High Court refers fee interpretation questions to CJEU under Aarhus Convention and equivalence principle.

[2025] IEHC 663

THE HIGH COURT

PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT

[H.MCA.2025.0000151]

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 13 OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES (ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT) REGULATIONS 2007

TO 2014

BETWEEN

SAVE LEITRIM ENVIRONMENTAL AND BIODIVERSITY COMPANY LIMITED BY GUARANTEE

APPELLANT

AND

COMMISSIONER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

RESPONDENT

AND

COILLTE CUIDEACHTA GHNÍOMHAÍOCHTA AINMNITHE AND IRELAND AND THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTICE PARTIES

AND

RIGHT TO KNOW CLG (BY ORDER)

AMICUS CURIAE

(No. 2)

JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Friday the 28th day of November 2025

Subject-matter of the dispute

1. This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(2) of Directive

2003/4 and/or Article 4(8) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on

Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental

Matters done at Aarhus on 25 June 1998 (the Aarhus Convention).

2. The request is being made in proceedings concerning an appeal to the referring court by the

appellant against a decision of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (the

commissioner) in respect of a fee imposed by a public body, the first named notice party (Coillte)

for time spent on search, retrieval and compilation in respect of information on the environment

requested by the appellant.

3. The appeal to the referring court against the decision of the commissioner was filed on 27

March 2025. The matter was heard on 26 September 2025. The referring court gave an initial

judgment on 22 October 2025, dealing with certain procedural and subsidiary issues and identifying

questions for reference to the CJEU. The parties then made further written submissions on the

answers to the questions. On 10 November 2025, the amicus was joined by order and made

submissions shortly thereafter.

4. In those circumstances the referring court is staying the proceedings and referring the

questions below to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

Legal context

Relevant international law

5. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention)

provides:

“Article 31

General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be

given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to

the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in

connection with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion

of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty

or the application of its provisions;

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement

of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”

Relevant European Union law measures

6. Article 216(1) TFEU provides for the EU to conclude international agreements. Article

216(2) provides that:

“Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on

its Member States.”

7. The Aarhus Convention was signed by the Community and subsequently approved by

Decision 2005/370. The provisions of the convention relevant to the present case include Article

4(8).

8. Relevant provisions of Directive 2003/4 include recital 18 and Article 5.

9. The CJEU (Grand Chamber) outlined the relationship between the Aarhus Convention and

the EU legal order in the judgment of 8 March 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo

životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, C‑240/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:125.

10. The CJEU considered Article 31 of the Vienna Convention in its judgment of 21 December

2023, Scuola europea di Varese, C‑431/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1021.

11. The CJEU held in the judgment of 6 October 2015, East Sussex County Council v Information

Commissioner, C-71/14, EU:C:2015:656 inter alia:

“Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28

January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive

90/313/EEC must be interpreted as meaning that the charge for supplying a particular type

of environmental information may not include any part of the cost of maintaining a database,

such as that at issue in the main proceedings, used for that purpose by the public authority,

but may include the overheads attributable to the time spent by the staff of the public

authority on answering individual requests for information, properly taken into account in

fixing the charge, provided that the total amount of the charge does not exceed a reasonable

amount.”

12. In ACCC/C/2017/147 (Republic of Moldova)

(https://unece.org/env/pp/cc/accc.c.2017.147_republic-moldova), the Aarhus Convention

Compliance Committee (ACCC) said at para. 89:

“89. Moreover, the Committee underlines that any charges for supplying environmental

information must be based on a transparent calculation and, while they may include a

contribution towards the material costs for supplying the environmental information, they

must not include the cost of the initial production, collection or acquisition of the information

itself or any other indirect cost. Thus, information held by public authorities should be

provided for free or at no more than the reasonable material costs of supplying the requested

information (e.g. postage or copying costs). Lastly, any charge must not have a deterrent

effect on persons wishing to obtain information, effectively restricting their right of access

to information.”

13. These findings were endorsed by the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) (including Ireland and all

other EU states as well as the EU itself) (Economic Commission for Europe Meeting of the Parties to

the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters Seventh session Geneva, 18–20 October 2021 Excerpt from the

addendum to the report of the seventh session of the Meeting of the Parties

(ECE/MP.PP/2021/2/Add.1)* Decision VII/8n concerning compliance by the Republic of Moldova with

its obligations under the Convention Adopted by the Meeting of Parties to the Convention on Access

to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental

Matters at its seventh session):

“The Meeting of the Parties,

Acting under paragraph 37 of the annex to its decision I/7 on the review of compliance,

Taking note of the findings of the Committee on communication ACCC/C/2017/147

concerning compliance by the Republic of Moldova in connection with access to

hydrometeorological information upon request,

Encouraged by the willingness of the Republic of Moldova to discuss in a constructive manner

with the Committee the compliance issues in question,

1. Endorses the findings of the Committee that:

(a) By establishing and maintaining a schedule of charges that does not meet the

requirement to ensure that any charge for supplying information does not exceed a

reasonable amount, the Party concerned fails to comply with article 4 (8) of the Convention;

(b) By not establishing and maintaining a clear, transparent and consistent framework to

implement article 4 (8) of the Convention, the Party concerned fails to comply with article 3

(1) of the Convention”

14. At the October 2021 MOP meeting, there were 19 contracting states the subject of decisions

on reports of the ACCC: https://unece.org/env/pp/cc/implementation-decisions-meeting-parties-

compliance-individual-parties.

15. The relevant ACCC reports are at https://unece.org/env/pp/cc/communications-from-the-

public.

16. A comparison between the ACCC reports and the MOP decisions (helpfully prepared by the

appellant) is set out in the Annex to the judgment of the referring court of 22 October 2025.

17. Review of the text of those decisions indicates:

(i) MOP decisions take a standard form in which the operative findings of the ACCC are

expressly endorsed – there are 31 instances of this across the 19 contracting parties

involved, some of which are the subject of multiple communications;

(ii) the wording of what is endorsed follows closely the operative findings of the ACCC,

and thus the level of detail in the MOP decision depends on those findings rather

than on selectivity by the MOP;

(iii) in eight cases (including Moldova, Ukraine and Ireland) the formula used is to take

note of the ACCC findings and then to endorse the operative findings; and

(iv) the Moldova decision is in a standard form in these and any other relevant respects.

18. The Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide (2nd Ed., 2014) at p. 224 states:

“To date, all findings of non-compliance by the Compliance Committee have been endorsed

by the Meeting of the Parties.”

19. Hence, there was nothing unusually weak or limited about the wording used in the Moldova

decision.

20. Parties have also identified the following potentially relevant EU law materials which relate

to the principle of equivalence:

(i) judgment of 16 December 1976, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v

Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, Case 33/76, ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, [1976]

E.C.R. 1989; and

(ii) judgment of 8 July 2010, Bulicke v Deutsche Büro Service GmbH, C-246/09,

ECLI:EU:C:2010:418, [2010] E.C.R. I-7003.

List of relevant domestic law measures

21. The European Communities (Access to Information on the Environment) Regulations 2007

(S.I. 133 of 2007) (the AIE regulations), as amended by S.I. 662 of 2011, S.I. 615 of 2014 and

S.I. 309 of 2018 transpose Directive 2003/4 into Irish law. A consolidated version is at:

https://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/2007/si/133/front/revised/en/html. It was not argued that

there was any material distinction between the wording of domestic law and the wording of the

Directive. The provision on fees is section 15.

22. The Freedom of Information Act 2014

(https://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/2014/act/30/revised/en/html) deals with fees in section 27. In

addition section 12(7) allows a body subject to Freedom of Information (FOI) to advise a requester

that information may be available under the AIE regulations.

23. Regulation 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (Fees) (No. 2) Regulations 2014 (S.I. 531

of 2014) (https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2014/si/531/made/en/print) provides:

“(1) Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) –

(a) an amount of €20.00 per hour is prescribed for the purposes of paragraph (a) of

section 27(3), and

(b) the following amounts are prescribed for the purposes of paragraph (b) of section

27(3):

(i) 4 cent per sheet in relation to a photocopy;

(ii) €10.00 in relation to a CD ROM (a compact disk read-only memory);

(iii) €6.00 in relation to an x-ray.

(2) Subject to paragraph (4), the appropriate maximum amount under paragraph (1),

for the purposes of paragraph (c) of section 27(3), is prescribed as €500.

(3) The appropriate minimum amount under paragraph (1), for the purposes of

paragraph (d) of section 27(3), is prescribed as €101.

(4) The overall ceiling limit under paragraph (1), for the purposes of paragraph (b) of

section 27(12), is prescribed as €700.”

Key facts

24. The appellant made a request to Coillte for access to environmental information on 12 July

2023 in relation to correspondence from August 2022 between Coillte and Soil Association

Certification in connection with the certification audit undertaken by that body of Coillte in and

around May 2022. An implied or deemed refusal arose on 11 August 2023, because a response was

not received within the time limit.

25. The appellant requested an internal review on 13 August 2023. That was granted on 11

September 2023, whereby the information was to be supplied subject to payment of a €30 fee.

26. On 13 September 2023, Coillte invoiced the appellant for €30 for 1.5 hours spent by Coillte

as a fee for time spent on search, retrieval and compilation (copying did not arise) in respect of the

information requested by the appellant. No material costs were charged since the information was

supplied in electronic form. The charge is thus framed in terms of time cost – described by the

appellant variously as “indirect” or “non-material” costs.

27. The appellant paid the invoice on or around 9 October 2023, and received the requested

information on 18 October 2023.

28. The appellant appealed the fee to the commissioner on 22 October 2023.

29. Coillte made a submission to the commissioner on 7 December 2023, and indicated that it

would reduce the charge to €15 (on the basis that some information was already in the public

domain).

30. The commissioner made his decision on 10 March 2025 (https://ocei.ie/en/ombudsman-

decision/1bc65-save-leitrim-clg-and-coillte/) affirming the €15 fee charged.

The first question

31. The first question is:

In the light of Decision VII/8n concerning compliance by the Republic of Moldova

with its obligations under the Convention Adopted by the Meeting of Parties to the

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and

Access to Justice in Environmental Matters at its seventh session held in Geneva,

18–20 October 2021, does Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 and/or Article 4(8) of

the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to

Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in

Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25 June 1998, have the effect, in its

application after the date of that decision, that a charge for supplying a particular

type of environmental information may not include any part of the cost of

overheads attributable to the time spent by the staff of a public authority, to which

a request for access to information on the environment under that directive and/or

convention is made, on answering individual requests for information, in particular

the costs attributable to the time involved in search, retrieval and collation of the

information?

32. The appellant’s proposed answer is Yes, Decision VII/8n concerning compliance by the

Republic of Moldova with the Aarhus Convention has the effect that Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4

must be interpreted as precluding a charge for supplying environmental information which includes

any part of the cost of overheads attributable to the time spent by the staff of the public authority

on answering the request for environmental information, in particular the costs attributable to the

time involved in search, retrieval and collation of that information.

33. The respondent’s proposed answer is that the commissioner is neutral on this question and

will apply the law as set out in any judgment of the CJEU.

34. Coillte’s proposed answer is No. In the judgment of 6 October 2015, East Sussex County

Council v Information Commissioner and others, C-71/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:656, the CJEU held at

§39 that the costs of ‘supplying’ environmental information which may be charged under Article 5(2)

of Directive 2003/4 encompass not only postal and photocopying costs “but also the costs

attributable to the time spent by the staff of the public authority concerned on answering an

individual request for information, which includes the time spent on searching for the information

and putting it in the form required.” That decision is binding on all Member States. It is unaffected

by the Moldova decision, which directly conflicts with it. The CJEU may decide to revisit East Sussex,

however, EU law on this point has not to-date been changed by the Moldova decision.

35. The State’s proposed answer is No. While the findings of the Aarhus Convention Compliance

Committee with regard to Communication ACCC/C/2017/147 were endorsed by the Meeting of the

Parties in Geneva in October 2021 by way of Decision VIII/8n, this Decision, insofar as it constitutes

an authoritative interpretation of the Aarhus Convention, operates as a matter of international law

only. The Decision cannot have binding effect as a matter of EU law. Accordingly, the decision of

the CJEU in East Sussex and in particular §§ 39-41, remains the authoritative and binding

interpretation of Directive 2003/4.

36. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is Yes. In the light of Decision VII/8n adopted by the

Meeting of the Parties, Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 and/or Article 4(8) of the Aarhus Convention

have the effect that a charge for supplying a particular type of environmental information cannot

include any part of the cost of overheads attributable to the time spent by the staff of the public

authority on answering individual requests for information, in particular the costs attributable to the

time involved in search, retrieval and collation of the information.

37. The referring court’s proposed answer is Yes. While the decision in the judgment of 6

October 2015, East Sussex County Council v Information Commissioner and others, C-71/14,

ECLI:EU:C:2015:656 was a perfectly valid interpretation of the Aarhus Convention at that time, the

CJEU is entitled to revise its interpretation of an international agreement following on a development

with interpretative significance. In view of general principles of interpretation, as reflected in the

Vienna Convention, the endorsement by the MOP of the ACCC findings regarding Moldova constitutes

a development with interpretative significance and should be viewed as a binding interpretation by

the parties to the convention (see the judgment of 27 September 2018, Mellifera eV, Vereinigung

für wesensgemäße Bienenhaltung, T-12/17, ECLI:EU:T:2018:616 at paragraph 86; Fasoli E. and

McGlone A., “The Non-Compliance Mechanism Under the Aarhus Convention as ‘Soft’ Enforcement

of International Environmental Law: Not So Soft After All!” Neth. Int. Law Rev. 65, 27–53 (2018),

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-018-0102-0). In view of the significant undesirability of divergent

interpretations of an international agreement as between the CJEU and the parties to that

agreement, and the potential to undermine the credibility of the international agreement concerned

as well as the goals and policies of the EU in becoming a party to that agreement, it is open to the

CJEU to hold that in the application of the convention after the date of the MOP decision concerned,

the interpretation favoured by the MOP decision would have effect in lieu of that previously applied

in Case C-71/14. The referring court would respectfully propose to the CJEU that such an alignment

of interpretations would best uphold the rule of law and environmental values of international and

EU law. As a matter of practice, the text of MOP decisions indicates that the MOP (in this case and

in cases generally) acts by endorsing the operative conclusions of the ACCC rather than by setting

out the full text. The referring court’s view is that, in such a context, to determine what those

conclusions mean and why they have been reached, the only method available is to have recourse

to the ACCC reasoning and text. Otherwise the conclusions are just assertions hanging in thin air

that a contracting state would have insuperable difficulty in understanding and complying with.

Therefore the endorsement of a conclusion must, in context, involve the endorsement of the reasons

for the conclusion.

38. The relevance of the question is that if the CJEU were to uphold the interpretation of the

Aarhus Convention adopted by its parties when they endorsed the ACCC findings in the Moldova

case, with effect from the MOP decision, then in the application of Directive 2003/4 after that date,

such as in the main proceedings, the domestic transposing legislation should be disapplied insofar

as it allows for fees of the type in question, namely the a fee for time spent on search, retrieval and

compilation. That would involve allowing the appeal and directing the refund of the €15 paid by the

appellant here.

The second question

39. The second question is:

If the answer to the first question is No, does Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4

and/or Article 4(8) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and

Access to Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus on 25 June 1998, as

part of EU law have the effect that in implementing such provisions in its domestic

law transposing the directive and/or the convention (“transposing legislation”), a

Member State is precluded by the principle of equivalence from imposing a charge

that includes include any part of the cost of overheads attributable to the time

spent by the staff of a public authority, to which a request (an “EU request”) for

access to information on the environment under that Directive and/or Convention

is made, on answering individual requests for information, in particular the costs

attributable to the time involved in search, retrieval and collation of the

information, if a charge of that amount for any part of the cost of overheads

attributable to the time spent by the staff of a public authority on a similar effort

of answering individual requests for information, in particular the costs

attributable to the time involved in search, retrieval and collation of the

information, would not be lawful in respect of a request (a “domestic request”)

under national freedom of information legislation (“domestic legislation”), and if

so, in the assessment by the referring court of whether the procedure for a

domestic request is sufficiently similar to the procedure for an EU request so as to

engage the principle of equivalence, do the foregoing provisions have the effect

that one or more of the following factors preclude a conclusion of sufficient

similarity:

(i) the fact that the purpose of the domestic legislation, which by

definition is not expressed in terms of implementing EU law and is

not accompanied by a proactive duty of publication, is to promote

access to records in the interests of transparency whereas the

purpose of the transposing legislation is to promote access to

environmental information in the interests of the environment with

a proactive duty of publication;

(ii) the fact that the transposing and domestic legislation differ in

certain points of detail and procedure, including the wording of tests

and exceptions and/or the rules regarding the charging of fees,

and/or involve legally separate competent authorities, which are

held in practice by the same individual official; and/or

(iii) the fact that the particular body from whom information was

requested by way of EU request in the procedure the subject of the

main proceedings was not itself liable to be subject to a domestic

request?

40. The appellant’s proposed answer is Yes. The principle of equivalence has the effect that a

charge for the time cost of the effort in dealing with a request under Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4

is precluded if the same charge would be unlawful under national freedom of information law (the

Freedom of Information Act 2014). None of the factors mentioned preclude a conclusion of sufficient

similarity.

41. The respondent’s proposed answer is No. The fees regime under the EU measure (Directive

2003/4) and the national measure (the Freedom of Information Act 2014) are conceptually different,

reflecting differences in the details of both access regimes. Under the access to information on the

environment (AIE) regime, the test for fees is one of deterrence. As such, smaller fees might be

allowed but larger ones disallowed if they are found to have a deterrent effect on the access to

environmental information. Under the Freedom of Information Act small fees are prohibited and

fees between €101 and €700 are allowed, with no test for deterrence. In addition, the two access

regimes have different approaches to the duty of proactive publication and the creation of records

in response to a request. As such, they are not sufficiently similar so as to trigger the principle of

equivalence. Finally, the fact that the notice party is not covered by the Freedom of Information Act

2014 means that the discussion of equivalence does not arise on the facts.

42. Coillte’s proposed answer is No. The principle of equivalence is not engaged in this case, as

the EU has legislated in the space and Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 specifies that a public body

is entitled to make a charge for the supply of environmental information, subject only to the

requirement that such a charge shall not exceed a reasonable amount. Furthermore, to trigger

equivalence, it is necessary for the EU action and the domestic action to pursue the same objective.

It is apparent that it cannot be said that the FOI and AIE regimes pursue an equivalent “purpose”

or share equivalent “essential characteristics”. The factors at (i)-(iii) do have the effect that a

conclusion of sufficient similarity is precluded.

43. The State’s proposed answer is No. The principle of equivalence is not engaged in the instant

case in circumstances where Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 as interpreted by East Sussex permits

of the charging of time costs where an EU request is made. Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 specifies

that a public body is entitled to make a charge for the supply of environmental information, subject

only to the requirement that such a charge shall not exceed a reasonable amount. EU law therefore

has substantively pre-empted the field. The principle of equivalence applies in the absence of EU

rules in the field and where it therefore falls to domestic procedural law to provide for rules governing

actions for safeguarding directly effective rights. In such instances applicable procedural rules must

not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions. The principle of equivalence

does not apply in the absence of directly effective EU rights and does not require Member States to

extend rules on appeal fees which apply in domestic legislation to EU requests because, when viewed

in one particular factual scenario, those domestic rules may be preferential by permitting a lower

appeal fee. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if the referring court engaged in an assessment of

whether the procedure for a domestic request is sufficiently similar to the procedure for an EU

request so as to engage the principle of equivalence, at least one or more of the factors identified

at (i) –(iii) preclude a conclusion of sufficient similarity in such an assessment.

44. The amicus curiae’s proposed answer is Yes. Article 5(2) of Directive 2003/4 and/or Article

4(8) of the Aarhus Convention do have the effect that a Member State is precluded, by reference to

the principle of equivalence, from charging for time cost of the effort in dealing with a EU request

where time cost cannot be charged where a domestic request is made. The procedure for the

domestic legislation and the procedure for the EU request are sufficiently similar. None of the factors

at (i)-(iii) mean that the procedure for the domestic request and the procedure for the EU request

are not sufficiently similar.

45. The referring court’s proposed answer is that this question does not arise because the answer

to the first question is Yes, but if it does arise the answer is Yes, and the factors referred to at (i)-

(iii) of the question do not preclude a finding of sufficient similarity. The principle of equivalence

applies and precludes a fee under legislation transposing Directive 2003/4 if a fee under domestic

FOI legislation would not be chargeable in comparable circumstances. In the view of the referring

court, the arguments rendering the procedures comparable are considerably stronger because the

essence of both procedures is access to information/records. The fact that in circumstances such as

the present case, such information/records can be obtained without charge under the domestic law

procedure but with a charge under the EU law procedure as transposed in Ireland amounts to a

breach of the principle of equivalence. The referring court considers that the technical differences

between the two regimes and/or even the fact that a particular body such as Coillte may not be

covered by the FOI Act are not circumstances sufficiently fundamental as to displace the underlying

comparability of the two systems for obtaining information/ records, for the purposes of the principle

of equivalence. It is incorrect to frame the issue in terms of EU law having pre-empted national

legislation and so having removed any discretion to deal with the matter to which equivalence could

apply. There is nothing about Directive 2003/4 in terms of text or purpose that supersedes the

general principle that insofar as a Member State has a discretion concerning the means of

implementation, the exercise of such discretion should respect the principles of equivalence and

effectiveness. Insofar as this question arises, and on the assumption that the determination of

whether the FOI legislation is appropriately comparable to the AIE legislation is for the referring

court to verify, the referring court would propose to conclude that it is so comparable subject to the

judgment of the CJEU.

46. The relevance of the question is that if the FOI and AIE regimes are comparable for the

purposes of the doctrine of equivalence, notwithstanding factors such as that Coillte is not an FOI

body, then statutory provisions for fees chargeable under domestic law transposing Directive 2003/4

for an AIE request should be disapplied in circumstances where fees would not be chargeable for an

FOI request. That would involve allowing the appeal and directing the refund of the €15 paid by the

appellant here.

Order

47. For the foregoing reasons, it is ordered that:

(i) the questions set out in this judgment be referred to the CJEU pursuant to Article

267 TFEU; and

(ii) the substantive determination of the proceedings be adjourned pending the

judgment of the CJEU, without prejudice to the determination of any appropriate

procedural or interlocutory issues in the meantime.