High Court extends time and quashes Tribunal decision for failing to address IDP claim.

[2025] IEHC 665

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2024/704JR]

BETWEEN

B.N. (GEORGIA)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND THE

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 28th day of November, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant, who is from Georgia, seeks to challenge a decision of the first respondent (the Tribunal) made on the 30 April 2024, which upheld a first instance decision by the International Protection Office (IPO) recommending that the applicant should not be granted international protection. As required by the International Protection Act 2015, the identity of the applicant has been anonymised.

2. On foot of the pleadings and as refined in oral argument, the court is required to adjudicate on two issues. The first is the procedural question of whether the applicant is entitled to an extension of time to bring the challenge, and the second is the substantive question raised by the applicant. The substantive question was posed by the applicant in written legal submissions as follows: “Did the Tribunal err in law and breach constitutional justice by failing to exercise its jurisdiction to examine and decide the Applicant’s international protection appeal, as made, by ignoring the claim presented in the appeal of an entitlement to international protection simply by being an internally displaced person from Abkhazia subject only to an internal relocation analysis in respect of Georgia?”

3. For the reasons explained in this judgment the court is satisfied (a) that the applicant ought to be granted an extension of time and (b) that the Tribunal’s decision should be quashed and remitted for further consideration. The basis upon which the court has decided that the Tribunal’s decision cannot stand is that there was a failure to engage with a substantial issue raised on behalf of the applicant as part of the appeal process.

4. The respondents argued that the underlying issue raised on behalf of the applicant was without merit or unfounded, such that nothing could be achieved by having it addressed by a freshly constituted Tribunal. I have decided that I should not seek to form a judgment on the argument raised by the applicant, as I consider that this is something that the applicant was entitled to have addressed as part of the statutory process. Accordingly, this judgment will not engage with the underlying merits of the issue raised by the applicant. That is something that will have to be addressed on foot of a fresh consideration. If that, in turn, raises an issue for further proceedings the substantial question will fall to be addressed at that point. This judgment is concerned with the legality and fairness of the Tribunal adopting the course of not adequately addressing an issue that formed a substantial part of the applicant’s appeal to that body.

BACKGROUND

5. The applicant was born in 1988. He left Georgia on the 23 February 2023 and entered the State on the 25 February 2023. He applied for international protection on the 27 February 2023, and on the same date he completed the IPO questionnaire. In that questionnaire he explained that he was seeking international protection on the basis that his partner was a distant relative, and their families opposed their marriage. He referred to verbal threats and physical assaults, and that they were hiding from their families but could not continue to stay in Georgia. He stated that the threats were not reported to local authorities because they wanted to avoid further complications with the families.

6. The applicant was interviewed pursuant to section 35(12) of the 2015 Act on the 21 March 2023, with the assistance of an interpreter. As part of that process he explained that his partner was related on their mothers’ sides and that they had been a couple since 2020, which gave rise to family difficulties. Essentially, his account was that his partner’s brother had criminal connections in Georgia and that they had faced threats from him through intermediaries. In addition, the applicant’s family members and the family of his partner’s former husband were making threats. He stated that he was unwilling to report matters to the authorities because of a relative who had political influence in Georgia.

7. Subsequently, solicitors acting for the applicant sent submissions in support of his application by email dated the 12 September 2023. Of considerable significance to what transpired, in addition to addressing the matters disclosed by the applicant in his interview, the email addressed a new substantial issue: the fact that the applicant had the status of an “internally displaced person” (IDP) in Georgia.

8. According to the submission, the applicant’s family was from the Svaneti area in Georgia. After the family home was destroyed in an earthquake, the applicant was relocated to Abkhazia. Following the breakdown of the USSR, there was conflict in Abkhazia and the applicant had to flee that area. The email then asserted: “As an IDP the applicant need only establish a real risk of persecution/serous harm as an ethnic Georgian in Abkhazia together with unreasonableness of relocation within the rest of Georgia in order to make out his need for international protection. Country reports (see attached) show that the applicant is at real risk of suffering persecution for reasons of his Georgian race in Abkhazia. The threat of violence and intimidation from his and his partner’s extended families renders continued internal relocation within Georgia unreasonable and/or unduly harsh for the applicant.”

9. The email attached extracts from country of origin information (COI) that described difficulties for ethnic Georgians in the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russian and Armenian communities form the majority.

10. The IPO recommended that the applicant should be refused international protection and subsidiary protection. This was communicated to the applicant by letter dated the 14 September 2023. The reasons for the recommendation were set out in a report pursuant to section 39 of the 2015 Act. As it is not relevant to the particular issue that arises in this application it is not necessary to set out the reasons that were given, save to note that the IPO accepted most of the material facts asserted by the applicant in his interview but did not accept that he would be in danger of persecution or a real risk of serious harm if he was returned to Georgia. In the context of Georgia being designated as a safe country of origin, the IPO decision noted there were difficulties and some lack of information in relation to the situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but that there was no ongoing situation of international or internal armed conflict in Georgia. There was no discussion of the issue raised in relation to the asserted status of the applicant as an IDP.

11. The applicant forwarded a notice of appeal to the Tribunal under cover of a letter from his solicitor dated the 28 September 2023.The covering letter also set out submissions on behalf of the applicant. It can be noted that the applicant in this case had a letter from the Georgian Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons dated the 28 March 2023, which confirmed that he had the status of an IDP. An oral hearing was requested. The submissions addressed the issues relating to the family conflict, but also highlighted the IDP issue as a separate matter that required to be addressed.

12. In that regard, COI was presented, and the following matters were expressly identified in the grounds of appeal: “2. The s.39 report fails to have any proper regard to the applicant’s status as an internally displaced person or to the risk of persecution/serious harm faced by the applicant in Abkhazia.” “6. Internal relocation is not relevant as the applicant will be at risk from (sic) throughout Georgia. Without prejudice to this, internal relocation would not be a reasonable option for the applicant and his partner in their particular circumstances, including the applicant’s status as someone who has been displaced by conflict in Georgia in the past. …”

13. The Tribunal permitted an oral hearing, which occurred on the 14 March 2024. After the hearing, the applicant’s solicitors made a further submission dated the 7 April 2024. As part of that submission the solicitors referred to an earlier Tribunal decision which was stated to address IDP issues. A redacted copy of that decision, from November 2021, was exhibited as part of the pleadings. It related to a claim by a Georgian applicant from Abkhazia. The factual situation was different from this case insofar as the applicant in that case claimed to have fought for the Georgian army and had been threatened by Abkhazian separatists. The Tribunal noted that a “novel” submission had been made to the effect that State protection for the applicant should be assessed in respect of the part of the country that he is from, Abkhazia, and that the real issue was one of internal relocation. The Tribunal accepted that while living outside Abkhazia the applicant in that case was treated as an IDP. Hence, the Tribunal concluded, albeit accepting that it was a “most unusual case”, that “the question is not simply whether there is police protection in Georgia to prevent him from harm, but whether it is reasonable for him to live in those places”

14. It can be observed that it is established that a Tribunal is not bound by any concept of precedence or stare decisis in relation to other Tribunal decisions, although the value of consistency has been referred to by the High Court. In addition, the earlier Tribunal decision was addressing a situation in which there was a finding that the applicant had established a well-founded fear of persecution with a Convention nexus. The consideration to the status of the applicant as an IDP was in the context of next logical step of the process which was a consideration of whether state protection was available.

THE TRIBUNAL DECISION UNDER CHALLENGE

15. The Tribunal decision that is challenged in these proceedings issued on the 29 April 2024. The decision noted that there had been an oral hearing in which both the applicant and his partner addressed the Tribunal with the assistance of an interpreter, and that post hearing submissions were permitted and received.

16. The substantive part of the decision commences with an assessment of the facts and circumstances that had been asserted by the applicant and his partner. It was accepted that the applicant and his partner were in a relationship and that their families disapproved of the relationship.

17. For the reasons explained in the decision, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant and his partner were threatened that they would be killed, whether by persons who were politically connected or otherwise. The Tribunal found that the parties had conducted their relationship openly while together in Georgia, and that the applicant continued to live and work in the same location. The Tribunal rejected the claims by the applicant’s partner that she had been threatened and assaulted by persons under the direction of her family. In addition, the Tribunal found that there was no support in the COI relating to the type of claim of family threats articulated by the applicant. None of those findings have been challenged in these proceedings.

18. With regard to the analysis of the well-founded fear criterion, the Tribunal started from the premise that there was insufficient evidence to make any finding that the applicant or his partner had been subjected to persecution. Having regard to the status of Georgia as a safe country, the Tribunal did not accept that there was a basis for the couple to fear a reasonable chance of persecution if returned to Georgia. This led to the conclusion to uphold the IPO recommendation that refugee status should be refused.

19. With regard to the subsidiary protection claims, the Tribunal found that there were no risks of serious harm by reference to death penalty, execution, torture or degrading treatment or punishment criteria. In relation to the Article 1(c) criterion, ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict’, the Tribunal stated the following: “36. The Tribunal has considered the COI before it and finds that while there are difficult situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, although the [applicant] lived in Abkhazia he left in the 1990’s. Both appellants have lived in [area of Georgia], and so the Tribunal is not satisfied that they are at real risk of serious harm by reason of internal armed conflict. Georgia is not currently in a state of international armed conflict.”

20. Hence for the reasons set out, the Tribunal found that the applicant and his partner were not entitled to subsidiary protection, and the overall recommendations of the IPO were affirmed.

THE PROCEEDINGS

21. On the 9 May 2015, the applicant applied for a review pursuant to s. 49(7) of the 2015 Act. As part of that application, the applicant’s solicitor asserted that the Tribunal decision failed to consider the IDP status of the applicant.

22. On the 29 July 2024, the applicant applied for and was granted leave to apply for judicial review. In summary, the relief sought in the statement of grounds was (a) an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the Tribunal; and (b) if necessary, an order pursuant to s. 5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended) extending the period for making the application for leave. The legal grounds upon which the applicant was permitted to seek that relief was: “1. The first Respondent erred in law and breached constitutional justice by failing to exercise the first Respondent’s jurisdiction to examine and decide the Applicant’s international protection appeal as made, by ignoring the claim presented in the appeal of entitlement to international protection simply by being an IDP from Abkhazia subject only to an internal relocation analysis in respect of the rest of Georgia.

2. The Tribunal erred in law by failing to treat the applicant as entitled to international protection simply by being an IDP from Abkhazia subject only to an internal relocation analysis in respect of the rest of Georgia.”

23. The notice of motion was filed on the 9 August 2024 with an initial return date of the 4 November 2024. The factual basis for the claim, which has been summarised above, was set out in an affidavit sworn by the applicant on the 19 July 2024, and affidavits sworn by his solicitor, Mr Ó Briain, on the 28 May 2024 and the 22 July 2024, with the second affidavit addressing the extension of time issue.

24. In that second affidavit, Mr Ó Briain sets out that following receipt of the Tribunal

decision the applicant decided that it should be challenged. The chronology of material events is as follows: Monday, 20 May 2024: Which was during the Whit vacation, documents were emailed to counsel. Tuesday, 21 May 2024: The solicitor had a discussion with counsel. Wednesday, 22 May 2024: Further documents were sent to counsel. Monday, 27 May 2024: Counsel emailed draft papers to Mr Ó Briain. Tuesday, 28 May 2024: Mr Ó Briain swore the grounding affidavit, and on that afternoon an employee sought to file papers in the Central Office but arrived after the Stamping Office closed at 15.30. Wednesday, 29 May 2024: The papers were filed and Mr Ó Briain emailed the asylum list seeking the next available date to move the ex parte application.

25. The respondents filed a statement of opposition on the 14 January 2025; and a short verifying affidavit was sworn on the same date by John Moore, a Higher Executive Officer in the Minister’s Immigration Service Delivery unit.

26. The statement of opposition set out a preliminary objection on the basis that the proceedings had been commenced one day after the expiration of the statutory time period. The substantive basis for opposing the applicant’s claims was premised on a factual description of the relevant events. In that regard, the respondents highlighted that the applicant himself had never given evidence to the effect that he faced persecution or risk of serious harm by virtue of being an IDP. Instead, it was asserted, that the applicant’s own evidence had focussed on the risks that he claimed flowed from the family response to his relationship with his partner.

27. Next, the respondents asserted that the Tribunal had to be taken to have considered the submissions made on behalf of the applicant. This was on the basis that the Tribunal expressly identified the submissions and other documents referable to the IDP issue and had stated that those documents were “fully assessed”.

28. Without prejudice to that point, the respondents went on to assert that even if there was no narrative discussion of the relevance of the applicant’s status as an IDP, this was not required having regard to the finding that there was no evidence of a well founded fear of persecution.

29. Finally, the respondents engaged with and disputed the proposition that an applicant could be entitled to international protection simply by being an IDP from Abkhazia. Put briefly, it was said that protection could not be given solely on the basis of a particular status but that the relevant tests had to be considered by reference to the particular circumstances of an applicant and the evidence tendered in that regard.

THE ARGUMENTS

30. By way of brief summary, as noted above the applicant narrowed his case to the simple proposition that the Tribunal fell into illegality by failing to engage with the arguments relating to his status as an IDP. The respondents’ case was that (a) the submissions on the applicant’s IDP status were acknowledged and there was a statement that they had been considered; (b) the IDP issue properly was not relevant in light of the findings on fear of persecution and serious harm; and, (c) the IDP point in any event was manifestly incorrect as a matter of law.

DISCUSSION: EXTENSION OF TIME

31. I am satisfied that the correct approach to an application for an extension of time under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended, recently has been set out comprehensively and correctly in the judgment of Simons J. in P. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT and Minister for Justice [2025] IEHC 403.

32. First, the judgment highlights the distinction between the test in other statutes and the RSC between the necessity to “show good and sufficient reason to make the application within” a prescribed period, and the test under the 2000 Act, whether there is “good and sufficient reason” for extending the period.

33. Second, the court should have regard to the analogous principles for an extension under Order 84, rule 21 of the RSC, albeit mindful that the threshold under Order 84 appears slightly higher. In that regard, relevant factors may include the nature of the orders under challenge, the conduct of the parties, the effect of the decision under challenge, steps taken by the parties subsequent to the decision under challenge, and the public policy consideration that public law challenges should be prosecuted promptly. It can be noted that Simons J. identified that an important policy consideration underpinning section 5 of the 2000 Act, was to ensure that the proceedings themselves would be determined with expedition and that delay in commencing proceedings could hinder the achievement of that policy objective.

34. Having regard to the factors identified above and the manner in which the extension application was dealt with in P. (Zimbabwe) it seems to me that the applicant has set out good and sufficient reasons for an extension of time. a. First, the delay was very minimal. It is very clear that the applicant sought to progress matters with real expedition, during a court vacation, to the point that the only reason why an extension is required is that the applicant’s solicitor attempted to file papers on time but encountered difficulty because the stamping office closed at 15.30 on the day in question. b. Second, that minimal delay did not contribute to any delay in the listing or determination of the proceedings. It can be noted that while the notice of motion issued returnable in the first instance for November 2024, the opposition papers were not filed until January 2025. c. Third, there was no argued or identifiable prejudice to the respondents. d. Fourth, the application for an extension was heard in tandem with the hearing of the substantive application for relief. e. Fifth, this was not a situation in which the applicant’s case manifestly was very weak or bound to fail.

35. Overall therefore, when the court considers the application and balances the respective justices of the parties’ position, it seems to me that there is a very strong basis for granting the extension sought.

DISCUSSION – THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

36. The first point for discussion is that I do not consider that in the circumstances of this case a legitimate distinction can be drawn between matters that an applicant raises in evidence and matters that are raised by legal representatives by way of a legal submission. It is fair to observe that ordinarily the applicant should identify, and is best served by identifying from an early stage, all the matters that go to making up their claim particularly in relation to factual matters. Equally however, the benefit of providing access to legal representation would be hollowed out if potentially important legal issues raised by those representatives were not afforded proper consideration. More fundamentally, the legal representatives act as agent for the applicant, and their arguments are his arguments.

37. Here, the point raised – whether ultimately it is a good or bad point – was identified and articulated clearly in the written submissions made as part of the appeal to the Tribunal. The applicant sought to progress that argument by reference to extensive COI. It must be treated as having formed an important part of the applicant’s case.

38. I do not consider that the respondents are correct that the issue raised by the applicant in these proceedings can be responded to by reference to the line of authority from G.K. v. Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418, which provides that if a decision maker expressly states that they have considered all the materials and arguments this should be accepted unless there is reason to believe that the statement is not correct. Likewise I do not consider that this issue falls within the category of issues addressed in cases such as I.R. v. Minister for Justice [2015]

4 IR 144, which hold that it is not necessary for the decision maker to mention every argument or every piece of evidence so long as the basis upon which the decision was made can be ascertained from the decision.

39. First, I consider that the general proposition in G.K. v. Minister for Justice largely responds to an administrative law argument that a decision maker failed to take account of a relevant consideration. More importantly the presumption that a decision maker has considered relevant matters may be rebutted by evidence to suggest that this was not so. In this case, it is not at all clear from the narrative portion of the decision referred to above that the Tribunal engaged with and resolved the actual argument made by the applicant, as opposed to simply referring to the fact that the applicant had been living outside of Abkhazia for some time, in the context of the Article 1(c) aspect of the subsidiary protection criteria.

40. Second, the I.R. v. Minster for Justice point, which is a central and entirely wellestablished feature of the jurisprudence is directed to the practicalities of decision making and the role of the court in judicial review. It is critically important to ensure that administrative

decision making is not unduly burdened by a requirement exhaustively to list and deal with each and every point raised by an applicant. However, the point made by the applicant here is that the decision was invalidated not merely by a failure to consider the arguments about the consequences of the IDP status, but rather that this argument was central to his claim, but appears to have been misunderstood and thus not properly considered. In that sense that the Tribunal fell into error, inter alia, by failing to comply with sections 28(4) and 61(3)(a) of the 2015 Act.

41. In the context of applications for international protection the decision maker is subject to a series of obligations that go beyond the obligations on a decision maker in what could be treated as the ordinary course of administrative law requirements.

42. In R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297, Hogan J. for the Court of Appeal emphasised the effect of the Qualification Directive on the role of the court in addressing a judicial review application concerning international protection: “63. It is, in any event, clear since the coming into force of the Qualification Directive (Directive 2004/83/EC) that the grant of asylum is fundamentally governed by EU law: see Case C-57/09 and C-101/09 B and D EU:C:2010:661. As this Court has already made clear in NM (DRC), the requirement of Article

39 of the Procedures Directive means that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings must nonetheless ensure that “the reasons which led the competent authority to reject the application for asylum as unfounded … may be the subject of a thorough review by the national court.”…”.

43. Hence, the court, while dealing with a judicial review application, is approaching the matter on the basis that what is required is a “thorough review”. A thorough review of the legality of a decision may be hindered if there is a conspicuous lack of clarity as to whether and if so how a decision maker engaged with and responded to a central legal issue, or if the

decision itself is open to a strong suggestion that the decision maker in addressing a central legal issue in effect addressed and answered a different question to that posed by an applicant.

44. The second general proposition applicable to international protection claims governed by EU law arises from the decision of the CJEU in Case C-756/21, X v IPAT. That decision was in a reference for a preliminary ruling that had been made by the High Court where a question arose regarding the duty of cooperation in Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83. Of note, the Court reiterated at para 50 of the ruling that: “ … the assessment as to whether or not the established circumstances constitute such a threat that the person concerned may reasonably fear, in the light of his individual situation, that he will in fact be subjected to acts of persecution must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the European Union …”

45. In the ruling, the CJEU found that the duty of cooperation required the determining authority to obtain up to date information regarding all the relevant facts as regards the general situation prevailing in the country of origin of an applicant for international protection. The obligation of cooperation and active engagement flows from the fundamental nature of the rights at issue.

46. Here the applicant as part of his argument, and as part of what I consider a central element of his argument, raised the IDP issue by reference to reasonably extensive COI regarding the concerns about South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

47. The EU law duty of cooperation is reflected in section 28 of the 2015 Act, which requires decision makers to assess all relevant elements of the application in cooperation with the applicant. The elements identified in s. 28(3) include the nationality and identity of the applicant and his “reasons for seeking international protection”. Likewise, s. 28(4) of the 2015 Act requires that an individual assessment is undertaken on an individual basis and that regard is had to a variety of elements including “all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking of a decision on the application, including the laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied.”(section 28(3)(a)). Relatedly, s. 61(3)(a) of the 2015 requires the Tribunal to operate in an inquisitorial nature.

48. Ultimately, I am not at all satisfied that the important principles derived from cases such as G.K. v. Minister for Justice or I.R. v. Minister for Justice were intended to override the obligation on the Tribunal to adequately consider the applicant’s “core claim”, as explained, for instance, in P.D. v. Minister for Justice [2015] IEHC 111. That case dealt with a challenge to a first instance decision under the earlier Refugee Act 1996, as amended; however, it seems to me the general principles described by Mac Eochaidh J. are of equal applicability and importance to matters dealt with under the auspices of the 2015 Act.

49. In P.D. v. Minister for Justice, the court reviewed decisions on the question of how “core claims” should be addressed and noted: “48. It is an over simplification of this jurisprudence to say that a decision maker must decide on the truth of each element of a claim for asylum. The common thread in the judgments is the need for clearly expressed decisions in relation to the core claim. The extent to which the elements of a claim are required to be formally decided depends on the circumstances of each case.”

50. The court also noted, at para. 63, that where such an error occurs it “constitutes significant error as to jurisdiction”.

51. I am conscious that many of the decisions in the international protection area that consider the question of whether a core claim has been addressed concern factual matters asserted by applicants. Hence, in M.A.B. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner & Ors [2014] IEHC 64, the court found that a decision was vitiated because the decision maker failed to state whether it was accepted that the applicant was a member of a particular tribe. As put by O’Malley J., this issue “was indeed a core part of the applicant’s claim. If it was not believed, then it would appear that he had no case at all. If it was believed, that did not necessarily determine the issue of his status, but it would provide a significant substratum of accepted fact.” Similarly, in M.M. v. Chief International Protection Officer & Ors [2022] IECA 226, the Court of Appeal found that the appellant’s sexual orientation and her personal safety in her country in light of that orientation “was at the very heart of her application”, and accordingly a clear finding was required.

52. In this case, what was required was not a finding of fact (although there are factual elements to the claim), but instead a consideration of the argument that the applicant’s status mandated a particular legal outcome. On balance, I am not satisfied that a distinction can be drawn between the resolution of factual and legal assertions where they form part of the core claim, and there is an assertion that the resolution of the issue may be determinative or at least strongly influence the outcome. The essential question is whether it is a satisfactory discharge of the legal obligations on the decision maker to proceed to make a decision without satisfactory evidence that there has been engagement with a core claim.

53. I agree with the respondents that the Tribunal is not bound by prior IPAT decisions, and that each decision must proceed on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. Nevertheless, there is some value in consistency, and it can be observed in this case that the Tribunal member’s attention was directed to an earlier decision – albeit not on all fours with the issues raised in the applicant’s case – in which the question of IDPs from Abkhazia was addressed. Again, where this formed part of the core claims of the applicant I do consider that it is adequate simply to state that this matter was considered, without there being any intimation as to how the matter was decided.

54. I disagree with the respondents that the court should treat the overall IDP argument as one that was inevitably bound to fail on the basis that IDPs do not have any particular cognisable legal status in refugee law; and, in turn, that there is no utility in having the matter remitted to be reconsidered by a fresh Tribunal. The point agitated in this case was that, whether ultimately this was a good or bad argument, it was a central legal argument raised by the applicant and one that he was entitled to have addressed at the appeal stage and not to have effectively determined for the first time by way of judicial review.

55. The Oireachtas in giving effect to EU law provisions on international protection has set out a structure for the resolution of claims. If a core claim is not addressed through the applicable statutory processes, the applicant has been deprived of the procedures provided for in law and the decision maker has erred as to jurisdiction. Judicial review does not operate as an effective substitute for the statutory decision-making process. The essence of the role of the court in judicial review in a broad sense is to consider the legality of the process, and not to make a decision that has been reserved to a statutory decision maker.

56. In all the circumstances, I am persuaded by the applicant that the Tribunal in this case fell into error. The applicant made the consequence of his status as an IDP a core part of his claim for international protection. The argument was that because of his status as an IDP the applicant “need only establish a real risk of persecution / serious harm as an ethnic Georgian in Abkhazia together with unreasonableness of relocation elsewhere in Georgia in order to make out his need for international protection.” While the decision touched on the fact that the applicant was from Abkhazia it did not properly engage with or determine that legal proposition. I consider that this was an error that vitiates the decision and requires it to be remitted for fresh consideration. Hence, the relief sought should be granted.

57. It is essential to make clear that the applicant is entitled to have the Tribunal engage with his core claim. As noted at the outset of this judgment, the core claim will or will not succeed; how it is resolved is a matter for the Tribunal. This judgment is directed to requiring the fresh Tribunal to engage with the IDP issue, but it should not in any sense be treated as preempting how the Tribunal should resolve that issue.

58. As this judgment is being delivered electronically my provisional view is that the applicant should be entitled to his costs to be adjudicated in default of agreement. In case the parties consider or wish to argue for a different approach to costs I will list the matter before me for final arguments at 10.30am on Thursday, the 11 December 2025.