High Court affirms Circuit Court dismissal of minor personal injury claim despite disproportionate legal costs awarded against plaintiff.

[2025] IEHC 682

CIRCUIT COURT RECORD NUMBER 2024/00101

THE HIGH COURT

BETWEEN

REGINA PUTNIENE

PLAINTIFF

AND

BRENDAN MCDONALD, MUNSTER DERIVATIVES LIMITED AND MOTOR

INSURERS BUREAU OF IRELAND

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Twomey delivered on the 15th day of December 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a case about a plaintiff (“Ms Putniene”) who suffered an injustice when she lost her personal injuries claim in the Circuit Court, and on appeal in the High Court.

2. The reason she suffered an injustice is not because she lost her claim for damages and had costs awarded against her – the objective evidence in the case favoured the defendant. Instead, the reason Ms. Putniene suffered an injustice is because it is likely to cost her €50,000 or more in legal costs to resolve a claim which was estimated at only €16,500. (The claim was for soft tissue injuries arising from a car accident and the medical reports state that she missed one day of work.)

3. It simply defies all logic for a plaintiff, like Ms. Putniene, to have to pay, say €50,000, to resolve a claim for €16,500. This is as illogical as a person paying €50,000 to repair a car worth €16,500, or a person paying €50,000 to buy a property worth €16,500. It is hard to think of any other walk of life where this type of irrationality occurs. Yet it is a daily occurrence in our courts.

4. In this Court’s view, it cannot amount to true justice, for the resolution of a claim to cost multiples of its value. Instead of justice being administered to Ms. Putniene, in this Court’s view, she has had an injustice inflicted on her. This is because resolving her bona fide claim over a minor car accident, which could happen to anyone in this country, is likely to cost her several times the value of her claim. It is not the fact that costs were awarded against her, which is the issue, but the amount of those costs - all because this minor claim was heard in the High Court.

5. As noted hereunder, this absence of any proportionality between the costs of resolving claims and the value of those claims, runs contrary to the central importance which the Supreme Court attaches to ‘proportionality’ in ensuring that the court decisions are ‘fair’ to plaintiffs and to defendants (Delaney v The Personal Injuries Board and Others [2024] IESC 10, per Collins J. at para. 61, quoting Denham J. (as she then was) in MN v. SM (Damages) [2005] IESC 17, at para. 38).

6. This injustice, which was inflicted on Ms. Putniene, arises for two reasons.

7. Firstly, it is because of laws, passed by the Oireachtas, which mean that cases of minor importance,1 and of minor value (whether on appeal or at first instance2) are not heard in See for example Gannon v. Road Safety Authority [2022/544/JR], where Meenan J. described it as an ‘utter waste of time’ for the High Court to have to hear a judicial review over the inadvertent failure of the Road Safety Authority to renew a driving licence (The Irish Times, 30 June 2022.) While Ms. Putniene’s case was an appeal of a Circuit Court decision to the High Court, Tennant v. Reidy [2022] IECA 137 is an example of a case where a minor value case was heard at first instance in the High Court, with Noonan J. noting (at para. 23) that a dispute over €20,000 ‘should never have come before the High Court at all’, given its value. affordable courts. Instead, under these laws,3 minor cases are heard in the most expensive trial court (the High Court) and, to a lesser degree, in the moderately expensive Circuit Court. In particular, these laws provide that a claim of only €15,001 is not heard in the more affordable District Court (where, in very general terms, the costs might be €1,000 or €2,000). Instead, such a claim is heard in the Circuit Court, where costs could be a multiple of €15,001.4 Similarly, a personal injury5 claim with a value of only €60,001 is not heard (at first instance) in the Circuit Court, but in the High Court, where costs could be a multiple of €60,001 (as costs in that court have been described as ‘prohibitive’ by a former President of the High Court).6

8. The second reason this type of injustice is visited on litigants like Ms. Putniene is because of laws passed by the Oireachtas which have led to a dramatic reduction in the proportion of affordable courts to hear minor claims. In particular, in recent decades there has been a 359% reduction7 in the number of (more affordable) District Courts relative to the number of (prohibitively expensive) High Courts. In addition, there has been a 54% reduction in the number of (moderately expensive) Circuit Courts relative to the number of High Courts.

9. Thus, the combination of (i) low monetary thresholds for cases to be heard in the High Court (and the Circuit Court) and (ii) the dramatic reduction in the proportion of District/Circuit Courts to High Courts, has resulted in minor claims not being heard in the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 s.14-17. Another example is s. 123 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2004 which provides for all appeals from the Residential Tenancies Board to be heard to the High Court, and so in Abeyneh v Residential Tenancies Board [2023] IEHC 81, a dispute over the return of a €500 deposit to a tenant was heard in a court, where costs are regularly in the tens of thousands of euros. See Nolan v County Registrar for County Waterford [2024] IEHC 253, where a proposed bill of €32,986 for Circuit Court legal costs was four times the value of the award of €8,000 in the Circuit Court. For non-personal injury cases, the monetary threshold for High Court actions is €75,001. Bourbon v Ward [2012] IEHC 30, at pgs. 39-40, per Kearns P. See for example the case of Burke v Lawless [2016] IEHC 259, where judgment was sought against a ‘woman in her mid-seventies’ for unpaid High Court litigation costs of €176,433.65, where “she cannot afford even the legal fees necessary to come represented to this application for summary judgment. She is worried that the house she owns will need to be sold to meet the legal fees that she now owes.” See Shannon v Shannon [2024] IEHC 291 at para. 3 et seq., where for ease, reference is made therein and herein to the number of Courts, rather than, more accurately, the number of judges. more affordable District Court. As result, litigants like Ms. Putniene end up having to pay legal costs which are likely to be multiples of the value of the claim.

Making laws like these understandable to the public

10. The classic definition of the rule of law, as stated by Lord Bingham is that ‘[t]he law must be accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable.’8 It is not controversial to state that the Irish courts must comply with the rule of law (and Scully v Coucal [2025] IESC 20 is a recent example of the Supreme Court applying the rule of law). In this Court’s view, complying with the rule of law means that judgments, insofar as possible, must be ‘accessible’. This is because, while judgments are not ‘the law’, in the same way as statutory provisions, they nonetheless apply statutes and consider their effect. For this reason, it seems clear that judgments are as much part of ‘the law’ as statutory provisions.

11. All of this means that any analysis, by this Court, of the effect of the foregoing laws, on Ms. Putniene, needs to be put in accessible terms. With this in mind, the foregoing laws (providing low monetary thresholds for disputes to be heard in the High Court – and the Circuit Court – and reducing dramatically the proportion of District Courts and Circuit Courts) means that there is a concentration of litigation (and crucially minor litigation) in the High Court. For Ms. Putniene, this meant that her minor claim for damages, estimated at €16,500, was heard in the High Court, even though this is the equivalent of a minor crime (say a speeding offence) being heard in the criminal division of the High Court (known as the Central Criminal Court). This would never happen in the criminal division of the High Court because minor criminal matters are never tried in the High Court (which hears only the most serious crimes, such as rape and murder). However, somewhat inexplicably, when Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2010) at pg. 37. it comes to minor civil matters, these cases are heard on a daily basis in the civil division of the High Court.

12. In this regard, this Court is unaware of why there has been such a massive drop in the proportion of affordable courts in Ireland in recent decades, such that litigation is concentrated in the most expensive court (the High Court), particularly when this is out of step with other countries.9 However, it seems clear that the primary winners from this concentration of litigation in the High Court are lawyers who are paid costs which are out of all proportion to the value of claims (which could have been heard in a lower court for a fraction of the costs). Similarly, it seems clear that the primary losers are consumers of legal services, who have to pay those legal costs. And the difference for consumers, in their dispute being resolved in the District Court (or the Circuit Court) rather than the High Court, is in the tens of thousands of euros. This is because, in very general terms, a hearing might cost hundreds of euros in the District Court, thousands of euros in the Circuit Court, but tens of thousands of euro in the High Court. To put the effect of these laws in ‘clear’ and ‘accessible’ terms for Ms. Putniene therefore, these laws mean that because her case was not heard in the District Court, this is likely to cost her tens of thousands in legal costs.

Making justice affordable

13. One solution to this type of injustice being inflicted on consumers like Ms. Putniene would be a reduction in the ‘prohibitive’ legal costs in the High Court, whether for all High Court cases, or for those which deal with cases of minor value or minor importance. However, a reduction in legal costs in the High Court seems very unlikely. This is simply because judges have for 60 years been calling, without success, for a reduction in legal costs in the See Shannon v Shannon [2024] IEHC 291 at para. 13 et seq. High Court.10 Indeed, it is now over seven years since Clarke C.J. called for the legislature to give ‘urgent consideration’ to the ‘cost of going to court’. (SPV Osus Limited v HSBC Institutional Trusts Services (Ireland) Limited [2019] 1 I.R. 1 at para. 7). Thus, there is no reason to believe that something which has not happened for 60 years is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

14. Accordingly, on the basis that High Court costs are likely to remain at their current level, perhaps ‘urgent consideration’ (to use Clarke C.J.’s phrase) might instead be given to a different way of making justice affordable. Thus, consideration might be given to ensuring that, as in the criminal division of the High Court, only serious cases are tried in the civil division of the High Court. In this way, minor cases (whether in value or importance11) would be heard in more affordable courts, rather than in the prohibitively expensive High Court.

15. To put it another way, if the aim of the legal system is to make justice affordable, as it should be, then this might be achieved (i) by increasing the proportion of affordable District Courts and Circuit Courts relative to High Courts12 and (ii) by ensuring that minor cases are heard in more affordable courts, rather than in a court with ‘prohibitive’ costs.

Why justice was not affordable for Ms. Putniene

16. The figure of €16,500 was used as the estimate for Ms. Putniene’s claim as it is the midpoint between her counsel’s estimate (of €30,000) and the defendant’s counsel’s estimate of between €500 and €3,000. Since, Ms. Putniene lost her claim in the Circuit Court, in line As noted in Beakonford Limited v Stokes [2025] IEHC 22 at para. 130, for 60 years, judges have been calling, without success, for a reduction in legal costs in the High Court. For example, the application to judicially review the decision to clamp a person’s car, with the costs of removing the clamp being €80, where Meenan J. questioned how it could be ‘proportional’ for the High Court to hear such a judicial review (The Irish Times, 17 October, 2022). It is important to note that it is not being suggested that there are too many High Court judges for the amount of litigation (including minor cases) which has to be heard in that court. Indeed, for many years, different Presidents of the High Court have called for more judges to be appointed, in light of the volume of litigation which is heard in that court. with the rule that ‘costs follow the event’, Donohoe J. awarded Circuit Court costs in favour of the defendant and against Ms. Putniene. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court for the reasons set out below. In line with the same rule, that ‘costs follow the event’, this Court awarded High Court costs against the plaintiff.

17. As a result of her pursuit of justice therefore, Ms. Putniene will have to pay Circuit Court and High Court costs to the defendant (and pay her own lawyers). However, crucially, the total costs she will have to pay could exceed €50,000 and therefore could be completely disproportionate to the estimated value of the claim. This raises the issue of proportionality, or its absence, in cases like this. The importance of proportionality to the administration of justice

18. This absence of proportionality is a matter of some significance, in light of the Delaney case, to which reference has already been made. This is because at para. 72, in reliance on existing caselaw, Collins J. makes clear how important ‘proportionality’ is, when it comes to determining whether an award of damages is ‘fair’ to a plaintiff and a defendant, and so in ensuring that justice is fairly administered.

19. This judgment states that damages which are awarded in a given case must be ‘proportionate’ to the damages awarded to other litigants. This is because it would not be ‘fair to the defendant’13 if a plaintiff, with say a minor soft tissue injury, got anywhere close to the damages awarded to a person with life-changing injuries. Similarly, it would not be ‘fair to the plaintiff,’14 with very serious injuries, to only get damages which were on a par with someone with minor injuries.

Delaney at para. 61, per Collins J., quoting from MN v SM (Damages) [2005] IESC 17, [2005] 4 IR 461. ibid.

20. Thus, it is clear from Delaney that there has to be a ‘rational relationship between awards of damages in personal injuries cases,’15 and that this is key in determining whether an award of damages is just and fair to plaintiffs and defendants, and so whether true justice has been administered by our courts. This principle has been referred to as ‘internal proportionality’,16 since it relates to the fact that awards of damages must be proportionate as between each other. Does the proportionality principle not also apply between damages and costs?

21. This raises the issue of whether there should also be proportionality, or a ‘rational relationship’, not just between the level of different awards, but also between the amount of damages being sought/awarded and the legal costs which have to be paid by a plaintiff/defendant to resolve that claim, in order to be fair to the plaintiff and the defendant.

22. This is an important question because, it seems to this Court, that the amount of costs ordered by a court to be paid by a litigant are as much a part of the administration of justice as the amount of any damages ordered to be paid by a litigant. This is because every time a defendant is ordered by a court to pay damages, she is invariably ordered to pay the costs. Similarly, every time a plaintiff loses a claim for damages, she is invariably ordered by a court to pay the costs. In this way, costs make up a hidden, but hugely significant, part of the administration of justice, particularly in the High Court where costs are so high.

23. On one level, it could be said that Delaney means that for true justice to be achieved, there must be proportionality between the damage suffered and the amount which is ordered to be paid by a court. In Delaney, the focus was on the amount of damages, so ordered and not on the costs which were ordered to be paid by a defendant (or a plaintiff). This therefore MN v SM (Damages) [2005] IESC 17, [2005] 4 IR 461 pg. 474, cited with approval by Noonan J. in McKeown v Crosby [2020] IECA 242, para.19, and by Collins J. in Delaney at para. 72. Delaney at para. 72. raises the question of whether this principle of proportionality ceases to apply, when it comes to costs, so long as there is ‘internal proportionality’ between different rates of damages ordered. If this were true, it would mean that someone is regarded as having been treated ‘fairly’ if they have to pay damages of €10,000 (and say €90,000 in costs) for a soft tissue injury they inflicted, provided that the amount of damages is proportionate to damages in other cases of soft tissue injuries and more serious injuries.

24. This Court does not believe that this is the case. It believes that this principle of proportionality means that there should be proportionality between the value of a claim and the costs of its resolution (since those costs will have to be paid by the losing party, whether a plaintiff or a defendant).

25. This is because, looking at this issue from the perspective of this case, we are dealing with two possible outcomes. One outcome is that the plaintiff loses her claim estimated at €16,500 and she will have to pay, say €50,000 in costs, and the other outcome is that the defendant loses, and he will have to pay €66,500 (say €50,000 in costs and €16,500 in damages).

26. From either perspective, the losing litigant will care little about how the court-ordered sum, that has to be paid, is broken down. This is because in the real world, the losing litigant is only concerned with how much she has to pay. Thus, she will only be concerned with the fact that the ‘justice’, which she has received, means that she has to pay €50,000 or €66,500 in respect of an injury that was estimated to be worth only €16,500.

27. In this Court’s view, in neither instance, can it be said that the plaintiff or defendant received justice, since how can it be ‘fair’ or ‘just’, in any one’s language, for a plaintiff or a defendant, in a dispute over €16,500, to have to pay €50,000 or €66,500.

28. Accordingly, it seems to this Court that true justice demands proportionality between legal costs and the value/importance of the issues at stake, even though our current laws, as evidenced by Ms Putniene’s case, achieve the opposite. Put another way, it seems to this Court that it would be ‘fair’ to a plaintiff and to a defendant if, in order to resolve a claim, it cost a fraction, or a proportion, of the value of the claim, rather the current situation, where it can cost a multiple of its value.

29. Despite all of this, it is clear that this Court must apply laws passed by the Oireachtas, even where it seems those laws cause systemic unfairness for litigants. In this regard, one would not expect any profession to act contrary to its own financial interests. Thus, one would not expect the legal profession to bring attention to the massive reduction in the proportion of affordable courts, or to point out that this reduction is not in the interests of litigants. This is because the reduction in the proportion of affordable courts means that more minor claims are being heard in expensive courts and so in lawyers getting paid multiples of the value of a claim, to resolve that claim.

30. However, the administration of justice, as recently observed in other quarters,17 is not about lawyers (or judges); it is about litigants. Since the role of the courts is to seek to improve the system for those litigants,18 this Court seeks to do so by highlighting that, in the absence of any change to the foregoing laws, injustice will continue to be inflicted on litigants, like Ms. Putniene, by a system which is supposed to administer justice. This is a matter of some significance because, as illustrated by this case, one is dealing with mundane everyday claims which affect people on a daily basis throughout the country.

Speech on 6 October 2025 at New Legal Year Ceremony, in which the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration stated that ‘the administration of justice is not about judges and lawyers. The administration of justice is concerned exclusively with serving the interests of those who seek justice’. The Irish Times, 6 August, 2022. Interview with Irvine P.: ‘I have always seen it as my responsibility to try to make the system better for the litigant, who must always be kept front and central in the administration of justice.’ ANALYSIS

31. This case concerns a traffic accident which took place on the morning of 19 July 2021 on a road between Tipperary town and Bansha. There was a collision between Ms. Putiene’s car and the defendant’s truck. As previously noted, the damages to which she might be entitled are estimated at €16,500.

32. The plaintiff and defendant came across as genuine in their respective beliefs that each of them was not to blame for the accident. The plaintiff alleges that she was travelling in the middle of a convoy of three vehicles. Ahead of her was a tractor (with an attached trailer) and behind her was a truck driven by the defendant. She was travelling on a road, with a single lane and a continuous white line. Accordingly, overtaking was not permitted on this stretch of road.

33. She says that, as the three vehicles approached a corner, the tractor began to move into, and drive in, the hard shoulder. In this regard, the engineering evidence was that there was a hard shoulder that commenced as one approached the corner, and that it only became wide enough for the tractor to start moving into it, some 70 metres from the corner, and that the tractor could have moved fully into the hard shoulder some 50 metres from the corner. The plaintiff states that when the tractor was driving in the hard shoulder, she continued to drive in the single lane, alongside the hard shoulder

34. The defendant’s version of events is very different. He alleges that when the tractor began to drive in the hard shoulder, the plaintiff sought to overtake the tractor as the vehicles approached the corner. As part of this manoeuvre, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff moved over the continuous white line to the other side of the road. He then claims that, in light of oncoming traffic, the plaintiff braked and pulled back into the lane which he was occupying. This, he says, forced him to suddenly brake, which led to the collision between the front of his truck and the back of the plaintiff’s car, as he says he could not avoid colliding with the plaintiff’s car.

35. Both the plaintiff and defendant agree that there was oncoming traffic. The defendant says that nonetheless there was sufficient time for the plaintiff to complete the overtaking manoeuvre (which he says she started). On the other hand, the plaintiff says that because of this oncoming traffic, she did not attempt to overtake the tractor and stayed in her lane. The defendant points out that as a result of the accident, the plaintiff’s car ended up coming to a halt at the wrong side of the road and that there was sufficient time for the oncoming traffic to stop and so avoided hitting the plaintiff’s car. This is not disputed by the plaintiff.

36. The defendant’s version of events is that the tractor ‘zigzagged’ and this caused her to brake, which led to the collision with the defendant’s truck which was behind her. It is her claim that the defendant was negligent in not leaving enough space to brake, since she says she never left her lane of traffic. For his part, the defendant re-iterates that the plaintiff did attempt to overtake the tractor and this led to her aborting her overtaking manoeuvre and to her turning back into her own lane and crashing into his vehicle.

37. Accordingly, this is a classic case of he says/she says, with no independent witness to corroborate either version. It is true that the plaintiff’s daughter, who was a passenger in the plaintiff’s car, gave evidence. However, she cannot be said to be an independent witness, who has no interest in the outcome of the case. Onus on the plaintiff to establish that her version of events is the correct one

38. In cases like these, where this is a complete divergence of claims, it is important to remember that the onus is on the plaintiff to establish the facts. There is no onus on the defendant to establish that his version is correct. Thus, if both versions were equally plausible, then this Court is obliged to hold for the defendant, since the plaintiff would not have discharged the onus on her to establish that her version is, on the balance of probabilities, the more likely one.

39. If one were considering only the two versions of events provided by the plaintiff and the defendant, where there is no independent testimony, this is a case where both versions are, on the face of it, equally plausible. However, there are certain additional factors, which lead this Court, to agree with O’Donohoe J. that the plaintiff’s claim for damages should be rejected.

40. The first reason relates to the fact that, in the absence of an independent witness, the only objective evidence regarding the accident is the evidence of the damage to the cars. In this instance, the defendant’s truck suffered damage to its front right hand side, while the plaintiff’s car suffered damage predominantly to its rear left-hand side. It is of course possible that the two cars were both in the same lane, with the defendant’s truck further to the left of the lane, and the plaintiff’s car further to the right of the lane. However, this objective evidence provides support for a finding that that the plaintiff’s car was positioned to the right of the truck, and therefore some support for the possibility that the plaintiff’s car was returning from being over the continuous white line.

41. To put it another way, if the damage had been to the rear right-hand side of the plaintiff’s car and to the front left hand side of the defendant’s truck, this would have supported the plaintiff’s version of events, since it would imply that her car was on the left of the lane, (rather coming back from crossing over the continuous white line).

42. Equally, of course, if the damage to the back of the plaintiff’s car had been to the centre and the damage to the front of defendant’s truck had been to the centre, this would have supported the conclusion that they were both in the centre of the lane.

43. Secondly, the other aspect of the testimony which casts some doubt on the plaintiff’s recollection. She was provided in court with a photograph of the straight section of road, some 120 metres from the locus of the accident. She stated that the tractor was not visible, when she was driving this section of the road. She was then provided with another photograph, some 100 metres from the locus. However, she claimed that when she was driving this section, the tractor was visible. This is entirely illogical. This is because she accepts that she was in a convoy, with all vehicles travelling in the same direction, with the tractor ahead of her and the defendant’s truck behind her for approximately 2 minutes prior to the accident. Thus, the tractor was on her side of the road and ahead of her at all times as she travelled on a straight part of the road as she approached the bend. It follows that if the tractor was visible, when she was 100 metres from the locus, it must also have been visible when she was 120 metres from the locus. Her recollection in this regard must therefore be incorrect and so it does cast some doubt on her recollection of the events of the day.

44. In this regard, while the plaintiff spoke through an interpreter, her daughter did not require an interpreter. Nonetheless, she also confirmed her mother’s version of events, namely that the tractor, although it was ahead of her, was not visible when the convoy was 120 metres from the corner, yet it was visible 100 metres from the corner. As previously noted, this is illogical and simply casts doubt on the recollection of both witnesses.

45. It is not being suggested that the plaintiff is deliberately lying. However, it does seem to this Court that her recollection of the events of the day may be mistaken.

46. For all these reasons, on the balance of probabilities, this Court finds that the plaintiff, as she approached a corner, attempted to overtake a tractor which was in the hard shoulder, which necessitated her car going over the continuous white line, and that on seeing oncoming traffic, she braked and came back into the lane. This caused the back left hand side of her car to crash into the front right hand side of the defendant’s truck.

CONCLUSION

47. This accident would not have occurred, in this Court’s view, if the plaintiff had not attempted to overtake a tractor on a road with a continuous white line, as she approached the corner, which was not a safe manoeuvre.

48. Accordingly, this Court affirms the decision of O’Donohoe J. of the Circuit Court, in which he rejected the plaintiff’s claim for personal injuries against the defendant and awarded costs against her.

49. Under the rule that ‘costs follow the event’, this Court orders that Ms. Putniene pay the defendant’s legal costs, even though these (and the costs of her own lawyers) could be several times the estimated value of her claim. (To do otherwise, would inflict an injustice on the defendant, as he would have then to pay his own legal costs, even though he won the case, which could not be justified.)

50. Nonetheless, it cannot, in this Court’s view, be fair, in anyone’s language, that resolving a bona fide claim can cost multiples of the value of the claim. However, our current laws are such that outcomes like this are a daily occurrence in our courts. This Court must apply those laws, even though an injustice results to Ms. Putniene. All this Court can do is highlight how these laws, unless they are reformed, will continue to inflict injustice, even though the system is supposed to administer justice. In this case, the injustice is likely to be the infliction of tens of thousands in additional costs on Ms. Putniene, because this minor claim was not required to be heard in the District Court.