High Court enforces Danish arbitration award against non-compliant respondent for principal, VAT, and costs.

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THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 668

(2025 484 MCA)

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 23 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 2010

AND

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 35 OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW

AND

IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 56 RULE 3 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPERIOR

COURTS

BETWEEN

SITE FACILITY APS

APPLICANT

AND

RANDRIDGE HOLDINGS LIMITED

RESPONDENT

Ex tempore JUDGMENT of Mr Justice David Barniville, President of the High Court, delivered on the 19th day of November 2025

A. Ruling on whether to proceed with Application

1. This is an application by the Applicant, Site Facility APS, a Danish company, for orders under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) recognising and enforcing a final award of an arbitrator dated 23 June 2025 (the “Final Award”), in which certain substantial sums were ordered to be paid by the Respondent, Randridge Holdings Ltd, to the Applicant for the detailed reasons set out in the final award. The arbitrator was appointed in Denmark by the Danish Institute of Arbitration and under its rules.

2. The motion seeking to recognise and enforce the final award was issued on 15 October 2025 and was made returnable before this Court to today’s date, 19 November 2025 at 10:30am. The motion papers were served on the Respondent company on 23 October 2025. An affidavit of service of Mr Peadar Ó’Cofaigh Byrne of Flynn O’ Driscoll LLP, the Applicant’s solicitors, which was sworn on 6 November 2025 exhibits a letter notifying the Respondent that this application to the High Court was returnable to 19 November 2025, in circumstances where the Respondent company had “failed to discharge the payment obligations on foot of the Final Award or otherwise…”. It was noted also in the letter that the Notice of Motion of this application and Grounding Affidavit of Jakob Heskjaer, the sole director of the Applicant company, were enclosed with the letter, and that orders would be sought by the Applicant for the recognition and enforcement of the Final Award in this jurisdiction. It was also outlined in the letter that the Applicant would be seeking to recover “the principal amounts outstanding, plus all interest to the date of payment, the arbitration costs, the legal costs of the arbitration, and the legal costs associated with this application and subsequent steps”. It was recommended in the letter that the Respondent company would “…take legal advice in relation to the issues raised [in the] letter and by the Court application”. This letter was sent by registered post to the Respondent company’s registered address at Unit 2, Bray South Business Park, Killarney Road, Bray, Co. Wicklow. Proof of delivery with a signature dated 24 October 2025 is exhibited to the affidavit of service.

3. A follow-up letter from Flynn O’Driscoll LLP to the Respondent company dated 5 November 2025 is also exhibited to the affidavit of service of Mr Ó’Cofaigh Byrne. That letter referred to the previous letter of 23 October 2025 and the Respondent company was asked to confirm safe receipt and to indicate whether it would consent to the application returnable for 19 November 2025 which is the application before me today. The letter of 5 November 2025 was sent by registered post and by email to a number of named individuals in the Respondent company including Mr Charlie Quinn, Chairman of the Randridge Group.

4. A very swift response to that letter was received by Flynn O’Driscoll LLP from Mr Quinn dated 6 November 2025. In that letter, Mr Quinn acknowledged receipt of the letters of 23 October 2025 and 5 November 2025. The letter went on to state:

“As you are aware, this matter is currently under appeal before the High Court in Denmark. Accordingly, pending the outcome of that appeal, we reject any assertion of liability or claim. In light of the above, we will be entering a defence in these proceedings. Our legal representatives will be in contact with you in due course”.

5. There matters lay until this morning, when the Applicant’s application for recognition and enforcement of the Final Award was listed before me at 10:30am this morning in the Arbitration List. The matter was called on shortly after 10:30am. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent. The matter was put back to second call, and was then put back to 10:45am. Thereafter, contact was made with the Respondent company by the Applicant’s solicitor, Mr John Fitzgerald of Flynn O’Driscoll LLP, and an email was received in response from Mr Quinn at 10:49am indicating that Mr Simon Murphy, a partner at Beauchamps LLP, would be in contact with Mr Fitzgerald. Mr Murphy did call Mr Fitzgerald shortly after, and it emerged that Beauchamps LLP had been first contacted at 10:00am this morning, some two weeks after Mr Quinn’s letter of 6 November 2025 in which he had indicated that a defence would be entered in the proceedings and that the Respondent company’s legal representatives would be in contact in due course. It appears that there was, at that time, no legal representative engaged on behalf of the Respondent company as, according to Mr Murphy, the first time that the Respondent company contacted Beauchamps LLP was at 10:00am this morning. I ultimately put the matter back from 10:45am to 11:30am this morning and that information concerning the 11:30am listing was conveyed to Mr Murphy in an email from Mr Fitzgerald sent at 11:07am. Mr Murphy responded to that letter at 11:18am in which he indicated that he would not be able to attend before the Court today at 11:30am and continued:

“We received contact about this matter this morning. Subject to clearing a conflict check, completing anti money requirements, and compliance with our letter of engagement, we intend to enter an appearance and act on behalf of Randridge Holdings Limited in this matter.”

6. That is now where matters lie. There is no appearance on behalf of the Respondent company this morning. I am satisfied that this is a very belated attempt by the Respondent company to seek to delay this recognition and enforcement application. Notwithstanding that, on 6 November 2025, it was indicated by Mr Quinn on behalf of the Respondent that its legal representatives would be in contact with the Applicant’s solicitors in relation to the matter. No such contact appears to have been made by the Respondent to its legal representatives until this morning at 10:00am. That was so notwithstanding that the Respondent company had almost four weeks’ notice of the application today, having been served with a letter on 23 October 2025 detailing that an application for recognition and enforcement was to be made on 19 November 2025. In those circumstances, I am not disposed to putting the matter back and I am going to proceed with the application this morning which, after all, is an application to recognise and enforce the Final Award of the Arbitrator in Denmark which was made on 23 June 2025. I am not satisfied that there is any reasonable basis for deferring consideration of the matter.

7. I will ask Mr Michael Connolly BL, counsel on behalf of the Applicant, to deal with a point made in correspondence on behalf of the Respondent and that is that there is apparently an application before the Danish courts by way of what is called an “appeal” in Mr Quinn’s email from the Final Award, although that application could hardly constitute an appeal in circumstances where the award is final and binding and cannot be appealed on its merits, save for on very specific grounds under Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and under s. 37 of the Danish Arbitration Act 2005 which deals with recourse against an award.

8. The grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement are set out in Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (which has force of law in the State by virtue of s. 6 of the 2010 Act which provides that: “(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be refused only:

(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof that:

(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or

(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or

(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made; or

(b) if the court finds that:

(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State; or

(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be

contrary to the public policy of this State.

(2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court referred to in paragraph (1)(a)(v) of this article, the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its

decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security.”

9. I have not been provided with any information by the Respondent, whether in correspondence or otherwise, as to the nature of any “appeal” proceedings in Denmark, and I have not been provided with any indication as to the grounds on which the Respondent company is seeking to challenge the recognition and enforcement of the Final Award. It is not suggested that there is any infirmity or defect in the Final Award, nor am I given any information as to the possible applicability of any of the grounds set out in Article 36 of the Model Law. The Respondent company has had ample time to set out relevant information to the Court, in circumstances where almost four weeks have passed since the Applicant’s application for recognition and enforcement of the Final Award was served on the Respondent.

10. It was highlighted in the course of this application by Mr Connolly BL that there is provision in s. 36(2) of the Model Law under which the Court could consider adjourning the application for recognition and enforcement, where the Court considers it “proper”

to do so if an application has been made to a court in which or under the law of which the award was made to set aside or suspend the award. However, I have not been provided with any evidence by the Respondent that any application has been made to the Danish courts to set aside or suspend the Final Award. If such an application had been made or if the Danish courts had made any such order, there is no reason why the Respondent could not have pointed that out. It had almost four weeks from service of the Applicant’s application to do so. Ultimately, I do not consider it appropriate or proper to adjourn this application for the reasons set out above.

B. Decision on Application

11. As noted earlier, this is an application by the Applicant company, Site Facility APS, a Danish company, for orders under s. 23 of the 2010 Act, Order 56, Rule 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and Article 35 of the Model Law, which has force of law in this State by virtue of s.6 the 2010 Act. The Applicant seeks to enforce in this jurisdiction the Final Award made by a Danish arbitrator in a dispute between the Applicant and the Respondent, an Irish company which has a registered address in Bray, Co. Wicklow.

12. The arbitration arose out of a dispute between the Applicant and a contractor company, Randridge International Ltd (In Liquidation). The Applicant entered into a Parent Company Guarantee (“PCG”) with the Respondent company, Randridge Holdings Ltd, on 28 April 2022. That PCG contained an arbitration agreement at clause 12 that provided as follows:

“Any dispute arising out of this Parent Company Guarantee including, but not limited to, any question regarding its existence, validity, termination and/or its performance shall, if not amicably settled, be exclusively and finally settled under the rules of arbitration adopted by the Board of the Danish Institute of Arbitration by one arbitrator (or by three arbitrators by mutual agreement) appointed in accordance with the Rules. The place and seat of the arbitration shall be Copenhagen. The procedural law of this place shall apply where the Rules are silent. The language to be used in the arbitration proceedings shall be English.”.

13. There was a dispute under the terms of the PCG. That dispute was referred to arbitration. The Arbitrator appointed by the Board of the Danish Institute of Arbitration was Ms Helen Lehto (Sole Arbitrator). The Arbitrator issued a very detailed Final Award on 23 June 2025. In her award, the Arbitrator sets out in great detail the procedural and factual background as well as the issues to be decided by the arbitration which were, essentially, issues relating to whether the Respondent was obliged under the PCG to discharge the costs of certain invoices sent by the Applicant to the original contractor company, Randridge International Ltd (In Liquidation). The Arbitrator notes at the very outset of the Final Award that the Respondent was, up to a point in time, legally represented in the arbitration. With effect from 14 October 2024, however, the Respondent was not represented and participated to a limited extent in the arbitration through its officers, including its Chairman, Mr Quinn. The Arbitrator also noted that certain directions were given, and among those was that a hearing of the arbitration would take place on 19 March 2025. The Respondent did not attend that hearing, and the hearing proceeded on that date in the Respondent’s absence. However, some material was provided by the Respondent to the Arbitrator including its defence to the claim in the arbitration and some written submissions.

14. The reason given by the Respondent for not attending the hearing was that there were ongoing settlement negotiations. The Respondent sought postponements of the arbitration on that basis previously and also pointed to the alleged ongoing settlement negotiations as a reason for its non-attendance at the arbitration. When asked by the Arbitrator as to whether there were ongoing settlement negotiations in place or whether a settlement had been reached, the Applicant said that this was not the case, and that the Respondent was fully aware that no settlement agreement had been reached, despite the Respondent having had ample time to propose one. The hearing proceeded before the Arbitrator and, on 19 March 2025, the Arbitrator produced her Final Award on 23 June 2025.

15. The Arbitrator decided in the Applicant’s favour in respect of some of the outstanding invoices and decided against the Applicant in relation to others. The total sum claimed by the Applicant in the arbitration was €986,223.05 together with VAT. The Arbitrator decided that some of the invoices had already been paid, and that the Respondent was not liable for others for various reasons which were comprehensively explained in the Final Award. The Arbitrator ordered that the Respondent pay to the Applicant various sums amounting to €236,525.96 plus interest, additional sums of €30,000 excluding VAT as compensation for legal costs and €20,800 as reimbursement for the sum paid by the Applicant for the cost of the arbitration giving a total figure of €287,325.96. The interest, as found by the Arbitrator, arises under the Danish Interest Act which is at the rate of the official lending rate set by the Danish National Bank plus an additional eight percentage points. This was dealt with at paras. 169-172 of the Final Award.

16. The total sum of €287,325.96 plus interest was directed by the Arbitrator to be paid by the Respondent within 14 days of the Final Award. Interest has been calculated by the Applicant up to 7 October 2025 at €72,222.11. The total figure as of 7 October 2025 that arises including interest on foot of the award is €359.548.07. The Applicant seeks to enforce the Final Award in that amount, together with continuing interest. Following a discussion with the Applicant’s counsel, Mr Connolly BL, and following instructions being taken by counsel, it was confirmed that the Applicant was not pursuing the further interest claimed thereafter in circumstances where there may be issues as to the seeking of compound interest, namely, interest upon interest, and it is not clear that there is an entitlement to that kind of interest in the material before me. The issue of compound interest could also potentially and arguably give rise to public policy issues in this jurisdiction (but I express no concluded view on that issue given that the point was not pursued by the Applicant before me). The sum and judgment being sought, therefore, is in the total amount calculated as of 7 October 2025 of €359,548.07.

17. As noted by Mr Heskjaer in his affidavit sworn on 10 October 2025, the Respondent has apparently recently instituted proceedings in Denmark seeking a declaration that the Final Award is invalid. The advice from the Applicant’s legal representatives in Denmark is that these proceedings do not have the effect of putting a stay on the Final Award, which, therefore, remains valid and enforceable. It is said also by Mr Heskjaer that the commencement of those proceedings is no more than an effort to frustrate the Applicant’s valid entitlement to have the Final Award recognised and enforced. It is further said in Mr Heskjaer’s affidavit that none of the grounds referred to in Article 36 of the Model Law are present in this case which might afford a basis for the Court not to enforce the Final Award.

18. Notwithstanding that the Final Award is dated 23 June 2025, and payment was sought thereafter within 14 days by the Applicant, and notwithstanding the fact that notice of this application was served on the Respondent on 24 October 2025, no material has been put before the Court to suggest what grounds have been advanced by the Respondent to set aside the Final Award in Denmark, and no assertions have been made by the Respondent that there is any stay on the award in Denmark. I am proceeding, therefore, on the basis that there is no stay on the Final Award, and that the award remains final and binding on the parties in Denmark.

19. It seems to me that this application clearly falls within s. 23(1) of the 2010 Act which provides that:

“An award (other than an award within the meaning of section 25) made by an arbitral tribunal under an arbitration agreement shall be enforceable in the State either by action or, by leave of the High Court, in the same manner as a judgment or order of that Court with the same effect and where leave is given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award.”

This is such an award made by an arbitral tribunal, under an arbitration agreement. In my view, it is enforceable in this State, and it is enforceable by means of an application for leave to enforce the award, which is what this application before me is.

20. My attention was appropriately drawn by counsel to Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law which is contained in a schedule to the 2010 Act. Article 35 deals with enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Article 36 sets out the grounds for refusing recognition enforcement, and those grounds are, as noted earlier, rather limited. No grounds falling under Article 36(1) have been advanced by the Respondent to the Court, and in any event, it does not appear to me that any of those grounds would apply on the facts of this case.

21. My attention was also appropriately drawn by counsel to Article 36(2) of the Model Law. That paragraph provides that:

“(2) If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award has been made to a court referred to in paragraph (1)(a)(v) of this article, the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order the other party to provide appropriate security.”

22. The relevant court is one that is mentioned in Article 36(1)(a)(v), and that is the court of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award has been made which in this case would be the Danish court. The proceedings brought in Denmark appear to be seeking a declaration that the award is invalid, however, these proceedings do not appear to have led to any suspension of or stay on the Final Award. The question is whether, in those circumstances and in light of the factual situation here, I should consider it “proper” to adjourn my decision on the recognition and enforcement application or to take any other step including ordering the Respondent to provide appropriate security. The Respondent has failed to cooperate and participate in this application before me, as indicated earlier. The Respondent has not provided any material to the Court which would suggest that there is any basis for the Court to conclude that there is any form of a stateable case to set aside this award in the Danish courts. There is no material provided by the Respondent that would allow me to conclude that it would be “proper” to defer or adjourn my decision on recognition and enforcement of this award, nor is there any basis for me to direct the provision of appropriate security in circumstances where I have not been provided with any information on the Respondent company other than that it is the holding company of the contractor in this case which is a company described as being in liquidation. I have no indication that the Respondent would be in a position to or would be willing to provide any security, much less security amounting to the value of the Final Award of the Arbitrator in this case, or anything like it. I do not, therefore, consider it “proper” or appropriate to adjourn my decision, nor do I believe it would be appropriate for me to embark on a consideration as to whether the Respondent should provide security in lieu of the enforcement of the Final Award until the Danish proceedings are determined.

23. I am, therefore, satisfied that I should now proceed to make the orders sought recognising and enforcing the Final Award of the Arbitrator in this case and I will turn now to the Originating Notice of Motion which sets out the orders which the Applicant seeks. I will first make an order in terms of para. 1 of the motion, namely, an order pursuant to s. 23(1) of the Arbitration Act 2010 recognising and enforcing the Final Award dated 23 June 2025 as against the Respondent in the sum of €236,525.96 in respect of the principal amounts, €30,000 in respect of VAT exclusive legal costs and €20,800 in respect of arbitration costs. I will make an order in the terms set out at para.

2 in respect of interest on the award as of 7 October 2025 in the sum of €72,222.11. I will also make an order entering judgment in favour of the Applicant in those amounts. I am satisfied that it is necessary for the court to expressly order that judgment be entered in the terms of the relevant arbitral award. In this regard, I accept the wise advice given by Arran Dowling-Hussey and Derek Dunne, the authors of Arbitration Law (3rd Edition), at p. 501, para. 8-129 where they say:

“The court can only give leave to enforce the award in terms of the award itself. When bringing an application for an order giving leave to enforce an arbitral award under s. 23 of the 2010 Act, care should be taken to ensure that the Notice of Motion seeking relief under s.23 of the 2010 Act, in addition to claiming an order pursuant to s. 23(1) of the 2010 Act giving leave to the applicant to enforce the arbitral award in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court with the same effect, also claims an order pursuant to s.23(1) of the 2010 Act entering judgment in terms of the arbitral award. At the hearing of the application, if the court grants the relief sought, care should also be taken to ensure to request the court to expressly order that judgment shall be entered in terms of the arbitral award. If the order of the court giving leave to enforce an arbitral award does not also include an order entering judgment in favour of the applicant in terms of the arbitral award, it will not be possible to obtain leave to issue execution of the order enforcing the arbitral award under Ord.

42 r.24 of the Rules of the Superior Courts”.

24. I will, therefore, make a further order under s. 23(1) of the 2010 Act entering judgment in the terms of the Final Award in the sums referred to at paras. 1 and 2 of the Originating Notice of Motion (i.e. €359,548.07). I will make no specific order in respect of ongoing interest accruing for the reasons mentioned earlier. I will make an order that the Respondent pay the costs of the Applicant of this application, to be adjudicated on in default of agreement. I will give liberty to apply in the event of any significant development in relation to any final order of a Danish court in the event that it reverses or sets aside the Final Award of the Arbitrator.