High Court grants plaintiffs full costs and stays execution pending further proceedings on lis pendens and mortgage removal.

APPROVED

THE HIGH COURT

AN ARD CHÚIRT

[2025] IEHC 602

Record No. 2024/215CA

BETWEEN

ALAN GAFFNEY AND DEREK GAFFNEY

PLAINTIFFS (RESPONDENTS)

AND

PHILIP GAFFNEY AND TERESA GAFFNEY

DEFENDANTS (APPELLANTS) (No. 2)

RULING on costs and final orders of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley on the 5th day of November 2025

1. This is my ruling arising from the judgment delivered in Gaffney and Gaffney v. Gaffney and Gaffney [2025] IEHC 460 (“the principal judgment”).

2. The principal judgment addressed a number of matters and interlocutory applications associated with the plaintiffs’ substantive application for well-charging relief set out in their Civil Bill for Well-Charging Relief, issued on 22nd January 2024 (which came before me in the context of an appeal by the First Named Defendant from an order of the Circuit Court).

3. In summary, the plaintiffs sought their costs, in circumstances where they say they were entirely successful in the substantive application and related motions and also accepted the proposed costs order referred to in the principal judgment of 50% costs, in respect of one motion (which was the Plaintiffs’ motion dated 30th October 2024).

4. The First Named Defendant (Mr. Gaffney) opposes the application for costs.

5. His central contention is that the proceedings involving the Plaintiffs, and the positions adopted by the Plaintiffs, including in the Civil Bill for Well-Charging Relief dated 22nd January 2024, were predicated on a false premise arising from what he states was a defective lis pendens. Mr Gaffney also argues that this ruling on costs and the making of final orders should await the outcome of proceedings which he states that he has issued seeking to challenge and remove the judgment mortgage and also having regard to other motions which he has listed for hearing before the Court of Appeal on 10th November 2025. Mr Gaffney, in his written submission at page 2, states that both the removal of the lis pendens and judgment mortgage proceedings are before the High Court on 17th November 2025.

6. The application to defer this ruling echoes the application made by Mr. Gaffney in early July 2025, where he argued that I should defer the delivery of the principal judgment, which application I refused for the reasons set out in the principal judgment.

7. Notwithstanding Mr. Gaffney’s submissions, I consider that it is appropriate that I deal with the costs of the matters that were heard before me and resulted in the delivery of the principal judgment, which addressed each of those matters.

8. I shall therefore make the following separate orders in relation to each of the applications which were heard before me.

The Plaintiffs’ motion

9. In relation to the Plaintiffs’ motion to extend time and their intention to vary certain parts of the Order of the Circuit Court (His Honour Judge Quinn) dated 24th July 2024, at paragraph 119 of the principal judgment, I indicated my provisional view that I would award the Plaintiffs 50% of the measured legal costs of their application against the First Named Defendant, as may be agreed, or adjudicated upon in default of agreement, by the County Registrar of the County of Meath (in accordance with O. 61, r. 12 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended (“the RSC 1986”). Whilst I acceded to the Plaintiffs’ application (and shall make an Order formally deeming the time for notice to vary to have been extended), I considered that this proposed costs order was appropriate in circumstances where the First Named Defendant’s appeal resulted in a de novo rehearing of the matter. I have also had regard to the differences between the initial letter of 19th August 2024 (which explained the application to vary) and that sent on 15th October 2024 (which mistakenly referred to a notice of intention to crossappeal). I propose, therefore, to make an order in those terms and to grant the Plaintiffs their costs as against the First Named Defendant on those terms.

The First Named Defendant’s Motion dated 30th October 2024

10. To recap, the First Named Defendant had issued a notice of motion on 30th October 2024 seeking permission to respond to the 60 pages of documents presented to him (which he stated was an abuse of process and contrary to proper procedures) and further seeking discovery in relation to the assertions made in the claim before the court which he stated was also denied to him during proceedings before the Trim Circuit Court, which he alleged was again an abuse of process and contrary to proper procedures. For the reasons set out at paragraphs 25 to 47 (inclusive) of the principal judgment, I refused the reliefs sought by the first named defendant in the motion dated 30th October 2024. The First Named Defendant has not stated any grounds which would suggest that the Order I proposed at paragraph 48 of the principal judgment should not be made. Therefore in applying O. 61, r. 12 of the RSC 1986, and having regard to the fact that the Plaintiffs have been entirely successful in opposing the First Named Defendant's application in this Notice of Motion, I shall, pursuant to sections 168 and

169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, make an Order that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such measured legal costs as against the First Named Defendant as may be agreed, or adjudicated upon the default of agreement, by the County Registrar for the County of Meath.

The First Named Defendant’s motion to set aside the High Court order and to take up the DAR

11. By a further Notice of Motion dated 30th October 2024, the First Named Defendant sought an order setting aside the order of the High Court dated 10th October 2024 and also an order granting him liberty to take up a transcript of the DAR at a ‘for mention’ hearing listed on 10th October 2024.

For the reasons set out in paragraphs 51 to 58 of the principal judgment, I refused the First Named Defendant’s reliefs in this notice of motion dated 30th October 2024.

12. As no submissions have been made which would warrant my departing from the order that I conditionally proposed to make in paragraph 59 of the principal judgment, given that the Plaintiffs have been entirely successful in opposing the First Named Defendant's motion, and having regard to sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, I order that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such measured legal costs as against the First Named Defendant as may be agreed, or adjudicated upon in default of agreement, by the County Registrar for the County of Meath in accordance with the provisions O. 61, r. 12 of the RSC 1986.

The First Named Defendant’s application to remove the judgment mortgage

13. By notice of motion dated 13th November 2024, the First Named Defendant sought an Order removing the judgment mortgage placed on the property of the First and Second Named Defendants.

14. For the reasons set out at paras. 61 to 66 of the principal judgment, I refused the First Named Defendant's application seeking an order removing the judgment mortgage placed on the property of the First and Second Named Defendants.

15. As no submissions have been made which would warrant an Order other than that proposed in paragraph 67 of the principal judgment, and as the Plaintiffs had been entirely successful in opposing the First Named Defendant's application, I shall make an order pursuant to sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such measured legal costs as against the First Named Defendant as may be agreed, or adjudicated upon in default of agreement, by the County Registrar for the County of Meath in accordance with the provisions of O. 61, r. 12 of the RSC 1986.

The First Named Defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 28th January 2025

16. By notice of motion dated 28th January 2025 the First Named Defendant inter alia sought an extension of time to lodge submissions and an order to direct the Plaintiffs to provide all and any reference material they intended to rely on and use two weeks in advance of the hearing date and other orders seeking directions as to how the Plaintiffs would approach the proceedings. These matters were addressed at paragraphs 70 to 83 of the principal judgment where I refused the reliefs sought by the First Named Defendant in the notice of motion dated 28th January 2025.

17. As no submissions have been made which would suggest that a different order should be made other than the one proposed at paragraph 84 of the principal judgment, as the Plaintiffs have been entirely successful in opposing the First Named Defendant's application, and having regard to sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, I shall make an order that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover such measured legal costs as against the First Named Defendant as may be agreed, or adjudicated upon in default of agreement, by the County Registrar for the County of Meath in accordance with the provisions of O. 61, r. 12 of the RSC 1986.

Civil Bill for well-charging relief dated 22nd January 2024

18. The substantive appeal related to the Order of His Honour Judge Patrick Quinn dated 24th July 2024 which resulted in a de novo re-hearing before me. This matter is addressed inter alia between paragraphs 121 to 204 of the principal judgment and for the reasons set out in the principal judgment I shall make the following orders:

(1) An order declaring the Plaintiffs judgment mortgage registered as a burden on Folio 3976 County Meath (“the property”) in respect of the judgment obtained by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants by order of the Court of Appeal made on 25th May 2023 (as amended pursuant to the slip rule on 26th July 2023) entering judgment in favour of the First Named Plaintiff against the Defendants in the sum of US$272,043.70 and in favour of the Second Named Plaintiff against the Defendants in the amount of US$100,000 together with interest at the rate prescribed by the Courts Act 1981 stands well-charged against the Defendants’ interests in the said property;

(2) An order for the taking of an account of other incumbrances affecting the property and the making of enquiries as to the respective priorities of any such incumbrances pursuant to sections 31 and 117(2)(a) of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009;

(3) In the event of the Defendants failing to discharge the judgment debt of US$272,043.70 in favour of the First Named Plaintiff and US$100,000 in favour of the Second Named Plaintiff together with such ongoing interest on the judgment debt at the rate prescribed the Courts Act 1981 within six months from the date hereof, the Registrar for the County of Meath shall take all such appropriate steps, and execute all such necessary documentation, to effect the sale of the property and the distribution of the proceeds of sale, pursuant to sections 31 and 117 (2) (b) of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 and in discharge of the Defendants’ debt to the Plaintiffs and in satisfaction of the Plaintiffs’ judgment mortgage registered against the said property;

(4) The Plaintiffs having been entirely successful in their application, pursuant to sections 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, are entitled to recover such measured legal costs against the Defendants as may be agreed or adjudicated upon in default of agreement by the County Registrar for the County of Meath in accordance with the provisions of O. 61, r. 12 of the Rules of Superior Courts 1986 and in addition the Plaintiffs are further entitled to recover all measured reserved legal costs of this application as against the First Named Defendant, as may be agreed or adjudicated upon in default of agreement by the County Registrar for the County of Meath in accordance with the provisions of

O. 61, r. 12 of the Rules of Superior Courts 1986. The said reserved costs shall include the costs of the application made on various dates in July 2025, by the First Named Defendant, that I defer the delivery of the principal judgment which I refused in the ruling delivered on 31st July 2025 and which are recited at paragraphs 205 to 211 of the principal judgment, and shall also include the costs of this application before me on 24th October 2025 which includes the costs of the costs application and the First Named Defendant’s application that this ruling be deferred.

(5) I shall stay the execution of the Orders at paragraphs 18(2) and 18(3) above, for a period of 6 months from the date of the perfection of this order.

Conleth Bradley

Tuesday 5th November 2025