High Court awards €115,000 for sexual abuse damages and costs in default of defendant's appearance.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 595

[Record No. 2022/4463P]

BETWEEN

R

PLAINTIFF

AND

L

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Barr delivered ex tempore on the 30th day of October 2025.

Introduction.

1. This case comes before the court for an assessment of damages, the plaintiff having obtained judgment in default of appearance against the defendant on 2 December 2024.

2. There was no appearance by the defendant when the case came on for hearing before the High Court sitting in Waterford.

3. The court is satisfied having regard to the affidavit of service sworn by Ms Bilous – Novichenko sworn on 21 October 2025, that on 22 September 2025 she served a true copy of the medical report of Dr Cian Aherne, dated 14 July 2022, on the defendant by posting a true copy thereof to him in a registered prepaid envelope at his home address. A declaration of service was also sworn by the same deponent on 22 October 2025, wherein she stated that on 7 October 2025 she served a letter advising the defendant that the case was going to come into the list for hearing on 28 October 2025. She also enclosed the S.I. 391 schedule and a notice to produce. These documents were served on the defendant by posting them to the defendant by prepaid ordinary post addressed to him at his home address.

4. The court has seen the documents referred to by Ms Bilous-Novichenko in her affidavit and the declaration of service. In particular, the court has had regard to the letter sent by the plaintiff's solicitor dated 6 October 2025 advising the defendant that the action had been listed for hearing before the High Court sitting in Waterford on 28 October 2025. In these circumstances, the court is satisfied that the defendant has had all reasonable notice of the proceedings and of the order made by the High Court and of the hearing of the assessment of damages before this court on 28th October 2025. The court is satisfied that it is appropriate for it to proceed to judgement notwithstanding that the defendant did not appear in court to contest the matter.

The Facts.

5. The plaintiff gave evidence before the court. His case is that he was sexually abused by the defendant when he was nine years of age. He stated that he was friendly with the defendant’s son. He used to go to the home of the defendant to play with his son and on occasions had sleepovers in the house.

6. The plaintiff stated that while he was asleep in bed in a room in the defendant's house, the defendant came into the room and started kissing him on the neck and face; he then proceeded to touch the plaintiff's genitals. On subsequent occasions, the defendant proceeded to perform oral sex on the plaintiff.

7. The plaintiff stated that on other occasions, the defendant would call him in from the garden where he was playing with the defendant’s son. He would proceed to sexually assault him in a similar manner to that described above. The plaintiff stated that this abuse took place between the months of March and September 1998. He stated that in all he was assaulted on approximately 10/15 occasions.

8. The plaintiff went on to describe how the abuse had affected him both at the time and in the years following the assaults. He stated that he had not told anybody about the assaults until he instituted these proceedings.

9. The plaintiff stated that he had been greatly distressed by the assaults which had been perpetrated on him. They had affected him in very many ways. He had had difficulty maintaining relationships with other people. He was unable to form ordinary friendships with male friends and had difficulty sustaining relationships with females, save for his present partner, who he stated had stuck with him even when he had tried to push her away. He stated that he was very grateful to her for staying with him. They have a young daughter to whom he is greatly devoted.

10. The plaintiff stated that the 10 years after the assaults were the hardest for him. He had difficulty trusting people and as noted above, had had great difficulty with relationships.

11. The plaintiff is currently 36 years of age. He had got married in 2023. His daughter is four years of age. The plaintiff stated that he felt that he had made progress towards recovery, but due to the fact that he had had hip surgery last year, he found that he was unable to pursue activities which had taken his mind off the abuse. As a result, he stated that he tended to ruminate about the abuse once more. He was hopeful that once he could get out and about again, and in particular, once he could start taking meaningful exercise, this would help his current condition.

12. The court was furnished with a medical report dated 22 August 2022, which had been provided by Dr Cian Aherne, a clinical psychologist. His report had been compiled following an interview with the plaintiff which was held on 14th July 2022, together with reviewing various documents including the following: a written statement by the plaintiff dated 9 January 2022; the Symptom Checklist 90 revised (1994); the PTSD checklist (PCL – 5; Weathers et al 2013); the International statistical classification of diseases and related health problems, 11th revision (ICD

– 11); the Power Threat Meaning Framework (an evidence-based mental health framework; Johnstone, Boyle et al 2018).

13. In the course of a detailed report, Dr Aherne came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was suffering from complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) as a result of the abuse that had been perpetrated upon him when he was nine years of age. In the medical report, Dr Aherne gave a detailed account of the history that had been given to him by the plaintiff as to how the abuse had come against him in the years since 1998. In particular, he noted that the plaintiff had exhibited behavioural problems in the form of having difficulties at school; having an attachment to fast cars and motorcycles, which were used as a means of "getting away" from the memory of the trauma. He noted that the plaintiff exhibited the symptoms of PTSD.

14. Dr Aherne was of the opinion that the plaintiff also had CPTSD, which was characterised by severe and persistent (1) problems in affect regulation; (2) negative beliefs about oneself and feelings of guilt, shame or failure related to the traumatic event and (3) difficulties in sustaining relationships and in feeling close to others. For the diagnosis to be made, these disturbances had to cause significant impairment in personal, family, social, educational, occupational or other important areas of functioning. From a careful analysis of the plaintiff's history as recounted to him by the plaintiff, Dr Aherne was satisfied that the plaintiff met the criteria for a diagnosis of CPTSD.

15. Dr Aherne concluded his report with the following diagnosis and prognosis:

“(R) is currently experiencing psychological trauma with stress responses that clearly fit the criteria for CPTSD. (R) meets the basic diagnostic criteria for PTSD but also meets the additional criteria for CPTSD. (R's) experiences of complex post-traumatic stress were at their worst for the first 10 years following his experiences of abuse and they still affect his daily functioning now.

(R's) complex post-traumatic stress is unlikely to resolve itself without further therapeutic intervention. If (R) is to make a recovery, it is recommended that he attends for individual psychotherapy sessions aimed at his particular experiences as soon as possible. Specific aspects of eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR), interpersonal therapy and/or mindfulness and yoga may be beneficial for (R). Interventions tend to be long-term (more than 12 sessions) and intensive.”

The Law.

16. The law on the assessment of damages in historical child sex abuse cases, has recently been analysed in depth by Egan J in Kemmy v Murray 2025 IEHC 421. This court is satisfied that the analysis and principles set down in that judgement are a correct statement of the law.

17. In the Kemmy case Egan J looked at the particular factors that apply when one is dealing with cases of PTSD/psychiatric injury that arise as a result of child sexual abuse. She summarised these relevant principles as follows at paragraphs 83 – 85:

“83. To expand somewhat on this point, one observes that the decision in MN went further than enjoining a court assessing general damages to balance and weigh "the three elements, fairness to the plaintiff, fairness to the defendant and proportionality to the general scheme of damages awarded by a court". It recognised that whilst the principal factor to be considered in such cases is the nature and duration of the psychological injury suffered by the plaintiff, this in turn is closely aligned with the nature and severity (ranging from acts of sexual assault through to rape), timing (in the sense of the developmental age of the plaintiff) and duration of the sexual abuse suffered. Thus, in the passage set out at para. 71 above, Denham J. considers factors of particular relevance in child abuse cases. Denham J. thus emphasised that a continuum of abuse over years will have consequences greater than the sum of the individual assaults. She stressed that sexual abuse at a critical time in a child's life can alter and subvert development. These two factors link the injury suffered to the nature, timing and duration of the abuse itself. Similarly, Denham J.'s observation that sexual assault which develops into rape is the most serious injury to a person, does not focus principally upon the plaintiff's psychiatric injuries, but on the nature of the abuse itself.

84. These factors, such as repeated abuse as part of a continuum and the nature and severity of the acts of abuse themselves (in the sense of the developmental age of the plaintiff) may have devastating consequences for the plaintiffs in such cases. Yet, these factors are not reflected in the Guidelines. Although the Guidelines reference clearly relevant considerations such as age; interference with quality of life and education; impact on work and the nature, extent and likely success of the treatment undertaken, they do not dovetail with or encompass this aspect of the analysis in MN.

85. In short, the MN analysis and the approach under the Guidelines differ. The MN approach places considerably greater weight than the Guidelines on the nature, severity, timing and duration of the abuse itself. These two assessment methodologies are not on all fours and the question which arises is which methodology applies in this case, and in cases of child sexual abuse more generally.”

18. In the course of her judgement, Egan J carried out a meticulous analysis of the case law and the principles underlying the legislation to determine whether the personal injury guidelines applied to the assessment of damages in sex abuse cases. Having carried out this analysis, she came to the conclusion that the guidelines do not apply to the assessment of such damages. This was primarily because the guidelines set down various bands of damages that should be awarded for various types of psychiatric injury, including PTSD. However, the guidelines do not take account of the additional factors that are present in cases of child sexual abuse. The judge outlined her conclusion as follows at paragraph 108:

“108. It is therefore no surprise that the Guidelines do not purport to assess damages for child sexual abuse and that they do not reference the various aspects of injury which the jurisprudence on deliberate torts, assaults, battery and rape take into account; such as the impact of a continuum of abuse, the specific acts of abuse and the likely lifelong impact of such events occurring in a child's formative years. Further, although the Guidelines reference interference with quality of life and education, as well as impact on work and personal relationships as considerations affecting the compensation to be awarded, they do not purport to encompass the devastating impact that sexual abuse and the consequences of its reporting can bring about. This case has involved the loss of home life and family, and the supportive networks and security upon which all human relations are based. For good reason, the Guidelines do not attempt to provide guidance on such complex impacts and ramifications.”

19. Later in her judgement, Egan J. referred to the necessity for a court to have regard to the nature, severity, timing and duration of the abuse itself when assessing the appropriate level of damages to be awarded: see paragraph 128. She continued as follows in relation to the factors to which a judge should have regard when assessing the appropriate level of damages:

129. In cases of child sexual abuse, the court must carefully analyse and apply each of the criteria outlined by Denham J. in MN on a case-by-case basis. It must also consider, balance, and weigh the requirements of fairness to the plaintiff, fairness to the defendant, proportionality to the general scheme of damages awarded by a court, proportionality to damages awarded in other cases of child sexual abuse of greater and lesser severity and proportionality to the currently prevailing upper limit on general damages. In some of these cases, damages well below the upper limit will be appropriate. In other cases, the consequences of the abuse, its nature, severity, timing and duration may be such that, particularly when aggravated or exemplary damages apply, damages approaching, or at, the upper limit will not only be appropriate but will, in justice, be imperatively necessary.”

20. Finally, Egan J. had regard to the fact that in child sex abuse cases it was very common to have a claim for aggravated and/or punitive damages. She stated as follows at paragraph 137:

137. Aggravated and exemplary damages will often be to the fore of a judge's mind in civil claims for the sexual, physical and psychological abuse of minors. Such egregious actions against minors, where the wrongdoer is in a position of trust, are entirely the type of actions in which such aggravated damages will often be appropriate.

Conclusions.

21. I accept the evidence of the plaintiff that he was subjected to sexual abuse in the manner described by him over the six-month period between March and September 1998, when he was aged nine years old.

22. I accept the medical evidence as contained in the medical report from Dr Aherne.

23. In considering the appropriate award of damages I must have regard to the nature, severity, timing and duration of the abuse and to its effect on the plaintiff.

24. While the abuse in this case does not fall at the extreme end of such abuse as in the MN v. SM [2005] 4 IR 461 or Kemmy cases, it nonetheless took place on approximately 10/15 occasions when the plaintiff was a young boy and was therefore vulnerable. It was abuse of a reasonably severe nature including touching of the plaintiff's genitals and performing oral sex on him.

25. The plaintiff did not try to exaggerate the effect of this abuse when giving his evidence. Indeed, if anything, he was reticent in his description of the abuse and of the effects that is has had on him.

26. I accept the content of the medical report as giving a fair and accurate account of how the abuse has had significant psychological effects and adverse effects on the plaintiff's ability to sustain meaningful interpersonal relationships.

27. That he has managed to confide the fact of his abuse with his current partner, with whom he has a young daughter, is a very positive step on his road to recovery. Nonetheless, Dr Aherne is of opinion that the plaintiff will require significant psychiatric treatment into the future to achieve a full recovery. His diagnosis and prognosis has been outlined earlier in this judgement.

28. In arriving at an appropriate award of general damages in this case, the court has had regard to the dicta of Denham J. (as she then was) in the MN case, and in particular that the court must be fair in the award of damages to both the plaintiff and the defendant. This is particularly important where the defendant has not appeared to defend the case in any way. The court has also had regard to the principles as outlined by Egan J in Kemmy v Murray. The court has also had regard to the personal injury guidelines, although for the reasons set out by Egan J in her judgement, these guidelines are not as determinative of the appropriate level of the award as in other personal injury actions.

29. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I award the plaintiff general damages of €60,000 to date. While I am satisfied from the content of Dr Aherne's report that it is likely that the plaintiff will go on to make a full recovery from the psychiatric injuries that he has suffered in the form of CPTSD, it is clear that it will take some time and significant psychological intervention for this to occur. In these circumstances, I award the plaintiff €30,000 for future suffering and disablement.

30. I am also satisfied that I am entitled to make an award of exemplary damages to mark the court’s abhorrence of the conduct of the defendant in preying on a vulnerable young boy for his sexual gratification. I award €25,000 as exemplary damages.

31. Accordingly, having regard to the above figures, I award the plaintiff judgement against the defendant in the sum of €115,000.

32. It is clear that the plaintiff is entitled to the costs of the action against the defendant, to include all reserved and discovery costs.

33. At the hearing, Mr Sheehan SC suggested that the court might measure costs as a means of both expediting the ultimate conclusion of the matter and saving the costs of adjudication. To that end, he submitted a proposed estimate of fees that would be properly recoverable by the plaintiff in respect of his legal costs.

34. The level of fees proposed appear to me to be entirely fair and reasonable. However, being conscious that the defendant has not had notice of them, nor has he had any opportunity to comment on them or to resist them, I propose to measure the costs in accordance with the estimate proposed by counsel for the plaintiff, but I will give the defendant four weeks from perfection and service of the final order on him to apply to the court in relation to the issue of costs and to apply to have same remitted for adjudication in default of agreement.

35. Accordingly, I measure the plaintiff's legal costs as being the following: senior counsel’s brief fee €7,500 (plus VAT); junior counsel’s brief €5,000 (plus VAT); solicitor’s instructions fee, to include outlay, €17,500 (plus VAT). This gives a total amount for fees exclusive of VAT of €30,000 which amounts to a total figure of €36,900 (inclusive of VAT). Final Order.

36. There will be judgement for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of €115,000.

37. The costs of the action are awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant to include all reserved and discovery costs.

38. The plaintiff's costs are measured at €36,900 inclusive of VAT.

39. Liberty to the defendant to apply within four weeks of service of the perfected order upon him to have the issue of costs remitted to adjudication in default of agreement.

40. The court will continue the order already made prohibiting the publication by any person of any facts that would tend to identify either of the parties to the action.