High Court dismisses certiorari application against asylum refusal for failing to address a specific claim ground.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 648

Record No. H/JR/2024/984

BETWEEN

MD

APPLICANT

AND

CHIEF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OFFICER

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

DECISION of Mr Justice Barr delivered electronically on the 24th day of November 2025.

Introduction.

1. The applicant is a Georgian national. She arrived in the State on 5 September 2022.

2. In these proceedings she seeks an order of certiorari quashing a decision of the respondent which was notified to her on 18 June 2024, which refused her a declaration of asylum or international protection, on the grounds that the decision-maker did not address and a significant ground that she had put forward as part of her claim to be granted refugee status or international protection.

3. The precise nature of this ground and whether it was referred to in the decision of the respondent will be addressed later in this judgment.

4. The respondent resists the application on the primary ground that the entirety of the applicant's claim to international protection was properly addressed in the decision.

5. Without prejudice to that assertion, it was submitted that the reliefs sought by the applicant should be refused on the basis that the proceedings herein were commenced outside the relevant statutory time limit; or in the alternative, because the applicant has an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT); which remedy she had availed of by lodging a notice of appeal to that entity.

Chronology.

6. Given the issues that arise for determination, it will be helpful to set out a brief chronology of relevant dates. The applicant was born in 1988 in the Abkhazia region of Georgia.

7. In 1993, the applicant's grandmother was killed in civil unrest that had erupted in that region. Her father was involved in the fighting on the Georgian side. He went missing and is presumed dead. The applicant and her mother fled from Abkhazia, travelling across mountains in hazardous weather conditions. They went to Tbilisi where the family, comprising of the applicant, her mother, and her two brothers, resided.

8. The applicant attended school in Tbilisi until 2006. Thereafter, she obtained work in a restaurant, rising to the position of manager.

9. In 2009, the applicant got married. In 2010 she had a daughter. In 2011, the applicant's husband converted to the Muslim faith. He went to Syria to fight in the civil war. The applicant states that her husband mistreated her physically and psychologically because she remained of the Christian faith and dressed in accordance with the tenets of that religion.

10. In 2014, the applicant's husband died of leukaemia. The applicant maintains that after her husband's death, friends of his, who were of a fundamentalist Muslim ideology, used to call in on her to check on how she was raising her daughter.

11. In 2018, the applicant bought a premises in Tbilisi from which she sold ladies’ clothing. She had set up a limited liability company through which she carried on this activity.

12. In 2021, the applicant stated that she had her daughter baptised into the Orthodox Christian faith. The applicant stated that after that she had a visit from some men who had been friends of her husband. She stated that they barged into her property and assaulted her verbally and physically. She did not describe the event in more detail. The applicant stated that she reported the matter to the police who came to her house. They drew up a report, which they handed over to the criminal police. However, she stated that nothing was done by the criminal police to either investigate the matter further, or to prosecute those involved.

13. The applicant stated that in August 2022, she was in her shop with her daughter, when a group of men barged into the store. It was the same men who had attacked her a year earlier. She stated that she was very scared because her daughter was present. She tried to get out of the shop, but she wasn't able to do, so as the men blocked her exit. She stated that the men threatened to make her disappear so that no one could find her. It was clear that they meant that they would kill her. She stated that they also intended to take her daughter abroad. She stated that she was assaulted several times during this incident. While running out of the store, she stated that her leg hit her daughter in the abdomen. This caused her daughter to suffer a serious injury in the form of a displaced diaphragm, leading to flooding of her lungs. Her daughter required emergency surgery in hospital.

14. The applicant states that as a result of that assault, she knew that she would never be safe in Tbilisi. She fled from the city on 13 August 2022, leaving her daughter in the care of her mother. She arrived in the State on 5 September 2022, whereupon she immediately applied for international protection.

The Applicant's Case.

15. The applicant challenges the refusal decision of the respondent on the basis that the respondent did not address a fundamental part of her case which was stated in the following way in a letter sent by her solicitor on 27 March 2024, which was the day before her interview:

“As an IDP [internally displaced person] the applicant need only establish a real risk of persecution/serious harm as an ethnic Georgian in Abkhazia together with unreasonableness of relocation within the rest of Georgia in order to make out her need for international protection. Country reports (see annex)

show that the applicant is at real risk of suffering persecution for reasons of her Georgian race in Abkhazia. The threat of violence and intimidation from the Islamist associates of her late husband renders continued internal relocation within Georgia unreasonable and/or unduly harsh for the applicant.”

The Time Issue.

16. The respondents’ decision under s.39 of the International Protection Act 2015 was given on 15 April 2024. The decision of the Minister under s.49 of that Act issued on 22 May 2024. Both decisions were notified to the applicant on 18 June 2024.

17. Section 5(1) (og) of the Illegal Immigrant (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended) provides that any challenge to the IPO recommendation must be instituted within 28 days, commencing on the date of notification of the decision to the applicant, unless the court considers there to be "good and sufficient reason" for extending time. Section 5(1)

(oi) of the Act provides that the same time limit applies to the Minister's decision to refuse permission to remain under s.49 of the Act.

18. These time limits meant that the time for bringing a challenge to the first respondent’s decision and to the Minister's decision expired on 15 July 2024. The applicant's proceedings herein issued on 31 July 2024.

19. In resisting the respondents’ submission that the proceedings herein should be struck out as being out of time, the applicant submitted that the court should exercise its discretion to extend time for the bringing of these proceedings having regard to the following matters: the applicant’s solicitor on the advice of counsel had written a letter within the relevant period on 8 July 2024 inviting the first respondent to withdraw his

decision due to the fact that it had failed to address or decide the fundamental plank of the applicant's case, and the first respondent had refused to do so by letter dated 15 July 2024; the extension of time sought is short, in the order of 14 days; the court should have regard to the fact that no delay was caused to the substantive hearing of the proceedings by the late institution thereof; nor was there any prejudice caused to the respondents by the delay.

20. For the reasons set out in GK v IPAT [2022] IEHC 204 and IT v Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 40, the court is satisfied that in considering whether there are good and sufficient reasons for extending the time for the institution of judicial review proceedings, the court can have regard to the following factors: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay, including any personal fault on the part of the applicant as distinct from his agents; all relevant facts and circumstances, including the decision sought to be impugned, the nature of the claim made that it is unlawful or invalid and any relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the parties; the interests of justice, including the consequences for the applicant; and whether the time limit is imposed by statute or under the rules of court.

21. The court accepts that in sending the pre-litigation letter of 8 July 2024, the applicant's solicitor acted reasonably. While there is no provision in the 2015 Act for the sending of such a letter, and while taking that step cannot be seen as providing an automatic right to an extension of time; the court is satisfied that having regard to the relevant period of delay in the institution of the proceedings in the present case; and having regard to the fact that that delay did not prejudice the respondent, or lead to any delay in the hearing of the substantive proceedings; and being satisfied that the applicant's solicitor acted reasonably in sending the pre-litigation letter, the court is satisfied that there are sufficient reasons to justify an extension of time in this case.

22. Accordingly, the court will extend the time for bringing the present proceedings up to and including 31 July 2024.

The Central Issue.

23. The core issue in this case is whether the decision that was handed down by the respondent failed to deal with a substantial ground put forward by the applicant as part of her application for asylum or international protection.

24. The applicant submits that when one reads the submission that was made by the applicant's solicitor in the letter of 27th March 2024, as quoted above, and when one has regard to the content of the country of origin information that was furnished with it, much of which put forward the case that Georgian people faced serious persecution and discrimination in Abkhazia; it was abundantly clear that the applicant was making the case that she was entitled to international protection simply by being an ethnic Georgian IDP from Abkhazia, subject only to an internal relocation analysis in respect of the rest of Georgia.

25. The applicant submits that while there are references in the impugned decision to the fact of the applicant being an IDP in Georgia since she fled from Abkhazia in 1993, the decision had failed to address her fundamental argument which had been made in this regard.

26. The applicant submitted that the impugned decision was unlawful for a failure on the part of the decision-maker to address this crucial aspect of the applicant's claim to international protection. In support of that submission, counsel referred to the provisions of s.28 of the 2015 Act, which mandated the decision-maker to fully investigate all aspects of the applicant's claim to international protection and was under a duty to cooperate with an applicant in that regard.

27. The applicant also relied on the decision in PD v Minister for Justice and Law Reform [2015] IEHC 111, where it was held that the decision at first instance was bad at law for a failure on the part of the decision-maker to carry out any investigation as to whether the laws in Zimbabwe and Malawi contained provisions that criminalised homosexual acts and on that basis rendered it unsafe for the applicant to return to those countries: see paras 60 and 61.

28. In response, the respondents submitted that when one looks at the entirety of the applicant’s application, including her application form, her questionnaire, her interview, the supporting documentation she submitted and the written submissions made on her behalf by her solicitor, the nature of her case was very clear. It was that having fled Abkhazia in 1993 with her mother and siblings, when she was six years of age, she had lived for approximately 30 years in Tbilisi, where she went to school, got married, had a child, worked in a restaurant, set up a business and purchased property.

29. It was submitted that the gravamen of her case was that following the conversion of her husband to Islam and in particular, following the baptism of the applicant's daughter in 2021, friends of her deceased husband had allegedly put pressure on her in the manner described by her in 2021 and in the incident in August 2022, leading to her

decision to flee from her home area in Tbilisi.

30. It was submitted that in approaching an application for asylum or international protection, a decision-maker had to ask the following questions: does the applicant face a risk of serious harm in the place whence she has fled; if so, is there state protection available; if not, can she relocate elsewhere in her country of origin?

31. It was submitted that the decision-maker had addressed the entirety of the applicant's case in his decision. He had had regard to the fact that the applicant had fled from Abkhazia; he had had regard to the accounts given by the applicant of the assaults and threats allegedly made to her; and he had had regard to the documentation submitted by her. Having considered these, he came to the conclusion that the applicant had not demonstrated that she had a reasonable fear of suffering serious harm at the hands of the associates of her deceased husband if she returned to Tbilisi.

32. It was submitted that her fleeing from Abkhazia was not a major part of her narrative, nor of her application for international protection, because she had lived for the vast majority of her life in Tbilisi. Her case was that she could not live in safety in that area due to the actions of the friends of her deceased husband. That narrative had not been accepted by the decision-maker for the reasons set out in the decision. It was submitted that if the applicant was dissatisfied with that decision, she had a full statutory appeal, of which she had availed by lodging an appeal to the IPAT. It was submitted that in these circumstances there were no grounds on which the court should grant certiorari of the decision that was made at first instance.

Conclusions:

33. I accept the submission made on behalf of the applicant that it is incumbent on a decision-maker to give a decision on the grounds put forward by an applicant as to why they should be granted asylum or international protection. However, that does not mean that some sort of rigid formula must be adopted when giving reasons for a

decision. The essential question is whether the decision-maker has fairly addressed the substance of the case put forward by the applicant.

34. I am satisfied that when read as a whole, the decision in this case clearly addresses the substance of the case that was made by the applicant. The decision refers to the fact that the applicant had fled from Abkhazia in 1993. This was referred to a number of times in the decision. There is no suggestion in the decision that it was safe for the applicant to return to Abkhazia. The issue of returning to there did not arise.

35. The core of the applicant's case for international protection was that she faced a fear of serious harm at the hands of associates of her deceased husband if she was forced to return to her home area of Tbilisi.

36. The respondent did not accept her narrative in that regard for the reasons set out in the decision. If the applicant is unhappy with that conclusion, she has a full right of appeal to the IPAT, at which she can make further submissions and produce such further evidence as she may think appropriate.

37. Essentially, the respondent held that the applicant could safely return to live in Tbilisi. Even if one were to adopt the argument put forward by the applicant and hold that as she was an IDP who had fled from Abkhazia, she would have to establish that state protection was not available and that she could not internally relocate within Georgia. Given the core finding that was made by the decision-maker, she would end up in the same position as she is in now; namely, being refused international protection because it was held that she could reside safely in Tbilisi.

38. I am satisfied that on any reasonable reading of the decision in this case, it is clear that the respondent carefully took account of all aspects of the case put forward by the applicant. Having done so, he reached a decision that was open to him on the evidence. There is no basis on which this Court can order that that decision should be struck down.

39. In her written submissions, it was submitted that the decision-maker had misunderstood this element of her claim. If he did that, it meant that he had at least considered the point. If the applicant feels that he misunderstood her argument in this regard, that is quintessentially a ground for inclusion in an appeal, where the applicant can remake the argument in a different or more forceful manner. The assertion that a

decision-maker may have misunderstood an argument that was put forward on behalf of an applicant, is not a ground for granting certiorari of the decision.

40. As this Court has held that there are no grounds for ordering certiorari of the impugned decisions, it is not necessary to decide the argument in relation to whether it is appropriate to grant certiorari, having regard to the existence of an alternative remedy in the form of an appeal to the IPAT.

41. In light of the findings in the judgment herein, it is proposed that the final order should be to refuse the reliefs sought by the applicant in her notice of motion and in her statement of grounds.

42. As this judgment has been delivered electronically, the parties shall have two weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise.

43. The matter will be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on16 December 2025 for the purpose of making final orders.