High Court dismisses Plaintiffs' application for interlocutory injunction against Defendants' agricultural activities due to lack of fair issue to be tried.

REDACTED APPROVED THE HIGH COURT PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT [2025] IEHC 618 Record No: 2025 3654 P Between /

M.A. and S.M.

Plaintiffs and M.C., M.D., P.M., JAMES CAPLIS AND THE MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND THE MARINE Defendants

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Emily Farrell delivered the 14th November 2025:

Introduction

1. The Plaintiffs reside [in Connacht] together with their 15-year-old daughter. The first three Defendants own separate lands adjacent to the Plaintiff’s on three sides and across the main road which passes in front of the Plaintiffs’ property. The Plaintiffs have instituted these proceedings as they resolutely believe that the actions of the first three Defendants, in spraying pesticides and spreading slurry on their own lands and on the grass verge outside the Plaintiff’s lands are causing them personal injuries and risk causing the death of the three members of their family.

2. The application before the Court is an application for interlocutory injunctive relief against the first, second and third named Defendants although the Notice of Motion states that a ‘PROHIBITIVE PERMANENT INJUNCTION’ is sought. Permanent relief can only be sought at the trial of the plenary action.

3. In the affidavit grounding this application, the Plaintiffs state that the first, second and third named Defendants (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Defendants’) have been using pesticides and other agricultural toxins which is causing them personal injuries, property damage and unemployment. They say that there is a “persistent presence of poisonous Air and other poisonous environmental conditions causing serious and life-threatening injuries” and that their ability to use their property is adversely affected as a result thereof.

4. The fourth named Defendant is an authorised officer within the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine and is sued in that capacity. The fifth named Defendant is the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine. No interlocutory relief is sought against either of those Defendants.

5. On 30th June 2025, the Plaintiffs issued a Plenary Summons, the operative part of which states:

“GENERAL INDORSEMENT OF CLAIM The plaintiff's claim is

We, plaintiffs and parents of a Family, seek the Rule of Law, which decides that defendants [M.C, M.D and P.M.] offend against us in Person, as a Family including a Child, by maliciously administering poisons, endangering our Lives and cause bodily harm in form of Personal Injuries. We, plaintiffs, seek therefore to prosecute under the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, No 23 endangering Life and inflicting grievous bodily harm, and, No 24 with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy any other person.

We, plaintiffs, prosecute [M.C.] under the Criminal Damage Act, 1991, for poisoning trees of our Private Property and killing two pet animals, dying from poisoning, when defendant [M.C.] uses poisons, in form of pesticides, maliciously over 6 years.

We, plaintiffs and parents of a Family seek the Rule of Law, which decides that defendants in his role as authorised officer at the government DAFM and Martin Heydon in his role as Minister for Agriculture abuse their authority on use of pesticides, allowing and enabling an uncontrolled and unlimited use of pesticides, when this causes Personal Injury and Property Damage.”

6. As was confirmed at the hearing of this application, a Statement of Claim has not been delivered by the Plaintiffs, although a document entitled ‘Statement of Claim’ was uploaded onto ShareFile (but not served) on Monday, 3rd November 2025, two days before the hearing of this application, and after all affidavits had been filed in respect of this application.

Counsel for the first named Defendant stated that he could not access ShareFile until shortly before the commencement of the hearing, and that even then it had not been possible to download or review the exhibits to the Plaintiffs’ replying affidavit. That affidavit had not been served but had been uploaded to ShareFile on 30th October 2025. However, Counsel was satisfied to proceed with a hard copy of the affidavit provided in the course of the hearing.

Interlocutory Application

7. A Notice of Motion was issued on 15th July 2025, grounded on an affidavit sworn by the Plaintiffs, in which the following order is sought:

“Seeking a PROHIBITIVE PERMANENT INJUNCTION stopping the administration of Environmental Poisons in form of pesticides and other agricultural toxins, endangering our Lives as a Family, at our Home address, pursuant to the Inherent Jurisdiction of this High Court, the Rule of Law shall be enforced through Articles

40.3.2 and 42A.4.1.i), of the Irish Constitution, in order to save our Lives immediately and IN URGENCY, guaranteeing the Protection of our Lives, Health and Property and enforcing the Prejudicial Right of our Child to Safety at Home.”

8. The document includes the following narrative statement:

“IN THE MATTER OF PROHIBITING ENVIRONMENTAL POISONING AND SOCIAL DISORDER Neighbours [M.C. and M.D.] are causing harm and destruction by the reckless overuse and abuse of pesticides and extend the use of pesticides into Criminal Activity by locating administration sites of poisons, in form of pesticides, on and near our Private Property borders in the pretence to control weeds and pests when carrying out a disguised chemical attack. Such lawless practices and Criminal Activity of environmental poison administrations by use of pesticides, is sought to be stopped through a High-Court-written prohibiting Injunction, addressed to the defendants [M.C. and M.D.], instructing these named defendants to be prohibited from use of pesticides and other poisonous substances on their private grounds, farmyard grounds, farming ground of grassland and on the Public Space of the Road R[...] measuring 100 meters from our Private Property borders, as such use of pesticides endangers our Lives causing Respiratory Disease, Cardiac Health problems and pain to us, plaintiffs.

Defendant [P.M.], neighbouring farmer, localises and targets other toxic agricultural substances (slurry) so close to our Private Property borders that we, plaintiffs, suffer severe poisoning. Such method is a disguised attack, carried out in the pretence to farm and is a Criminal Activity because of causing symptoms of Gas Poisoning and Heart Failure to plaintiff [S.M.], and other injuring symptoms to his Family, and is sought to be stopped through a High-Court-written prohibiting Injunction addressed to this named defendant, instructing [P.M.] to be prohibited from use of slurry and pesticides on grassland adjacent to the West border of our Private Property.

This High-Court-written prohibition of use of poisons in form of pesticides and other toxic agricultural substances is essential to survival and safety of plaintiffs suffering life-endangering symptoms. Failing of provision of the High-Court-written prohibitive Injunction may lead to Death. Effects of poisons include Death.

The three defendants, [M.C, M.D and P.M] are also sought to be instructed through the High-Court-written Injunction to refrain from Social Disorder by not swearing and shouting at us, plaintiffs, not verbally assaulting us, not making death threats to us, not asking us to leave our Private Property and Home, and to not retaliate in any other way or through someone on their behalf.

The High-Court-written Injunction to defendant [M.C.] is also sought to include to instruct him to refrain from tearing branches from our trees, stop driving his tractor into branches and foliage, damaging trees at our Private Property border, to not throw rubbish into our Private Property and to stop observing us plaintiffs, in person or by camera, by stalking us and our Private Property and to stop any form of harassment.” (original emphasis)

9. The application advanced in submissions at the hearing (and when the matter was previously listed before me for the purposes of fixing a date) was for an injunction restraining the Defendants from using pesticides within 100 metres of the Plaintiffs’ property. In effect, the Plaintiffs seek a buffer zone of 100 metres between their land and the lands on which the Defendants may use pesticides or spread slurry. At the hearing, the Plaintiffs referred to the first and second named Defendant in their submissions. It was submitted that each of these two Defendants spray pesticides four or five times per year. The first and second named Defendants agree that they use pesticides but deny using them in an inappropriate, abusive or harmful manner.

10. The fact that the substances being utilised by the Defendants are authorised by law is not in issue in these proceedings. The Plaintiffs submitted at the hearing that the pesticides which the Defendants are using may be lawfully purchased and used, including on the verge of the road which is in public ownership. They acknowledge that this is permitted by S.I. 155, i.e. S.I. 155 of 2012, European Communities (Sustainable Use of Pesticides) Regulations 2012 (as amended). The validity of that Statutory Instrument is not challenged in these proceedings. As stated in an email from the Department of Agriculture Food and the Marine, exhibited by the Plaintiffs:

“Pesticide active substances contained in plant protection products (PPs) are approved centrally at EU level based on detailed assessments and a rigorous peer review process managed by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). PPPs are subsequently authorised, or not, nationally by the relevant competent authorities (DAFM in the case of Ireland) in accordance with rigorous evaluation and decision-making criteria agreed at EU level.

PPPs are only authorised for placing on the Irish market and use if it can be reliably concluded that the intended uses are effective and safe and it is robustly demonstrated that there are no unacceptable impacts on human and animal health and the environment. All authorised product labels which are approved before final authorisation, contain detailed information relating to the safety and use of the product.”

11. The Plaintiffs and the second named Defendant are unrepresented. The third named Defendant did not appear and is not represented. There is no affidavit of service of the proceedings or the Notice of Motion on the third named Defendant. I am not satisfied that he has been served with the Notice of Motion or the proceedings. The allegations regarding slurry are confined to the third named Defendant.

12. The second named Defendant has offered an undertaking in response to this application.

That undertaking was not accepted by the Plaintiffs. Their response to the undertaking offered, dated 25th August 2025, stated that they, the Plaintiffs “have drawn up a detailed plain how to take you off the High Court Case. This means, we are holding Private Court, should you be so willing to do so. …” The conditions proposed by the Plaintiffs were not accepted by the second named Defendant.

13. As was explained at the hearing, the role of the Court is to independently and impartially determine the issues in dispute in the proceedings, applying the law. It is not the Court’s function to advise either side, nor to descend into the proceedings – As Holland J. stated in Malone & Ors v. Laois County Council & Ors [2025] IEHC 345 “ultimately and essentially the same rules apply to lay litigants as apply to represented litigants. Fairness to both sides is the watchword.”

The evidence

14. Two affidavits have been sworn by the Plaintiffs and the first and second named Defendants have each filed a replying affidavit, which were responded to by the second of the Plaintiffs’ affidavits.

15. The Plaintiffs assert that the actions of the Defendants which they seek to restrain are causing them personal injuries. However, no evidence which has been put before the Court to establish that they suffer from the medical conditions other than the averments of the Plaintiffs. No evidence has been put before the Court to support or verify the Plaintiffs’ assertion that these medical conditions have been caused by the pesticides (or slurry) utilised by the Defendants.

16. I accept, for the purposes of this application, that the Plaintiffs suffer from the medical conditions described in their affidavits, and note that this has been accepted for present purposes by the first and second named Defendants. Whilst a report from a veterinary hospital has been exhibited relating to their pet cat, dated 11th June 2020, no reports from any doctor or other healthcare professional in respect of the Plaintiffs or their daughter. The veterinary report states that the cat had suffered kidney failure, but no cause was specified.

The only document exhibited which emanates from a medical professional or hospital is a letter dated 3rd May 2025 notifying the first named Plaintiff of an outpatient appointment in respect of her daughter.

17. Whilst hearsay evidence may be admitted in interlocutory applications, the identity of the person who made the statement must be identified and the party relying on hearsay evidence must state that they believe the hearsay statements to be true: Fennell v. Slevin [2023] IECA 177, per Edwards J..

18. Furthermore, opinion evidence is not admissible, save where given by an appropriately qualified expert. The Plaintiffs do not profess to hold any medical or scientific expertise, nor would it be open to them to provide expert opinion evidence in support of their own case even if they had such expertise.

Threshold for the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief

19. In Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corporation v. Clonmel Healthcare Limited [2020] 1 I.R. 1;

[2019] IESC 65. O’Donnell J. (as he then was) stated:

“The logic of an interlocutory application is that it is heard and determined in advance of the trial. It would make little sense for valuable and expensive court time to be used in an attempt to predict, on the balance of probabilities, the outcome of a case which is yet to be heard, where the evidence had not been ascertained and, more relevantly, had only been adduced on affidavit, and where the arguments were not fully developed. Accordingly, Lord Diplock concluded that there was no rule that a prima facie case should be established before an injunction could be granted. Instead, the court should consider whether a fair issue was to be tried, which means no more than the case not being frivolous or vexatious. If so, the court should then proceed to consider how the matters should best be regulated pending the trial a which involved a consideration of the balance of convenience.”

20. As O’Donnell J. held, the underlying theme of the American Cyanamid test adopted by the Supreme Court in Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy [1983] I.R. 82; [1983]

IESC 2 was to “reassert the flexibility of the remedy and the essential function of an interlocutory injunction in finding a just solution pending the hearing of the action.”

21. The first question to be considered is whether it is possible that the Plaintiffs would obtain a permanent injunction at the trial of the action – then to consider if there is a fair question to be tried. If so, it is necessary to consider the balance of convenience, or balance of justice, which includes an assessment of the adequacy of damages.

22. As noted above, no relief is expressly claimed in the Plenary Summons, but reference is made to personal injuries and the desire to prosecute the first, second and third Defendants for offences contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 and the Criminal Damage Act, 1991, in respect of damage caused to trees and two pet animals (stated to have died on 14th June 2020 and 24th June 2025).

23. While a document entitled ‘Statement of Claim’ has been uploaded to ShareFile, it was not delivered, or served on the Defendants, nor is it included in the booklet of papers prepared by the solicitor for the first named Defendant. The document is not consistent with the requirements of Orders 19 and 20 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, nor does it set out with any conciseness what reliefs or remedies are sought. It does refer to injunctive relief and compensation, but also includes statements under the following headings: ‘End of Social Injustice’, ‘Judicial Review Resolving Dysfunctional Legislation’, ‘A Civil Society’ and ‘Plaintiffs Compensation’. The Plaintiffs did not suggest that a Statement of Claim had been delivered when it was stated by the Defendants that a Statement of Claim had not been delivered.

24. It is not open to a litigant to seek to institute criminal proceedings by issuing a Plenary Summons in the High Court. Furthermore, I observe that sections 23 and 24 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 on which the Plaintiffs rely have been repealed by the Non- Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997. A fair question to be tried does not arise in respect of these elements of the claim. It is not necessary to consider the issue raised in the third paragraph of the Plenary Summons as it relates only to the fourth and fifth named Defendants, who are not parties to the application for interlocutory relief.

25. The Plenary Summons does not specify any relief which is sought in respect of the claim that the Plaintiffs have suffered personal injuries which have been caused by the Defendants.

No reference is made therein to injunctive relief, but this is not fatal to an application for interlocutory relief.

26. Whilst reference is made in the grounding affidavit to the Plaintiffs’ GP having neglected or refused to complete the forms required to enable the Plaintiffs make an application to the Injuries Resolution Board, no such application appears to have been made, nor is an IRB authorisation before the Court. Although the Plenary Summons does not refer to breach of constitutional rights, the Plaintiffs have asserted that the actions of the Defendants breach their rights under various provisions of the Constitution. For this reason, and as neither the first nor second Defendants have raised an issue regarding the lack of authorisation from the Injuries Resolution Board, this is not a matter which I must consider.

27. As the Plenary Summons alleges that the Defendants are endangering the lives of, and causing personal injuries to, the Plaintiffs, I accept that it would be open to the Court to grant interlocutory injunctive relief if the principles or test for the grant of such relief is met.

Fair Question to be Tried

28. The objective of the Court in determining an application for interlocutory injunctive relief is to seek to achieve a result which gives rise to the least risk of injustice pending the determination of the proceedings. That assessment necessarily takes place at a time when the Court does not have the benefit of all the evidence which will be available at the trial of the action (assuming the case proceeds to trial) and the facts cannot be established. For this reason, it is necessary for a plaintiff to establish that there is a fair question to be tried in order to obtain interlocutory injunctive relief. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove his or her case at this stage, but to demonstrate that there is at least a prospect or chance that she or he would succeed at the trial. To that extent, the Court is required to engage, to a degree, in speculation as to the possible outcome of the proceedings, but it does so on the basis of the claim advanced and evidence adduced in respect of the interlocutory application.

29. The core of the claim advanced by the Plaintiffs is that their health and life is at risk by reason of the Defendants’ use of pesticides. Reliance is also placed, albeit to a lesser extent, on the use of slurry, but only in respect of the third named Defendant. He has not appeared and there is no evidence that the proceedings were served on him.

30. The Plaintiffs’ medical status, and that of their daughter is not disputed by the first or second named Defendant. Despite there being absolutely no supporting evidence, I do accept for the purposes of this application, that they suffer from the medical conditions stated in their affidavits. On the Plaintiffs’ case, their daughter had been prescribed an EPI pen, which she carries with her, prior to moving to the area in 2017. It is also stated that she is highly allergic to grass pollen. It is stated that the first named Plaintiff was informed, when she attended Castlebar Hospital in February 2020, that she probably suffers from asthma and that her blood sugar level and thyroid function tests were abnormal. I can take judicial notice of the fact that asthma is a relatively common medical condition, which can be serious especially if it is not well controlled. However, there is no evidence before the Court to demonstrate, or even suggest, a causal link with asthma or the reported abnormal blood test results with pesticides. While it is averred that the second named Plaintiff experienced “symptoms related to gas poisoning and heart attack” after exposure to slurry (alleged only in respect of the third named Defendant), the Plaintiffs’ evidence is that he went to bed and did not seek medical attention. There is no evidence before the Court of him having attended any medical professional.

31. Save insofar as the Plaintiffs sincerely believe that there is a connection between the use of pesticides and their medical conditions, there is no evidence whatsoever before the Court linking these medical conditions with exposure to pesticides. The first named Defendant concludes from that she only suffers facial swelling as a result of her allergy to Spruce, Pine and Fir trees when pesticides are present. They also complain that they have not been afforded appropriate medical care.

32. There is no evidence to support the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the trees which fell during storms had been weakened by the Defendants’ use of pesticides, as alleged.

33. The Plaintiffs’ affidavits contain many averments, or opinions, for which there is no supporting medical or scientific evidence, nor has any person been identified as having informed the Plaintiffs of various matters stated therein and relied upon on a hearsay basis.

In particular, the Plaintiffs include averments regarding the health of the first and second named Defendants and certain of their family members and speculate as to the cause of death of two recently deceased persons who had lived in relatively close proximity to the Plaintiffs and Defendants. Exhibiting death notices from rip.ie and speculating as to what was or may have been the cause of death is entirely inappropriate, and I have placed no weight on those averments and exhibits. In submissions, the first named Plaintiff stated that their death certificates, which are not before the Court, do not refer to pesticide poisoning.

34. I have struck out averments regarding the health of the wives of the first and second named Defendants from the affidavits sworn by the Plaintiffs. No basis is provided for those averments which are clearly speculative and are based on hearsay. These assertions have been flatly controverted by the first and second named Defendants. These Defendants also averred, and submitted, that these averments were extremely upsetting, distressing and offensive. The Plaintiffs’ response to these denials was to double down on these unsupported allegations. At page 39 of their second affidavit, the Plaintiffs state “[M.C.] provides two Doctor’s notes stating that he and his wife do not suffer from pesticides poisoning. This one line statement is not explained or proven by any health assessment carried out. No scientific evidence in form of a blood test, or any other test, is provided.” (original emphasis) They “request medical proof” and “genuine and truthful medical proof” from M.D. (page 50 of the Plaintiffs’ replying affidavit).

35. The Plaintiffs aver, on page 2 of their first affidavit, under the heading “1. Introduction”

that “The environmental poisoning stems mainly from the application or administration of poisonous chemicals in the form of pesticides” by the first and second named Defendants.

They claim that “pesticide or poisonous chemical exposure is permanent by now and at times severe” and set out the ways in which they say their health, and that of their daughter, has been affected. Reference is made to an intention to seek damages through the Injuries Resolution Board, but the Plaintiffs state that their GP refused or failed to complete the forms which they had left at the reception of her Clinic. They state that they have been unable to obtain appropriate medical attention for the symptoms which they attribute by them to actions of the Defendants.

36. In the Plaintiffs’ replying affidavit the allegations against the first named Defendant are expanded to question the ownership of part his lands and it is implied that the first named Defendant is guilty of defamation and slander.

37. In the words of the first named Defendant “the Plaintiffs have based their entire case on belief and suspicion.” The nature of the averments of the Plaintiffs, which are largely based on speculation, conjecture and their own very strongly held personal beliefs, in particular as to the existence of a causal link between the pesticides and the Plaintiffs’ stated medical conditions, and the motivation of the Defendants, undermines the weight which can be placed on their unsupported or disputed averments. It is alleged that the first and second named Defendants are using pesticides in “an orchestrated and co-ordinated” manner as “a disguised chemical attack”. The Plaintiffs state in their second affidavit, “Pesticide use of grassfields by other local farmers also means pesticide exposure to all local residents.

Synergistic effects of slurry and pesticide exposure combined prove injuring to us Plaintiffs ...” It is also averred that “The high number of Cancer patients in Ireland suggests and indicates that a pesticide caused Human Health Crisis is well underway for several years and decades. This is something our Case confirms, describing conditions in our Living Environment and neighbours Human Health.”

38. The Plaintiffs have urged the Court to accept their view of the credibility and character of the Defendants and to interpret facts particularly relating to the areas which have been sprayed by the Defendants as supporting their contention that the Defendants are conspiring together to poison the Plaintiffs and are motivated by malice against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs appear to be under the misapprehension that disputing averments of the Defendants amounts to proof that they are lying and that the Court should discount those averments as untruthful.

39. In submitting that the Defendants have not proven that their wives do not suffer from the medical conditions asserted by them, the Plaintiffs fail to appreciate that the burden of proof rests on them – it is for the Plaintiffs to establish that there is a fair question to be tried, and that an injunction should be granted.

40. The claim advanced is that because of the Defendants’ spraying pesticides (and that the third named Defendant spread slurry), the Plaintiffs are suffering from a variety of medical conditions and that damage has been caused to their pets and trees on their lands. In the absence of any evidence of a causal link between the use of pesticides by these Defendants, I cannot be satisfied that the Plaintiffs have discharged the burden of proof. The Court cannot speculate as to whether or not there is a causal link between pesticide use and the harm the Plaintiffs say has been caused to them, particularly in relation to the alleged risk to human health and life. As Dignam J. held in Nihill v Everyday Finance DAC [2022] IEHC 484, and Rogers and Another v Allied Irish Banks Plc and Others [2024] IEHC 50, albeit in a different context, the court cannot speculate on central parts of the case advanced by a plaintiff.

41. It is accepted by the Plaintiffs that the pesticides the subject of these proceedings were lawfully purchased and are authorised for use, including on publicly owned property. Not only is there a presumption in law that S.I. 155 of 2012 European Communities (Sustainable Use of Pesticides) Regulations 2012 is valid, and was made in accordance with law, it has not been challenged in these proceedings. That Statutory Instrument was made to give effect to Directive 2009/128/EC establishing a Community framework aimed at achieving sustainable use of pesticides, through the reduction of the risks and impacts of pesticide usage on human health and the environment.

42. No evidence has been provided which challenges, or contradicts, the statements in the email of 13th December 2024 from the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (see para.

10 of this judgment) which states that Pesticide Active Substances “are only authorised for placing on the Irish market and use if it can be reliably concluded that the intended uses are effective and safe and it is robustly demonstrated that there are no unacceptable impacts on human and animal health and the environment.”

43. Taking the Plaintiffs’ case at its height, there is no evidence on which weight can be placed, to support the central thesis that the Plaintiffs’ health and lives, and those of their daughter, are at risk by reason of the actions of the Defendants. There is a complete lack of medical or scientific evidence to support the assertion that there is a causal link between the actions of the Defendants and the harm which the Plaintiff seek to guard against by way of an interlocutory injunction. The Affidavits sworn by the Plaintiffs are replete with allegations which are unsupported and are speculative. Photographs of the members of the Plaintiffs’ family, deceased pets, a deformed apple, and trees which were blown down in storms, do not establish, or support the existence of a causal link which is central to the Plaintiffs’ case, even to the relatively low threshold necessary for a fair question to be tried.

44. In their replying affidavit the Plaintiffs have exhibited correspondence with a number of laboratories in Ireland, including Teagasc and private laboratories, in which it was stated that they could not provide the testing sought by the Plaintiffs. However, in the grounding affidavit, the Plaintiffs state:

“We could pay for a testing service and found a laboratory in Germany. But why is the Irish state not providing same service nationally? To pay for the scientific testing for court evidence when being made unemployed through pesticide abuse, is inadequate and inappropriate.”

45. They also rely on a judgment of the High Court in John Donnelly & Sons Ltd v. Hoey & Anor [2024] IEHC 52, in which case Barr J. awarded damages to the plaintiffs for spotting and speckling on a crop of apples which was found to have been caused by spray drift of Spotlight Plus from the defendants’ potato field. The apples were unsuitable for sale to the public, but were sold for use for processing and the production of cider. The judgment is not of assistance in determining the issues before this Court, nor can findings of fact made by Barr J. on the evidence before him fill the evidential lacuna in the instant case. The same can be said of the judgment of the Dutch Court which Plaintiffs put on ShareFile.

46. The first named Defendant has averred that he is a Bord Bia certified beef farmer, and he has set out details of inspections by the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine as a result of the complaints made by the Plaintiffs, and of regular inspections by Bord Bia. He has passed all such inspections and no further steps were taken by the Department or An Garda Síochána in relation to the Plaintiffs’ complaints. He disputes the substance of the Plaintiffs’ case including the allegation that, on 5th November 2021, he attacked a former friend of the Plaintiffs, identified only as Neil, a gardener and groundskeeper, with whom they have lost contact.

47. Both the first and second named Defendant deny overuse or malicious use of pesticides.

They have averred that their use of pesticides is limited and controlled and they provided explanations as to how and why they use pesticides. In all the circumstances, having reviewed all of the evidence before the Court, and considered the submissions made, I cannot be satisfied that there is a fair question to be tried as to the claim that the Plaintiffs’ health, lives and property are at risk by reason of the Defendants’ use of pesticides. There

is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs’ claim that they are suffering personal injuries by reason of the Defendants’ use of pesticides may be made out at the trial.

48. The Notice of Motion also makes reference to injunctive relief to restrain certain other behaviour. All of the inappropriate behaviour alleged against the first and second named Defendants is denied.

49. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, and the nature of the averments and manner in which the case has been advanced, which reduces the weight which I can place on unsupported averments by the Plaintiffs, I am satisfied that there is no basis to grant interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain the first or second named Defendants from speaking in an abusive manner to the Plaintiffs, including by making verbal assaults or death threats. Clearly such behaviour (which is denied) would be inappropriate, and it may well amount to a criminal offence were it to occur. However, that is not a sufficient basis on which to grant an injunction. A fair issue to be tried is not made out in this regard.

50. As I have found that a fair issue to be tried has not been made out, it is not necessary to consider the balance of convenience, or balance of justice, or to assessment the adequacy of damages.

51. The Plaintiffs have not provided an undertaking as to damages, a point made by the first named Defendant in his replying affidavit. However, that is not a factor on which I have relied in deciding this application.

52. In finding that the Plaintiff have not established a fair question to be tried, it is not to say that the Plaintiffs might not be able to prove their case at trial. However, I am satisfied that in applying the principles for the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief, on the basis of the evidence before the Court, I must refuse relief.

Orders

53. Accordingly, I shall dismiss the application for interlocutory injunctive relief.

54. Unless any party applies otherwise by written legal submission within 14 days of the delivery of the judgment, the foregoing order shall be perfected forthwith thereafter on the basis of the following orders as to costs: an order for costs (including the costs of written submissions) in favour of the first named Defendant against the Plaintiffs, to be adjudicated in default of agreement. I shall also make an order awarding the second named Defendant the legitimated expenses and outlay incurred in respect of the said motion, to be adjudicated in default of agreement.

55. I shall place a stay on the adjudication and execution of the costs orders, pending the determination of the proceedings. I do not consider it appropriate to stay the proceedings until the Plaintiffs have discharged the costs awarded and I refuse that application by the first named Defendant.

56. If any party unsuccessfully contests the proposed order in relation to costs, an order may be made in respect of the costs of that application in accordance with Order 103, rule 40(4)

RSC.

Emily Farrell