High Court dismisses judicial review of IPAT refusal of refugee status from safe country Georgia.

[2025] IEHC 625

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2024/227JR]

BETWEEN: G.G.

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL,

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY,

IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell on the 18th day of November, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. The applicant in these judicial review proceedings seeks to quash a decision by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to refuse him refugee status and subsidiary protection. The decision of the Tribunal was made pursuant to the provisions of the International Protection Act, 2015 (the 2015 Act). In accordance with section 26 of the 2015 Act, the identity of the applicant has been anonymised and any potentially identifying information has been presented in a manner which minimises the potential for the applicant to be identified.

2. The applicant is a national of Georgia, which has been designated a safe country pursuant to section 72 of the 2015 Act. The factual basis of the applicant’s claim is that he is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religion, which was accepted to be a minority religion in Georgia. He sought protection in Ireland based on his contention that he faced religious persecution. A feature of the overall case is that many aspects of the applicant’s history were accepted by the International Protection Office and Tribunal. The Tribunal found on balance that the applicant had been subject to assaults and that he had a well-founded fear that he would be subject to further persecution if he was returned to Georgia. However, the applicant’s claims were rejected on the basis that the Tribunal was not satisfied that state protection would not be available to the applicant. Accordingly, the principal dispute agitated by the applicant relates to the way the Tribunal went about considering whether the applicant could avail of state protection.

3. The applicant’s case was heard before the Court of Appeal delivered a single judgment in two appeals, Z.M. v. IPAT and Minister for Justice, and N.G. v. IPAT and Minister for Justice. That judgment was delivered on the 21 October 2025 and has the neutral citation [2025] IECA

208. That judgment, which I will refer to as “Z.M.”, gave detailed consideration to the manner in which certain provisions in the 2015 Act, particularly sections 28, 31 and 33, fall to be applied where an applicant seeks international protection and is from a country that has been designated as safe. Those sections are considered in the context of their EU law sources in the Procedures and Qualification Directives. I did not consider it necessary to hear further argument in relation to the implications of that judgment because in large part the judgment does not substantially disturb the approaches adopted by the High Court in a number of cases, including the N.G. case, which were the subject of some discussion at the hearing of this case.

4. It is necessary at this point to reiterate the general nature of the approach to be adopted by the court in applications of this type, and which has been applied in this case. In R.A. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297, Hogan J. for the Court of Appeal emphasised the effect of the Qualification Directive on the role of the court in addressing a judicial review application concerning international protection: “63. It is, in any event, clear since the coming into force of the Qualification Directive (Directive 2004/83/EC) that the grant of asylum is fundamentally governed by EU law: see Case C-57/09 and C-101/09 B and D EU:C:2010:661. As this Court has already made clear in NM (DRC), the requirement of Article

39 of the Procedures Directive means that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings must nonetheless ensure that “the reasons which led the competent authority to reject the application for asylum as unfounded … may be the subject of a thorough review by the national court.”…”.

5. Hence, the court, while dealing with a judicial review application, is approaching the matter on the basis that what is required is a “thorough review”.

6. For the reasons provided below, I have concluded that the application should be refused.

THE EVIDENCE

7. The evidence available to the Court was provided by way of the applicant’s affidavit sworn on the 15 February 2024. The exhibits to this affidavit include the impugned decision, the supporting material considered by the Tribunal, as well as the decision of the IPO at first instance and the material available before that body.

8. In accordance with the statutory process underpinning claims for international protection, the applicant first completed an IPO questionnaire outlining the basis for his international protection claim. On the 28 July 2023 the applicant completed an interview pursuant to s. 35 of the 2015 Act. The material circumstances were accepted by both the IPO and the Tribunal.

9. The applicant was born in Georgia and completed his education to a bachelor’s degree level in that jurisdiction. Prior to his departure, the applicant worked in the field of IT for 8 years. The applicant explained that he converted to Jehovah’s Witnesses in October 2021 and attempted to keep his religious beliefs secret. Despite intending to keep his religious views secret, the applicant described two incidents when he was assaulted for these views, as well as a further violent incident in the family home involving his father. In May 2022, the applicant was approached by a named neighbour who confronted the applicant over his religious views. The named individual subjected the applicant to verbal threats and insults, such as that the applicant “betrayed his country and religion”. This preceded a physical assault in which the applicant was badly beaten and hospitalised. A police report was exhibited to the applicant’s affidavit in relation to this incident, and the report was available to the Tribunal when completing its decision.

10. A further incident occurred in April 2023. The applicant describes an attack outside a church which similarly resulted in hospitalization, with the police report also exhibited. A third incident involved the applicant’s father in which the applicant explained that his father produced a knife and threatened the applicant.

11. The applicant arrived in this jurisdiction on the 20 May 2023, and he applied for international protection on the 22 May 2023 on the basis that he was suffering persecution as a result of his religious beliefs. The applicant provided supporting information to the IPO for the purposes of considering his claim. The documentation provided can be summarised as supporting his identity, religion, education and the specific instances of assault upon which his claim for persecution are predicated. The IPO issued its first instance decision under cover letter dated the 14 August 2023.

12. A notice of appeal was completed by the applicant on the 22 August 2023. Correspondence from the Tribunal to the applicant’s legal representatives in December 2023 invited further submissions with regard to the applicant’s reliance on particular country of origin information. Submissions were subsequently provided to the Tribunal on behalf of the applicant on the 17 January 2024. The impugned decision was then completed and issued to the applicant on the 23 January 2024.

The Tribunal Decision

13. The impugned decision begins with a preliminary discussion on the appeal proceeding in an “on the papers” manner. The applicant did not provide reasons why the appeal should be heard by way of oral hearing and the Tribunal conducted an independent analysis of the issue as required. The Tribunal ultimately was satisfied the appeal was one most appropriately dealt with on the papers, and no issue was raised by the applicant in this regard.

14. A brief outline of the claim was provided after which the Tribunal considered the factual circumstances advanced by the applicant. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant is a national of Georgia on the basis of the applicant’s documents and his ability to speak Georgian.

15. The Tribunal further accepted the credibility findings that had been made by the IPO at first instance. In summary, these findings were that the applicant was a member of the Jehovah’s Witness religion and suffered verbal and physical assault due to his religious beliefs. In the premise of the incidents described previously, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant suffered persecutory acts with a nexus to the applicant’s religious beliefs. The Tribunal having accepted that the applicant suffered past persecution, made an express finding that he was entitled to the benefit of the rebuttable presumption outlined in section 28(6) of the 2015 Act. The Tribunal’s application of this presumption forms one of the bases of challenge by the applicant and will be considered further below.

16. The question concerning the adequacy of state protection occupied the bulk of the Tribunal’s analysis and formed the primary basis upon which the decision has been challenged. The Tribunal had regard to several pieces of country of origin information (COI), some of which were identified by the Tribunal while the applicant requested further COI to be considered.

17. The Tribunal first considered the US Department of State Report on Religious Freedom for 2022, which outlined several distinct incidents in which religious minorities in Georgia faced persecution. The report also noted that religious minorities continued to report resistance from local communities when establishing places of worship.

18. The European Commission Working Document in respect of Georgia was also considered, notwithstanding that this document was prepared, as noted by the Tribunal, for the purposes of assessing Georgia’s application for membership of the EU. The relevant portion of the working document noted that notwithstanding the comprehensive legal framework, religious minorities face several challenges in exercising their freedom of religion rights. The working document further notes that while hate crimes toward religious minorities are addressed, “some investigations…lack effectiveness”. The Tribunal alluded to this point in its consideration of the COI, but did not provide any detailed analysis in relation to it.

19. In relation to the COI brought to the Tribunal’s attention by the applicant, the Tribunal noted that the particular reports were outdated, and it had sought clarification from the applicant on this point. A 2015 report from Amnesty, in particular, was not considered in detail by the Tribunal due to the availability of other more contemporary reports available from the same source.

20. Freedom House Reports from 2022 and 2023 were contrasted by the Tribunal. This consideration was the subject of discussion at the hearing. In the body of the decision, the Tribunal noted that “the 2022 report convinced the Tribunal that there was not effective state protection in Georgia for Jehovah’s witnesses”. In that regard, the Tribunal noted that a separate earlier decision involving a different applicant was influenced by the “stark statement” contained in the report that religious minorities are “insufficiently protected by the State”.

21. On the other hand, the 2023 report from the same source omitted the statement that religious minorities were “insufficiently protected by the State”. The Tribunal considered that the question before it was therefore whether, with the benefit of the 2023 report, could it be said that there is effective, non-temporary protection for Jehovah’s Witnesses.

22. The Tribunal then acknowledged the report of the European Commission in 2022 which noted a lack of effective investigations and a failure to establish hate motives in crimes committed on the basis of religion. Notwithstanding this finding, the Tribunal did not consider that the available COI went so far as to say effective protection is not available. The Tribunal also considered that ECtHR jurisprudence illustrated that Georgia provided adequate means to seek redress.

23. The Tribunal also considered references to corruption within the Georgian judiciary. However, the Tribunal considered that there was a functional legal system in place which was capable of prosecuting and punishing the acts complained of by the applicant.

24. Having considered the COI, the Tribunal considered that the issue before it was therefore, “Whether the State in question takes reasonable steps for the detention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of offenders and that such a system is available to the Appellant and that it is effective and non-temporary.”. In concluding upon this issue, the Tribunal determined that state protection was effective and available. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the applicant ought not be entitled to refugee status or to subsidiary protection.

GROUNDS OF REVIEW

25. By Order dated the 13 May 2024, the applicant was granted leave to challenge the

decision of the Tribunal. In accordance with the Order granting leave, the applicant further submitted an amended statement of grounds which was appended to the Order granting leave. The grounds upon which the applicant is relying upon are summarised as follows: a. First, the applicant contended that he was entitled to have his appeal dealt with on the basis of the rebuttable assumption provided for in s. 28(6) of the 2015 Act. The applicant argued that the appeal was considered using the normal “forward looking test” and that this amounted to an error of law. The applicant further argues that the decision was contrary to s. 28(6); as the Tribunal accepted that the applicant suffered past persecution, no good reason was provided to find that this persecution would not be repeated.

b. In relation to the Tribunal’s consideration of the 2022 and 2023 Freedom House reports, the applicant argues that it was irrational to conclude on the availability of state protection due to the omission of a sentence contained within the 2022 report from the 2023 report. The applicant argues that the decision was arrived at without properly considering the issue of state protection. In particular, the effectiveness of the legal measures in place in Georgia was not properly considered by the Tribunal.

c. The applicant raises a further argument in relation to section 33 of the 2015 Act. The applicant argued that the provisions of section 33 preclude the consideration of a country as a safe country where the applicant has submitted serious grounds for considering Georgia not safe in his particular circumstances. The applicant argued there was no proper analysis or conclusion under section 33, and that this amounted to an error in law. In connection with that point, the applicant relied upon the judgment of Barrett J. in B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 as support for the proposition that the Tribunal was obliged to consider the four questions set out in that judgment and that failure to do so was an error in law.

Statement of Opposition

26. The respondents filed a statement of opposition on the 7 October 2024. The respondents accepted the factual circumstances giving rise to the claim for international protection but argued that the decision of the Tribunal was reached in accordance with law.

27. The respondents argued that the impugned decision explicitly acknowledged that the applicant was entitled to the presumption contained within section 28(6) of the 2015 Act.

28. The respondents did not accept that the conclusion on state protection was reached on the basis of an omission, as suggested by the applicant. Rather the respondents contended that the COI was considered in its entirety and the conclusion on state protection was reached on the basis of this consideration. The respondent further rejected the suggestion that the impugned

decision reduced the analysis of adequate protection to merely whether there were laws / constitutional guarantees in place, but that the decision considered the effectiveness of these measures.

29. In relation to the judgment of Barrett J. in B.C. v IPAT, the respondents argued that there was no requirement in law for the four questions outlined in the judgment to be specifically set out. The respondents suggested that, when considered substantively, there was no reasonable distinction between the questions set out by Barrett J. and the test applied by the Tribunal.

ARGUMENTS

30. The applicant provided legal submissions which addressed some of the grounds pleaded. In accordance with an Order of Gearty J. made on the 13 February 2025, the applicant provided supplemental written submissions which address the remaining grounds but which were not included in the substantive submissions.

31. In the substantive submissions provided by the applicant, the grounds pleaded were distilled into three legal issues which the applicant argues as arising: i. Whether certiorari should be granted on the basis of failure to apply section 28(6) of the 2015 Act. ii. Whether certiorari should be granted on account of the finding of availability of state protection being largely based on the absence of a statement to the contrary being contained in a country report. iii. Whether certiorari should be granted on account of the failure of the respondent to apply the proper approach to an assessment of state protection in circumstances where the applicant has established a fear of persecution on a Convention ground but where he is from a country which has been designated as a safe country of origin.

S. 28(6) rebuttable presumption

32. The applicant submitted that notwithstanding the explicit reference to the rebuttable presumption within para. 5.1 of the impugned decision, the Tribunal continued in its determination of the appeal without any further reference to or application of the presumption. The applicant referred to para 5.17 of the decision in this regard, “[t]he Tribunal must start its consideration from the position that there is a presumption of State Protection”.

33. The applicant argued that while this approach may be permissible where the standard “forward looking test” is applicable, this approach ignores the presumption contained within s. 28(6) which the applicant is entitled to in the determination of his claim. Reference was made to the case of M.Y. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 345; the applicant contended that this judgment provides analogous circumstances in which certiorari was granted for the failure to apply the rebuttable presumption provided for in s. 28(6).

34. The position of the respondents was that the Tribunal made explicit reference to the s. 28(6) ground and this presumption was enjoyed by the applicant. The respondents considered that the applicant established future risk but that the issue in this instance was whether there was effective non-temporary protection available to the applicant. The applicant’s reliance on M.Y v IPAT was rejected on the basis that in M.Y., there was no reference to s. 28(6) in the impugned decision, where the instant decision specifically stated the applicant enjoys the presumption.

Discussion of section 28(6) of the 2015 Act issues

35. In N.U. v. IPAT & Ors [2022] IEHC 87, Phelan J. explained the effect of section 28(6) of the 2015 Act: “20. By reason of s. 28(6) of the 2015 Act, in assessing the extent of a future risk (“real”) and in that context the availability of state protection, the Tribunal is directed to treat as a serious indicator of risk that an applicant has already been subjected to persecution or harm. This provision has been described as creating “a rebuttable presumption” that where events constituting persecution have been established, (see IL v. IPAT & Anor. [2021] IEHC 106), this in turn establishes a serious indication that the applicant’s subjective fear of suffering serious harm, if returned, is well founded unless there were good reasons to consider that such serious harm would not be repeated.

36. However, as confirmed by Phelan J. in E.S. v. IPAT & Anor [2022] IEHC 613, there is no requirement for the Tribunal to refer expressly to a rebuttable presumption in the decision; the requirement is that the decision is “couched in terms which reflect that the decision maker is aware of the significant evidential benefit which supports a finding of future fear of or risk of persecution or harm unless good reasons are identified to explain why the past event is not a valid indicator of future risk.” [para 42]

37. Likewise, it is preferable but not essential for the decision maker to refer to specific statutory provisions; but where the relevant statutory provisions are not referred to expressly the court will need to be particularly vigilant to ensure that the Tribunal has identified the correct test, and that it has been understood and considered in substance. Furthermore, as Phelan J. identified in E.S. at para 51, where the Tribunal accepts that there is a future risk of harm based on previous occurrences, there can be no basis for contending that the applicant was deprived of the benefit of s.28(6) of the 2015 Act.

38. The Court of Appeal in Z.M. confirmed previous findings of the High Court that the question of whether an applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution is separate from the question of whether state protection is or is not available in their circumstances. Hence, there is no basis for any contention that a finding that an applicant has established a well-founded fear of persecution – or a real risk of suffering serious harm – means that the Tribunal implicitly must be taken as having accepted already that state protection will not be available for the applicant.

39. In addition, the Court of Appeal in Z.M., made clear that it may not be necessary for the Tribunal expressly to refer to section 28(6) of the 2015 Act - although this is what occurred in this case. Instead, the court needs to be able to have a clear basis for understanding that the evidential presumption was engaged with by the decision maker. In addition, once it is clear that the presumption was applied to the benefit of the applicant, the Tribunal will not need to provide reasons for its rebuttal.

40. In its decision, the Tribunal expressly acknowledged that the applicant experienced matters that were sufficiently serious to constitute persecution, and that this triggered an entitlement to the benefit of section 28(6) of the 2015 Act. There was no express finding that the applicant had established that he had a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of suffering serious harm. However, for two main reasons I consider that this is a necessary inference to be drawn from the approach adopted by the Tribunal. a. In the first instance, the reference to the benefit of the presumption was set out in a section headed “Analysis of Well Founded Fear”. Accordingly the presumption was applied in the context of the forward looking section of the analysis. Moreover, there was no finding as far as I can ascertain that the Tribunal found that the applicant was not likely to face difficulties on the basis of his religious beliefs if he was returned to Georgia.

b. Second, the remainder of the section addressed the question of whether state protection was available for the applicant. While the manner in which the Tribunal addressed the question of state protection is a separate matter to be considered, I am satisfied that the approach adopted by the Tribunal was premised on an acceptance that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution, otherwise the extensive engagement with the issue of state protection would have been unnecessary.

41. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the applicant’s claim for relief on the basis of his section 28(6) argument cannot succeed because the applicant in fact was afforded the benefit of the evidential presumption in that subsection.

Issues relating to treatment of COI on state protection

42. The second main argument made by the applicant was that it was irrational, unreasonable and a material misrepresentation of the COI to reach the conclusion contained within the impugned decision. The omission of a phrase in an updated version of a Freedom House report as compared to a version published the year prior, formed the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion on the issue of state protection, according to the applicant. The crux of the applicant’s argument in this regard is that it was unsafe to assume that the omission of this phrase led to the conclusion that there is now adequate state protection for Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Rather, the applicant considers that the other COI available to the Tribunal provides ample support to the proposition that there is not adequate state protection.

43. The respondents disagreed with the proposition that the Tribunal’s decision was reached on the basis of the omission of one phrase from the Freedom House report. In respect of the analysis afforded to the two versions of the Freedom House report, the respondents acknowledged that the Tribunal previously considered there to be inadequate state protection on the basis of the explicit reference to such a deficit in the 2022 report. The respondents contextualised the analysis of the two versions of the Freedom House report and explained that the Tribunal preferred the 2023 version because it was the more up to date report and that there was no basis for relying on the explicit statement contained within the 2022 version.

44. The respondents also argued that the analysis of the Freedom House report was not an isolated analysis. Rather it was accompanied by further consideration of the other COI available to the Tribunal. In particular, the respondents noted that the Tribunal engaged with the applicant and sought clarification and submissions on the COI available to the body, rather than relying solely on its own consideration of the 2023 Freedom House report.

45. The respondents’ submissions continued by addressing the analysis of other COI information. The respondent argues that where the Tribunal preferred any given piece of COI, this was explicitly provided for in the impugned decision and a reason was provided for this, particularly where more up to date information is available.

Discussion

46. The issue here is whether the treatment of the COI by the Tribunal was rational, and not whether it was open to the Tribunal to take a different view or, still less, whether the court would have reached a different conclusion. It is a matter for the Tribunal to decide on the weight to be placed on the various pieces of COI that were considered. As noted by Phelan J. at para

79 in E.S., “it is well established that the Tribunal is not entitled to use COI selectively or to ignore relevant COI in the Applicant’s favour without comment. The Tribunal is required to weigh up the different and conflicting information and explain why it considered that notwithstanding that the information goes in contrary directions, a particular conclusion or finding is being reached or one part of the information preferred over another.”

47. It is clear from my reading of the decision that the Tribunal engaged extensively with the COI in order to form a view on the question of whether there was effective non temporary protection available to the applicant having regard to his particular circumstances. It was also apparent that the Tribunal was particularly concerned to explain how it approached the fact that there were differences between the 2022 and 2023 Freedom House reports. I am satisfied that the applicant was not correct to characterise the decision as one that turned on the Tribunal overly emphasising the absence of one phrase or sentence from the later Freedom House report. Clearly the modification in the 2023 Freedom House report was a factor that was considered and properly needed to be considered. The point, as I understand the decision, was that the COI, taken in the round, was reasonably closely balanced. In an earlier decision, that balance was tipped in favour of a finding that state protection would not have been available for an applicant because the 2022 Freedom House report stated that religious minorities (expressly including Jehovah’s Witnesses) “are insufficiently protected by the state”.

48. However, these situations are not fixed, and the Tribunal is obliged to have regard to up to date information. In that regard the 2023 Freedom House report did not include the phrase referred to above. The result was that the balance that had tipped one way in favour of an earlier applicant now tipped in the other direction for this applicant. I do not consider that this was irrational or involved excessive weight being placed on the different emphases in the two Freedom House reports. Instead what occurred was that the overall balance was struck by the

decision maker in light of the most up to date available information. I do not consider that the approach adopted was irrational in any sense. The decision maker in this case clearly engaged with the COI and did so in what seems to me to be an openminded manner. The decision maker was obliged to reach a conclusion and I am satisfied that the decision made was within the range of reasonable decisions that were open on the evidence.

Issue regarding the approach to assessment of state protection

49. The applicant grounds this argument in the dicta of Phelan J. in N.U. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 87. In the instant case, the applicant argues that there was no express conclusion by the Tribunal that no serious grounds had been submitted, and the Tribunal could not rely on the safe country designation to ground its findings. Insofar as this occurred, according to the applicant, the decision is rendered unlawful.

50. Counsel for the applicant considered para. 46 of N.U as authority for this proposition:- As set out above the test under s. 33 is that a country may be treated as a safe third country “only where” the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be safe. Accordingly, the Tribunal can only rely on the safe country of origin designation to ground a decision that state protection is available where it has considered the applicant’s personal circumstances and concluded that no serious grounds have been submitted. If this is the conclusion, the Tribunal is then not required to proceed to consider the s. 31 test because the tribunal is satisfied that the country of origin is a safe country and, by definition, state protection is available. Where it proceeds, even if on a “what if I am wrong basis”, it should do so having first clearly recorded a conclusion in respect of its s. 33 assessment.

51. The respondents’ approach to this issue was to argue that the comments in N.U. had to be understood in the light of later observations made by Phelan J. in E.S. v IPAT [2022] IEHC

613. In E.S., the applicant had relied heavily on the dicta of Phelan J. in N.U. This resulted in clarification of N.U by the learned Judge, where it was stated at para. 69:- In contending that the Decision was flawed by reason of the failure to address s. 33 in express terms, the Applicants relied extensively on my earlier decision in N.U.. It is important to recall, however, that in that case I was considering a

decision where there had been an apparent conflation of ss. 31 and 33 such that the Tribunal in that case relied on the s. 33 designation in the context of the s.

31 assessment. I found that the designation of a State as a safe country of origin ceases to be a relevant factor once s. 31 is applied and the task is to consider: “ …whether actual state protection within the meaning of s. 31 is available in the individual circumstances of the applicant” (para. 55).

52. The respondent therefore submitted that the designation of Georgia as a safe country of origin did not preclude an analysis of state protection. Instead, what was required were substantial grounds for considering that Georgia was not a safe country in the particular circumstances of the applicant. The Tribunal with reference to the state protection available to the applicant, concluded that Georgia was a safe country for the applicant.

Discussion

53. From para. 41 onwards in N.U. Phelan J. discussed a number of commentaries on the effect of designating a country as a safe country of origin, including Article 21 of the Procedures Directive, which emphasises the need for the applicant for international protection to show that despite the designation, the country should not be considered relevant in “his particular circumstances”. In that regard at para 45 Phelan J. explained that for the purposes of section 33 of the 2015 Act: “This requires a consideration by the Tribunal of whether grounds have been submitted and a conclusion as to whether they constitute serious grounds within the meaning of s. 33(b). … Given that the conclusion on the application of s. 33 determines what further assessment is required by the Tribunal of the claim for state protection, it is important in my view that the application of s. 33 is considered and a conclusion reached in clear terms.”

54. It can also be noted that the structure of the provision makes clear that, as put by Ferriter

J. in XS and JT v. IPAT and Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 100 at para 36, the onus rests with the applicant to rebut the presumption of state protection.

55. Section 33, hence, makes clear that a state designated as safe will only be considered safe in relation to a particular applicant where the applicant has not submitted serious grounds for considering the country not to be safe in their “particular circumstances and in terms of his eligibility for international protection.” Again, these are concepts that were considered in detail by the Court of Appeal in Z.M.

56. Regarding the overall effect of designating a country as safe, the Court of Appeal stated: “106. Looked at overall, the scheme in the Procedures Directive regarding safe countries is as follows. Countries may be designated as safe at an EU level by the Council or at a national level by member states. In order for a country to be designated as safe by a member state, an assessment must be carried out which looks, inter alia, at the legal and political situation in that country and the extent to which protection against persecution or mistreatment is provided in that country. Even where a country is designated safe, an application for international protection from that country must be individually examined and the country may only be treated as safe as regards the individual applicant where the applicant does not establish serious grounds for not considering the country to be safe in his particular circumstances. Phrasing this in positive rather than negative terms, the designation of a country as safe is always subject to the requirement that each application for protection be individually examined and to the entitlement of an applicant for protection to show that the country is not safe in their particular circumstances. Further, where the Council has designated a country as safe then applications for protection from that country must be treated as unfounded – and under Article 23(4) treating an application as unfounded allows but does not require a member state to prioritise or accelerate that application. Of course, a prioritised or accelerated procedure must still afford the applicant the opportunity of showing that in their personal circumstances the country is not in fact safe. Finally, member states are given a fairly wide discretion to lay down “further rules and modalities” for the application of the concept in national law.” [emphasis added]

57. The Court of Appeal went on to note that: “116. The purpose of section 33 is clearly to ensure that notwithstanding the designation of a country as a safe country of origin, an applicant for international protection may nonetheless present the case that the country is not safe for them in their particular circumstances. Section 33 does not in its terms require a separate and discrete analysis to be conducted and a decision made as to the existence of “serious grounds” as a precursor to the carrying out of the assessment of facts and circumstances required under section 28.”

58. Noting the different tasks set out in the 2015 Act, the Court of Appeal held that: “118. Therefore, there is no separate section 31 protection analysis which must be preceded by a section 33 analysis, and which will only be required if in the course of the section 33 analysis an applicant has submitted serious grounds for suggesting that a designated country is not safe. There is an assessment of facts and circumstances pertaining to the application under section 28 in which the availability of state protection, as defined in section 31, will be relevant. The fact that a country has been designated safe will also be relevant to overall analysis to be conducted under section 28. However, and this is an important proviso, the designation of a country as safe is always subject to the entitlement of the applicant to submit grounds showing that it is not safe for them in their particular circumstances.”

59. Importantly, the Court of Appeal explained at paras 119 and 120 of the judgment in Z.M. that there was no basis for excluding the fact that a state had been designated as safe as part of the section 33 analysis. The wording of section 33, seen in its EU law context, “positively requires decision makers to have regard to the designation of a country as safe rather than precluding them from doing so unless they have made an anterior decision that the applicant has failed to discharge the burden of submitting serious grounds that it might not be.”

60. With regard to the standard of state protection, the Court of Appeal found that: “134. … State protection must be effective but it is not required to be absolute. The obligation on a state under Article 7 is to take “reasonable steps”. The requirement outlined in Article 7, albeit not necessarily exhaustive, is that a state operate an effective legal system and, in particular, an effective criminal justice system as regards acts constituting persecution or serious harm. … Absolute protection, especially where the threat emanates from criminal elements, would in any event be impossible to attain.”

61. The approach adopted by the Tribunal in this case was to focus on the COI relating to the protection afforded to religious minorities in Georgia and whether there was effective non temporary protection for Jehovah’s Witnesses. I am not at all satisfied that the fact that the Tribunal did not expressly set out the factors identified by Barrett J. in B.C. v. IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 amounts to a flaw. This issue falls to be treated in much the same way as arguments that a decision is flawed because the Tribunal did not expressly set out relevant statutory provisions. The point has to be whether it is clear from the decision that the Tribunal identified and applied the correct tests. In this case, it is clear from the decision that the Tribunal was fully cognisant of and at a number of points referred to the constituent elements in the underlying statutory provisions.

62. The core finding of the Tribunal was set out in paras 5.17 and 18 of the decision: “[5.17] The central submission made on behalf of the Appellant is that there are issues in relation to the effectiveness of the protection and that it may be temporary. The Tribunal must start its consideration from the point of view that there is a presumption of State Protection. Further, Georgia is a designated Safe Country of Origin which does not preclude an analysis of the adequacy of State Protection but requires that there are substantial grounds for considering that the country is not safe for the particular Appellant. [5.18] From this point of view, it is accepted that there are issues within the Georgian system for State Protection, and it does not compare favourably to that of the State. However, that is not the test. The test is whether the State in question takes reasonable steps for the detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of offenders and that such a system is available to the Appellant and that it is effective and non-temporary. The Tribunal is satisfied that there is State Protection generally available in Georgia, and while it might not cover matters such as high level political corruption, it is effective and available for the particular Appellant. The issue of concern is that, up until last year, the Freedom House report led the Tribunal to conclude that State Protection was not available for Jehovah’s Witnesses. Thankfully, the position in the updated Freedom House Report does not contain the stark view that State Protection is not available to Jehovah’s Witnesses so the Tribunal has to review all the material with a view to establishing on a ex nunc basis, State Protection is available to the Appellant.”

63. The onus was on the applicant to submit serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his particular circumstances, in accordance with section 33 of the 2015 Act. The applicant’s case before the Tribunal was predicated on an argument that the COI established substantial grounds for considering that Georgia was not safe in his particular circumstances. As part of its analysis, but only part, the Tribunal took account of the fact that Georgia has been designated as safe. Z.M. and earlier cases makes clear that this does not undermine the decision. The Tribunal considered the COI in detail and explained why it had reached the decision that state protection was available for the applicant, having regard to the overall availability of protection for religious minorities.

64. I am not satisfied that the applicant has a basis for suggesting that there was no finding that he had not submitted serious grounds for considering that Georgia was not a safe country for him. While there was no express finding to that effect, it was entirely clear from the substantive analysis engaged in by the Tribunal that this was the conclusion. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Tribunal decision in this case was lawful and the challenge must be rejected.

65. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, I am proposing to make an order refusing the application for relief by way of judicial review. My provisional view is that having fully succeeded the respondents are entitled to their costs. I will list the matter for final orders before me at 10.30 am on Thursday, the 27 November 2025 when I will hear arguments on the form of orders and costs, if required.