High Court allows appeal where reconstituted committee closed file after admitting procedural error, despite appellant's submission concerns.

THE HIGH COURT [2025] IEHC 640 [2025 No. 65 MCA]

Between:

BREDA COONEY

Appellant

– and –

LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Respondent

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Max Barrett of 20th November 2025.

1. Ms Cooney made a complaint to the Legal Services Regulatory Authority about a solicitor whom she had engaged. Her complaint was upheld by decision of 8th January 2024 made by a Complaints Resolution Officer at the Authority. The solicitor applied for an internal review of that decision. By decision of 16th April 2024, the Review Committee disagreed with the finding of the Complaints Resolution Officer.

2. Ms Cooney appealed the last decision to the High Court. Before or at the hearing, the Authority acknowledged that there had been procedural error in how it treated with the review application and consented to the impugned decision being remitted to the Authority for fresh

decision by a newly constituted Review Committee.

3. As it happens, that newly constituted Review Committee also decided, this time on 14th January 2025, that the legal services provided to Ms Cooney by the solicitor in question had not been inadequate. Pursuant to s.62(5)(b) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, the reconstituted Review Committee remitted the complaint to the Authority with a direction that the file be closed.

4. The provisions concerning complaints and disciplinary hearings are contained in Part 6 of the Act. I will consider specific provisions of Part 6 as necessary. However, I have set out, in Diagram 1 (at the rear of this judgment), a summary overview of what Part 6 provides.

5. Ms Cooney was self-represented at the hearing of this appeal. As I understand Ms Cooney’s case, she has three key concerns regarding the actions of the Authority with respect to the consideration undertaken by the freshly constituted Review Committee. Thus, she complains that it (i) did not invite a submission from her as required under s.62(5) of the Act, (ii) closed the complaint improperly, (iii) made a decision that was substantively wrong.

6. I will deal first with the complaint that the Review Committee did not invite a submission from Ms Cooney as required under s.62(5) of the Act. In point of fact, she was asked by the initial Review Committee on 16th February 2024 to make a statement. By letter of 8th March 2024, Ms Cooney indicated that the basis of her complaint remained as she first stated, and she asked simply that this be done. I understand that this was done by the Review Committee as initially composed and by the Review Committee to which the matter was remitted on consent.

7. It is accepted that the reconstituted committee did not ask for further submissions. The Authority maintains in this regard that the parties had already been afforded an opportunity to make statements and that the matter was remitted by the High Court to be reconsidered by a differently constituted Committee. My own sense is that the key element in this is what was ordered by the High Court. It ordered that the matter be reconsidered by a freshly constituted committee. It did not order those matters be recommenced ab initio. The Authority did as the High Court contemplated: it had a freshly constituted committee consider the material that went before the initially constituted committee and arrived at a fresh decision. My own respectful sense is that in her focus on what s.62(5) requires, Ms Cooney has overlooked that the proper matter of focus once the High Court made its order was what that order required. The Authority has done precisely as required of it by that order.

8. Ms Cooney’s second complaint concerns the decision of the reconstituted Review Committee, pursuant to s.62(5)(b) of the Act, to remit the complaint to the Authority with a direction that the file be closed. Section 62(5)(b) provides, inter alia, as follows:

“The Review Committee shall consider reviews requested and, having given both the client and the legal practitioner an opportunity to make a statement in writing to it as to why the determination of the Authority under section 60 or 61, as the case may be, was incorrect or unjust, determine the review by..(b) remitting the complaint to the Authority, with such directions as the Review Committee considers appropriate or necessary, to be dealt with again under section 60 or 61, as the case may be…”.

9. Ms Cooney contends, in effect, that this means that the only options open to Committee under (b) are essentially to direct a re-commencement of the whole complaints process. I do not consider that it is the correct reading to be afforded to s.62(5)(b). It seems to me that it is perfectly clear in what it provides. It empowers the Review Committee to determine a review:

• By remitting the complaint to the Authority (as it has done in Ms Cooney’s case)

• With such directions as the Review Committee considers appropriate or necessary (here the direction in effect to close the file)

• With the complaint to be dealt with again under s.60 or 61, as the case may be (here neither such case presents, given the direction in effect to close the file).

10. I am buttressed in my sense that this is the correct reading to be given to the provision when I look to the alternative. If I were to adopt the (if I might respectfully observe, mistaken) reading contended for by Ms Conroy, that would be to create a never-ending cycle whereby a complaint, if adjudicated upon in a manner not to the satisfaction of one of the parties (which seems the all-but-inevitable consequence of every adjudication) would fall to be recommenced. Respectfully, I do not accept that this could be what the Oireachtas intended.

11. I turn now to the question whether the Review Committee’s decision was substantively wrong. In fact, the substance of the decision was not argued by Ms Cooney before me and she seemed to accept the relatively narrow role that, in L.L. v. Legal Services Regulatory Authority [2023] 6 JIC 1403; [2023] IEHC 315, the High Court was identified as having in proceedings such as those now before me. There, it will be recalled, the court held that an appeal to the High Court is an appeal confined to error on the part of the Review Committee, such that Ms Cooney in the case before me would have to show that the decision of the Review Committee is vitiated by a serious and significant error or by a series of such errors. Such errors as have been alleged to have occurred have been addressed by me above and I have found no error actually to be present.

12. I am sorry that Ms Cooney suffered the personal tragedy which led to her having to engage a solicitor in the first place. I understand why she would feel dissatisfied with the decision of the reconstituted Review Committee: at least one party always walks away from an adjudication process feeling disappointed in the outcome. However, for the reasons stated, I do not consider that the decision of the reconstituted Review Committee is tainted in any way by error. Consequently, I am compelled to reject the present appeal against that decision and to refuse the various reliefs sought by Ms Cooney in the notice of appeal grounding these proceedings.

13. I will hear the parties as to costs. As these proceedings were heard in Cork, it may be that the parties would prefer any (if any) costs application to be heard remotely. Diagram 1

Overview of Part 6 of Legal Services Regulation Act 2015

s.49. Construction. Defines key terms for the purposes of Part 6 and clarifies when legal services are deemed to be of an inadequate standard.

▼ s.50. Misconduct by legal practitioners. Defines the range of acts or omissions that constitute professional misconduct by legal practitioners.

▼ s.51. Complaints under Part 6. Provides for the making of complaints to the Authority, including complaints initiated by clients, the Law Society, or the Authority itself.

▼ s.52. Referral of complaints by professional bodies. Requires the Bar Council, King’s Inns, and the Law Society to refer relevant client complaints about barristers or solicitors to the Authority and allows those bodies also to make complaints directly.

▼ s.53. Limitation period. Suspends the running of limitation periods for costs adjudication while a related complaint under Part 6 is pending or until two months after its determination.

▼ s.54. Withdrawal of complaint. Allows Authority to continue dealing with a complaint even after its withdrawal, where it considers this to be in the public interest, with notice to the parties concerned. ▼ s.55. Regulations regarding complaints. Empowers Authority to make regulations governing the making and investigation of complaints, etc.

▼ s.56. Fees in respect of complaints. Authorises Authority, with Ministerial approval, to prescribe and regulate fees for making complaints.

▼ s.57. Preliminary review of complaints. Obliges Authority to review each complaint for admissibility, seek responses or further information as needed, and notify both parties of its determination and reasons.

▼ s.58. Admissibility of complaints. Sets out the grounds on which a complaint must or may be found inadmissible, including where it is frivolous, previously determined, time-barred, or subject to pending court proceedings.

▼ s.59. Authority may request Law Society to investigate. Enables the Authority, Complaints Committee, or Disciplinary Tribunal to request the Law Society to investigate matters relevant to a solicitor’s complaint and to provide interim and final reports admissible in proceedings.

▼ s.60. Resolution of complaints about inadequate services. Requires the Authority to first facilitate informal resolution of complaints about inadequate services and, if unresolved, empowers it to direct remedial action or compensation up to €3,000, subject to review.

▼ s.61. Resolution of complaints about excessive costs. Provides for informal resolution of complaints about excessive legal costs and, if unresolved, empowers Authority to direct refunds or waivers of fees, subject to review and consistent with any later adjudication.

▼ s.62. Review Committee. Establishes a threemember Review Committee (two lay persons and one legal practitioner) to review Authority determinations under ss 60 or 61, with power to confirm, remit, or substitute its own direction.

▼ s.63. Appeal to High Court. Allows either party to appeal a Review Committee determination to the High Court within 21 days.

▼ s.64. Assistance in resolving potential misconduct matters. Permits Authority to facilitate resolution of complaints involving potential misconduct of inadequate service and requires disciplinary bodies to consider genuine efforts to resolve the matter when determining any sanction.

▼ s.65. Mediation or informal resolution. Protects confidentiality of statements made during informal or mediated complaint resolution and provides that related costs are shared equally unless otherwise agreed.

▼ s.66. No admission of liability. Clarifies that legal practitioner agreement to engage in informal or mediated complaint resolution does not constitute an admission of fault or misconduct. ▼ s.67. Guidelines for informal resolution. Requires Authority to publish guidelines governing informal resolution of complaints, including procedures, record-keeping, and steps to follow where resolution is not achieved.

▼ s.68. Referral of misconduct complaints. Requires the Authority to refer misconduct complaints to the Complaints Committee where informal resolution efforts have not succeeded.

▼ s.69. Establishment and membership of Complaints Committee. Establishes Complaints Committee, composed mainly of lay members with solicitor and barrister nominees, to investigate misconduct complaints through divisions chaired by lay members.

▼ s.70. Investigation of complaints. Empowers Divisional Committees of the Complaints Committee to investigate referred complaints, gather information and evidence, etc.

▼ s.71. Powers of Divisional Committee. Authorises Divisional Committee to impose specified sanctions or directions for lesser misconduct, including compensation or cost contributions, and to refer more serious matters to the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal where appropriate.

▼ s.72. Appeal of Divisional Committee determinations. Provides right of appeal to the High Court against a Divisional Committee’s determination or direction.

▼ s.73. Publication of reports. Requires Authority to publish biannual reports on its complaint-handling functions.

▼ s.74. Establishment of Disciplinary Tribunal. Establishes Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal to hear applications and perform disciplinary functions under the Act.

▼ s.75. Membership of Disciplinary Tribunal. Provides for appointment of a predominantly lay Disciplinary Tribunal.

▼ s.76. Chairperson of Disciplinary Tribunal. Provides for appointment of chairperson.

▼ s.77. Applications to Disciplinary Tribunal. Empowers Disciplinary Tribunal to hear applications referred by Complaints Committee or Law Society.

▼ s.78. Presentation of case to Disciplinary Tribunal. Assigns responsibility for presenting evidence of alleged misconduct to the Authority (or its nominee) or, in Law Society applications, to the Law Society.

▼ s.79. Regulations relating to Disciplinary Tribunal. Authorises Disciplinary Tribunal to make regulations governing its applications and proceedings.

▼ s.80. Powers of the Disciplinary Tribunal. Confers on the Disciplinary Tribunal powers equivalent to those of the High Court in compelling witnesses and documents, etc.

▼ s.81. Inquiry by Disciplinary Tribunal. Provides for public oral hearings by the Disciplinary Tribunal to determine whether misconduct has occurred.

▼ s.82. Sanctions following finding of misconduct. Empowers Disciplinary Tribunal, after finding misconduct, to impose or recommend a range of sanctions.

▼ s.83. Appeals from Disciplinary Tribunal. Provides for appeals to High Court by the Authority or the legal practitioner against findings of misconduct or sanctions.

▼ s.84. Appeals to the High Court. Sets out High Court powers on appeal from the Disciplinary Tribunal.

▼ s.85. High Court consideration of disciplinary matters. Empowers High Court, on reference or appeal from the Disciplinary Tribunal, to confirm or overturn findings and impose sanctions ranging from censure and restitution to suspension, strike-off, or restrictions on practice.

▼ s.86. Exercise of High Court jurisdiction. Provides that High Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction under ss 84 and 85 is to be exercised by the President of the High Court or a judge designated by the President.

▼ s.87. Appeals to the Court of Appeal. Allows Authority or legal practitioner to appeal a High Court order under s.85 to the Court of Appeal within 21 days.

▼ s.88. Publication and notification of disciplinary outcomes. Requires that disciplinary decisions and court orders be furnished to the relevant professional bodies and published.

▼ s.89. Privilege. Grants absolute privilege to complaints, documents, proceedings, reports, and publications made or issued under Part 6.

▼ s.90. Enforcement of disciplinary orders. Empowers High Court, on application by Authority, to compel compliance with directions, determinations, or orders made under specified provisions of Part 6.

▼ s.91. Transitional provisions for solicitors. Preserves application of prior Solicitors Acts to existing complaints.

▼ s.92. Transitional provisions for barristers. Provides for High Court consideration of precommencement barrister misconduct.

▼ s.93. Appointment of monitor. Authorises Authority to appoint staff members as monitors.

▼ s.94. Powers of the Authority. Confers on the Authority, when handling complaints about solicitors, all powers that the Law Society possesses under the Solicitors Acts 1954-2015.