High Court dismisses certiorari application against District Court conviction for breach of safety order due to sufficient evidence.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 658

Record No. 2023 314 JR

BETWEEN

E.B.

APPLICANT

AND

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 28 November 2025

Introduction

1. This case arises out of the conviction of the applicant for an offence contrary to section 33(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 (breach of a safety order) before the District Court on the 11th of January 2023.

2. The applicant seeks an order of certiorari on the basis that there was no evidence before the court to sustain such a conviction and that, therefore, he did not receive a fair trial in accordance with law.

Procedural Background

3. A safety order was made on the application of the applicant’s former partner in the District Court on the 18th of September 2020. The safety order also included the applicant's daughter, who was named as a dependent of the applicant’s former partner.

4. The prosecution of the applicant arose out of an allegation that the safety order was breached on the 31st of March 2022, in circumstances where the applicant was said to have communicated with his daughter by sending a birthday card and a birthday present to a school where his daughter was a pupil.

5. On the 15th of June 2022, the applicant was charged with an offence contrary to section 33(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 2018 and subsequently granted bail.

6. The matter was listed again before the District Court on the 20th of July 2022 and the 28th of September 2022, at which point a hearing date was fixed for the 11th of January 2023.

7. On the 11th of January 2023, the applicant was convicted after a contested hearing and received a two-month suspended sentence. The duration of suspension was for a period of twelve months.

8. The ex parte application for leave in these proceedings was made on the 31st of March 2023 seeking an order of certiorari in respect of the conviction.

9. On the return date of the 19th of June 2023, the applicant applied to adjourn the leave application to the Michaelmas term in order to file a supplemental affidavit.

10. It transpired that extra court resources were made available in September of 2023 and, therefore, the matter was relisted, and leave was granted to bring the within proceedings on the 18th of September 2023.

11. The order granting leave provided that the notice of motion was to issue within seven days of the perfection of the leave order, which occurred on the 27th of September 2023.

12. However, the notice of motion did not issue within seven days of the perfection, and the return date set, i.e., the 14th of November 2023, lapsed with no notice of motion having issued.

13. On the 20th of December 2023, the applicant was granted liberty by Hyland J. to file a notice of motion returnable to the 30th of January 2024. While the parties are agreed that such an order was made, no written order appears to have been taken up nor has the order been made available to me.

14. The matter came on for hearing before me on the 16th of October 2025. In circumstances where it was agreed that an order had been made, I ruled that, for the avoidance of doubt, an extension of time to move the application would be granted if it was considered necessary.

15. For reasons that remain unexplained, the notice of motion that issued sought further reliefs which were not contained in the statement of grounds.

16. These were, “if necessary, an interlocutory Order suspending execution of the said prison sentence pending the outcome of the present application” and, further, “an Order remitting the prosecution to the Circuit Court for a retrial of the Applicant’s appeal against his conviction in the District Court.”

17. On making enquiry in relation to this, counsel indicated that no such reliefs were being sought, and the matter proceeded without further reference to these reliefs.

18. The twelve-month bond in relation to the suspended sentence expired on the 11th of January 2024. While there was a reference to “an element of mootness” in the papers filed in opposition, it was accepted in the hearing before me that the matter was not, strictly speaking, moot as there was an extant conviction against the applicant, and, in the event, mootness was not argued.

Factual Background

19. It must be emphasised that this is an application for judicial review and not an appeal in respect of a criminal trial. However, it will be necessary to say something of the evidential background in order to properly analyse the legal complaint being made.

20. The applicant was in a long-standing family law dispute with Ms. A, the mother of the applicant’s child.

21. It was alleged that the applicant communicated with the child, in breach of the safety order, on the 31st of March 2022 by sending a birthday card and a birthday present to her school.

22. The particulars of offence on the charge sheet were that the applicant “on the 31/03/2022 at [the child’s school], contravened safety order made at [the District Court] on the 18/09/2020 in that you did communicate with dependent person [the child] by sending a birthday card and a birthday present to her school in contravention of the safety order. Contrary to Section 33 (1) of the Domestic Violence Act 2018.”

23. These items were contained in a wrapped package. The package included a card, apparently signed by the applicant, together with his mobile telephone number and an exhortation to call him if he was ever needed. The card was addressed to a “special daughter” and wished her a “happy birthday.”

24. There was also a letter dated the 28th of March, again apparently signed by the applicant, with the same mobile telephone number and a request for the child to call him “whenever you want.” The letter addressed the child by name. Both documents reference the child’s birthday and contain other personal information that is unnecessary to dwell on for the purposes of resolving this case.

25. It is accepted that the package was not received by the child at the school. It appears that Ms. A was summoned to the school to collect the package. She subsequently gave the package to the child, understanding it to be a present from the applicant, while being unaware that it contained the card and letter referred to above.

26. In the course of exchanges before me, it was conceded by counsel for the applicant that the package was delivered by the applicant to the school. The entire District Court hearing appears to me to have been predicated on this fact.

The District Court Hearing

27. I have had the benefit of considering the transcript of the hearing before the District Court, which became available to the parties on the 29th of April 2024.

28. Before turning to some of the salient parts of the evidence, it is evident from the transcript that the District Judge conducted the hearing with impeccable fairness. The complaint in these proceedings really arises from his treatment of the evidence at the close of the prosecution case.

29. It is clear that the prosecution originally intended to call three witnesses: Ms. A, Ms. B (the school principal) and Garda C who took the complaint and charged the applicant with the relevant offence.

30. The proposed evidence of Ms. B was to the effect that the applicant had called to the school on the 31st of March 2022 and dropped off the package in question. She would have also said that she contacted Ms. A to collect the package from the school on the 1st of April 2022.

31. It is clear that on the 11th of January 2023, the District Judge was presiding over a busy list. The case was called in the morning, at which time all prosecution witnesses were present, but was unable to proceed as the applicant’s solicitor was not present.

32. The case was put to second call and was not reached again until 3pm. By this time, Ms. B had become unavailable as she had to return to work. There was no application to adjourn the matter, and the case proceeded with the prosecution now relying on two witnesses.

33. An understandable, but perhaps unnecessary, controversy arose in relation to this aspect of what transpired in the District Court. The respondent complains that the applicant failed, at the leave stage, to bring the court’s attention to what had happened when the case was first called. This is set out in the affidavit of Garda C.

34. In response, the applicant’s solicitor swore a replying affidavit saying that both he and the applicant were present when the court sat but accepted that he could well have been outside the court when the matter was first called. He also says that he was not given any notice of a witness difficulty in the afternoon and was not informed of such until he had a conversation with either Garda C or a court presenter in the afternoon of the 11th of January 2023.

35. The respondent says that these matters should have been deposed at the leave stage, and complains that the wrong impression was given to the Court in the pre-leave written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant, where there is a reference to the fact that at the hearing, “only one witness was called by the Director of Public Prosecutions, namely, the Applicant’s former partner.”

36. These issues were emphasised as having a bearing on my discretion in relation to the remedy sought by way of judicial review.

37. I am satisfied that nothing really turns on these matters.

38. What developed on the 11th of January 2023 was the sort of thing that happens as a matter of routine in a busy District Court list, and the fact that the matter went to second call was not a result of any contrivance but rather arose from a legal practitioner being out of court, perhaps dealing with other clients, and a busy District Judge pressing on with his list.

39. It is true to say that the pre-leave submissions said that “only one witness was called by the Director of Public Prosecutions, namely, the Applicant’s former partner.” However, the affidavit filed by the applicant’s solicitor at the leave stage says at paragraph 7 that “the state proceeded to call only one civilian witness in the prosecution of the case, namely [Ms. A],” which does accurately reflect the position.

40. I am also satisfied that there was no lack of candour in how the matter was presented in the affidavit of the applicant’s solicitor. What transpired between first and second call may not have had an obvious relevance when leave was being applied for, and it was only when opposition papers and the affidavit of Garda C were served that focus was brought to bear on it. Even at that stage, while the applicant’s solicitor remembered having a conversation about the witness difficulty in the afternoon, he could not recall whether it was with Garda C or the court presenter. During the hearing before me, it was confirmed that the evidence was in fact led by the court presenter.

41. In any event, Ms. B was not called as a witness and there was no application for an adjournment.

42. At the outset of the hearing, defence counsel indicated an objection to hearsay and in particular to any statements made by Ms. B to Ms. A. It is clear that the District Judge understood this, and even at one point admonished Garda C to be “careful” in relation to hearsay. It is also clear to me that the District Judge understood the distinction to be drawn with reported speech, which may be admissible, by reference to Ms. A explaining how it was that she came to attend at the school.

43. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to dwell on the principles and authorities in relation to hearsay. However, I do observe that in the course of the hearing, notwithstanding the objection raised, defence counsel asked certain questions that could have only elicited hearsay or were founded on hearsay e.g., Ms. A was asked whether she was told what was in the box and whether she knew that the box was from the applicant.

44. Further, in circumstances where the package was in a sealed box, the only person who could actually confirm in evidence that it was delivered by hand to the school was Ms.

B. However, all parties proceeded on the basis that it had been so delivered by the applicant. This appeared to be an admitted fact. As will be seen, the gravamen of the applicant’s case relates to the date on which the offence is said to have occurred.

45. Ms. A gave evidence that she collected the package from Ms. B at the school on the 1st of April 2022, having received a phone call asking her to collect it. This was accepted by defence counsel. Ms. A said that she told her daughter about the present and left it up to her to decide if she wanted to open it.

46. Ms. A said that she did not want to leave the package at the school as “it’s not really their thing to deal with. I mean, I like, I was called to.”

47. Her evidence was that her daughter opened the package some weeks later and became upset upon finding the letter. Ms. A said that she was unaware that the package contained a card or letter.

48. Ms. A was cross-examined to the effect that she must have known that the package came from the applicant and was specifically asked whether she knew that by giving the package to her daughter, “it could be potentially a breach of the safety order.”

49. Garda C confirmed in cross-examination that Ms. A was not present in the school on the 31st of March 2022, but Ms. B was.

50. Ms. A also confirmed in cross-examination that she was not present in the school on the 31st of March 2022. The following exchange with counsel occurred:

Q. – in relation to the 31st of March, when on the charge sheet it is alleged that [the applicant] gave this present and the card in the box to [Ms. B], you were not present in [the child’s school]; is that correct?

A. I wasn’t in the school, of course not, no.

Q. No. No.

A. He dropped it to her.

Q. Thank you, Judge.

51. Garda C gave evidence that the child’s birthday was the xxxxxxxxxxx.

52. The letter and card were made exhibits in the hearing.

53. It does not appear that the applicant was interviewed in relation to the allegation, so there was nothing of an inculpatory or exculpatory nature from the applicant as part of the prosecution case.

54. Defence counsel sought a direction at the close of the prosecution case.

55. The thrust of the application was that there was “no evidence of any communication on the 31st of March” and that the only person who could have given that evidence was Ms. B. It was further submitted that the “actus reus is that [the applicant] allegedly gave the package to [Ms. B]. We have no evidence how or when this happened.”

56. The District Judge refused the application in the following terms: “No, I’ll refuse your application for direction. I have the evidence of the prima facie here. It was a clear communication from [the applicant] to his daughter, in contravention of the safety order.”

57. When asked for reasons by defence counsel, the District Judge said: “Yes, I have the letter and the card here. I've heard evidence from [the child’s] mother that she received the box from her school and that the box came from [the applicant], the defendant, and it was given to [the child], it was for [the child’s] use. It was a present for her birthday.”

58. Defence counsel then said “Right. I’ll not go any further Judge.” There was no further submission. The applicant did not give evidence, nor did he call any evidence. The District Judge proceeded to convict the applicant and imposed the sentence referred to above after hearing a plea in mitigation.

Discussion

59. In argument before me, counsel for the applicant moved the application with admirable economy. In essence, he submitted that the actus reus had not been established as having occurred on the date alleged. He submitted that there was simply no evidence that the offence occurred on the 31st of March 2022, and that the hearing was shorn of the attributes of a trial in due course of law where a conviction was recorded in those circumstances.

60. The respondent submitted that an application for judicial review, in the circumstances outlined above, was inappropriate and that if the applicant was unhappy with the determination of the District Judge, the proper step to take was to appeal the decision, a step which was available to the applicant.

61. She further submits that where the complaint relates to the sufficiency of evidence, as in this case on her submission, an order of certiorari should not and cannot follow.

62. She submits that the hearing was held in accordance with law, that the decisions of the District Judge were all within jurisdiction and that the evidence before the court allowed for appropriate inferences to be drawn, leading to the conviction.

63. In relation to the general principles applicable to applications of this type, there did not appear to be much in dispute between the parties.

64. In Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50, the Supreme Court considered some of the applicable principles in the context of a drug driving case. The issue that arose related to evidence of incapacity, which was required in a drug driving case, in contradistinction to a drink driving prosecution which can be maintained by virtue of the presence of a concentration of alcohol above the permitted threshold.

65. Clarke J. (as he then was) asked the question “is Judicial Review appropriate?” at paragraph 3 of his judgment. At paragraph 3.5, he said: “It obviously leads to the next question as to just what it is that renders a determination affecting legal rights to be regarded as unlawful or, in the words of Henchy J., not ‘in accordance with law’. In the particular context of this case, the question arises as to what type of error actually renders a decision of a statutory court unlawful as opposed to being merely regarded as being in error. The so called ‘error within jurisdiction’ jurisprudence must be seen in that light. Some errors may be such as render the ultimate decision unlawful and thus capable of being quashed by way of judicial review. Some errors do not render the decision unlawful and are only capable of being corrected, if at all, by an available appeal. It should also, in that context, be recalled that there would be little point in making any distinction between a judicial review and an appeal if there were no difference in substance between the sort of issues which could be canvassed in the respective cases.”

66. At paragraph 3.6, he continued: “It is important, therefore, to emphasise that judicial review is fundamentally concerned with the lawfulness of decisions taken affecting legal rights whether by persons, bodies, or courts having statutory jurisdiction. Judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of those decisions. There may be some legitimate debate as to the type of error which can lead to a decision being regarded as unlawful rather than simply incorrect. However, the fundamental distinction between unlawfulness, which can give rise to a decision being quashed on judicial review, and incorrectness, which can not, remains.”

67. The description of the distinction between unlawfulness and incorrectness as “fundamental” is important and is a thread which runs through the authorities.

68. At paragraph 3.7, Clarke J. said: “In a case such as this, where an accused is tried before the District Court on a charge of driving under the influence of a drug, the relevant District Judge clearly has jurisdiction in the narrow sense provided that the accused is properly summonsed to appear before the Court. Whether the accused is guilty is a question of fact (or, in many cases, a mixed question of law and fact) to be decided by the District Judge on the evidence. Save in an extreme case, it is not a matter for the High Court (or this Court on appeal), in considering whether to quash a conviction thus arising, to, to use the language of Keane C.J. in D.P.P. v. Kelliher [2000] IESC 60, inquire ‘… into the merits into the decision and inquiring whether on the facts before him the District Judge was right or wrong in the course that he took. That is not a course which is open to the Superior Courts to take in judicial review proceedings. It is tantamount to affording the Director a right of appeal in such a case and of course it must inevitably follow that such a right of appeal would have to exist also in the case of an accused person who conversely took exception to an order returning him or her for trial’.”

69. At paragraph 3.8, he said: “Thus, there are very significant limitations on the extent to which it is appropriate for the superior courts to exercise their judicial review jurisdiction arising out of allegations that the evidence before a lower court or other

decision maker was insufficient to justify the conclusions reached rather than insufficient to establish that the decision maker had any lawful capability to make the relevant decision in the first place. Absence of a lawful power to make the decision would render the decision unlawful. Save in an extreme case, absence of sufficient evidence as to the merits would only render the decision incorrect and, thus, not amenable to judicial review.”

70. The reference to “extreme” cases in both paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8 of the judgment is, in my view, significant.

71. In relation to the relevance of the availability of an appeal, Clarke J. said at paragraph 3.9: “But there is a further matter for consideration. That is the availability of an appeal. The default position on the invocation of judicial review as opposed to an appeal as a method of challenge in criminal proceedings is set out in the judgment of Hederman J. in Sweeney v. Brophy [1993] 2 I.R. 202 at p. 211, where he observed: ‘In my judgment certiorari is an appropriate remedy to quash not only a conviction bad on its face or where a court or tribunal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction but also where it acts apparently within jurisdiction but where the proceedings are so fundamentally flawed as to deprive an accused of a trial in due course of law. I take this opportunity of emphasising that certiorari is not appropriate to a routine mishap which may befall any trial; the correct remedy in that circumstance is by way of appeal.’”

72. The “default position,” so described, clearly contemplates judicial review where it can be said that an applicant has, in effect, been denied a first hearing which complies with the constitutional requirements of justice. An appeal, where it is available, is the appropriate remedy where the first hearing has the attributes of a hearing in accordance with law, but the applicant contends that the decision maker was wrong.

73. At paragraph 3.16, Clarke J. summarised the relevant principles in the following way: “It seems to me that while there may not be complete consistency between all of the authorities, the balance of the case law suggests that the following principles apply. First, judicial review is concerned with the lawfulness rather than the correctness of the decision sought to be challenged. Second, where the jurisdiction of the relevant decision maker to embark on the process of making the relevant decision is either not challenged or is established, an error by the

decision maker in reaching the necessary conclusions to determine the appropriate decision to be made does not, of itself, necessarily render the

decision unlawful. At a minimum, it requires a fundamental error to raise the prospect that the decision is not merely incorrect but also unlawful. It is unnecessary, for the purposes of this case, to attempt any exhaustive examination of what might be said to be the type of error which is sufficiently fundamental to render a decision unlawful in all types of cases. For present purposes, it can at least be said that issues concerning the adequacy of evidence before a decision maker (as opposed to a complete absence of evidence of a necessary matter) will not render a decision unlawful. Third, even if judicial review might otherwise lie, a court will not exercise its jurisdiction where the law allows for an appeal and where an appeal would be an appropriate remedy to deal with the complaint made. Thus, there may be circumstances where judicial review will not lie against a first instance or initial decision but where it might lie against a similar decision of a body from which no appeal or no further appeal lay.”

74. In the same case, McKechnie J., giving judgment, said at paragraph 69: “The High Court, when exercising its judicial review jurisdiction, is not a court of appeal, save as provided by statute, and should not lend this jurisdiction to second guessing the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence given at trial.”

75. Importantly, in my view, McKechnie J. also counselled against minutely combing the evidence as given in order to test the conclusions reached.

76. In E.R. v. DPP [2019] IESC 86, Charleton J. said the following at paragraph 17 in relation to the nature of the judicial review jurisdiction in a criminal context: “As will emerge from the section which follows, an accused in a criminal trial who is advised to forego an appeal and instead pursue a judicial review, faces a burden different to an argument as to right and wrong. Judicial review is not about the correctness of decision-making, nor is it the substitution by one court of a legal analysis or factual decision for that of the court under scrutiny… Judicial review is about process, jurisdiction and adherence to a basic level of sound procedures. It is not a reanalysis.”

77. It seems clear from the remarks of Charleton J. and McKechnie J. that “reanalysis” or ‘combing the evidence’ are to be avoided by this Court, lest the application take on the characteristics of an appeal where the Court is, in truth, being invited to substitute its own view of the evidence.

78. The respondent submits that this is exactly what the Court is being invited to do in this case. The applicant, however, submits that no reanalysis is necessary – there is a complete absence of evidence.

79. The relevant authorities were reviewed by Phelan J. in Zadecki v. DPP [2022] IEHC 602.

80. Zadecki was a case where it might be said that the evidential position was quite stark. The case involved charges of possession of stolen property where there was no evidence that the items were in fact stolen, which was an essential proof. It appears that this was conceded by the prosecuting Garda.

81. However, notwithstanding the apparent concession, the District Judge found that it was his role to consider the evidence and, having done so, proceeded to convict the accused.

82. At paragraph 26, Phelan J., after considering Sweeney and Dunne, Judicial Review of Criminal Proceedings, 2nd Edition, said:

“So, I must now determine if it can truly be said that this is an extreme case in which there is a complete absence of evidence as to a necessary matter, namely the fact that the cards were stolen.”

83. Phelan J. was satisfied that there was a circumstantial basis to infer that the items had been stolen because of the suspicious inability of the accused to name a friend whom he claimed owned the items.

84. More generally, she held at paragraph 32: “The test I must apply is not whether I would have arrived at the same

conclusion on the evidence but rather whether, in judicial review proceedings, I ought properly to intervene to quash a conviction obtained on the basis of this type of evidence in circumstances where an appeal to the Circuit Court is available to the Applicant. As I am satisfied that this is a case of weak evidence as opposed to no evidence, the authorities do not support any interference by this Court in judicial review proceedings where the remedy of an appeal is available. It is well established that a District Judge is quite entitled to make a wrong decision on the law, once he retains jurisdiction to make that decision and has not erred in a manner which deprives him of jurisdiction.”

85. That was also a case where a direction, based on the classic Galbraith principles, was applied for and refused in the District Court. The essence of the test in R v. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 is that if, taken at its highest, the prosecution evidence is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict, the judge must stop the case. However, if the strength or weakness of the evidence depends on issues like witness reliability, which are generally for the jury, and on one possible view of the facts a jury could properly convict, then the judge should leave the case to the jury. While expressed in the context of a jury trial, the test is equally applicable in a summary trial context.

86. This refusal was essentially a finding that the accused had a case to answer. The accused’s solicitor went on to make a further submission as to the weight to be given to the evidence by the District Judge as the trier of fact. I note that in the case before me, there was no submission to the District Judge to reassess the evidence after the direction application had been refused.

87. The respondent submits that the circumstances in Zadecki are analogous to the circumstances in this case, and that the same approach should be followed. She further submits that the evidence in this case is in fact stronger than in Zadecki. The applicant submits that the decision is distinguishable on the basis that the suspicious answer of the accused in that case afforded a basis on which an inference could be drawn.

88. The applicant also relied on Woolmington v. DPP [1935] 1 AC 462. I do not regard this authority as being of any great assistance in the context of the arguments in this case, as Woolmington involved a direction to a jury in a murder case which imposed a positive onus on the accused to demonstrate why a charge of murder could be reduced to manslaughter or excused as an accident. I do not believe there to be any dispute in this case in respect of where the burden of proof rests in a criminal prosecution.

Decision

89. In the course of exchanges with counsel for the applicant, it was accepted that the date was not, in the strict sense, material to the charge before the Court, as might be the situation in a defilement case or a failure to file tax returns in a particular year. It was also accepted that there could have been no objection in principle to an application to amend the date, nor to a formulation of the charge as occurring ‘on a date unknown’ between two dates.

90. The date on the charge sheet is better described as a particular of the offence as charged and was an element to be established in evidence. There was no argument before me in relation to the definition of ‘communication’ under the Act or the significance, or otherwise, of the date on which the child opened the package. The case advanced completely turned on what was said to be a complete absence of evidence as to the date on which the package was delivered, thereby resulting in a conviction otherwise than in accordance with law.

91. It seems to me that this case is far from the “extreme” as contemplated in Sweeney. As stated above, the case was conducted, in general terms, in an impeccable manner. The applicant was represented skilfully by counsel who took tactical decisions in relation to concessions, objections and the fundamental basis on which the case was put i.e., that the applicant delivered the package to Ms. B at the school.

92. While resisting the temptation to reanalyse or minutely comb the evidence, there were a number of strands of evidence before the court which entitled the District Judge to draw an inference as to when the package was delivered. It contained an internal date of the 28th of March 2022. The child’s birthday was the xxxxxxxxxx. The uncontroverted evidence was that Ms. B was present in the school on the 31st of March 2022. It was accepted that Ms. A was alerted to the existence of the package by a phone call from Ms. B and that she collected the package on the 1st of April 2022.

93. While another trier of fact may not necessarily have come to the same conclusion, that is not the test. There was an available body of evidence before the District Court allowing for appropriate inferences to be drawn as to the elements of the offence and, in particular, the date upon which the package was received at the school. Applying the Galbraith test of taking the prosecution case at its highest, the rejection of the direction application seems to me to have been well within the jurisdiction of the District Judge.

94. There was no further submission to the court as to the weight to be attached to the evidence thereafter, and I am of the view that it would be inappropriate for me to substitute any view I might have of that evidence.

95. As Phelan J. said in Zadecki, this case might, on one view, be regarded as “a case of weak evidence as opposed to no evidence.” However, as she continued, “the authorities do not support any interference by this Court in judicial review proceedings where the remedy of an appeal is available.”

96. This was a purely summary matter, albeit a very serious one from the perspective of the applicant, relating to an event that transpired in March of 2022. The hearing itself could have taken no longer than twenty minutes and runs to nine pages of transcript. The matter came on for hearing before me on the 16th of October 2025. This is not ideal from anyone’s perspective. What is clear, in my view, is that a full de novo appeal to the Circuit Court was available to the applicant, and that was the route which should have been taken where the applicant was unhappy with the findings of the District Judge.

97. For the reasons set out above, I conclude that the applicant has not established an entitlement to relief by way of judicial review on this application. Accordingly, I will make an order dismissing the proceedings.

98. Having regard to the provisions of section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, it appears to me that the respondent is entitled to an order for costs in relation to these proceedings. I would propose to make such a costs order to be stayed for a period of two weeks from today’s date. If the applicant contends for an alternative order, he should indicate this to the respondent and the Court within that two-week period. The matter can then be relisted for hearing on that issue with the stay to continue until further order.