High Court denies exemplary damages for nuisance, awarding only general damages and property devaluation to plaintiffs.

THE HIGH COURT [2025] IEHC 587 Record No: 2018/ 8457P

BETWEEN:

MARGARET WEBSTER AND KEITH ROLLO PLAINTIFF AND

MEENACLOGHSPAR (WIND) LIMITED

DEFENDANT AND Record no: 2018/ 8458P BETWEEN:

ROSS SHORTEN AND JOAN CARTY PLAINTIFF AND

MEENACLOGHSPAR (WIND) LIMITED DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Emily Egan delivered on the 31st day of October 2025

INDEX

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3

General damages ............................................................................................................ 3

Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims ............................................................... 4

Property Devaluation ....................................................................................................... 4

Aggravated and Exemplary Damages ................................................................................. 5

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................... 5

General damages ............................................................................................................ 5

Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims ............................................................... 6

Property devaluation........................................................................................................ 6

Aggravated and exemplary damages ................................................................................. 7

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES ...................................................................................... 7

Causation and remoteness/foreseeability ........................................................................... 7

The assessment of general damages for nuisance................................................................ 8

Property devaluation, stigma damages and reinstatement costs .......................................... 11

Aggravated damages ..................................................................................................... 13

Exemplary Damages ...................................................................................................... 14

EVIDENCE ...................................................................................................................... 15

Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo .............................................................................................. 15

Mr. Ross Shorten........................................................................................................... 16

Mr. Anthony O’Regan ..................................................................................................... 16

Mr. Alan Fitzgerald ........................................................................................................ 18

Mr. Tom Corr ................................................................................................................ 19

Mr. Corr’s comparables............................................................................................... 20

Mr. Corr’s scientific research ....................................................................................... 21

Material not considered by Mr. Corr ............................................................................. 24

APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE ................................ 25

General damages and Mr. Rollo’s accommodation claims .................................................... 25

Ms. Webster.............................................................................................................. 28

Mr. Rollo................................................................................................................... 28

The Carty Shortens .................................................................................................... 31

Property devaluation...................................................................................................... 31

Preliminary remarks in respect of the property devaluation claims ....................................... 31

Stigma damages in respect of HH .................................................................................... 32

Devaluation of NF .......................................................................................................... 35

Aggravated Damages..................................................................................................... 36

Plaintiffs’ submissions ................................................................................................ 36

a) the manner in which the wrong was committed, involving such elements as oppressiveness, arrogance or outrage; or ................................................................. 36

b) the conduct of the wrongdoer after the commission of the wrong, such as a refusal to apologise or to ameliorate the harm done or the making of threats to repeat the wrong . 36 Failure to respond the plaintiff’s legitimate complaints ............................................ 36 Conway criterion (c) conduct of the wrongdoer and/or his representatives in the defence of the claim of the wronged plaintiff, up to and including the trial of the action ................. 37 Conduct during the course of the proceedings and during the trial of module 1 .......... 37 Abject failure to engage with the substance of the plaintiffs’ legitimate complaints . 37 Failure to disclose noise monitoring data gathered at NF ..................................... 38 Allegation that the WTN was inaudible inside the Webster Rollo bedroom .............. 38 Response to the court’s module 1 judgment on liability ........................................... 38

Defendant’s submissions ............................................................................................ 39

Discussion and conclusion in relation to aggravated damages ......................................... 41

Exemplary damages ...................................................................................................... 45

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 46

INTRODUCTION

1. This is my third judgment in these proceedings. At the conclusion of module 1, I held (”the principal judgment”) that the Wind Turbine Noise (WTN) from one of the two turbines operated by the defendant (T2) caused a nuisance to the plaintiffs during night hours and quiet waking hours (“sensitive periods”). At the conclusion of module 2, I determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction to abate the nuisance during sensitive periods and outlined the restrictions to be imposed upon the operation of T2 during those times.

2. There are four main issues to be considered in this judgment. The first concerns the assessment of general damages for each plaintiff for the defendant’s WTN nuisance, which has caused them to suffer substantial, pronounced, prolonged and repeated interference with the ordinary use, comfort and enjoyment of their homes beyond what an objectively reasonable person should have to put up with (for the sake of shorthand, I will refer to this as “general damages for nuisance”). The second issue concerns Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims. The third main issue concerns property devaluation and the fourth concerns aggravated and exemplary damages. I summarise below the issues arising in respect of each of these issues.

General damages

3. Although the legal principles governing the assessment of general damages for nuisance are the same in respect of each of the plaintiffs, their particular factual circumstances differ considerably.

4. Ms. Webster continues to live at Hill House (“HH”). In her case, therefore, I must assess general damages for nuisance from the date of the commencement of the operation of the turbines in February 2017, until the date upon which this court’s order abating the nuisance will take effect.

5. The situation is different in respect of Ms. Webster’s former partner, Mr. Rollo. In my principal judgment, I found that the WTN caused Mr. Rollo to suffer from a major depressive disorder of at least moderate severity with low mood, sleep disturbance and irritability. He therefore suffered a recognisable psychiatric injury.1 Mr. Rollo’s case is that, due to the severity of the WTN impact, it was necessary for him to urgently “remove himself from the situation”2 and leave HH, which he did in March 2021. Mr. Rollo contends that, as he no longer lives at HH, he continues to be denied the benefit of any amenity whatsoever in that property, which he continues to co-own with Ms. Webster; this, he argues, ought sound in an award of ongoing general damages for nuisance (or in an award in respect of his future accommodation, as to which see below). By contrast, the defendant maintains that Mr. Rollo was directly exposed to the nuisance for a shorter time than Ms. Webster and is only entitled to general damages for nuisance up to March 2021. It is therefore necessary to consider the appropriate approach to the assessment of general damages for nuisance for Mr. Rollo in the period while he lived at HH and his entitlement, if any, to general damages for nuisance (or other compensation) after he left HH in March 2021.

Albeit that I held that, because this psychiatric condition was not reasonably foreseeable, Mr. Rollo could not recover general damages for personal injuries.

In Ms. Webster’s words.

6. The Carty Shortens are in a different situation again. They had purchased Nettlefield (“NF”)

with the intention of retiring to the country and making it their permanent home. However, even prior to the commencement of the operation of the wind farm, the Carty Shortens had decided, for family reasons, to sell NF. The Carty Shortens maintain that the sales process was very protracted and difficult. Ultimately, NF was sold in August 2021. This means that general damages for nuisance fall to be awarded to the Carty Shortens only during the period of their occupation of NF between February 2017 and August 2021.

Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims

7. The second main issue concerns Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims. Ms.

Webster and Mr. Rollo maintain that the impact of the WTN caused the breakdown of their relationship by the summer of 2020, at which point they decided to separate. By reason of that separation, and by reason of the passage of four years since Mr. Rollo left HH, it is no longer possible for him to return to HH even if the nuisance is now abated by this court’s order. Mr.

Rollo’s past accommodation claim arises because, after he left HH in March 2021, he had to rent alternative accommodation. The total amount of rent paid by Mr. Rollo between March 2021 and the present time is €42,900. I must consider whether all or part of this sum is recoverable by way of either general damages for nuisance or by way of special damages. Mr. Rollo’s future accommodation claim arises because he can now no longer return to HH which, he maintains, is substantially attributable to the WTN nuisance. Mr. Rollo therefore claims the cost of securing future accommodation in a comparable property. This future accommodation claim is advanced on two alternative bases. Mr. Rollo seeks either the current cost of purchasing a house similar to HH or alternatively full “reinstatement costs” (to again adopt the term used by the parties), consisting of the building costs of a property similar to HH on a stand-alone greenfield site in the vicinity. As regards the quantum of the first alternative, it is common case that the present value of HH absent the WTN nuisance is €400,000. As regards the quantum of the second alternative, the plaintiff has presented evidence that reinstatement costs are in excess of €1 million. It is fair to say that Mr. Rollo did not advance reinstatement costs as an item of special damages per se.

Rather, this narrative, and the figures just set out, were tendered to the court as an aspect of the overall circumstances of the case which the court might consider relevant in assessing damages.

Property Devaluation

8. There are two aspects of property devaluation which are said to arise from the WTN nuisance.

9. The first devaluation claim concerns HH. Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo maintain that even though the court has made orders which it considers will fully abate the nuisance, the capital value of HH will still be devalued in the context of a future sale. This claim is advanced on three separate factual grounds. First, they say that, even though this court has indicated that the order which it will make will fully abate the nuisance, a potential purchaser of HH will still have a lingering uncertainty as to whether the court’s order will be effective in fully abating the nuisance and that this will impact the price that they are prepared to offer for the property. Second, the

Webster Rollos argue that a potential purchaser will be concerned that the defendant may not wholeheartedly comply with the terms of this court’s order, which will also impact the price. Third, the plaintiffs observe that this court will be making very detailed orders concerning the ongoing operation of T2, which will inevitably involve the future owners or occupiers of HH, in the short to medium term at least, in some level of ongoing engagement with the defendant and in verifying the effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendant in response to this court’s order. The Webster Rollos claim that this ongoing requirement for engagement/ verification will also discourage buyers, reducing the open market price of HH. In short, it is maintained that, notwithstanding the order of this court abating the WTN nuisance, HH will still be devalued, which sounds in ”stigma damages” (to adopt the term used by the parties).

10. The second devaluation claim concerns NF. The Carty Shortens claim that the WTN impacted the sale price of NF. This devaluation claim was originally quantified as the differential between the August 2021 valuation of NF in the absence of WTN nuisance and its sale price in August 2021 (at which stage of course, the nuisance was still continuing). However, during the course of module 3, this devaluation claim was altered. The Carty Shortens now quantify the devaluation of NF as the differential between the total expenditure outlaid in the purchase, renovation and furnishing of NF and its sale price in August 2021. This is a somewhat higher figure than previously advanced.

Aggravated and Exemplary Damages

11. The fourth and final issue in this judgment concerns the plaintiffs’ claim to aggravated and exemplary damages which is said to arise by reason of the defendant’s conduct before and during the trial of these proceedings and after the delivery of this court’s judgments in modules 1 and 2.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

12. My decision on each of these main issues is set out from paras 121 to 227 below. In summary, I find as follows:

General damages

13. In relation to the assessment of general damages for nuisance, I follow the approach set out by Quinn J. in the landmark judgment of Byrne v. Abo Energy Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 330 (“Byrne”). Having regard to the particular nature and effect of the nuisance on each plaintiff, I have decided to award general damages to each plaintiff as follows: to Ms. Webster €10,000 for each year of the nuisance commencing in February 2017 and continuing to the date of this court’s order or in the event of a stay pending appeal, until any final orders take effect; to Mr. Rollo, €18,500 for each year of the nuisance commencing in February 2017 and concluding in March 2021. I make no award of general damages in respect of Mr. Rollo’s psychiatric injury, in respect of the breakdown of the Webster Rollo relationship or in respect of the period after Mr. Rollo left HH. I have huge sympathy for Mr. Rollo. I fully accept that the WTN nuisance which he was forced to endure, the consequent exhaustion, frustration and helplessness and indeed the recognisable psychiatric disorder caused thereby, all contributed to the breakdown of his relationship with Ms.

Webster. However relationships break down for a number of reasons and I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence before me to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the breakdown of the Webster Rollo relationship can be attributed to the WTN or that but for the WTN, Mr. Rollo and Ms. Webster would still be living together as a couple and further that they would have continued to do so into the future. I should also say that, even if I had held with the plaintiffs on this aspect of causation and concluded that but for the WTN, Ms. Webster and Mr.

Rollo would still be living together as a couple in HH, this eventuality is not in my view a reasonably foreseeable consequence of WTN nuisance. In short, I am not satisfied that the breakdown of the relationship, Mr. Rollo’s departure from HH in March 2021 and the ongoing consequences thereof were either caused by the defendant’s nuisance or were foreseeable consequences thereof.

14. As to Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty, I award damages of €7,500 each per annum from February 2017 to August 2021, the date of the sale of NF. This lower annual figure for damages reflects the fact that, for the period in question, NF was not the Carty Shortens’ full-time home, but rather a place which they visited most weekends and to which they eventually planned to retire.

Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims

15. I am not satisfied that Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation are recoverable items of either general or special damages. As regards the past rental costs, I am not satisfied that the breakdown of the Webster Rollo relationship which was always going to require that they were separately accommodated, was either caused by the defendant’s nuisance or was a foreseeable consequence thereof. As regards Mr. Rollo’s future accommodation claim, the WTN is not presently preventing Mr. Rollo from enjoying HH and, due to this court’s abatement orders, it will not do so in the future. Rather, Mr. Rollo cannot return to HH because of the couple’s separation.

Whilst it is quite possible that the WTN nuisance has made a material contribution to the difficult circumstances in which Mr. Rollo now finds himself, no submission was made to me that I should apply a modified causation test to this aspect of the case. This all inexorably means that I cannot be satisfied that Mr. Rollo’s inability to return to HH can be attributed to the WTN nuisance and that no damages can flow in respect of the past or future accommodation claim.

Property devaluation

16. Insofar as concerns the claims relating to property devaluation I decide as follows. Vis a vis HH, I reject any argument for stigma damages based on the premise either that this court’s order will not fully abate the nuisance, or that the defendant may not wholeheartedly comply with this court’s order. However, I find as a fact on the balance of probabilities, that potential buyers will be put off by the requirement for ongoing engagement with the defendant and by the potential requirement to verify the effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendant in response to this court’s order. Stigma damages therefore fall to be awarded. Insofar as concerns the quantum of these stigma damages, I award an amount of €30,000.

17. In respect of NF, I am satisfied that, were it not for the WTN nuisance in this case, the market value of NF at the time of its sale to Ms. McGinn would have been approximately

€350,000. As such, the Carty Shortens, who sold NF to Ms. McGinn for €295,000, sustained a loss of €55,000.

Aggravated and exemplary damages

18. Finally, I am not satisfied to award either aggravated or exemplary damages. I view the approach of the defendant prior to and during the trial of these proceedings as unimpressive and as prolonging the upset, disturbance and distress experienced by the plaintiffs. However, I do not think that this is a case in which the criteria set out by Finlay C.J. in Conway v. INTO [1991]

2 IR 305 (“Conway”) for the award of aggravated damages can fairly be said to be met. The same is the case in relation to exemplary damages. I am not sufficiently satisfied that the defendant’s behaviour has been so bad as to amount to a conscious and deliberate violation of the plaintiffs’ rights such as to merit the sanction of an award of exemplary damages. I am also influenced by the fact that, when the case is looked at in the round and in light of the injunction which I propose to grant, compensatory damages are sufficient to indicate that the defendant’s failure to properly engage with the substantial and bona fide complaints of the plaintiffs is to be deprecated.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Causation and remoteness/foreseeability

19. It is trite law that there are two elements to establishing causation in respect of tort claims.

The plaintiff must demonstrate:

a. that the defendant’s breach, in fact, resulted in the damage complained of (factual causation); and b. that this damage should, as a matter of law, be recoverable from the defendant (legal causation).

20. It appears to be common case that factual causation is established by the application of the “but for” test. If the defendant’s conduct was not, as a matter of fact, the cause of the alleged loss, then the plaintiffs may not recover damages in nuisance for that loss.

21. Thereafter, in considering legal causation, one examines how far removed the damage suffered is from the contemplation of the defendant. This engages the concepts of remoteness and foreseeability. This means, as the defendant submits, that it is not liable for a particular type of damage, for example, the breakdown of the Webster Rollo relationship and its consequences, if this fallout could not have been foreseen. The test is an objective one; the question is whether a reasonable person would have foreseen that the consequences suffered by the plaintiff might be the result of the nuisance alleged.

22. In my principal judgment, I applied this test of reasonable foreseeability to Mr. Rollo’s claim for general damages for personal injuries in the form of pure psychiatric injury. I was satisfied that Mr. Rollo had sustained a recognisable psychiatric injury which, in terms of factual causation, was caused by the WTN. I then considered whether legal causation was established and observed that the courts generally adopt a cautious approach towards the recovery of damages for pure psychiatric injury. I concluded that, where a pure psychiatric injury is occasioned by nuisance, reasonable foreseeability of “that particular kind of injury”3 is a precondition to an award of damages for such injury. I held that the defendant would only be liable for Mr. Rollo’s psychiatric injury if an injury of that kind was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the WTN nuisance.

23. In my principal judgment, I also noted that in applying this test of remoteness, one must distinguish between mental distress and psychological injury. In this jurisdiction, damages for mental distress may be awarded for nuisanceas in Patterson v. Murphy [1978] ILRM 85 (“Patterson”). It is wholly foreseeable that constant and intrusive noise would cause mental distress, annoyance, frustration and lack of calm. It is also foreseeable that WTN would cause loss of sleep, irritability, loss of concentration, impairment of function, etc. However, I held that it is not generally foreseeable that a recognisable psychiatric illness would ensue.

24. Applying these principles, I held that although Mr. Rollo’s psychiatric injury was caused by the WTN, he was not legally entitled to succeed in a personal injuries claim for pure psychiatric injury; this was, because such an injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of WTN nuisance. Legal causation was not therefore established.

25. In the present module it will be necessary to apply these same principles to the plaintiffs’ argument that the WTN nuisance destroyed the Webster Rollo relationship, which should sound in general damages and in an award of special damages in respect of Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation costs. In each case, I must consider both whether the WTN nuisance is the factual cause of these losses and whether these losses are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of WTN nuisance.

The assessment of general damages for nuisance

26. Hanrahan v. Merck Sharp & Dohme (Ireland) Ltd [1988] ILRM 629 (“Hanrahan”) was a claim for damages for, inter alia, discomfort caused by smells from the defendant’s nearby factory which the Supreme Court analysed as a private nuisance claim. The High Court had held that the intense and frequent objectionable smells from the defendant's factory were so frequent, pronounced and prolonged that each of the plaintiffs had made out a case for damages in nuisance. The judgment of Henchy J. established the following principles in relation to the law of private nuisance:

• What an occupier of land is entitled to as against his neighbour is the comfortable and healthy enjoyment of the land to the degree that would be expected by an ordinary person whose requirements are objectively reasonable in all the particular circumstances.

• Where the nuisance comprises an interference with the plaintiffs comfort in the enjoyment of their property, the test is whether the interference is beyond what an objectively reasonable person should have to put up with in the circumstances of the case.

• The plaintiff is not entitled to insist that their personal fastidiousness should be treated as inviolable.

See, in this respect, para 668 and 671 of my principal judgment referencing Geoghegan J. in Fletcher v. Commissioner for Public Works [2003] 1 IR 465 who stated : “What clearly emerges from the judgments in that case is that the control mechanism applied in the case of actions for pure psychiatric damage is that that particular kind of damage must have been reasonably foreseen. This is in line with the judgment of this court in Kelly v. Hennessy.”

• The case for damages in nuisance is made out if the interference is so pronounced and prolonged or repeated that a person of normal or average sensibilities should not be expected to put up with it.

• The plaintiff must show sensible personal discomfort, including injurious affection of the nerves or senses of such a nature as would materially diminish the comfort and enjoyment of, or cause annoyance to, a reasonable person accustomed to living in the same locality.

• It is not necessary that an interference be so odious or damaging that it affects the plaintiffs’ health. It is enough if it can be said that a reasonable person in the plaintiffs’ circumstances should not be expected to tolerate it without requiring the defendant, to make financial amends.

27. In my principal judgment, I cite and apply these principles in finding that nuisance is established on the facts of this case and that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, including general damages. In Hanrahan, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of liability and the matter was then remitted to the High Court for the assessment of damages. Because the case thereafter settled, the precise basis upon which general damages for nuisance might be assessed was not considered further.

28. The legal principles applying to the assessment of damages for private nuisance caused by WTN have recently been comprehensively analysed in the Byrne. In Byrne, a married couple brought a claim in respect of a six turbine wind farm situated near their home in Bunclody, Wexford. The plaintiffs claimed that the noise, vibration, and shadow flicker emanating from three of the six turbines interfered with the enjoyment and use of their property. Quinn J.’s judgment considers the legal and factual issues arising in respect of the assessment of general damages, the appropriate remedy, aggravated and exemplary damages and the plaintiffs’ claim to stigma damages (notwithstanding the order for permanent shut down of the turbines). In other words, Byrne considers many of the same legal issues that arise in the present case (albeit that the claim to stigma damages was differently formulated to that presented before me). Moreover, Byrne was decided on foot of evidence from many of the same expert witnesses featured in this case. Thus, acoustic evidence was given by Mr. Stigwood and Ms. Large on behalf of the plaintiffs and Mr. Carr on behalf of the defendant. In addition, Mr. Mayer provided testimony in relation, inter alia, to the science behind the plaintiffs’ experience of the WTN and potential mitigation measures. There was a further overlap in expertise in relation to property valuation which, as in this case, was provided by Mr. O’Regan on behalf of the plaintiffs and Mr. Corr on behalf of the defendants.

29. Quinn J. noted that in considering whether WTN objectively constitutes a nuisance, one does not simply assess the loudness of the noise. Rather, he observes that there was no substantial disagreement as between the experts4 that a number of features can typically be relevant to the degree to which WTN may constitute a nuisance. The features listed include loudness, pitch or frequency, amplitude modulation, different noises simultaneously emitting from the same sound source, changeability, erratic or unpredictable changes, tonal noise,

I assume that Mr. Carr ascribed to this general consensus. If so, then his views have evolved considerably since he gave evidence in module 1 of these proceedings.

duration of the noise, timing of the noise, nature of the receiving environment, sensitisation and attenuation. I considered many, but not all, of these features as relevant in reaching my finding of nuisance in module 1 of this case.

30. As liability was admitted in Byrne, the first issue considered was the assessment of damages for nuisance to date and whether, as the defendants contended, this should be measured by reference to the notional capital damage to the value of the plaintiffs' property, or, as the plaintiffs contended by reference to broader principles relating to the assessment of general damages focusing on the impact of the nuisance on each plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of their home.

31. After a comprehensive review of the relevant common law authorities - including this court’s principal judgment - Quinn J. held with the plaintiffs on this issue. The learned judge was satisfied that Hanrahan and Patterson, together with this court’s principal judgment, set out the appropriate guiding principles for assessing damages in such cases and moreover confirmed that general damages can be awarded to each plaintiff for the effect upon them of the nuisance to date.

32. I am in complete agreement with Quinn J. that it would be unjust and potentially discriminatory if persons who endure nuisance in their home life such as that caused by excessive noise, could be awarded wholly different amounts of compensation for the same type of interference primarily by reference to the capital value of their property. Indeed, I note that the defendant in the present case did not contend that that notional capital damage measure should apply. The true value of a person's home in the context of the enjoyment they get from its ordinary use and amenity, as a place of refuge, rest and relaxation cannot be measured fairly by reference to its capital value. In assessing general damages for nuisance, it is necessary to consider and assess the nature, effect and duration of the impact on the amenity of the home by reference to an objectively reasonable person in the circumstances of the plaintiff.

33. In addition to the principles set out at para 26 above, Quinn J. summarised the following principles in relation to the assessment of general damages for private nuisance, which I also gratefully adopt:

• the general purpose of such general damages is to compensate the plaintiff by restoring them fairly and reasonably to the position they were in prior to the nuisance (known as the principle of restitutio in integrum);

• in the assessment of those general damages for private nuisance, the measure of the damages should be fair and reasonable to both sides and proportionate to the wrong sustained and to the general approach of the courts to awards in analogous cases;

• the court should consider all the relevant factors in the particular case, including the nature of the plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff's relation to it, the nature of the wrongful act causing the nuisance, the conduct of the parties subsequent to the wrongful act, and the pecuniary, economic or other relevant implications or consequences of the wrongful act complained of;

• as the tort of private nuisance protects a property right, it may well be helpful to consider whether the nuisance complained of has caused a notional damage to the capital value or income generating value of the property. Whether this is appropriate will depend on all the circumstances of the case.

34. I pause to note that, in the present case,5 the defendant has not submitted that the plaintiffs ought not be entitled to both general damages for the period of their exposure to the WTN 6 and to damages for property devaluation/ damage to the capital value of NF.7

35. In Byrne, Quinn J. found that the WTN interfered with the plaintiffs’ general ability to experience and enjoy their home. This interference was particularly acute in terms of sleep disturbance and loss of substantial enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ garden. Finally, both Mr. Byrne and Ms. Moorhead worked in the home (the former generally only in the evenings) and their ability to do this was also interfered with.

36. Quinn J. awarded general damages to Mr. Byrne of €10,000 for each year of the nuisance and to Ms. Moorhead of €15,000 for each year of the nuisance. This differential reflected the fact that the position for the second named plaintiff, Ms. Moorhead was in general appreciably worse because she was at home more, than the second named plaintiff, Mr. Byrne and because her depths of resilience were already stretched by various health difficulties. As the admitted nuisance had continued for twelve years, the award of general damages for nuisance to date in respect of each plaintiff was €120,000 and €180,000 respectively.

Property devaluation, stigma damages and reinstatement costs

37. I have not been referred to any specific authorities setting out the approach to be followed by the court in approaching the issues of property devaluation or stigma damages arising in this case. However, as Quinn J. points out in Byrne, the well accepted general principles underlying the court’s jurisdiction when it comes to damages guide the court in private nuisance cases such as this.

38. In Munnelly v. Calcon Ltd [1978] IR 387 (“Munnelly”), Henchy J. considers the principle of restitutio in integrum which underpins the law of damages. In Munnelly part of the plaintiff's house collapsed as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendants who were building a house next door. Although dealing with the particular issue of a claim for reinstatement costs, Henchy J.’s judgment contains helpful dicta such as the following:

“The particular measure of damages allowed should, in my view, be objectively chosen by the court as being that which in all the circumstances of the particular case is best calculated to put the plaintiff fairly and reasonably, so far as a pecuniary award can do so, in the position in which he was to be found before the happening of the damage complained of.”

39. Kenny J. reinforced this point, stating:

“The dominant rule of law in assessing damages is the principle of restitutio in integrum and subsidiary rules can be justified only if they give effect to that dominant rule.”

40. Henchy J. emphasised that the damages to be awarded are to be reasonable, that is as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other and continued:-

Which of course is not to overlook the defendant’s argument-which I accept as correctthat Mr. Rollo’s past and future accommodation claims are inadmissible.

Save for an argument advanced by the defendant at module 1 -which I did not accept-that the claim of the Carty Shortens for private nuisance should fail, in limine, because at the time of the trial they no longer owned, or occupied NF.

The position is slightly different in relation to the Webster Rollo claim for stigma damages in respect of HH. I deal with the defendant’s argument in respect of this claim separately at para.s 155-165 below.

“I accept those two principles as being basic to, although not necessarily exhaustive of, the concept of restitutio in integrum on which the law of damages in cases such as this rests. It is in the application of those principles that difficulty may arise, for a court, in endeavouring to award a sum which will be both compensatory and reasonable, will be called on to give consideration, with emphasis varying from case to case, to matters such as the nature of the property, the plaintiff's relation to it, the nature of the wrongful act causing the damage, the conduct of the parties subsequent to the wrongful act, and the pecuniary, economic or other relevant implications or consequences of reinstatement damages as compared with diminished-value damages…..

41. In Byrne, the plaintiffs had also advanced a claim for “stigma damages”. It will be recalled that Quinn J. made an order for the permanent shutdown of the three turbines causing the WTN nuisance. Despite this, the plaintiffs’ valuer, Mr. O’Regan, gave evidence that in his opinion the house would still suffer damage to its capital value. The rationale for the claim to stigma damages was that future purchasers would discount their offer based on the noise nuisance history. However, Mr. O’Regan could not provide any examples of this actually happening. The court was not persuaded that the weight of his evidence was sufficient to make out the claim to stigma damages. Quinn J. observed that there was planning permission for a wind farm and that the three other turbines were to be allowed to continue to operate. He noted that the award of damages made was designed to properly compensate the plaintiffs for the duration and effect of the nuisance to date and that the court’s order for the full shutdown of the three relevant turbines meant there will be no ongoing nuisance into the future. The claim to stigma damages was “… too speculative and [was] lacking in supportive examples. In addition, there is a sense in which it would not be reasonable to impose such damages on the defendants where the nuisance, as a result of the orders made, will have been fully abated.”

42. The rationale for the plaintiffs’ claim for stigma damages in the present case, is quite different to that advanced in Byrne (in which the plaintiffs valuer equated a fully resolved private nuisance claim with a “haunted house” syndrome). In the present case, the plaintiffs’ argument is that stigma damages will arise by virtue of a well-founded and reasonable fear on the part of a potential purchaser of HH that the injunction will not fully abate the WTN nuisance or that the defendant will not wholeheartedly comply with the terms of the injunction. Separately the present claim to stigma damages arises from the requirement for ongoing engagement with the defendant and verification of the effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendant in response to this court’s order. The Webster Rollos argue that this will be off-putting to potential purchasers. None of these three arguments were applicable in Byrne because Quinn J. ordered the shutdown of the turbines causing nuisance.

43. Munnelly is also of relevance to the measure of any award to Mr. Rollo for future accommodation, and to his claim for reinstatement costs in particular. The Supreme Court considered whether damages should be measured on a reinstatement basis or on the basis of diminution in value. Although the plaintiff’s building had been negligently destroyed by the defendant’s negligence, Henchy J. held that the authorities did not establish that an award of “reinstatement damages, which may vastly exceed damages based on diminished value, are to be awarded as a prima facie right or, even if they are, that the plaintiff's intention as to reinstatement should be the determining factor”. Noting that that the pre-damage value of the property was £35,000 and that reinstatement would cost £65,000, Henchy J. stated that reinstatement damages would “enrich the plaintiff excessively and unnecessarily and would mulct the defendants unreasonably”.

44. A claim for reinstatement costs was advanced by the plaintiffs in Byrne and was rejected on similar logic. Quinn J. stated that the figures claimed would leave the plaintiffs with a house of equivalent standard but as a new build, whereas the plaintiffs' home was by that time over twenty years old.

Aggravated damages

45. In Conway v. INTO [1991] 2 IR 305 (“Conway”) Finlay C.J. noted that three headings of damages in Irish law are potentially relevant to any particular tort or breach of constitutional rights:

(1) Ordinary compensatory damages being sums calculated to recompense a wronged plaintiff for physical injury, mental distress, anxiety, deprivation of convenience, or other harmful effects of a wrongful act and/or for monies lost or to be lost and/or expenses incurred or to be incurred by reason of the commission of the wrongful act.

(2) Aggravated damages, being compensatory damages increased by reason of

(a) the manner in which the wrong was committed, involving such elements as oppressiveness, arrogance or outrage, or

(b) the conduct of the wrongdoer after the commission of the wrong, such as a refusal to apologise or to ameliorate the harm done or the making of threats to repeat the wrong, or

(c) conduct of the wrongdoer and/or his representatives in the defence of the claim of the wronged plaintiff, up to and including the trial of the action.

Such a list of the circumstances which may aggravate compensatory damages until they can properly be classified as aggravated damages is not intended to be in any way finite or complete. Furthermore, the circumstances which may properly form an aggravating feature in the measurement of compensatory damages must, in many instances, be in part a recognition of the added hurt or insult to a plaintiff who has been wronged, and in part also a recognition of the cavalier or outrageous conduct of the Defendant.

(3) Punitive or exemplary damages arising from the nature of the wrong which has been committed and/or the manner of its commission which are intended to mark the Court's particular disapproval of the Defendant's conduct in all the circumstances of the case and its decision that it should publicly be seen to have punished the Defendant for such conduct by awarding such damages, quite apart from its obligation, where it may exist in the same case, to compensate the plaintiff for the damage which he or she has suffered.

46. In Shortt v. Commissioner of An Garda Siochána [2007] 4 IR 587 (“Shortt”), Hardiman J.

emphasised that injury to feelings, loss of dignity, humiliation, frustration, helplessness and despair are all aspects of compensatory damages. The factors just listed relate to the feelings and perceptions of the plaintiff. Aggravated damages, on the other hand, focus not on the feelings of the plaintiff but on the actions and demeanour of the defendant. Aggravated damages reflect factors such as those set out at para 2 (a), (b) or (c) in the above passage, which exacerbate the wrong.

47. As Quinn J. points out, Uren v. Bald Hills Wind Farm [2022] VSC 145 (“Uren”) provides a good example of how a court can deal with the issue of aggravated damages in a WTN nuisance claim. Richards J. noted that "a reasonable neighbour would have tried to reduce the noise; Bald Hills has not". In Uren, the wind farm never responded to the plaintiffs’ complaints by trying to reduce the WTN at their homes. Rather, it denied that they had any cause for complaint, minimised their lived experience of the noise, and treated them as hypersensitive troublemakers.

Richards J. noted that the operator had disputed the complaints even when approached by the local authority when it ought to have directed its attention to finding a solution to “the gearbox tonality issue" that arose in that case. Richards J. concluded that the defendant had not dealt properly with the plaintiffs' reasonable and legitimate complaints and that this "at least doubled the impact of the loss of amenity each of them suffered at their homes".

48. In Byrne, Quinn J. held, in the context of his consideration of general damages, that the general response of the defendants was exceedingly poor. He noted that, whilst they had admitted liability during the trial, for twelve years the defendant had avoided engaging properly or substantively with the plaintiffs’ complaints. The defendants had also declined, without explanation, to properly cooperate with the legitimate investigations of the local authority or to provide requested information. Aggravated damages were merited because, “the only sensible inference that can be drawn is that the defendants made a decision not to engage in any substantive or proper way with the claims being made by the plaintiffs and that this has aggravated the obvious distress suffered by the plaintiffs and significantly prolonged the duration of the nuisance”. Quinn J. measured aggravated damages at 20% of the award of compensatory damages.

Exemplary Damages

49. The test for exemplary damages is set out in para 3 of the extract from Conway, at para 45 above. Exemplary damages arise from the conduct of the defendant and Griffin J. refers to whether or not its actions are a “deliberate and conscious disregard of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff”.

50. In Shortt, Hardiman J. emphasised that compensatory and aggravated damages serve an entirely different function to exemplary damages. The latter damages are awarded to “make an example of the wrongdoers…by marking in terms that everyone can understand the sheer evil of what was done and the detestation which the courts, speaking for civil society in general, must feel and express for it”. Hardiman J. acknowledged that exemplary damages may be awarded against a wrongdoer who is not a government or state agency and stated that in such circumstances the means of the wrongdoer are to be taken into account in the calculation.

51. In Conway, Finlay C.J. indicates that exemplary damages should not be awarded if, in the opinion of the court, the amount necessarily payable by the wrongdoer in the form of compensatory damages constitutes a sufficient public disapproval of and punishment for the particular form of wrongdoing.

52. In Byrne, Quinn J. was concerned by the largely unexplained failure of the defendants to properly engage with the plaintiffs’ complaints at a time when the wind farm was generating substantial revenues of over €1,000,000 a year. However, he was not satisfied that this behaviour was so clearly a conscious and deliberate violation of the plaintiffs’ rights as to merit the sanction of an award of exemplary damages. In so holding, Quinn J. took account of the positive manner in which the defendants had behaved during the trial, including making an admission of liability on day 11, initiating a partial shutdown of the turbines and making an apology to the plaintiffs at the end of the hearing. Quinn J. also admonished the wind industry against repeating the conduct of the defendants and observed that “a failure to properly engage with substantial and bona fide complaints is to be deprecated’”.

53. Having set out the relevant legal principles, I now turn to analyse the factual and expert evidence tendered in module 3

EVIDENCE

Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo

54. Ms. Webster did not give additional evidence in module 3. I summarise her evidence as to the impact of the WTN at paras 48 to 78 of the principal judgment and at paras 119 to 132 of the module 2 judgment.

55. Mr. Rollo provided relatively brief additional testimony at module 3, in which he described long term sleep disturbance and depression by reason of the WTN. He is particularly hurt that the defendant failed to take any steps to mitigate or reduce the impact of the WTN at HH even after it was notified of his mental illness in December 2020 and furnished with Prof. Gournay’s report expressing grave concern for Mr. Rollo’s life and requesting that, as an interim measure, T2 was switched off at night to allow respite.

56. Mr. Rollo states that he was forced to move away from the WTN nuisance and left his home in March 2021. On the other hand, he also accepts that he and Ms. Webster had decided to separate in the summer of 2020. This predates the significant mental illness precipitated by the WTN which Mr. Rollo developed later the same year. Mr. Rollo and Ms. Webster are also both of the view that the WTN, Mr. Rollo’s reaction to it and his ensuing mental illness caused the breakdown of their relationship.

57. Mr. Rollo states that by reason of the impact of the WTN and of the defendant’s failure to respond adequately when notified of the impact, he has lost his home, his relationship and his plans with Ms. Webster to have children and a future together as a family.

58. Mr. Rollo is understandably distressed that these proceedings have been ongoing since 2018 and that, notwithstanding the two judgments of this court, he and Ms. Webster are “still fighting”

the case. As a result, he feels that he is stuck and cannot move on with his life and make any plans.

59. Whilst he retains shared ownership of HH, Mr. Rollo has been obliged to live in rented accommodation for the past four years. From March 2021 to August 2021, Mr. Rollo resided with family friends paying €300 per month. In August 2021, he secured his current rental accommodation in a flat in Wexford at a cost of €900 per month payable in advance. Mr. Rollo’s total rent to date is agreed (without prejudice to liability) at a figure of €42,900.

60. Mr. Rollo wishes to leave rented accommodation and live in a home with a similar aspect and views to HH but further away from the Ballyduff wind farm. This, he states could be achieved either by awarding him a sum which would permit him to buy an existing similar house or by an award of reinstatement costs.

Mr. Ross Shorten

61. Mr. Shorten’s direct evidence was brief. NF had been built as a fulltime permanent house with a view to the Carty Shortens ultimately retiring to the country. Mr. Shorten confirmed that he and Ms. Carty had purchased the site, built the house and garage and landscaped the garden, performing much of the work themselves and directly supervising the rest.

62. Mr. Shorten stated, as he had previously indicated at module 1, that he and Ms. Carty spent approximately €500,000 on the purchase of the site, the development and the furnishing of NF.

In circumstances, therefore, where the property was sold for €295,000 plus €10,000 for the contents in August 2021, Mr. Shorten’s view is that the couple’s loss should be reflected in a devaluation claim of €195,000.

63. Under cross-examination, Mr. Shorten accepted that this calculation had not previously been part of the NF devaluation claim, which had been pleaded on the basis of an estimated differential between the August 2021 market values of NF with and without the WTN nuisance, respectively.

Mr. Anthony O’Regan

64. Mr. Anthony O’Regan is an experienced estate agent, auctioneer and valuer. He has acted as a valuer for 47 years specialising mainly in countryside properties. Although his practice is based in Cork city, he is familiar with the area of Wexford where HH and NF are situated.

65. Mr. O’Regan has prepared two separate valuation reports in respect of HH, the first dated June 2020 and the second, May 2025. In his first report, Mr. O’Regan values HH without the negative impact of the wind farm at €270,000. His report states that there is continuing scientific uncertainty over the adverse health consequences of wind farms creating apprehension in the general public which perpetuates the debilitating effect of wind farms on property prices. He states that, depending on their proximity, wind farms can negatively affect the value of property by varying degrees.

66. I pause here to observe that much of the literature opened to the court by the defendant’s valuation expert, Mr. Corr, also suggests that mere proximity to a wind farm can impact property values– irrespective entirely of nuisance due to WTN or shadow flicker.

67. Ultimately, however, the professional experience of both Mr. O’Regan and Mr. Corr is that the recent and current buoyancy of the Irish property market is sufficient to neutralise the potential negative impact of the mere presence of a wind turbine. I expect that this may also be due to the fact that the imperatives of climate change have also brought about a more positive attitude towards renewable energy sources, including wind farms. Regardless of the cause, the valuers’ joint experience is that, absent nuisance, one would not presently expect property values to be impacted by the mere presence of a wind turbine. As the experts are unanimous in this view, I will accept it to be correct.

68. By contrast, both valuers are agreed that WTN nuisance and/or shadow flicker nuisance will negatively impact property values albeit to different degrees. In this respect, Mr. O’Regan’s view was that as of 2020, the open market value of HH as impacted by the WTN nuisance was €150,000. This would suggest a reduction in value associated with the WTN nuisance at €120,000 or 44%.

69. In May 2025, Mr. O’Regan prepared a second report in respect of HH. As of that date, he valued HH with a turbine present but with no WTN nuisance at €400,000. Mr. Corr agrees with this valuation but not with Mr. O’Regan’s view that the present value of HH as impacted by the WTN nuisance is €275,000. This suggests a discount for WTN nuisance of €125,000 or 31%.

70. As regards stigma damages, Mr. O’Regan’s May 2025 report opines that should the WTN nuisance be fully abated by this court’s injunction, the open market value of HH will nonetheless be reduced to a figure in the order of €300,000 i.e. a loss in value of €100,000 or 25%.

71. In Mr. O’Regan’s view, any potential purchaser of HH would need to be informed of the contentious court proceedings against the neighbouring wind farm operator and of the specifics of the court’s injunction restricting the nearby turbine. I interpret him as contending that this would limit the pool of potential purchasers in three ways. First, a potential purchaser would be concerned that the court’s order may not be effective in abating the WTN nuisance. There would be a lingering apprehension that WTN would remain an issue impacting the amenity of the property. Second, a potential purchaser would fear that the defendant may not wholeheartedly comply with this court’s injunction. They would worry that this would lead to dispute with the neighbouring wind farm and that they might be exposed to the inconvenience and legal costs associated with future enforcement proceedings. Thirdly, a potential purchaser would also be deterred by the fact that to be effective, the court order abating the nuisance must contemplate ongoing engagement as between the owners or occupiers of HH and the defendant. An effective court order will involve the owners or occupiers of HH in retaining appropriate experts to verify the effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendant in response to this court’s order.

72. Mr. O’Regan accepted that there was no literature or piece of research which studies stigma damages after the abatement of WTN nuisance by order of a court. Although the defendant criticises him for this, I do not. Given the uniqueness of this scenario, it would be surprising if such literature existed.

73. Although not addressed in his direct oral evidence, Mr. O’Regan’s opinion as to the impact of the WTN on the valuation of NF is advanced in a report dated 17th June 2020. Thus, in June 2020, Mr. O’Regan viewed the current market value of NF absent the WTN nuisance as €325,000. In his opinion the WTN nuisance reduced the open market value of NF as of that time to €200,000. This represented a €125,000 discount in value or approximately 38.5%.

74. Under cross examination, Mr. O’Regan accepted that, in reaching his opinions on the likely open market value of HH and NF with and without the WTN nuisance (or, in respect of HH the ongoing stigma damages) he had not been able to locate any directly comparable properties (“comparables”) which were similarly impacted to support his opinion. He also accepted that he had not reviewed the relevant literature in his report. He acknowledged that his assessment of the impact of the WTN on the value of the properties was essentially based on a “hunch” or a “gut” instinct.

75. Under cross examination, Mr. O’Regan was asked whether he had had regard to Ms. McGinn’s evidence as to the ongoing impact of the WTN on her enjoyment of NF. It will be recalled that Ms. McGinn did not complain of very significant ongoing impact. In Mr. O’Regan’s view, Ms.

McGinn purchased NF for a very good price which will impact her attitude to the turbine. Overall Mr. O’Regan’s view remained that, whilst it is possible to sell properties impacted by WTN nuisance, it is nonetheless extremely difficult to do so.

76. Mr. O’Regan’s high estimation of the likely reduction in value of both HH and NF as a result of the WTN is undermined by the ultimate sale price received for NF in August 2021. Thus, in June 2020, Mr. O’Regan estimated that if sold, NF would command a sale price of no more than €200,000. Ultimately, it achieved €295,000, albeit over a year later in August 2021. The valuers are agreed that house price inflation in the South East of Ireland over the 14 month period ending in August 2021 was 16%. This would mean that Mr. O’Regan’s 2020 estimate can be increased by 16% to €232,000. Even allowing for this increase however, Mr. O’Regan’s estimated devaluation in market value by reason of the WTN nuisance was wide of the mark. Indeed, as will become apparent, Mr. O’Regan’s estimated devaluation of 38.5% is over double that which I find is likely to have pertained at NF (15% approximately, see para 173 below). In fairness, I ought also point out that Mr. Corr’s estimated devaluation of 7% is also wide of the mark, coming in at only half of that which I find ultimately pertained.

Mr. Alan Fitzgerald

77. Mr. Fitzgerald is a loss adjusting expert specialising in claims pertaining to properties damaged by flooding, fire and other contingencies. The purpose of Mr. Fitzgerald’s report was to calculate the full reinstatement cost of HH on a “new for old basis”. The defendant did not call a loss adjuster.

78. Mr. Fitzgerald’s opinion is that the full reinstatement cost of HH is €1,009,260, plus €45,400 per annum for rental accommodation whilst the new property is being built, together with the costs of moving the house contents.

79. This sum is significantly greater than the agreed full market value of the HH, absent WTN nuisance. Of course, it is also significantly greater than the diminution in value which Mr. O’ Regan contends flows from the WTN nuisance, or ongoing stigma damages (€120,000 and €100,000, respectively).

80. Mr. Fitzgerald’s opinion is that an award of full reinstatement costs is nonetheless merited.

If Mr. Rollo recovers only the diminution in value of HH, he would be forced to buy a house significantly less appealing than that in which he lived before, which would not represent restitutio in integrum.

81. Mr. Fitzgerald observed that home insurance policies, of which he has extensive experience, provide for a full reinstatement and permit the insured to rebuild on a new for old basis without any deduction for wear and tear. Betterment is therefore permissible subject to the adequacy of the sum insured. In any event, Mr. Fitzgerald did not believe that the difference between a house of similar proportions to HH on a new for old basis would result in any measurable betterment.

82. On the other hand, Mr. Fitzgerald conceded that the present case was unusual, both because there was no physical damage to the property and because reinstatement was sought, not of the original property, but of an identical property on a green field site.

Mr. Tom Corr

83. Mr. Corr is a chartered valuation surveyor. He is a fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and an associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. Mr. Corr has over 40 years’ experience in property valuation. For the past 25 years, Mr. Corr has focussed on property valuations and on compulsory purchase cases requiring assessment of injurious affection (devaluation) to dwelling houses from various types of infrastructure including road schemes, pipeline easements, rail schemes and so on.

84. Mr. Corr was initially engaged by the defendant to assess the June 2022 market value of HH and NF with and without the Ballyduff wind farm. Mr. Corr’s opinion is informed by three factors:

first, his site visit to and the inspection of the subject properties in May 2022 together with a further “driveby inspection” conducted in 2025; second, the sale prices achieved for comparable properties which were then adjusted to take account of the specific attributes of the subject properties; and third, what he terms “scientific research” (as to which see below).

85. As of June 2022, Mr. Corr valued HH at €390,000 in the absence of the wind farm and at €365,000 with the wind farm fully operational. This comprised a €25,000 discount in capital valuation attributable to the wind farm, a discount of 6.5%.

86. Mr. Corr was re-engaged in June 2025 to assess the market value of HH under the following three scenarios (a) the market value of HH with the wind farm operating as present; (b) the market value of HH on the assumption that the wind farm was operational but did not pose any WTN nuisance; and (c) the market value of HH on the assumption that the wind farm did not exist at all.

87. On scenario (a), Mr. Corr’s view is that the June 2025 open market value of HH (impacted by the WTN nuisance as found by this court), is €375,000. Indeed, he states that, based on the “scientific research”, this figure could well be higher and closer to €400,000. This potential devaluation of €25,000 is the maximum likely figure; in the current strong housing market, there may in fact be no impact on the market value at all.

88. Mr. Corr proposes scenario (b), in which the wind farm is operational but does not pose any WTN nuisance, as equivalent to Mr. O’Regan’s stigma damages scenario. His opinion is that the open market value of HH on scenarios (b) and (c) is in the same: €400,000 as of June 2025. On scenario (b), any negative impact on the valuation of HH would be completely eliminated by the abatement of the WTN nuisance by court order. There would be no residual impact on the market value of HH.

89. Mr. Corr was also instructed in June 2022 to report on the valuation of NF and visited the house for that purpose. This inspection took place during the day and there was a “fair wind”.

Mr. Corr described the WTN - a vroomph noiseas intermittent and “actually quite loud”.

90. As of June 2022, Mr. Corr estimated the open market value of NF in the absence of the wind farm WTN as €360,000. Allowing for the presence of the wind farm as presently operating, the open market value at that time was estimated to be €335,000. This comprised a €25,000 discount in capital valuation attributable to the WTN, a discount of 7%. Mr. Corr attributed this comparatively low reduction in valuation to the strength of the property market at the time of the sale of NF.

91. In his updated valuation report of June 2025, Mr. Corr states that the actual market value of NF with the wind farm fully operational as it presently is (equivalent to scenario (a) above), was crystallised on 12th August 2021, when the property was sold for €295,000. His opinion is that, taking account of the presence of the wind farm but assuming that same did not pose any WTN nuisance (equivalent to scenario (b) above), the open market value of NF at that time was €318,000. This is the same as his valuation in the absence of any wind farm at all (equivalent to scenario (c) above). On either scenario the WTN nuisance produces a discount of 7%. As regards the delay and difficulty in selling NF, Mr. Corr did not view the fact that there had been eighteen viewings of NF and that six potential buyers put in no bid at all as unusual. He states that it would not be unusual for a rural property to take some time to sell, particularly one located near a wind farm.

Mr. Corr’s comparables

92. Mr. Corr uses essentially the same comparables in respect of both HH and NF. However, the primary focus is NF, as this property was sold at a time when the WTN was ongoing (whereas, the devaluation claim in relation to HH is now necessarily limited to stigma damages).

93. Mr. Corr advances 7 different comparables. Comparables 1, 2 and 3 are intended to demonstrate that proximity to the Ballyduff turbines has no appreciable effect on the market value of either HH or NF. Comparables 4, 5, 6 and 7 are primarily intended to support the estimated open market value of NF absent the turbine, at the time of its sale in August 2021, which as I say Mr. Corr puts at €318,000.

94. I will examine these comparables in a little more detail.

95. Comparables 1, 2 and 3 are 700 metres, 2 km and 1.9 km respectively from the nearest Ballyduff turbine.

96. Mr. Corr relies upon the fact that, although comparable 1 is located relatively close to the Ballyduff turbines, it sold for €475,000 in August 2024. Mr. Corr states that this sale price, when compared to comparables 2 and 3 indicates that proximity to the Ballyduff wind turbines had no impact on the value of comparable 1 (or, inferentially on the value of NF (or HH)).

97. The difficulty with this, however, is that comparable 1 on the one hand, and comparables 2 and 3 on the other, are not truly comparable. Comparable 1 is a significantly larger house than comparables 2 and 3. It has an additional bedroom and is situated on a larger site. Therefore, the mere fact that comparable 1 achieved a sale price significantly in excess of comparables 2 and 3 tells us very little about the likely value of comparable 1 were it not for the proximity of the Ballyduff turbine.

98. More particularly, this exercise tells us very little about the impact of the WTN on NF (or HH). Comparable 1 is located 700 metres from the turbine. This is a far greater distance than that as between NF and T2. Indeed, it is also a greater distance than that as between NF and T1, the further of the two Ballyduff turbines. It was never contended that T1 gives rise to WTN nuisance at NF (or HH). There is equally no suggestion that the Ballyduff turbines give rise to a

WTN nuisance at comparable 1. One cannot therefore deploy the open market value of comparable 1 to assess the impact of WTN nuisance on the open market value of NF (or HH).

99. The sale prices achieved for comparables 1, 2 and 3 in 2024 and 2025 are of little assistance in assessing the likely market value of NF at the time of its sale in August 2021. Mr. Corr therefore relies on comparables 4, 5, 6 and 7 which sold between early 2021 and mid-2022.

100. Mr. Corr conceded that it is very difficult to find two houses which are truly comparable unless they are located in the same housing estate. In rural Ireland, where one is dealing with one off houses built to spec, true comparability is extremely elusive.

101. Comparable 4 sold for €395,000 in March 2022. Mr. Corr’s report states that comparable 4 is more valuable than NF for a number of reasons including its superior location, its larger site and its level ground. There is surely little purpose in putting a comparable before a court and then arguing that it is not in fact comparable to the subject property which ought therefore attract a lower value than the comparable tendered. In any event, comparable 4, which was built in 1995 is a much older property than NF which was constructed in 2004; its square footage is also less than that of NF. Furthermore, Mr. Shorten’s evidence was that Mr. Corr had underestimated the internal square footage of NF by omitting the attic bedroom. This issue was not addressed at all in Mr. Corr’s oral evidence. If Comparable 4 is accepted as a comparable, then even allowing for a “dialling back” of the sale price to August 2021, this would still suggest that the open market value of NF (absent the WTN nuisance) was considerably higher than Mr.

Corr’s estimate of €318,000. Comparable 5 sold for €339,000 in February 2021. Mr. Corr states that the location of this property is also superior to that of NF and that its square footage is larger. Subject to Mr. Shorten’s point that Mr. Corr has underestimated the internal square footage of NF, this may well be correct. However, comparable 5 is on a smaller site than NF and it is also a considerably older property. If comparable 5 is accepted as a comparable to NF, this would also suggest an August 2021 open market valuation of NF above that estimated.

Comparable 6, which sold for €325,000 in June 2022 is a smaller house than NF on a smaller site, although it was constructed more recently in 2017. Comparable 7 which sold in June 2022 for €340,000 is also smaller than NF but is said to be in a superior location because it is less remote. Overall, there is little insight to be gained from the sale prices of these two disparate comparables in June, 2022 (€325,000 and €340,000 respectively).

102. In summary, although it is of course good practice to have regard to valid comparables, I do not believe that it has been adequately demonstrated that any of the properties tendered are in fact comparable to NF.

Mr. Corr’s scientific research

103. Mr. Corr estimates that the WTN nuisance as found by the court, reduces the open market value of HH and NF by between 6.5 and 7%. He maintains that his opinion is supported by what he called “the scientific research”, which comprises both Irish and international studies on the impact of wind farms on property values.

104. The first of these is a North American book by Bond, Sims and Dent, “Towers, Turbines and Transmission Lines” (Blackwell 2013), which concludes that there is no significant evidence that the value of properties is affected by the mere proximity of wind turbines. That premise does not cover the factual situation here. The plaintiffs do not argue that the sale price of NF was impacted by the “mere presence of the turbine” but by the WTN nuisance associated therewith. In any event, the definition of close proximity to a turbine used in this study (i.e. within two kilometres of a turbine) encompasses properties significantly further away than NF and HH are from T2. Further the authors qualify their conclusion, stating that any impact will depend on the nature of the property, its location and the overall value attributable to either the vista or the area.

105. The second paper relied upon by Mr. Corr is a paper by Hoen, et al. published in December 2009, “The Impact of Wind Power Projects on Residential Property Values in the United States”. This is based on data comprising 7,500 sales of single family homes situated within ten miles of existing wind facilities and concludes that there is no conclusive evidence of widespread property value impacts. The distance between the properties examined and the turbines in this data set is entirely distinguishable from the present circumstances.

106. The third study relied on is Brunner, et al. “Commercial Wind Turbines and Residential Home Values: New Evidence from the Universe of Land-Based Wind Projects in the United States” published in 2023, which examines data from house sales between 2005 and 2020. The study finds that, on average, the value of homes within one mile of proposed wind farms experienced a decline of approximately 11% following the announcement of a new commercial wind energy project, relative to counterfactual homes located three to five miles away. Once again the study is concerned with the impact of the mere presence of wind farms rather than with the impact of either potential or established WTN nuisance. Mr. Corr also accepts that, due to its large land mass, the North American housing market is distinguishable from its European counterparts. In North America, purchasers who are sensitive to wind farms simply do not buy property in their vicinity and capital values are not impacted in the manner that might occur in a comparatively smaller country with a comparatively smaller potential market such as Ireland.

107. Mr. Corr emphasises that the Brunner study found that the negative impact on market values diminished considerably over time; by nine years after project announcement it was statistically insignificant. This is consistent with other research which also finds price impact at its highest in the planning and construction phases of wind farms. This is quite logical. Planning permission for wind farms, at least in this country, are time limited and one would expect any negative impact on property values to decay over time. Furthermore, I have no difficulty accepting Mr. Corr’s view that the negative effect on valuations is associated with increased community awareness at the time of the grant of permission for the relevant wind farm. However, in the present case, NF was sold during the currency of WTN nuisance litigation which is likely to have focussed community awareness. In addition it is unfortunately inevitable that the litigation itself will, as it were, refresh such community and market awareness in so far as concerns the potential sale of HH in the future.

108. Third, Mr. Corr relies on a large scale data analysis published by Guo, et al. in 2024, on foot of data from more than 300 million home sales and 60,000 wind turbines in the US between 1997 and 2020. A drop of only 1.12% in home values within view of a wind turbine was found and this devaluation was no longer detectable by the end of the 20 years. This study had no relevance as it is concerned only with visibility of turbines and not with WTN nuisance.

109. Fourth, Mr. Corr refers to a study published by the Centre for Economics and Business Research carried out in the United Kingdom in 2014, which finds no negative impact on house values from wind farms across seven sites in England and Wales. This, however, is contradicted by a fifth study, Gibbons, ‘Gone with the wind: valuing the local impacts of wind turbines through house prices’ (London School of Economics, 2014) which finds that impact on market value varies with proximity. Properties within two kilometres of larger wind farms suffered a price reduction of 12%.

110. The most relevant paper identified by Mr. Corr, Gillespie and McHale, “Wind Turbines and House Prices Along the West of Ireland” (University College Galway, 2023), presents data collected on foot of the impact of wind farms on house prices in seven counties along the western and southern coast of Ireland in the years 2016 to 2021. Gillespie finds a robust and significant reduction in value of 14.7% in the house prices for properties within one kilometre of a turbine. It also found that the effect increases with turbine height, the number of turbines and the level of urban influence. It notes that, despite the benefits associated with wind energy, wind turbines impose undesirable externalities on residents mainly through aural and visual pollution and are often fiercely opposed at a local level. Gillespie further observes that the negative effects of turbines, which are highly localised, are not appropriately distributed among the population benefitting from renewable energy.

111. Gillespie uses proximity alone as a proxy for any negative effects of the wind farm. It is clear that the authors had no access to WTN information as pertained to any of the properties in its cohort. One is therefore left to assume that the average 14.7% includes many properties where WTN is not intrusive and, presumably, some properties where it is intrusive or may even amount to WTN nuisance. There is however no breakdown as between these categories.

112. Mr. Corr emphasises that the methodology set out in the Gillespie paper is objective and robust. Notwithstanding this, neither Mr. Corr nor Mr. O’Regan appear to agree with its finding that mere proximity to a turbine will negatively impact property values. They agree that, at least in recent times, the buoyancy of the Irish property market is sufficient to neutralise the potential negative impact of the mere presence of a wind turbine. As stated above, I would expect that society’s more positive attitude towards renewable energy developments may also be a factor here. In 2025, a potential purchaser may not view mere proximity to a wind farm in the same negative light as they would have done in for example, 2016.

113. Gillespie concludes that its findings are consistent with existing European studies finding significant negative price impacts on residences near turbines. Most of these studies correlate distance to turbines with both noise and visual disturbance and ultimately recommend that turbines are placed in highly remote areas to minimise impacts on residents. These European studies find that house prices remain significantly low -reduced by between 2% and 25% - within two kilometres of turbines for up to eight years post construction. Price effects are greatest at close proximity to turbines and increase non linearly as distance increases, culminating in insignificant effects beyond four kilometres.

114. Mr. Corr emphasised that Gillespie also notes that the price impact decays over time, becoming insignificant after ten years.

115. Mr. Corr’s overall view is that, notwithstanding the findings of the Gillespie paper showing a 14.7% reduction in house valuation for properties within one kilometre of a turbine, the value of the properties in issue here, were reduced by only half that figure- 6 to 7%, even in the presence of WTN nuisance. Why precisely this should be is not explained. The subject properties in the Gillespie study, were located within one kilometre of a turbine. HH and NF are substantially closer: they are located within approximately 350 metres of a turbine. Furthermore, the impact of the turbines on the valuation of HH and NF in this case arises not merely from mere proximity, but also from a complaint of WTN nuisance which, incidentally, has been found by the court to be substantiated.

Material not considered by Mr. Corr

116. Mr. Corr stated that he did not read this court's principal judgment prior to preparing his report and had considered only the module 2 judgment. Nor did he familiarise himself with the evidence of the plaintiffs or their acoustic experts as to the impact of the Ballyduff WTN as he apparently only “scanned” these transcripts. By contrast, Mr. Corr placed considerable emphasis on the evidence of Ms. McGinn.

117. In giving evidence for the defendant wind farm in Byrne, Mr. Corr’s opinion as to the impact of the WTN on the capital value of the plaintiffs’ home changed dramatically, increasing seventeenfold from 1% to 20% (albeit that 2% of this was attributable to the visual impact about which no complaint was made). Quinn J. sets out Mr. Corr’s explanation for this as follows:

prior to giving evidence he had been sent the plaintiffs’ witness statements and transcripts and the transcripts of plaintiffs’ primary acoustic expert, Mr. Stigwood. Mr. Corr explained to Quinn

J. that having read this material his view had completely changed because the case was an “outlier”.

118. Given Mr. Corr’s experience in the Byrne litigation, it is unsatisfactory that he failed to carefully read the statements and transcripts of the evidence of the plaintiffs and their acoustic experts in this case and that he has only a passing acquaintance with this court’s judgment. This court has found that the WTN in this case causes an objectively unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property and with its amenity. Mr. Corr has failed to take this properly into account.

119. Instead, Mr. Corr prefers to base his valuations on comparables which are not in my view comparable and on “scientific” research, the most relevant of which finds that mere proximity to a wind farm reduces property values by 14.7%, even in the absence of WTN nuisance. Mr. Corr’s expressed opinion is that that such statistical analysis of actual sales data is a more accurate and useful indicator of price impacts than an analysis based only on the personal opinion of valuers and agents (such as Mr. O’Regan and himself). As such, he should have explained how it has informed his analysis here.

120. Mr. Corr acknowledges that there are multiple variables that feed in to the price that purchasers are prepared to pay for a particular property including location, size of the house, site area, house condition, landscaping, BER, etc. Whether or not there is a wind farm close to the subject property is only one of these variables. This is of course correct. However, whether this wind farm causes WTN nuisance at the subject property is surely an exceptionally important variable. Moreover, whether the abatement of this WTN nuisance requires ongoing engagement and verification is also likely to be an important variable.

APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE

General damages and Mr. Rollo’s accommodation claims

121. I will not repeat the evidence already summarised in this court's principal judgment as to the impact of the WTN on the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their properties. In short, the WTN gives rise to a serious adverse noise impact exceeding reasonable tolerability by a substantial margin. The enjoyment of the plaintiffs’ homes, as places of rest and relaxation, has been substantially interfered with by annoying, distracting, unpredictable and intrusive noise, as well as vibration and a sense of pressure emanating from T2. The erratic and unpredictable amplitude modulation, thumping, vibration and low frequency pressure is disturbing, distracting and distressing both externally and internally, particularly at night, in the early mornings and at sensitive times of the day. The plaintiffs have no control over their own sound environment. They have no ability to simply be quiet in their homes, despite their secluded rural locations. There is no real respite from the noise open to the plaintiffs. The interference caused all four plaintiffs to experience serious and frequent sleep disturbance with all that that entails. The WTN and the exhaustion caused by lack of sleep interfered with the plaintiffs’ ordinary ability to concentrate, read and at times, to work. In addition, the plaintiffs were deprived of the enjoyment of their gardens as places to rest, relax and cultivate. The level of interference was objectively supported by the plaintiffs’ expert acousticians, the material in their reports and the recorded sound data.

I accept that, particularly during sensitive periods, the nature of the interference was extreme and well beyond what an objectively reasonable person should have to put up with in the circumstances of the case. The behaviour and response of the plaintiffs to the WTN was in general that of objectively reasonable and patient people and the general response from the defendant was, in my view, exceedingly poor.

122. At the court’s request in the present case, both parties made submissions on the appropriate level of general damages. All parties agree that the law in relation to the assessment of general damages in cases of this nature is as stated by Quinn J. in Byrne. However, each party seeks to argue that, in certain respects, the annual damages award made in that case is not applicable here.

123. The plaintiffs propose general damages for Ms. Webster of €30,000 per annum for the period since the wind turbines commenced operation, continuing until this court’s order takes effect. Damages for Mr. Rollo are proposed at €50,000 per annum up to March 2021, when he was obliged to leave his home and €20,000 per annum for the period since March 2021. Damages for Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty were proposed at €25,000 each per annum for the period up to August 2021 when they sold NF.

124. The plaintiffs relied upon the following features as supporting a higher damages award in this case than in Byrne.

125. First, it is said that in contrast to Byrne, three out of the four plaintiffs before me have been forced to leave their homes as a result of the unremitting WTN.

126. Mr. Rollo could find no escape from the WTN anywhere in his house and suffered sleep disturbance, mental distress and depression which, he argues, ultimately forced him to leave HH in March 2021. The plaintiffs emphasise that, prior to this, Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo had been partners for life. When they bought HH in July 2015 they believed that they had found their “home for life” and had planned to start a family together. The couple had been trying to conceive since 2014 and had also discussed fostering or adoption. All of these plans were ruined because the couple were deprived of the healthy and comfortable enjoyment of their home and suffered distress and discomfort in their home with no way of controlling their environment. It is argued that the WTN nuisance arrived for Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo at a crucial time in their lives and at a crucial age period, with the result that even when these proceedings are resolved, the consequences of the damage caused by the defendant will remain with both plaintiffs indefinitely.

127. Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty built their home, NF in 2004 and a studio was added for Ms. Carty’s graphic design interests. They too considered that they had found “the home of their dreams in a beautiful setting.” It was a place full of their treasured memories to which they escaped from Dublin, where they enjoyed hosting friends and family and to which they intended to retire. Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty were unable to tolerate the WTN experienced indoors and in their garden. After the Ballyduff turbines became operational, Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty found visiting NF frustrating and upsetting. Ms. Carty, in particular, found that she was unable to bring herself to spend time at the house any more. The plaintiffs argue that, because they had lost the peaceful calm and amenity of NF, Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty considered they had no option but to sell. After a protracted and disappointing process, the sale closed in August 2021, at a figure that the plaintiffs contend represents a very substantial undervaluation.

128. It is therefore argued that what distinguishes the present case is that, unlike the plaintiffs in Byrne, the lives of both couples have been fundamentally altered and irrevocably damaged by the noise nuisance. Essentially, therefore the plaintiffs argue that quantum ought to reflect that this case is more serious than Byrne.

129. In response to these arguments, the defendant submits that, as the court has already determined that the psychiatric injury suffered by Mr. Rollo was not reasonably foreseeable, he is not entitled - as a matter of law - to be compensated for either that injury or its subsequent consequences. It is also argued that the evidence given by the plaintiffs does not support the proposition that Mr. Rollo was forced to leave HH as a result of the WTN. Rather, the defendant submits that the reason Mr. Rollo departed HH in March 2021, was because his relationship with Ms. Webster had by that stage ended. The defendant therefore submits that the Webster Rollos are not entitled to be compensated on the basis that the WTN was so extreme as to drive Mr. Rollo from the house and to ruin the couple’s relationship. For the same reason, the defendant argues that Mr. Rollo is not entitled to recover general damages after he left HH. Nor, it is said, is he entitled to recover rental payments from March 2021 to date, as he would have incurred this expenditure in any event consequent upon his separation from Ms. Webster.

130. Insofar as concerns the Carty Shortens, the defendant submits that the evidence demonstrates that the Carty Shortens had already decided to sell NF before the Ballyduff wind farm commenced operation. The sale is therefore for reasons entirely unrelated to the WTN nuisance. I accept that the defendant’s interpretation of this aspect of the evidence is correct.

131. As such, the defendant argues that the four plaintiffs are not entitled to be compensated on the basis that the WTN forced them to leave their home. The defendant also argues that, for a number of reasons, the interference with the plaintiffs’ reasonable amenity in this case is less than that which pertained in Byrne.

132. First, in Byrne the plaintiffs experienced WTN from three different turbines and from the interaction between the sounds emanating from each. In this case, only one turbine is implicated which the defendant argues attracts lesser damages. I am not attracted to this argument. What the court ought focus upon in assessing general damages is the nature and characteristics of the WTN itself and on the interference occasioned thereby from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person. I acknowledge that the interaction of the three turbines in Byrne added a particular feature whereby the sound waves overlapped, but did not synchronise, drawing attention to the WTN. I appreciate that this particular feature is not replicated here. However, the Ballyduff WTN nonetheless has multiple attention drawing features such as impulsivity (sudden changes in sound level), erraticism (with no clear periodicity or rhythm, exhibiting spikes and double spikes of AM) and variability/intermittency (when AM disappears and returns again). I found that these features, which are particularly evident in light of the high AM values displayed, mean that the WTN lacks any pattern to which one could acclimatise and therefore impacts coping mechanisms. What precise scientific factors give rise to these featuresand whether they are attributable to the WTN of one turbine or the interaction in the WTN of three turbinesis not particularly pertinent at this stage of the inquiry. Irrespective of whether it is caused by one or by three turbines, the noise is the noise and the impact is the impact. In this case, I have found the impact to be unacceptable.

133. Second, the defendant argues that in Byrne there were three elements to the WTN nuisance: amplitude modulation, low frequency noise and a tonal droning noise. In this case, however, only the first two elements are present and there is no complaint of tonal noise. This statement is correct so far as it goes. However, my analysis of this issue would be similar to that just outlined. Whether or not the noise is intolerable by reference to each of the same three factors as pertained in Byrne is not of primary importance. The key point is that, in both cases, the court has found that the noise is intolerable and represents an objectively unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs’ amenity and enjoyment of their homes. The reasons for this finding will differ from case to case just as the features of the WTN will differ. Although tonal noise was not a feature complained of by the plaintiffs in the present case, this does not in itself mean that the Ballyduff WTN is less intrusive than the WTN in Byrne. Other features may be more prevalent in the present case than in Byrne. For example, my reading of the judgment in Byrne suggests that the unsettling and physiologically distressing sense of vibration and pressure emanating from the turbines in this case is a more prominent feature of the WTN than was the case in Byrne. In the present case, all four plaintiffs vividly describe how their houses vibrate with the WTN, which appears to reverberate through the walls and ceilings.

134. The defendant’s third argument is that in Byrne, the defendant admitted that the turbines caused a nuisance to the plaintiffs 24 hours a day, seven days a week. By contrast, in the present case, the court has found that whilst the turbine noise is liable to annoy at other times of the day, it can reasonably be tolerated or masked during working hours. The WTN in this case only gives rise to actionable, compensable nuisance during night hours and during quiet waking hours. This point has some force. On the other hand, it is important to note that in Byrne, Mr. Byrne generally worked away from home over much of the period of operation of the turbines.8 As a result, any compensation payable to him was generally in respect of his exposure to the nuisance when he was at home in the evenings, nights and weekends - effectively at sensitive periodsrather than on a 24 hour basis. This factor cannot, in itself, therefore, justify awarding a lesser sum to Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo than was awarded to Mr. Byrne.

135. The defendant appears to acknowledge this in proposing general damages for Ms.

Webster in the amount of €10,000 per annum from February 2017 to the date of cessation of the nuisance. General damages for Mr. Rollo are also proposed at €10,000 per annum from February 2017 up to the date he left HH in March 2021. General damages for Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty are proposed at €5,000 per annum from February 2017 to the date they sold NF in August 2021.

136. In Byrne, Quinn J. emphasised that the measure of damages should be fair and reasonable to both sides and proportionate to the wrong sustained and to the general approach of the courts to awards in analogous cases. There is no doubt that Byrne is an analogous case, and I accept entirely its precedential value, as do the plaintiffs and the defendant in this case.

This inexorably means that this court should award general damages which are proportionate with, but not necessarily identical to, the awards made in that case.

Ms. Webster

137. For reasons explained at paras 140 to 144 below, I conclude that Ms. Webster is not legally entitled to general damages for the breakdown of her relationship with Mr. Rollo. Leaving that issue aside, as I must, I view the impact of the WTN upon Ms. Webster as broadly comparable to the impact of the WTN on the first named plaintiff in Byrne. Taking this into account, I award Ms. Webster general damages in the amount of €10,000 per annum from 2017 to the date of cessation of the nuisance. This amounts to approximately €87,500 from 1st February 2017 to the date of this judgment.

Mr. Rollo

138. Mr. Rollo’s claim to general and special damages is complex and requires detailed analysis. As is evident from my principal judgment, I accept that Mr. Rollo sustained a recognisable psychiatric injury as a result of the WTN. I have no difficulty accepting that this put significant pressure on his relationship with Ms. Webster. I also further accept that the serious deterioration in Mr. Rollo’s mental health in December 2020 was in response to the WTN and that as a result of this serious deterioration, Mr. Rollo urgently needed to leave HH.

In Byrne, the turbines commenced operation in 2013. Mr Byrne generally worked away from home save for the period after his retirement from the Law Reform Commission in 2021.

139. However, for reasons already outlined, I am not satisfied that Mr. Rollo’s psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable such as to impose liability on the defendant for this chain of events. In any event, the evidence establishes that, because of the prior breakdown of his relationship, it was inevitable that either he or Ms. Webster would, in due course, have to move out of HH. This explains why, despite the cessation of the nuisance, Mr. Rollo cannot, and will not, return to HH. As such, the breakdown of the relationship between Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo is the primary cause of Mr. Rollo leaving HH9 (and of his ongoing future inability to return even after the WTN nuisance is abated). Therefore, Mr. Rollo (and Ms. Webster) could only recover general damages reflecting the breakdown of the relationship, and its downstream consequences (including Mr. Rollo’s accommodation requirements), if they establish both that the WTN “factually” caused the breakdown of the relationship and also that this breakdown was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the WTN nuisance.

140. I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the breakdown of the relationship between Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo, which is the cause of Mr. Rollo leaving HH, was caused by the WTN. Although I accept that both the WTN and Mr. Rollo’s resulting psychiatric illness put the relationship under significant strain, I cannot be satisfied that, but for these factors, Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo would have remained together and would remain together in the future. It is impossible to attribute the breakdown of a relationship between two people to a single cause. On the contrary, there are invariably a myriad of factors at play.

141. Even if I am incorrect in this and the WTN is the factual cause of the breakdown of this relationship, for reasons I now explain, I am nonetheless of the view that such an event was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.

142. My principal judgment references the relevant World Health Organisation guidance in relation to WTN, namely the Environmental Noise Guidelines for the European Region (“WHO ENGER 2018”).10 WHO ENGER 2018 states that evidence on health effects from WTN (apart from annoyance) is either absent or rated as “low” or “very low” quality. One would expect wind turbine operators to be aware of this. This specific aspect of WHO ENGER 2018 is also quite extensively referenced in the Irish Draft Revised Wind Energy Development Guidelines 2019, of which one would also expect Irish wind turbine operators to be aware. None of the scientific evidence cited to me in module 1 established a link between WTN and severe mental health consequences such as those suffered by Mr. Rollo. In light of this, there was no evidential basis to support a finding that a wind turbine operator in the position of the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that Mr. Rollo would suffer a recognisable psychiatric injury as a result of the WTN. Therefore, even if it were established that, Mr. Rollo’s psychiatric illness was the factual cause of the relationship breakdown, foreseeability is not established.

143. Leaving aside Mr. Rollo’s psychiatric illness, one searches in vain in the literature for any suggestion of a link between WTN and family or relationship disharmony. Although WHO ENGER 2018 is an extremely detailed document discussing a wide range of reported and potential

Albeit that the urgency of his departure - in terms of its timing - was accelerated by his acute psychiatric deterioration in December 2020.

WHO ENGER 2018 sets out a conditional recommendation for WTN levels. In my principal judgment, I concluded that there was insufficient evidence to test the WTN in issue here against this conditional recommendation.

WTN impacts, it contains no suggestion that WTN is associated with family or relationship disharmony. Nor is there any such suggestion in the multitude of studies, guidance documents and peer reviewed literature opened to this court in any of the three modules of this hearing.

There is therefore no evidential basis to support a finding that a wind turbine operator in the position of the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that the Webster Rollo relationship would come to an end as a result of the WTN

144. This compels me to four conclusions: first, Ms. Webster and Mr. Rollo are not legally entitled to general damages reflecting the very sad breakdown of their relationship; second, Mr.

Rollo is only legally entitled to general damages during the period of his occupation of HH, but not after he left in March 2021. Third, Mr. Rollo is not legally entitled to recover the rental payments which he has expended since he left HH in March 2021. Fourth, Mr. Rollo is also not legally entitled to recover the cost of future alternative accommodation on either of the bases tendered.

145. In assessing Mr. Rollo’s general damages for the period of his occupation of HH between February 2017 and March 2021, I have had regard to the fact that the WTN caused Mr.

Rollo to suffer profound sleep disturbance. Critically, this exhaustion continued to impact upon him on a 24/7 basis even when he was away from HH. Thus, Mr. Rollo’s levels of exhaustion adversely impacted his concentration and mood, making it difficult and, eventually, dangerous for him to work at heights. The relentlessness of the WTN and his inability to control, prevent, ameliorate or escape it, particularly at night, caused Mr. Rollo to suffer irritability, frustration, helplessness and despair, which impacted almost every aspect of his daily life. All of these reactions were those of an objectively reasonable person in the circumstances of Mr. Rollo.

Likewise, all of this was, in my view, an entirely foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s nuisance.

146. These foreseeable impacts of the WTN are to be distinguished from the recognisable psychiatric injury11 which Mr. Rollo later suffered as a result of the WTN. For reasons already explained, this psychiatric injury was not reasonably foreseeable and Mr. Rollo cannot be compensated for its additional impact. For the avoidance of doubt, as stated in my principal judgment, I am satisfied that Mr. Rollo did not fulfil the criteria for a psychiatric injury until midto-late 2020. Up to that point in time, Mr. Rollo’s reaction to the turbine was within the band of a reasonable and foreseeable response and he is entitled to be fully compensated for its impact on his life.

147. It is indisputable that, even ignoring the psychiatric injury which he later developed, the foreseeable impact of the WTN on Mr. Rollo over this period (from commencement of the operation of the turbines until mid-to-late 2020) was more severe than the impact on any of the other plaintiffs in this case. It also seems to me that the WTN had a dramatically more negative impact on Mr. Rollo than on either of the two plaintiffs in Byrne. As such, I award Mr. Rollo compensation of €18,500 per annum from February 2017. As the psychiatric injury which Mr.

Rollo suffered in mid to late 2020 was unforeseeable, I award no uplift in general damages in that regard. Rather, I will continue general damages at the previously stated rate of €18,500 up

And from the consequences of that psychiatric injury.

to the date that Mr. Rollo left HH in March 2021. This amounts to approximately €77,000.00 between February 2017 and March 2021.

The Carty Shortens

148. NF was not a permanent residence of the Carty Shortens. This means that, even while they still owned NF these plaintiffs were less exposed to the WTN nuisance than the Webster Rollos and, it follows, less than the Byrne plaintiffs. The couple’s evidence is that prior to 2006 or 2007, they were at NF either every weekend or every alternative weekend and over holiday periods. As the defendant argues, because the couple found that they were spending less time at NF, they decided to place NF on the market in 2016 for reasons unconnected to the wind farm.

I will award general damages to both Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty somewhat below the level awarded to Ms. Webster at €7,500 per annum from February 2017 to August 2021. This amounts to approximately €34,000.00 each between 1st February 2017 and 10th August 2021.

Property devaluation

Preliminary remarks in respect of the property devaluation claims

149. The Gillespie study finds a 14.7% reduction in valuation as a result of mere proximity to a wind turbine (even leaving aside noise nuisance). As stated, this does not accord with the recent experience of either Mr. O’Regan or Mr. Corr. For the avoidance of doubt, I should state that even if this 14.7% devaluation were made out in a given case, absent nuisance, there would generally be no legal basis for recovery of damages for property devaluation arising from mere proximity of a wind farm. Presumably, the vast majority of wind farm developments in the State operate in a manner that does not give rise to nuisance; compensation cannot be awarded simply because a wind farm12 has been constructed nearby which has reduced the value of one’s home.

150. However, in the case of NF (and HH to date), it is common case13 that the defendant’s tortious acts in causing or permitting WTN nuisance caused property devaluation at the time of its sale. The question is not whether such property devaluation has occurred or is compensable; property devaluation has occurred and, as it is due to WTN nuisance it is clearly compensable.14 Rather, the question in the case of NF is what percentage property devaluation pertained at the time of its sale. The question in respect of HH is whether the property devaluation is likely to continue even after this court’s order abating the nuisance and, if so, in what percentage.

151. Ideally, the issues thus presenting would be resolved with the assistance of the evidence of independent valuers. In this case however, such evidence is scarce assistance.

152. I am wholly unconvinced by Mr. Corr’s evidence. For reasons already set out, the comparables advanced by Mr. Corr do not demonstrate anything of value in relation to this particular case. Mr. Corr presented the Gillespie paper and then propounded a 7% devaluation

Provided that the wind farm benefits from planning permission and operates in compliance with that permission.

For the purposes of the present module and subject of course to the defendant’s right of appeal on liability.

Subject once again to the defendant’s right of appeal on liability.

notwithstanding a court finding of persisting nuisance at the time of the sale of NF. Moreover, notwithstanding his assertion in the context of the Byrne proceedings that reading the plaintiffs'

evidence caused him to increase his valuations by a factor of 17, he failed to read the equivalent material in this case and failed to read this court’s principal judgment. These factors are sufficient to undermine the value of Mr. Corr’s opinion on the impact of the WTN on property valuation.

However, I am also concerned by the fact that Mr. Corr placed repeated and heavy emphasis on Ms. McGinn’s evidence and yet somehow failed to refer to a facet thereof which is particularly relevant to valuation: her clear statement that “the house itself is a house that I’d never have been able to afford only for the wind turbine being behind it.” Ms. McGinn therefore viewed herself as having secured a reduction in the NF purchase price by reason of the impact of the Ballyduff wind farm. It is well recognised that persons who believe they have obtained a financial benefit from a wind farm are less likely to be annoyed by WTN. Ms. McGinn is certainly in that category.

Mr. Corr’s heavy emphasis on her testimony to the exclusion of this factor and of other highly pertinent testimony, is striking. All of these unexplained omissions and inconsistencies cast doubt on Mr. Corr’s objectivity and independence as a witness. I therefore place comparatively little weight on his opinion on the likely valuation of NF in August 2021, in the absence of the WTN nuisance or on the claim to stigma damages in respect of HH.

153. Mr. O’Regan’s evidence as to the valuation of both NF and HH is not particularly impressive or well-reasoned. Mr. O’Regan's 2020 report does put forward some comparables, so his various valuations of NF at that time are not, as the defendant contends, reached in an absolute vacuum. Having said that, I accept that in many respects Mr. O’Regan’s opinions are, as counsel for the defendant fairly observed, no more than a gut feeling or hunch. On the other hand, the instinct of an estate agent as experienced as Mr. O’Regan is nonetheless of value to this court. I agree with Quinn J.’s assessment that, in comparison to Mr. Corr, Mr. O’Regan had substantially more experience of working in the residential property market and that his approach to valuation was more rooted in real life experiences of sales. Crucially, Mr. O’Regan's testimony is, at least, non-partisan.

Stigma damages in respect of HH

154. The plaintiff argues that HH will suffer a diminution in value irrespective of this court’s order, which ought to sound in stigma damages. The plaintiffs’ case is that a potential purchaser of HH would be concerned that the court’s order may not be effective in abating the WTN nuisance and that the defendant may not wholeheartedly comply with this court’s injunction.

They would also worry about the ongoing need to engage with the defendant and to retain experts to verify the effectiveness of the measures taken in response to this court’s order.

155. The defendant did not contend that, as a matter of legal principle, stigma damages cannot be awarded in this jurisdiction. Likewise, it did not contend, as a matter of legal principle, that a claim for damages cannot be made out in circumstances where it is established that a court order required to abate a nuisance will inexorably result in property devaluation. Aside from Byrne and Uren, the defendant has cited no authority to me on the legal issues arising in respect of this aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim. It relies on Byrne as establishing that it is not reasonable to award stigma damages when the WTN is to be fully abated by order of the court.

As I understand it, the defendant’s primary argument in respect of the stigma damages claim appears to be that I cannot be satisfied, as a matter of fact, that the value of HH will be impacted by the requirements of engagement and verification. I will first consider this argument before returning to consider the argument based on Byrne.

156. The defendant argues that Mr. O’Regan’s analysis proceeds on the factually (and legally) erroneous assumption that, regardless of the injunction, “there is going to be a nuisance in some shape or form.” It contends that this assumption ignores my ruling that the injunction will eliminate the nuisance fully. Likewise, the defendant argues that Mr. O’Regan’s analysis assumes that it will not comply with this court’s order. It states that there is no evidence that this will occur. Indeed, by letter dated 12th June 2025, the defendant specifically confirmed its intention to fully comply with the order of this court.

157. I should say that I did not understand Mr. O’Regan to argue that the WTN nuisance would necessarily continue after this court’s abatement order. Rather, I understood him to say that a potential purchaser would be concerned that the nuisance might continue. Likewise, Mr. O’Regan did not assume that the defendant would not comply with the intended injunction. Rather he apprehends that a potential purchaser would fear that this may occur and be deterred from putting in an offer for HH.

158. Regardless of whether the two concerns just mentioned are ascribed to Mr. O’Regan or to a potential purchaser of HH, they are not in my view legally relevant considerations in the assessment of damages for property devaluation. I accept the defendant’s submission that, in assessing damages for property devaluation, I must assume that this court’s order will fully abate the WTN nuisance and also that the defendant intends to fully comply with that order. Neither of the two factors just discussed can therefore found a claim to stigma damages.

159. However, there is force in the third factor relied upon by the plaintiffs. It appears to be common case that the court order abating the nuisance must contemplate ongoing engagement as between the owners or occupiers of HH and the defendant. An effective court order will involve the owners or occupiers of HH in retaining appropriate experts to verify the effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendant in response to this court’s order. This requirement for ongoing engagement and verification is likely to continue in some fashion for the life time of the planning permission.

160. I accept Mr. O’Regan’s view that different people will take a different view of the risks posed by the litigation and the consequences of the court orders in this case. Some purchasers will be put off by the requirement for ongoing engagement and verification and some will not. Inexorably though, as a matter of logic and common sense, this requirement will reduce the range of potential purchasers prepared to bid on the property. The defendant correctly observes that Mr. O’Regan is unable to point to comparable properties which have been devalued by the impact of an ongoing WTN abatement order. It argues that, as in Byrne, the claim to stigma damages is “too speculative and…lacking in supportive examples”. However, both the present case and the form of remedy that I order, are unique. One would not expect comparators to be available.

161. Mr. Corr’s view is that the value of HH will not be impacted by the requirements of engagement and verification. His view is that a potential purchaser would view the abatement order as “insurance or protection” against future WTN nuisance. However, this only goes to meet the arguments that a potential purchaser will fear that the WTN nuisance will continue or that the defendant might not intend to comply with the injunction. For reasons already discussed, I hold both these potential considerations to be irrelevant in any event. Mr. Corr’s “insurance or protection” thesis does not meet the argument that the open market value of HH will be negatively impacted by the requirements of ongoing engagement with the defendant and the potential need to retain appropriate experts to verify the effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendant.

162. It appears that Mr. Corr’s primary counter-argument to the proposition that this will deter potential purchasers is that the market will be a cure-all. Such is the buoyancy of the housing market that, no matter when it comes to market, there will inevitably be two purchasers prepared to enter into a bidding war to acquire HH, irrespective of any stigma arising from the requirements of engagement and verification. However, that is a matter of pure speculation.

163. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the requirement for ongoing engagement with the defendant and ongoing verification will give rise to a reduction in the open market value of HH.

164. I also hold that it is unlikely that the stigma impact arising from the foregoing factors will decay in the foreseeable future. There is, in all likelihood, a further year to eighteen months minimum to run in this litigation. Thereafter, a further judgment will be handed down by the appellate court. All this will keep the WTN nuisance and the requirement for ongoing engagement and verification of compliance “current” in the mind of potential purchasers. There is also a further twelve years to run on this planning permission and it is likely that the requirement for the owners or occupiers of HH to continue to engage with the defendant and to verify the effectiveness of the measures adopted, will continue for the entirety of that period. Whilst I accept that the open market value of HH may ultimately recover should the defendant’s wind farm not be granted an extension of its planning permission on expiry thereof, that is a distant contingency.

165. I do not accept the defendant’s argument that, where the nuisance is fully abated and an award of general damages is made, it is not reasonable to also award the plaintiffs an additional sum for stigma damages. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clear that the requirement for ongoing engagement and verification, which is the proximate cause of the devaluation of HH, would not have occurred were it not for the defendant’s WTN nuisance. It is wholly attributable to the defendant’s tortious acts. It is also a foreseeable consequence thereof. In circumstances where I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, notwithstanding the abatement of the nuisance, the capital value of the plaintiffs’ house will be reduced, it would be unreasonable to fail to reflect same in an award of damages. This requirement for ongoing engagement with the defendant and ongoing verification also renders the present case entirely distinguishable from both Byrne and Uren, in which Quinn J. and Richards J. respectively, ordered a total shutdown of the offending turbines and therefore declined to award stigma damages.

166. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to stigma damages for property devaluation which is wholly attributable to the defendant’s tortious acts to date. The quantum of damages for diminution in value can usually be resolved by expert evidence. In the present case, I find the evidence of both valuers on this issue to be of limited assistance. However, difficulties in estimating the likely percentage devaluation, cannot disentitle the plaintiffs to compensation and the court must, if necessary, deploy some degree of estimation. Although I view the devaluation in the open market price calculated by Mr. O’Regan as too high, I accept that the impact of the requirements of engagement and verification on the market value of HH will be appreciable. I am also influenced by the Gillespie study which found evidence of reasonably substantial property devaluation by reason of mere proximity to a turbine. Although, the valuers in the present case are agreed that this does not reflect their present experience, Mr. Corr does not suggest that I should disregard the Gillespie findings. Likewise, the defendant makes no submission to that effect. As such, I proceed on the assumption that, in reasonably recent times (2016-2021), mere proximity to wind turbines was capable of giving rise to a sustained 14.7% property devaluation.

Matters have moved on since 2016-2021, in terms of market buoyancy and, in terms of community attitudes towards (and indeed experience of) wind farms. However, if mere proximity to wind turbines is shown to have impacted property values by 14.7% in the recent past, then it does not seem unreasonable to estimate that protracted court proceedings resulting in an order requiring ongoing engagement and verification will cause a devaluation of, perhaps, half that amount. Indeed, I would view such an estimate as highly conservative.

167. I therefore will assess stigma damages in this case at approximately 7.35% of €400,000 (the agreed present value of HH). This amounts to approximately €30,000. In my view, there is no injustice to the defendant or disproportionality in awarding this figure. It is modest and, on any measure, is insignificant in comparison to the profit which the defendant would have lost if this court had directed the total shut down of T2.

Devaluation of NF

168. Shortly before the hearing of module 3, Mr. Shorten and Ms. Carty substantially amended the basis of their devaluation claim. Their reformulated claim is based on the differential between acquisition and renovation costs on the one hand and the August 2021 sale price on the other. They therefore claim a loss of €195,000 due to the WTN nuisance.

169. I cannot accept this reformulated claim.

170. The issue of devaluation should be approached by reference to the likely differential in the value of the subject property at the time of sale, with and without the nuisance.

171. NF was sold for €295,000 plus €10,000 which it is common case was less than it would have commanded were it not for the WTN nuisance. Both valuers are agreed that the sale price achieved for NF is unlikely to have been reduced by the mere presence of the Ballyduff turbines. I therefore hold that any reduction in the value of NF at the time of its sale in August 2021 was attributable to the WTN nuisance and will be compensable as such. So far, so straightforward.

172. Ideally the court would be guided by the evidence of expert valuers as to this sale price differential. However, I can place little weight on the defendant’s valuation evidence and although I have greater faith in the plaintiffs’ valuation evidence, it is not of high quality.

173. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that a figure of €350,000 is likely to represent the value of NF in August 2021, absent the WTN nuisance; the market price reduction on account of the WTN nuisance is therefore €55,000. I reach this conclusion on two separate grounds. First, I have greater faith in Mr. O’Regan’s opinion than in Mr. Corr’s opinion. I accept that the true valuation of NF in the absence of the WTN nuisance is closer to the estimate put forward by Mr. O’Regan than to that put forward by Mr. Corr. Mr. O’Regan's opinion as expressed in his report, is that the value of NF in June 2020 was €325,000.

Updating this valuation by the agreed percentage for house price inflation - 16% - would suggest a valuation of just over €375,000 in August 2021. An assumed August 2021 valuation of €350,000 (absent the WTN nuisance) is well short of €375,000 . It is therefore a conservative starting point. Assuming that the value of NF absent the WTN nuisance would have been €350,000, the sale at €295,000 represents a devaluation of €55,000. Second, Mr. Corr estimates that a 7% reduction in the market value of NF applied on account of the WTN nuisance in August 2021 which he calculates produces a loss of €25,000. The Gillespie paper leads me to conclude that this proposed 7% deduction significantly under-estimates the price impact of WTN nuisance. In my view, 14.7% represents a conservative estimate of likely property devaluation in a case such as the present where ongoing WTN nuisance is occurring at the time of the relevant sale. 14.7% is just over twice the 7% devaluation put forward by Mr. Corr. Applying this increase to Mr. Corr’s figure of €25,000 and rounding up slightly, produces the same loss as that just calculated: i.e. €55,000. Incidentally, €55,000 also represents the approximate midpoint as between the devaluation opinions of the two valuers and is in my view a fair, reasonable and proportionate assessment.

Aggravated Damages

Plaintiffs’ submissions

174. The plaintiffs assert that the defendant’s behaviour and conduct is significantly more egregious than that of the defendants in Byrne. They argue that the following aspects of the defendant’s conduct, which I group under the potentially applicable Conway criteria, ought to attract an award of aggravated damages.

a) the manner in which the wrong was committed, involving such elements as oppressiveness, arrogance or outrage; or

b) the conduct of the wrongdoer after the commission of the wrong, such as a refusal to apologise or to ameliorate the harm done or the making of threats to repeat the wrong

Failure to respond the plaintiff’s legitimate complaints

175. In April 2017, very shortly after the two turbines at Ballyduff commenced operation the plaintiffs asked Mr. Brazil to address the unacceptable nature and character of the WTN penetrating their properties. At a meeting in HH on 14 th August 2017, the plaintiffs inquired about mitigating and reducing WTN and requested that the turbines were turned off at night and at weekends. Mr. Brazil did not accede to this request. The plaintiffs submit that rather than taking any practical steps to ameliorate the WTN nuisance, the defendant requested that they sign a “noise acceptance agreement” in exchange for €4,000 per annum per house. He also stated that, some years into the future, he could potentially purchase one of their houses on a first come first served basis.

176. The Webster Rollo plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s response to the psychological report of Prof. Gournay in December 2020, outlining concern for Mr. Rollo’s life and requesting that the turbines were switched off at night to allow respite, is a distinct aggravating factor which is significantly more pronounced than those held to give rise to aggravated damages in Byrne.

They maintain that, despite this acute emergency, the defendant continued to operate T2 without restriction.

177. The plaintiffs observe that, to date, Ms. Webster has endured WTN nuisance for over

8 years and that it continues. Mr. Rollo endured it for 4 years until he left his home. The suffering for Mr. Rollo also continues as, it is said, he remains forced out of his home. Both plaintiffs still contend with the defendant’s utter disregard for their plight.

178. The plaintiffs emphasise that, even to date, the defendant here has made no apology to them. It has shown no remorse for the harm that it has caused. Instead, as in Shortt, the defendant has shown “a callous self-serving disregard for the plight of the plaintiff[s]… throughout”.

179. The plaintiffs argue that this unneighbourly conduct is relevant to the public interest.

In Byrne, Quinn J., regretting the “shallow” level of engagement by the defendant with complaints of nuisance, noted that “engaging with the public and addressing legitimate concerns is essential to the goal of rolling out substantial wind energy. The conduct and approach of the defendants in this case represents a threat to the goal of developing windfarms and wind energy”. I made a comment to a similar effect at para 204 of my module 2 judgment.

Conway criterion (c) conduct of the wrongdoer and/or his representatives in the defence of the claim of the wronged plaintiff, up to and including the trial of the action

Conduct during the course of the proceedings and during the trial of module 1

Abject failure to engage with the substance of the plaintiffs’ legitimate complaints

180. The plaintiffs sent initial letters of claim to the defendant on 27 th September 2017 and 13th October 2017. The defendant’s solicitors responded rejecting the plaintiffs’ allegations of serious and intolerable nuisance and denying that they were suffering distress or injury due to the operation of the wind farm. The plaintiffs argue that a full defence was filed in December 2020, before the defendant had a written report from any acoustician.

181. Mr. Carr was engaged by the defendant in January 2021, as its lead acoustician. He critiqued the methodology of the plaintiffs’ experts rather than engaging with the substance of the complaints made. He chose not to listen to or to monitor the WTN, or indeed to attend the plaintiffs’ homes before writing his reports. Furthermore, despite the plaintiffs’ complaints of significant AM, Mr. Carr did not carry out any monitoring capable of identifying AM values. Nor did he engage with the vast amount of external and internal data collected by the plaintiffs’ experts over two lengthy periods of monitoring. Similarly, Mr. Carr did not conduct any monitoring capable of identifying low frequency characteristics.

182. The plaintiffs note that the defendant’s essential approach in module 1 was to assert compliance with an averaged decibel level set out in its planning permission as a full answer to the complaints of nuisance. It did not consider the nature, character, frequency, emergence, dominance or erraticism of the WTN.

Failure to disclose noise monitoring data gathered at NF

183. Mr. Brazil arranged for Brendan O’Reilly, an acoustician, to monitor noise at NF in June 2017, and agreed both orally and in correspondence that the noise compliance report would be provided to Mr. Shorten. Despite repeated requests, no such report was ever made available prior to the trial of module 1. Nor was the underlying data gathered at NF by Mr. O’Reilly disclosed to the plaintiffs in discovery, even though it is common case that it fell within the scope of the defendant’s discovery obligation. Graphs of this NF data were not referenced in either Mr.

O’Reilly’s expert report or in Mr. Carr’s reports. The data only came to light in Mr. Brazil’s second supplementary discovery affidavit, well into the trial of module 1. In my principal judgment, I found that “the NF graphs show that total operational noise exceeds the permission limit of 40dBA leq at windspeeds between 7m/s and 10 m/s. At a windspeed of 9m/s, it exceeds the limit by perhaps as much as 4 dB”. It is abundantly clear that this undisclosed NF data was not favourable to the defendant’s liability case and the plaintiffs are highly critical of the defendant for, as they maintain, withholding it.

Allegation that the WTN was inaudible inside the Webster Rollo bedroom

184. The defendant commissioned Mr. O’Reilly to provide a written commentary in response to the December 2020 psychological report of Prof. Gournay, concerning Mr. Rollo’s acute psychiatric deterioration. In this report, Mr. O’Reilly, who had never been inside the plaintiffs’ houses asserted repeatedly that “noise levels from the windfarm, even when at maximum sound power output and when facing directly down towards the house, will be inaudible inside this bedroom (even with the front window open)”. The plaintiffs submit that although they themselves and their acousticians were extensively cross-examined in module 1 on this false premise, with counsel saying that this evidence would be tendered by the defendant’s experts, neither Mr. O’Reilly nor Mr. Carr gave this evidence. The inference seems to be that this was either an intimidation tactic or that the defendant was simply flying a kite in full knowledge of the lack of underlying evidence to support the argument made.

Response to the court’s module 1 judgment on liability

185. The court heard evidence and legal submissions over 51 days in module 1 and held that the WTN from T2 poses a nuisance to the plaintiffs.

186. The plaintiffs argue that, when facilitated by the court, recognising the public interest of wind energy, with an opportunity to mitigate the nuisance, the defendant squandered its opportunity. The plaintiffs argue that the defendant’s entire approach to the mitigation phase and to module 2 of this trial was cynical and self-serving. In my module 2 judgment, I found that the defendant had “implemented a “mitigation strategy” that, had any thought been given to the matter, was always bound to fail”.

187. The plaintiffs note that in module 2, the defendant’s expert, Mr. Carr, presented a report which wholly ignored the court’s findings on nuisance and on the interpretation of the planning permission noise condition and which attempted to adduce new evidence to challenge the court’s findings on liability. The plaintiffs argue that this was a deliberate strategy and that the defendant attempted to use module 2 to confound the court’s findings in order to mend its hand to improve its chances on appeal.

188. In my module 2 judgment, I found that the defendant’s approach in module 2 was entirely inconsistent with the case it had presented at module 1, that its new evidence was inadmissible and that, even if admitted, this evidence would not alter this court’s finding on liability. I found that the arguments sought to be advanced on foot of this new evidence were factually and legally unsustainable.

189. The plaintiffs also submit that the two judgments of this court have been disrespected by the defendant which is intent on appealing. The plaintiffs both question and indeed criticise the currently stated rationale for the defendant’s intended appeal which its counsel has articulated as being “because its survival depends on it” and in order to secure clarity for the wind industry.

Defendant’s submissions

190. The defendant submits that the present proceedings are readily distinguishable from Byrne and that no award of aggravated damages is merited.

191. In Byrne, Quinn J. found that the defendants had made a decision not to engage in any substantive manner with the claims being made by the plaintiffs, which the defendant states did not occur here. This non-engagement explains why the defendants in Byrne called only one witness as to fact, Mr. Spicer, who had never met or had any direct interactions with either plaintiff. The defendants in Byrne did not call any evidence to address the plaintiffs’ allegation that they had failed to engage with their complaints and did not seek to explain this refusal. By contrast, in the present case, the defendant emphasises that Mr. Brazil gave evidence in module

1 and module 2.

192. The defendant contends that it is clear from the evidence in the present case that Mr. Brazil did engage with the plaintiffs in an effort to find a resolution to their complaints, inter alia, in the following ways:

• An initial February 2017 complaint of mechanical malfunction was immediately investigated and rectified by the defendant;

• The defendant maintained regular contact with the plaintiffs between March and August 2017. Ms. Webster confirmed that Mr. Brazil was very approachable;

• Noise and shadow flicker surveys were commissioned prior to the delivery of the defence in an attempt to investigate the complaints;

• On 14th August 2017, a meeting was held at NF with a view to resolving all concerns;

the defendant offered the following forms of mitigation and/or resolution: (a) sound proofing the properties; (b) a noise acceptance agreement with payment per property of €4,000 per year indexed to inflation for the operational lifetime of the wind farm;

(c) the installation of shadow flicker measures; and (d) the purchase of the properties;

• On 12th September 2017, Mr. Brazil wrote to the plaintiffs making a proposal in relation to HH and NF being purchased by the defendant for their full market value.

193. The defendant contends that negotiations on the above offers, which could otherwise have continued, ended following receipt of letters threatening legal action on 27 September 2017 and

13 October 2017.

194. The defendant fairly points out that it did not ignore Prof. Gournay’s psychological report in December 2020 concerning Mr. Rollo and immediately invited the plaintiffs to mediation. The defendant also engaged in a second mediation as directed by the court which took place on 11th and 27th June 2024. The defendant emphasises that following this second mediation, it trialled the Enercon 1,600kW Operating Mode on a 24/7 basis (“the 1,600 mode”).15 The defendant also observes that, in the course of their evidence in module 2, its experts and some of the plaintiffs’ experts expressed the view that there had not been enough time to trial any other mitigation measures in advance of module 2.

195. The defendant’s response to the allegation of non-engagement with the plaintiffs’ legitimate complaints is that, from the outset, it took advice from appropriately qualified experts who offered an informed expert view to the effect that the WTN levels were planning compliant and that there was no nuisance.

196. In response to the plaintiffs’ criticism in relation to the “missing” NF data, the defendant acknowledged oversight on their part but noted that it did provide the data via a supplemental affidavit of discovery, albeit half way through the trial of module 1. It submits that a mistake of this character in making discovery does not warrant making an award of aggravated damages.

197. The defendant submits that at all times it acted reasonably in procuring and following expert advice and could not reasonably have foreseen that the competing evidence of the plaintiffs’ experts would be preferred. There was a significant dispute between the acoustic experts in module 1, which required weeks of complex technical evidence to resolve. Although the court found that the plaintiffs had established nuisance on the basis, inter alia, of the expert evidence adduced, the defendant argues that the mere fact that its expert evidence did not prevail at trial cannot provide a basis for awarding aggravated damages. The defendant also emphasises that, although the court was troubled at the partisanship of both parties’ experts during the course of module 1, it did not ultimately conclude that either had failed to discharge their duty to the court.

198. The defendant also observes that this court has now fashioned a bespoke injunction to eliminate the WTN nuisance. The solution identified by the court was not one which had previously been identified by the experts on either side. It submits that it would not therefore be appropriate to award aggravated damages by dint of the defendant’s failure to implement these specific measures during the attempted mitigation process or at any earlier stage.

199. The defendant also emphasises that the court has already rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that it acted negligently. This court has found that the defendant’s attitude towards the plaintiffs’ complaints, while inflexible and overly rigid, did not amount to a breach of a duty of

This is more fully explained in my module 2 judgment.

care. This, it is said, prevents the court from finding that the defendant was guilty of oppressive, arrogant, or outrageous conduct such as might justify an award of aggravated damages.

200. The defendant argues that it is not reasonable to interpret its intended appeal as any form of disrespect to either the court or the plaintiffs. The issues in the present case are of sufficient importance as to warrant review by an appellate court. The fact that the defendant proposes to exercise its right of appeal, rather than, for example, acknowledging and/or apologising for any form of wrongdoing, is not a basis for making an award of aggravated damages.

Discussion and conclusion in relation to aggravated damages

201. It seems to me that, despite the alleged remedial actions outlined by the defendant at para 192 above, the defendant’s general approach towards the plaintiffs has been distinctly unneighbourly. Although the defendant offered to make some contribution towards sound proofing the plaintiffs’ properties, this exercise was pointless without first investigating the low frequency elements of the WTN, which cannot be effectively ameliorated by such attenuation measures. I view the defendant’s offer of compensation of €4,000 per annum per house as entirely derisory, particularly when the defendant also required that this noise acceptance agreement would be noted on the title deeds of HH and NF and would bind all purchasers thereof.

A further requirement for the execution of this agreement was that Mr. Brazil would have a right of first refusal if either property was ever put on the market. Similarly, the letter of 12th September 2017 was not, as now contended by the defendant, an offer to buy the plaintiffs’ properties. Rather, the letter stated that, as a strictly without prejudice goodwill gesture, the defendant would be prepared to make an offer to buy each of the plaintiffs’ properties at the fair open market value (absent the wind farm). However, the defendant would only make such an offer when it was “in a position to satisfy and maintain its required banking covenants.” The letter indicated that the defendant would let the plaintiffs know “as soon as this [was] likely to happen”

and would also let them know of any adverse circumstances likely to imperil or delay its ability to make such an offer, such as a significant shortfall in expected revenue. This cannot fairly be characterised as an offer to buy the plaintiffs’ properties, even if the plaintiffs might have otherwise been willing to sell their homes.

202. By way of further example of the defendant’s unneighbourliness, it has been aware since 2017 of substantial shadow flicker emanating from the turbines. Whilst I held that the degree of shadow flicker was not, in itself, sufficiently intrusive as to give rise to actionable nuisance, there is no doubt that this issue was amenable to a simple and inexpensive technical solution. It is extremely disappointing that, despite commissioning a shadow flicker report in May 2017, the defendant did not take the minimal step of addressing this legitimate complaint until seven years later (after this court’s principal judgment).

203. Finally, there is no reason why the defendant could not have tendered an apology to the plaintiffs either before the proceedings commenced, or throughout the proceedings. An apology is not an admission of liability. It is a human gesture that, occasionally and if sincerely made, can make a real difference.

204. However, I must bear in mind that aggravated (and exemplary) damages are in general an exception to the usual approach, which is to confine a plaintiff to compensatory damages, if same can adequately compensate the plaintiff. I do not believe that these instances of unneighbourliness can, in themselves, amount to oppressive, arrogant or outrageous behaviour within the meaning of Conway criterion (a).

205. Likewise, in examining both criterion (a) and more particularly criterion (b) of Conway, it is important to bear in mind that cases such as the present are distinguishable from cases in which aggravated damages are claimed for a once off tort. In cases of the latter kind, there is no temporal overlap between the commission of the tort and the actions of the defendant and its legal representatives in defending the claim. In other words, the actionable wrong will have been committed (or not, as the case may be) before the initiation and a fortiori the defence of the claim. By contrast, in this case, as in other nuisance cases in which an interlocutory injunction is either not sought or not granted by the court, the reverse will be the case. In nuisance cases, the alleged nuisance will continue throughout the trial unless the defendant agrees to desist or is ordered to desist by the court on an interlocutory basis. In cases such as the present, it can always be argued that the continuation of the nuisance is unneighbourly, particularly as pleadings are exchanged, evidence is heard and legal submissions are furnished setting out the impact on the plaintiff of the nuisance alleged. However, this cannot and does not mean that nuisance actions are in a separate category, meriting a more permissive approach to aggravated damages. These plaintiffs emphasise that not only did the defendant refuse to ameliorate the harm and make threats to repeat the wrong, it did in fact continue to repeat the wrong and continues so to do; in reality however, that is the nature of a private nuisance action consisting of ongoing emissions (rather than a one off escape of noxious material or an identifiable event causing damage). A defendant is legally entitled to rest on the onus of proof and require the plaintiff to prove their case before ceasing the activity alleged to constitute the nuisance. This cannot, in itself, give rise to aggravated (or exemplary) damages.

206. Turning to Conway criterion (c), the starting point must be to fully acknowledge that a party has a right to defend proceedings brought against it. The defendant cannot be criticised for deciding to defend these proceedings, even if such defence is ultimately unsuccessful.

207. The particular defence advanced by the defendant to the plaintiffs’ claim was, in my view, deeply flawed. The defendant utterly failed to engage with the particular characteristics of the WTN exhaustively identified by the plaintiffs and their experts. It also wed itself to the thesis that planning permission conclusively establishes the boundaries of acceptability and reasonableness of use in the context of a private nuisance claim. In my view, this line of defence is, and always has been, contrary to legal authority. Having said that, I do not believe that mounting a factually and legally unsustainable defence merits an award of aggravated damages, still less an award of exemplary damages.

208. In addition, I remain perplexed by the decision of the defendant during the course of module 1 not to collect, or if collected, not to place before the court, and IOA RM reference method assessment. Instead of placing this evidence before the court, which it could and should have done, the defendant relentlessly criticised the plaintiffs’ expert for not doing just this. When this IOA RM reference method assessment finally came to hand in the course of module 2, it showed very high levels of AM. Had the court accepted the defendant’s criticism of the plaintiffs’ expert’s approach to AM then, irrespective of the objective fact that AM levels are extremely high at this location, the plaintiffs might well have lost the case. It is also troubling that, when the defendant did finally put evidence before the court in the course of module 2, it did so in a manner that was incomplete and selective.

209. I also was, and remain, extremely unimpressed by the defendant’s failure to discover the NF data during the course of module 1. As pointed out in my prior judgment, this data was not convenient to the defence advanced. It demonstrated both that total operational noise exceeded the limits in the planning permission, even as interpreted by the defendant, and furthermore that, applying the analysis urged on the court by Mr. Carr, background noise levels were extremely low. I do not draw an inference that the defendant deliberately withheld this documentation as, unlike in the Byrne case,16 there is insufficient evidence to so conclude.

However, the explanation tendered by the defendant for why this information was not furnished to the Carty Shortens notwithstanding their repeated requests is unconvincing. Whilst the actions of the defendant may not in this respect have been deliberate, they were, at the very least, careless and displayed a lack of appropriate respect and care for their neighbours, as well as for the court processes and the obligations of discovery inherent therein.

210. However, in my view, all of the above whilst regrettable, is not sufficiently reprehensible as to merit an award of aggravated damages.

211. Turning now to the period after this court handed down the principal judgment.

212. In light of the public benefit of renewable energy as enthusiastically emphasised in the submissions of counsel for the defendant, the court decided to permit the parties a period of time in which to attempt to agree mitigation measures.

213. I view the defendant’s approach to this mitigation phase as entirely unconstructive.

The defendant was repeatedly informed by this court that its mitigation strategy and expert reports at module 2 must engage with the particular aspects of the WTN found to give rise to nuisance. I am satisfied that the defendant fully understood this.17 I am further satisfied that the defendant made no real attempt to do this. As will be clear from this court's module 2 judgment, the report, statement and evidence of Mr. Carr, did not address itself to the characteristics and features of the WTN identified by this court as giving rise to nuisance. Further, the sole mitigation measure trialled by the defendant, the 1,600 mode, was incapable of abating those characteristics. Rather the primary focus of the defendant’s efforts at module 2 was, once more, to dispute liability. Furthermore, although the defendant now suggests that there was inadequate time to trial mitigation measures other than the 1,600 mode prior to the module 2 hearing,18 it did not request either the plaintiffs or the court to extend the mitigation period for the purposes

In which Quinn J. concluded that the defendant had made a deliberate decision not to engage with the Council’s requests for information.

It is clear from submissions made at the case management hearing 2nd July 2024 that the defendant understood that it was to embark upon an iterative process of trial and error to try determine how best to mitigate the particular features of the WTN identified by the court in its principal judgment as giving rise to WTN nuisance. The court was informed that the parties had reached agreement as between them as to the appropriate time frames and procedures for this iterative process. The parties informed the court that all of the relevant data would be gathered by September 2024 and the trial of module 2 was set for late November 2024.

Para 45 of the defendant’s module 2 submissions and para 112 of the defendant’s module 3 submissions.

of trialling other potential turbine modes. Rather, the position which the defendant adopted at the case management hearing on 2nd July 2024 was only that further time would be required to prepare reports at the conclusion of the mitigation trial in September 2024. Likewise, at the subsequent case management hearing of 8th October 2024, the defendant indicated that the 1,600 mode was the lowest operating mode that it was prepared to deploy as otherwise the wind farm would not remain “viable” in a meaningful way.

214. This case has many of the features exhibited by Byrne. Thus, it is clear that the level of engagement by the defendant was poor right from the outset. The defendant filed a full defence without conducting a substantive assessment of the particular characteristics of the WTN complained of and relied instead on planning grounds. From an early point, the defendant was armed with very substantial and fulsome reports from the plaintiffs’ experts. Despite this, whilst liability remained fully in issue throughout the case, there was little meaningful engagement with or challenge to the substance of either the plaintiffs’ complaints or their experts’ evidence. Rather than engaging with the evidence of the plaintiffs’ experts, Mr. Carr merely advanced technical objections thereto. In a further echo of Byrne, despite being given every opportunity to put forward meaningful proposals of mitigation, the defendant failed to do so. It did not call evidence from an Enercon engineer or some other independent engineer to assist in developing a meaningful mitigation strategy. In short, as in Byrne, this defendant chose not to carry out any straightforward assessment of whether the plaintiffs’ claim had any substantive merits, did not give the plaintiffs’ claim serious or substantive consideration and then chose not to engage with the case as pleaded and as advanced. As in Byrne, the defendant paid no heed to the serious complaints of the plaintiffs even though those complaints, on any analysis, had all the indicia of genuine and substantive complaints and were supported by an abundance of expert data. I am fully satisfied that all of the above has caused, and continues to cause, the plaintiffs additional upset and distress. Further, as in Byrne, throughout the entire period of the proceedings and continuing to date, this defendant is continuing to make substantial profits. I am in total agreement with Quinn J. that such behaviour represents a threat to the goal of developing wind farms and wind energy.

215. On the other hand, I accept that there are also factors which render this case distinguishable from Byrne. Thus, in Byrne the defendants had withheld cooperation and engagement not just from the plaintiffs but from the planning authority who had served enforcement notices. The evidence demonstrated that this was also part of a deliberate strategy. In addition, the defendants had put forward no person capable of giving any evidence as to the decisions taken by it, either in relation to the manner in which they operated the wind farm, or in relation to the defence of the case. The defendants thus failed to call any person who had actually interacted directly with the plaintiffs or who was directing the litigation strategy. Although I am deeply unimpressed by the defendant’s behavior in this case, it did tender Mr. Brazil who gave evidence, on which he was cross examined at length, as to its approach to the plaintiffs’ WTN nuisance complaints.

216. The plaintiffs submit that the defendant has in many ways acted in complete disregard for this court's judgment and in many ways in defiance of it. However, refusing to accept the correctness of the judgment of a court of first instance when one still has a right of appeal cannot possibly found a claim to aggravated or exemplary damages. The position would clearly be quite different in respect of a court of final appeal. It would be rare that fully defending a case, attempting to bring in new evidence or exercising one’s right of appeal could found a claim for aggravated damages.

217. Here, I cannot ignore the fact that in these proceedings there were two separate mediations; the first of which was at the request of the defendant. The second mediation was of course directed by the court at the conclusion of module 1. Although neither of these mediations were fruitful, I cannot speculate as to why that may be.

218. Although the defendant ought to have taken honest and constructive steps to address the plaintiffs’ complaints, I accept that it could not have foreseen the precise injunction that the court would grant. Whilst this court’s judgments substantially uphold the plaintiffs’ complaints and although it is to be hoped that the remedy crafted will give Ms. Webster relief in the future, I have not granted the relief specifically sought by the plaintiffs, which was the full shutdown of T2 at night. Therefore, insofar as the plaintiffs demanded that the turbine was turned off at night and the defendant declined to do so, neither party has ultimately been found to be entirely correct or entirely incorrect.

219. Taking account of all of the factors outlined above, I am not satisfied that the conduct of the defendant in the defence of the proceedings gives rise to aggravated damages.

Exemplary damages

220. Exemplary damages are intended as per Shortt at paras 108-109 “to mark the Court’s disapproval of outrageous conduct on the part of a defendant… They may financially punish a defendant as a deterrent to that defendant as well as a deterrent generally to the arrogant use or abuse of power. In their purely punitive dimension the means of a defendant may be relevant in order to ensure that the punishment is proportionate”.

221. The plaintiffs submit that the conduct of the defendant in this case has been markedly worse than that of the defendants in Byrne and has been such as to require condemnation by way of an award of exemplary damages.

222. The plaintiffs argue that this is not a case where compensatory damages alone will suffice to demonstrate the “public disapproval of and punishment for the particular form of [the defendant’s] wrongdoing”. Murray C.J. in Shortt interpreted Conway as providing “a wide discretion in determining the circumstances in which a separate award for exemplary damages ought or ought not to be made.”

223. As regards quantum of exemplary damages, the plaintiff submits that the means and earnings of the defendant are relevant. O’Flaherty J. in McIntyre v. Lewis [1991] 1 IR 121, held that “the means of the parties, irrelevant in the assessment of compensation, are material in the assessment of exemplary damages. Everything which aggravates or mitigates the defendant's conduct is relevant.” The Supreme Court allowed £5,000 in general damages and £20,000 in exemplary damages.

224. The plaintiffs rely upon a letter dated 24th June 2025, in which the defendant provided financial information including an estimate of an anticipated 18% loss in revenue should the court’s proposed injunction be imposed. The plaintiffs observe that the defendant has substantial annual revenue, with €1,738,631 in y/e 30 th April 2024 and €2,225,963 in y/e 30 th April 2023. They note that 18% of the revenue for y/e 30 th April 2024, the less profitable of the

2 years, is €312,954, or €26,079 per month. The plaintiff argues that this monthly figure, applied for the 101 months of unlawful operation, indicates that the defendant has earned revenue of €2,633,979 by operating T2 in a manner that causes a nuisance.

225. The plaintiffs therefore submit that an award of exemplary damages is merited and that the Court ought to have regard to the level of financial benefit accruing to the defendant in the course of the past 8 years arising from its continued unmitigated operation of T2.

226. The defendant recalls that in Conway, Griffin J. stated that exemplary damages may be awarded where there has been, on the part of a defendant, wilful and conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard for another’s rights. It observes that a similar claim for exemplary damages was advanced by the plaintiffs in Byrne and was expressly rejected by Quinn J.

notwithstanding a finding that the defendants had behaved in a reprehensible manner in deciding not to engage with the legitimate complaints of the plaintiffs, Quinn J. stated:

“Notwithstanding this, I am overall, not satisfied that I can safely conclude that the defendants behaved the way they did out of a deliberate and conscious decision to violate the plaintiffs’ rights”

227. I accept that the same logic applies here. Like many commercial entities, the defendant has sought, albeit in an unneighbourly, rigid and unconstructive manner, to advance its own financial and litigious interests. I explain above in my rejection of the plaintiffs’ claim to aggravated damages, why I do not ultimately regard the defendant’s behaviour or conduct, either in the commission of the tort or in the defence of the proceedings, as oppressive, arrogant or outrageous in the sense used in Conway. For similar reasons, I cannot conclude that the defendant has acted on foot of a deliberate and/or conscious decision to disregard or violate the rights of the plaintiffs. I therefore make no award of exemplary damages in this case.

CONCLUSION

228. It follows from the foregoing that I make the following awards of damages in this case:

• general damages to Ms. Webster in the amount of €87,500 to date, such general damages to continue until the abatement order takes effect;

• general damages to Mr. Rollo in the amount of €77,000;

• general damages to Mr. Shorten in the amount of €34,000;

• general damages to Ms. Carty in the amount of €34,000;

• Damages in respect of reduction in the capital value of NF in the amount of €55,000;

• Damages in respect of reduction in the capital value of HH in the amount of €30,000.