, and the court in exercise of its judicial review function, to understand the substantive basis for the conclusion on credibility and the process of analysis or evaluation by which it has been reached.”

36. Further, it is clear from the existing jurisprudence that “decisions on credibility should not be parsed and overanalysed” (per Humphreys J in NPBK (DRC) v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors [2020] IEHC 450, at §23) and a

decision on credibility must be viewed in the round – instead of parts of that

decision being viewed in isolation from the whole – since the “cumulative impression made upon the decision-maker especially where the conclusion takes particular account of the demeanour and reaction of an applicant when testifying in person” is of significance in determining credibility (see Cooke J in IR, at §10.8).

This jurisprudence is of particular application in the present case since counsel for the applicant accepted in oral submissions that he was, in effect, parsing the credibility decision.

37. Having set out the backdrop against which the applicant’s claim must be viewed, I will now consider each of the legal grounds underpinning the applicant’s claim for relief.

Whether the Tribunal erred in law in so far as its findings at §4.1 of the impugned

decision, as set out hereunder, were irrational in the legal sense and/or whether the Tribunal failed to have regard to the relevant country of origin information which might bear upon the issue?

38. It is clear from the impugned decision that the Tribunal, having accepted the applicant’s nationality as Georgian, proceeded to assess the facts and circumstances of the application and at §4.1 – in considering blood feuds – the Tribunal noted the evidence of the applicant as set out at §4 above and, in particular, the applicant’s evidence when questioned by the presenting officer. In response to questions that:

- his stated fear was inconsistent with him returning home during the holidays and then returning home permanently when his online classes started – the applicant stated that he went home on holidays and then it was safer at home rather than in rented accommodation after Covid-19 began and the danger became visible when the family returned from Russia;

- his evidence regarding being careful and not going to public places did not tally with his evidence of continuing to go to university in Tbilisi – the applicant stated that when he was in Tbilisi the family of the deceased were not in Georgia and he gave himself permission to go out because he felt it was safe;

- the war began in February 2022 and yet no action was taken against him [by the family of the deceased] until September 2022 – the applicant stated they left Russia when mobilisation began, but he was unable to say when this was.

39. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant had reasonably explained how he could essentially carry on a normal life – by attending university and travelling home for the holidays – whilst under the same risk as he now claimed before the Tribunal, a risk in respect of which he sought international protection. The

Tribunal was of the view that the fact that the relevant family members of the deceased were based in Russia did not mean that they could not have come back to Georgia at any time to exact revenge upon him and the fact that the applicant stated that he felt safe during that time undermined the subjective element of the wellfoundedness of his stated fear. Furthermore, the possible time lapse between the family returning from Russia and the attack on the applicant in September 2022 did not chime with the applicant’s explanation that the family did not attack him earlier because they were living in Russia, together with the applicant’s evidence that he did not go into hiding until after the September attack. Ultimately, and as regards the blood feuds and the applicant’s risk of being a victim of a blood feud, the Tribunal held that the applicant’s evidence did not tally with his actions whilst in Georgia and the Tribunal did not find his evidence in that regard to be credible.

40. Counsel for the applicant took issue with the fact that the Tribunal did not address the applicant’s assertion that the family of the deceased were in Russia for a period of time and submitted that if the applicant had left Georgia whilst the family remained in Russia, then that may well have been sufficient to undermine the wellfoundedness of his claim. And that further, in circumstances where it was the very return and ensuing assault that crystallised the applicant’s fear and caused him to leave, the Tribunal did not make a clear finding on whether or not it accepted that the assault occurred as and when the applicant contended that it did; or whether the Tribunal was of the view that even if the attack did occur, it was the mere fact that the applicant remained in Georgia when the family could have returned from Russia at any time that undermined the applicant’s claim.

41. Counsel submitted that this lack of fundamental clarity or finding – on whether it accepted that the attack occurred or not – arose where the Tribunal merely concluded that “[t]he fact that he states those people were based in Russia does not mean that they could not have come back to Georgia at any time, even just a visit, to exact revenge upon him and the fact that he stated that he felt safe during that time undermines the subjective element of the well-foundedness of his stated fear” and it was thus unclear whether the Tribunal accepted or rejected the applicant’s evidence that the family were out of the country but returned – leading him to be attacked in September 2022 – or whether there were other reasons for rejecting the claim.

42. Alternatively, counsel for the applicant submitted that if the Tribunal were rejecting the central element of the applicant’s claim – the attack on his person in September 2022 – solely on the basis that the family could have returned at any time, and so the applicant would not have acted as he did in returning to the family home whilst they were away, that was to effectively reject the central element of the claim on the basis that the Tribunal would have behaved differently. In this regard, counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal had placed itself in the shoes of the applicant and speculated as to how it would have behaved in the circumstances, but that there was no evidential basis for the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s evidence did not tally with his actions whilst in Georgia. And following on from this, counsel for the applicant noted that the notion that protection to victims of persecution may be refused in part because a decision-maker is of the view that he would have behaved differently, or that the sensible persecutor or sensible victim would have done things differently, had received some attention in the United Kingdom and my notice was drawn to the decision of Keene LJ in Y v. Secretary for State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 where it was stated at §25:

“The fundamental [legal principle applicable to the approach that an IJ [immigration judge] should adopt towards issues of credibility] is that ‘he should be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible, because there is a considerable risk that he will be over influenced by his own views on what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by his own background in this country and by the customs and ways of our own society.”

43. However, it must be noted firstly, that this specific claim – that the Tribunal failed to make a finding as to whether the September 2022 attack actually occurred – was not pleaded in the amended statement of grounds and absent leave from the Court to advance such arguments, which said leave was not sought, then I am precluded from considering same (see AP v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2;

[2011] 1 IR 729 per Murray CJ at §2-§10). I am therefore not making any determination as to the findings – or lack thereof – by the Tribunal in this regard.

44. Secondly, the comments of Keene LJ in Y upon which the applicant relied must be read in light of §26-§27 of his judgment which continued:

“None of this, however, means that an adjudicator is required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an Appellant, no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour the account may be. The

decision maker is not expected to suspend his own judgment … In appropriate cases, he is entitled to find that an account of events is so far-fetched and contrary to reason as to be incapable of belief … … A decision maker is entitled to regard an account as incredible by such standards, but he must take care not to do so merely because it would not seem reasonable if it had happened in this country. In essence, he must look through the spectacles provided by the information he has about conditions in the country in question.”

45. Further, and as alluded to by counsel for the respondent, the passage cited from the judgment in Y, considered the circumstances in which a decision-maker can make a finding that an applicant’s narrative was “inherently incredible” (i.e., not plausible or inherently implausible). In the present case, the Tribunal rejected the credibility of the applicant’s account of being in fear of being killed in a blood feud as it was inconsistent with his own actions – in other words, the Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence to be lacking in credibility or, putting it another way, the applicant’s evidence was implausible. And in these circumstances, the applicant is then not entitled to the benefit of the doubt from this Court (per Hyland J in MZ).

46. In terms of bolstering the applicant’s credibility, my attention was drawn by counsel for the applicant to contents of the first questionnaire completed by the applicant on 12 December 2012, wherein the applicant gave details of the specific events which happened to him and counsel submitted that the applicant had set out his claim on the very first day and that his claim remained the same throughout the process.

47. Counsel for the applicant also noted that the European Asylum Support Office (now the European Union Agency for Asylum) has stated that there are four categories of credibility findings which can be made, being:

- internal inconsistency, such as an applicant making different statements at different stages of the process;

- external inconsistency, such as an applicant stating something that does not chime with that which is known from COI;

- lack of detail/lack of specificity, as regards a claim that might suggest a lived experience;

- inherent implausibility, where a claim is so implausible it is incapable of belief.

And counsel for the applicant submitted that a decision not anchored in any of these categories is legally frail and that credibility must be assessed in the round.

48. However, it seems to me that, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal was entitled to form the view that it did and, in the words of Keene LJ, I do not believe that the Tribunal should have “suspend[ed] its own judgment” and the Tribunal was entitled to find that the applicant’s actions – in remaining in Georgia

– were not consistent with his fear of reprisal.

49. Separately, counsel for the applicant, in oral submissions, directed me to a decision of the US Court of Appeal Loho v. Mukasey 531 F. 3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2008) where a voluntary return to the petitioner’s country of origin was held to undermine her testimony that “she had experienced past suffering or that she feared returning home” (see §II[2]) and argued that, conversely, in the present case, the fact that the applicant ‘remained’ in Georgia for a period of time should not preclude him, albeit counsel accepted that it could militate against him, from now seeking refugee status.

50. Whilst certainly a novel lens through which to view the applicant’s decision to remain in Georgia, I am not persuaded by this argument in the circumstances of this case and the Tribunal was entitled to form the view that it did, as regards the applicant’s credibility, given the inconsistency between the applicant’s fear of reprisal on the one hand and the applicant remaining in Georgia, and moving about freely, from 2018 to 2022 on the other hand.

51. Lastly, and although the statement of grounds was amended to include a claim that “the Tribunal failed to have regard to the relevant country of origin information which might bear upon the issue”, this claim did not feature in written legal submissions and was not elaborated upon by counsel at oral hearing, other than by way of counsel referring me to the s.35 interview when, in answer to the question “Can you explain how your father’s car accident was a threat to you in Georgia?”

the applicant replied:

“Because of the tradition, they want to protect their family’s reputation, they needed to take blood from one of the male members of the family that was involved. My father is locked in the house and is not leaving the house. You cannot kill your rival in their house or in the crowd. You just need to find them alone to be able to kill them. This is to avoid killing another person accidentally.

You cannot go to their house because of the present [sic] of women and other vulnerable family members. We have our own rules and traditions based on our religion and culture.”

and counsel for the applicant stated that blood feuds in Georgia are a feature of the COI. There were no further submissions made on behalf of the applicant on this aspect of the judicial review statement of grounds and, on one view, it does not therefore fall to me to make a determination on this issue. But, that said, it seems clear that the “relevant country of origin information which might bear upon the issue” is the fact that blood feud exists in some parts of Georgia, and this fact is supported by COI. It is also clear from the impugned decision that blood feud was brought to the Tribunal’s attention and the Tribunal held that “the Appellant’s evidence regarding blood feuds and his risk of being a victim of one does not tally with his actions whilst in Georgia. The Tribunal does not find that his evidence in this regard is credible.” It follows therefrom that what the Tribunal did not find credible was the applicant’s evidence of his risk of being a victim of blood feud, rather than the Tribunal not accepting the existence of blood feud per se.

52. Thus, and in all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal acted irrationally and/or erred in law in coming to the conclusion that they did at §4.1 and, applying the dictum of Murray CJ in Meadows, I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision “properly flows from the premises on which it is based and [it is not] at variance with reason and common sense.” The Tribunal had evidence before it, the applicant’s own evidence, and the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to the inconsistencies in this evidence as regards the applicant’s fear of reprisal on the one hand and the applicant remaining in Georgia, and moving about freely, from 2018 to 2022 on the other hand.

Whether the Tribunal erred in law in so far as its findings at §4.3 of the impugned

decision, as set out hereunder, were irrational in the legal sense?

53. It appears that the applicant was questioned by the Tribunal regarding a court case involving his father, consequent upon the road traffic accident, albeit that it is not entirely clear to me how this line of questioning arose before the Tribunal. The fact of the court case, or the outcome of same, was not in issue before the IPO and this anomaly – albeit appreciating that the Tribunal hearing is a hearing de novo (see MSS v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors [2025] IEHC 294, per O’Donnell J at §76) – was not addressed in the statement of grounds or by way of submissions. Being that as it may, the applicant stated to the Tribunal that he did not know much about this court case because he was not there. The Tribunal found, at §4.3, that the applicant’s evidence regarding the court case “was lacking in detail and quite basic in nature, in that he knew the outcome of the case but little more” and when asked by his counsel if he was not interested in the case, the applicant stated that “he was interested but due to the accident he was not able to go out as freely as before.”

54. The Tribunal was not satisfied with the applicant’s “apparent lack of information regarding this case as he could have garnered this information from his father or other member of his family” and it appears that during the hearing before the Tribunal on 06 September 2022, the applicant claimed that he could try to get documents relating to this court case, but no such documents were submitted at the resumed hearing or subsequently and neither were submissions made, explanations offered, nor an extension of time sought in relation to same. The Tribunal also noted at §4.5 of the impugned decision that there was a duty on the applicant to cooperate and to make efforts to substantiate a claim, whilst acknowledging that applicants were not always in a position to support their claims with documentary evidence.

55. Counsel for the applicant, relying on the decision of Heslin J in GA & anor v.

International Protection Appeals Tribunal & ors [2022] IEHC 440 – and §85 thereof in particular – submitted that §4.5 of the impugned decision could not stand on its own, but it is of note that the applicant did not seek to impugn this particular paragraph in his statement of grounds. Section 28(7) of the Act of 2015, as set out at §33.b above, obviates the need for an applicant to support his/her statements by documentary evidence if five cumulative criteria are met by such applicant and the last of these criteria is that “the general credibility of the applicant has been established.” In the present case, it is clear that the Tribunal was of the view that the applicant was not credible for the reasons as set out in the impugned decision and that being so, the Tribunal was entitled to take the absence of substantiating documentation into account.

56. And of course, I must also bear in mind that the applicant had a not insignificant period of time from 06 September 2023 (the first hearing date) to 12 December 2023 (the resumed hearing date) to bolster any gaps in his knowledge, and noting that the first criterion set out in s.28(7) is that “the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her application”, again I am of the view that the Tribunal was entitled to take the absence of substantiating documentation into account.

57. At §e.3 of the statement of grounds, it was pleaded on behalf of the applicant that “the Tribunal did not accept the explanation offered by the Applicant for not knowing more about his father’s court case, other than the outcome, on the basis that he was away (at University in Tbilisi)” but it appears to me that this is a mischaracterisation of the Tribunal’s findings. Nowhere in §4.3 of the impugned

decision is there a reference to the applicant being away at university in Tbilisi, but rather that the applicant (on his evidence) was “not able to go out as freely as before.”

58. Counsel for the applicant further submitted that it was difficult to understand what more the applicant might have been expected to know, or why the applicant should necessarily have been more informed or interested beyond the all-important outcome, but in circumstances where the applicant was afforded an opportunity by the Tribunal on 06 September 2023 to garner information from his father or from family, the applicant’s complaint about the Tribunal’s finding simply does not pass muster. And in this regard, I also note the decision of Humphreys J in NPBK where he stated at §29-§30:

“… Once the decision-maker says the evidence was vague, that is the reason for declining to accept it, and that satisfies constitutional and administrative law requirements. To demand details of precisely why is to impermissibly demand reasons for the reasons.

There is simply no legal principle that when an account is rejected as vague, the decisionmaker has to fill in as to in what precise respect and what exactly could have been said. In any event, in the present case the particular findings are sufficiently clear and reasoned in all the circumstances.”

59. Counsel for the applicant submitted, at hearing, that the Tribunal arrived at the impugned decision on the basis of inherent implausibility, and that a decisionmaker should not simply go through each aspect of the applicant’s statements and conclude on the balance of probabilities that something would or wouldn’t be the case (in the present case, that the applicant should have known more about his father’s court case), without giving clear reasons, on the foot of evidence before it.

However, and again in the words of Keene LJ, I do not believe that the Tribunal should have “suspend[ed] its own judgment” and the Tribunal had ample evidence before it to come to the conclusions that it did.

60. Thus, I am not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that the findings of the tribunal at §4.3 were irrational in the legal sense, and again I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision “properly flows from the premises on which it is based and [it is not] at variance with reason and common sense.”

Whether the Tribunal erred at §4.2 of the impugned decision, again as set out hereunder, by the manner in which it assessed the applicant’s documentary evidence of his hospitalisation in [a local hospital] following the attack in September 2022?

61. §4.2 of the impugned decision concerned the applicant’s attendance at a local hospital following the attack on him and the applicant gave evidence to the Tribunal that he had bruising as a result of the attack on him and that he stated he spent one day in hospital. When asked during the hearing before the Tribunal if he underwent surgery, the applicant replied ‘no’, and to the effect that he did not need surgery.

However, a hospital medical report submitted by the applicant referred to him undergoing surgery to his eye and upon clarification being sought by the Tribunal, the applicant stated that he was in hospital for ten days because he needed help and he did not know much regarding medicine and, as regards the duration of the stay, the applicant suggested that the interpreter may have made a mistake by saying one day.

62. In considering these inconsistencies, the Tribunal held that it was:

“… to be expected that the Appellant would be in a position to state with clarity whether he underwent surgery. His account of his injuries during direct evidence was vague and lacking in detail and then his evidence did not tally with that contained in the medical report which he submitted. This undermines the reliability of the report submitted. The Tribunal finds that the Appellant’s evidence in relation to the injuries sustained by him was inconsistent and in the absence of a reasonable explanation for same, the Tribunal does not accept that he has provided credible evidence in this regard.”

63. Referring to the decision of Cooke J in IR, counsel for the applicant drew my attention to §10, the seventh principle, being that “a mistake as to one or even more facts will not necessarily vitiate a conclusion as to lack of credibility provided the

conclusion is tenably sustained by other correct facts. Nevertheless, an adverse finding based on a single fact will not necessarily justify a denial of credibility generally to the claim” and he submitted that a single adverse finding would rarely, if ever, be enough to sustain a decision, whilst accepting that if an applicant (not, I should stress, the applicant in the present case) were ‘found out in a lie’ that may well be sufficient to find against such applicant.

64. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal seemed to have considered the unreliability of the medical report in the context of the prior adverse credibility finding at §4.1 and, as such, there was a failure to properly consider the medical evidence since the Tribunal artificially separated the medical evidence from the rest of the evidence and reached conclusions as to credibility, at least in part, prior to the consideration of that medical evidence. But it must also be noted that counsel for the applicant accepted that the Tribunal went on to offer an ‘independent’ reason for rejecting the medical evidence (that the submitted medical report referred to the applicant having undergone eye surgery when the applicant stated that he did not have surgery) which said reason was not sought to be impugned by the applicant in the present case. It is clear that the position of the Tribunal was that the discrepancy between the applicant’s account of events and the contents of the medical evidence was not one of negligible quality. And, in answer to a question from me, counsel accepted that this ‘independent’ reason was a significant and material finding, with no available explanation provided for it on affidavit.

Thus, irrespective of the argument as to the separation of the medical evidence, the applicant implicitly accepted that the Tribunal had grounds upon which to form a view that the applicant had not “provided credible evidence” as regards the medical report.

65. In putting forward the argument as to the separation of the medical evidence, counsel relied on Mibanga v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 where Buxton LJ at §30 stated:

“The adjudicator’s failing was that she artificially separated the medical evidence from the rest of the evidence and reached conclusions as to credibility without reference to that medical evidence; and then, no doubt inevitably on that premise, found that the medical evidence was of no assistance to her. That was a structural failing, not just an error of appreciation, and demonstrated that the adjudicator’s method of approaching the evidence diverted from the procedure advised in paragraph 22 of HE [HE (DRC - Credibility and Psychiatric Reports) [2004] UKIAT 00321]”

and counsel noted that whilst the approach in Mibanga does not appear to have been adopted in this jurisdiction, Clark J in RMK (DRC) v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2010] IEHC 367 stated at §19:

“It is usually the case that the probative value of any medico-legal report cannot be assessed until the primary facts are determined. It seems to this Court that the slavish application of the forensic timing principle may lead to absurd results and requires some caution as even in cases where torture is asserted and medical evidence supports the claim, the medical evidence is secondary to the preliminary determination of whether the applicant’s asserted identity, origins and reasons for seeking asylum are found credible. Medical evidence is not determinative of a fear of persecution for a Convention reason and must be viewed in the round with those preliminary circumstances but does not by itself neutralise negative credibility findings.”

before concluding at §19-§20 that:

“There would be little practical advantage in assessing the probative value of medical evidence that an applicant has injuries highly consistent with torture before carrying out a basic credibility assessment in relation to the asserted fear of persecution for a Convention reason.

The appropriate manner of assessment is to consider all facets of the evidence in context and not to come to any conclusion until all available evidence is reviewed. Where an applicant provides a story which might be true and the medical evidence tends to confirm his story then it is axiomatic that an overall assessment of the evidence should weigh in his favour. The difficulty however is when, notwithstanding very compelling and supportive medical reports which outline objective findings, the applicant’s narrative is not found credible and is not supported by reliable COI. It is entirely possible that a person seeking asylum could have been injured and maltreated in legitimate combat, in criminal activity or from an accident. While the Court has serious misgivings relating to the treatment of the content of the three medical reports in this case, it finds no merit in the applicant’s arguments relating to the alleged artificial separation of the medical evidence from the credibility assessment and makes no criticism of the timing of the consideration of the medical reports in this case.

However the Court’s assessment of the treatment of the medical evidence is affected by later findings.”

66. Counsel for the applicant concluded by submitting that had the Tribunal considered the medical report in the round, it may have forgiven this inconsistency – had the applicant been found to be otherwise generally credible – and therefore that in the event that the two other findings made against him were impugned, or either one of them was, then the extant finding concerning the medical report should not be relied upon as sufficiently robust to uphold the overall decision.

67. Thus, and on one level, and given my findings at §5252 and §6060 above, and the fact that I have not faulted the findings of the Tribunal at §4.1 or §4.3, there is no need for me to further consider the applicant’s arguments as regards the Tribunal finding at §4.2.

68. However, it seems to me that the error condemned in Mibanga is one where a

decision-maker failed to properly weigh medical evidence by forming a definitive view of an applicant’s credibility before considering the medical evidence (see also the decision of Phelan J in AS v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2023] IEHC 53 at §65) and Humphreys J in OA (Nigeria) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 100 noted at §16 that:

“ … the U.K. Immigration Appeal Tribunal tackled the logical shortcomings of [the Mibanga] Court of Appeal judgment in H.H. (Ethiopia) [2005] UKIAT 00164, (Unreported, IAT (Judges Mackey and Lane), 25th November, 2005) at para. 21, holding that Mibanga was: “not intended to place judicial fact-finders in a form of forensic straightjacket. In particular, the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as laying down any rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact-finders are to approach the evidential materials before them … the Court of Appeal itself revisited the issue in S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1153, [2007] INLR 60, a decision which endorsed the approach in H.H. (Ethiopia) and held that the outcome in Mibanga was extraordinary and exceptional (see paras. 21, 24 and 30).

69. As against this, counsel for the applicant submitted that the so-called Mibanga duty has now been reaffirmed in the UK in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) [2021] UKUT 33 and that I should consider its application in the present case.

But absent full argument on the issue, and noting that QC was a decision of a Tribunal in the UK as opposed to the Court of Appeal (as was the case in HH (Ethiopia) and S, as referred to by Humphreys J in OA), I am of the view that this is not an issue that requires to be decided by me.

70. The decision of Faherty J in MM v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 158, is instructive in terms of the treatment of medical reports by the Tribunal. Faherty J, at §28, noted that:

“ … it would appear that the approach of the courts to the question of the discretion of decision makers as to how to deal with medical evidence will depend on the particular circumstances of each case. Some general principles emerge however … In summary, my understanding of what the jurisprudence establishes is as follows:

• In considering any assessment of an applicant’s credibility, decision makers are obliged to consider the medical evidence in total before them;

• The medical evidence must be put into the totality of the evidence to be assessed and must not be tangential or peripheral to such assessment;

• It is always a matter for the decision maker to assess the probative value of the contents of such reports;

• Where an applicant provides a story which might be true and the medical evidence tends to confirm his or her story then it is axiomatic that an overall assessment of the evidence should weigh in the applicant’s favour;

• If medical evidence is to be rejected, it is incumbent on the decision maker to give reasons;

…

• The requirement to more fully address reasons for rejecting medical reports which attach a higher probative value to clinical findings may be less where the balance of the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of a finding of a lack of credibility.”

71. In the present case, the issue with the medical report is that its contents contradicted the applicant’s own evidence to the Tribunal – as distinct from corroborating or confirming any part of the applicant’s claim – and it seems to me that the Tribunal did not seek to separate the medical evidence from the other evidence (as was the contention in Mibanga) since in concluding as it did that the applicant’s own evidence did not tally with the contents of the medical report, thereby undermining the reliability of the report, the Tribunal was viewing the evidence in the round.

This was not a case where a decision-maker/the Tribunal had, in effect, neutered favourable medical evidence by making negative credibility findings prior to considering the medical evidence. In summary, given the inconsistency between the medical report and the applicant’s own evidence – and in the absence of a reasonable explanation for same from the applicant – the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the evidence of the applicant was not credible.

72. Further, and as set out at §6464 above, it is clear that the applicant is not challenging the Tribunal’s rationale for rejecting the medical evidence and thus, the applicant’s complaint as regards §4.2 of the impugned decision is a very narrow one and on the basis of that which I have set out above, I must also reject this ground.

Whether the doctrine of severability in administrative law should apply in the event that any of the identified findings were successfully impugned?

73. In circumstances where I have not found for the applicant on any of the pleaded grounds, it is not necessary for me to consider the doctrine of severability.

Conclusion

74. For the reasons as set out above, the applicant has not persuaded me that the impugned decision is frail on any of the pleaded grounds and thus I am not satisfied to grant the applicant the reliefs sought.

Costs

75. Pursuant to s.169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, costs should follow the event “unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties”. In circumstances where the applicant has not succeeded in his application, and there is nothing of note concerning the particular nature and circumstances of the case, or the conduct of the proceedings by the parties which might permit me to order otherwise, I am inclined to award the costs of the proceedings to the respondent.

76. However, it is open to the parties to contend for the making of a different form of costs order and I will hear the parties in relation to the precise form of order to be made. I propose listing this matter, in person, for 10:45 on 18 December 2025 for such purpose.