High Court allows appeal against Chief Appeals Officer, setting aside finding of implied employment contract.

APPROVED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 579

Record No. 2023/16MCA

BETWEEN/

RYANAIR DAC

APPELLANT

-AND-

AIDAN REDDY (IN HIS CAPACITY AS APPEALS OFFICER), THE CHIEF

APPEALS OFFICER AND THE MINISTER FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION

RESPONDENTS

-AND-

PAUL CLEMENTS, REDSBERRY MANAGEMENT SERVICES LIMITED AND

CONTRACTING PLUS CONSULTANTS LIMITED

NOTICE PARTIES

(No.2)

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 23rd day of October 2025

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary

1. This judgment deals with the issue of costs and the form of the final order in the matter of Ryanair DAC v Reddy & Ors (No.1) [2024] IEHC 719 (unreported, High Court (Bradley J.) 26th November 2024) (“the principal judgment”).

2. In the principal judgment, I concluded that whilst it was common case that Mr. Clements was never directly employed by Ryanair, a central tenet of the Appeals Officer’s findings (and endorsed by the Chief Appeals Officer) was based on the contact which occurred between Mr. Clements, Ryanair and Brookfield before the offer of the contract from Brookfield to Mr. Clements from which prior contact the Appeals Officer inferred the establishment of an implied contract as between Ryanair and Mr. Clements with Brookfield acting as the agent of Ryanair. I considered that the Appeals Officer in coming to that determination, erred in law in reaching the conclusion that there was an implied contract on the facts as there was no evidence to support such a finding and the inferences which were drawn by the Appeals Officer on those facts were ones to which no reasonable decision maker could have drawn.

3. The matter had been listed initially for hearing for three days between Tuesday 7th and Thursday 9th May 2024, but was adjourned to resume hearing on Thursday 30th May 2024 when judgment was reserved. Judgment was delivered on Tuesday 26th November 2024.

4. At the end of the principal judgment, under the sub-heading ‘Proposed Order’, I indicated the terms of a proposed order and stated that I would discuss with the parties the precise form of the order to be made and the terms of any further orders or consequential declarations which arose. I indicated that any further submissions which the parties wish to make on these matters and also on the question of costs (having regard inter alia to O. 90, r. 6 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended (“the RSC 1986”) which provides that “No costs shall be allowed of any proceedings under this Order unless the Court shall by special order allow such costs”, to sections 168 and 169(1)(a) to (g) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 (“the LSRA 2015”) and (the re-cast) O. 99 of the RSC 1986) should be exchanged and filed in court before the end of January 2025 and I drew the parties attention to the decision of the Supreme Court on costs in Little v The Chief Appeals Officer & Ors [2024] IESC 53 (judgments of Hogan

J. and Murray J. delivered on 19th November 2024).

5. I duly received written legal submissions and authorities from the Appellant (“Ryanair”) and the State Respondents. On the first ‘for mention’ date, after judgment had been delivered, counsel and solicitor appeared on behalf of the second and third named Notice Parties and indicated that those parties wished to make written and oral submissions on the form of the final order(s). Neither the first, second or third named Notice Parties had participated during the four day substantive hearing in May 2024.

6. The matter had been mentioned on Wednesday 5th February 2025 and on Wednesday 19th February 2025 when it was assigned and a 2 hour slot for Friday 7th March 2025. However, the matter was mentioned in the Non-Jury/Judicial Review List on Thursday 20th February 2025 due to some of the counsels’ unavailability on 7th March 2025 and it was assigned a hearing date for Monday 26th May 2025 in order to address the question of costs and the form of the final order(s).

7. I duly received written submissions on behalf of the second and third named Notice Parties and, in addition, counsel made oral submissions. As stated, I received written submissions and authorities and heard oral argument from senior counsel for the Appellants and the Respondents.

8. This second judgment therefore addresses the issue of costs and the form of the final order(s) arising from the determination in the principal judgment.

THE PRINCIPAL JUDGMENT

9. In summary, in the principal judgment, I determined that the inferences drawn by the Appeals Officer which led to his determination that Mr. Clements was an employee of Ryanair DAC during the period from 15th February 2010 to 30th April 2014, were ones which no reasonable decision-making body in his position could draw and were in error. Having regard to the guidance and approach set out in the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Revenue Commissioners v Karshan Midlands Ltd T/A Domino’s Pizza [2023] IESC 25, I considered the errors in the inferences made by the Appeals Officer included inter alia the status and weight given to the nature of the new evidence or new facts between the Appeals Officers’ initial decision/determination dated 17th May 2016 and his revised decision dated 12th July 2021; the question of agency, i.e., that Brookfield acted in an agency capacity for Ryanair; the finding that there was an ‘implied contract’ between Mr. Clements and Ryanair; the failure of the Appeals Officer to have regard to the regulatory context and consequences of Mr. Clements operating Ryanair’s scheduled flights. These matters are further detailed in the principal judgment.

COSTS

10. The respective positions of the parties, first on the question of costs, were as follows.

Summary of submissions made on behalf of Ryanair

11. On behalf of Ryanair, it was submitted that the usual position under section 169 of the LSRA Act, that costs follow the event, applies in this case, given that Ryanair was entirely successful in its appeal.

12. It was submitted that the appeal concerned a private commercial dispute, rather than any case of public interest or general public importance and, therefore, there would be no reason for the court to depart from the usual position.

13. Reference was made to the criteria in the judgment of Murray J. in Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53 which sets out the steps a court should take when deciding whether a matter constitutes a public interest claim and therefore what might constitute grounds for obtaining costs. It was submitted that this appeal did not fall within the scope of Little, given that the matter concerned a private claim by an individual.

14. It was further submitted that even if I accepted the argument that the matter was a ‘test case’, that would not automatically convert it into a case of public interest, as set out in the High Court judgment of Lynch v. Minister for Health & Ors [2024] IEHC 712, where Simons J. at paragraph 9 of his judgment stated that the phrase ‘test case’ is “essentially a case management tool rather than a characterisation for costs purposes”.

15. It was accepted that whilst the High Court ultimately retained a discretion to depart from the default position on costs (Power v. HSE [2021] IEHC 454 per Simons J. at paragraph 14), there was no basis for me in this case to exercise my discretion and depart from the default position on costs under s. 169 of the LSRA 2015.

16. It was submitted, therefore, that Ryanair was fully entitled to its costs given that it was entirely successful in its appeal.

Summary of submissions made on behalf of the State Respondents

17. It was submitted on behalf of the State Respondents that this appeal was different to other costs matters because the relevant Order of the RSC 1986 was that set out in Order 90.

18. It was submitted that at paragraph (19) of the principal judgment, I had stated that Order

90 of the RSC 1986 was the appropriate Order under which the appellant should have brought its appeal. O. 90 of the RSC 1986 prescribes a default position of no order as to costs (unless a special order is made for costs). Therefore, it was submitted that I should follow that which is set out in O. 90, r. 6 of the RSC 1986 and make no order as to costs in those circumstances.

19. The provisions of s. 168(1) of the LSRA 2015 were referred to, which prescribes the power to award legal costs, and states as follows:

“168. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, a court may, on an application by a party to civil proceedings, at any stage in, and from time to time during, those proceedings –

(a) order that a party to the proceedings pay the costs of or incidental to the proceedings of one or more other parties to the proceedings.”

20. Further, the following provisions of section 169(1) of the LSRA 2015 were relied upon:

“169. (1) A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties, including-

(a) conduct before and during the proceedings,

(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or

contest one or more issues in the proceedings,

(c) the manner in which the parties conducted all or any

part of their cases,

(d) whether a successful party exaggerated his or her claim,

(e) whether a party made a payment into court and the date

of that payment;

(f) whether a party made an offer to settle the matter the

subject of the proceedings, and if so, the date, terms and

circumstances of that offer, and

(g) where the parties were invited by the court to settle the

claim (whether by mediation or otherwise) and the court

considers that one or more than one of the parties was

or were unreasonable in refusing to engage in the

settlement discussions or in mediation.”

21. It was further submitted by the State Respondents that Ryanair had not in fact been “entirely successful” but only “partially successful” and had not succeeded, for example, on all issues in the appeal. It was submitted, therefore, that Ryanair was not entitled to its costs under s. 169(1) LSRA 2015 given that it applies only to parties which are ‘entirely successful’ in the proceedings. I was referred to the decision of the High Court (Simons J.) in Ryanair v. An Taoiseach [2020] IEHC 673, in which Simons J. addressed the question of ‘partial’ and ‘entire’ success in litigation, at paragraphs 5 to 9 of his judgment, to the effect that where there is a variety of issues and the overall successful party does not succeed on one or more issues, s. 169 of the LSRA 2015 does not apply. It was submitted that Ryanair, in its appeal, whilst ‘overall’ successful was not ‘entirely’ successful for the purpose of s. 169 of the LSRA 2015 and therefore s. 169 of the LSRA 2015 should not be applied.

22. It was submitted, for example, that Ryanair was not entirely successful in circumstances where it had sought an Order pursuant to O. 84C of the RSC 1986 and I had found in my judgment (as argued for on behalf of the State Respondents) that Ryanair had instituted the appeal under the wrong order and should have moved their appeal under O. 90 of the RSC 1986.

23. Further, the argument made behalf of Ryanair that the matter concerned a decision by the Chief Appeals Officer to revise, rather than a refusal to revise, was rejected by me at paragraph 33 of the principal judgment. Also, it was submitted that whilst at paragraph

42 of the principal judgment, I rejected the preliminary argument on behalf of the State that the appeal be dismissed on the preliminary point that Ryanair had invoked the wrong order, I had agreed with the underlying submissions made on behalf of the State that the Ryanair should have brought its appeal under O. 90 of the RSC 1986.

24. Finally, it was submitted that even if I found against the State Respondents on the application of O. 90 of the RSC 1986 and its arguments in relation to s. 169 of the LSRA 2015, I should exercise my discretion to make no order as to costs having regard to the commercial nature of Ryanair.

25. It was submitted that, in contrast to Ryanair, the State Respondents did not have a commercial interest or a personal interest and that they were merely defending the

decision made in circumstances where the parties to the proceedings did not take an active part in the proceedings, and that the State respondents, compared to Ryanair, did not stand to secure a material advantage. Accordingly, it was submitted that it was in the public interest that the proceedings be defended and determined on their merits and that I should make no order as to costs, in accordance with O. 90 of the RSC 1986.

26. No submissions on costs were made on behalf of the second and third named Notice Parties.

FINAL ORDER

27. The respective positions of the parties on the terms of any final order were as follows.

Summary of submissions made on behalf of Ryanair

28. In relation to the final order, Ryanair made reference to a draft Order which had been circulated between the parties and submitted that the form of the final orders should be as follows:

(i) An Order striking out the decision of the Chief Appeals Officer dated 15th December 2022 refusing to revise the decision of the Appeals Officer;

(ii) An Order extending the time for Ryanair to appeal the decision of the Appeals Officer;

(iii) An Order pursuant to section 327 setting aside the decision of the Appeals Officer;

(iv) A Declaration that Ryanair was not the employer of Paul Clements in the period from 15th February 2010 to 20th April 2014 for the purposes of the social welfare code.

29. In reply to the submissions made on behalf of the State Respondents in relation to final orders, Ryanair submitted that it was not appropriate for the matter to be remitted as that

decision had been made and should stand as it was.

Summary of submissions made by on behalf of the second & third named Notice Parties

30. There had been no participation by any of the Notice Parties in the substantive appeal hearing in May 2024. Counsel on behalf of the second and third named Notice Parties appeared at the first ‘for mention’ date after judgment had been delivered and made submissions as to the form of the final order.

31. It was submitted that the second and third named Notice Parties had no difficulty with whichever variant I wished to adopt in relation to most of the reliefs which had been proposed in the two draft Orders furnished on behalf of Ryanair and the State Respondents.

32. Issue was, however, taken with the State Respondent’s suggestion that an Order be made restoring the decision of the Appeals Officer dated 17th May 2016. It was submitted that it would be more appropriate to remit the matter for rehearing to a new Appeals Officer. Counsel set out the power of the High Court to remit as discussed in both Brightwater Selection (Ireland) Ltd v. Minister for Social & Family Affairs [2011] IEHC 510 (Gilligan

J. at paragraph 52) and National Museum of Ireland v. Minister for Social Protection [2017] IEHC 198 (Murphy J.) to the effect that if a court thought it appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, it had the power to remit the matter. Both of those cases dealt with Labour Court decisions, and counsel for the second and third named Notice Parties submitted that they were of relevance to the matter before me as both cases concerned a ‘section 327’ appeal under the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005, as amended, and in both cases, the High Court found that it had the power to remit the matter back for rehearing.

33. In their application for a remittal, I was also referred, on behalf of the second and third named Notice Parties to O. 38, r. 9 of the RSC 1986 which addressed the hearing of proceedings commenced by Special Summons, as follows:

“On the hearing of any special summons … the Court, as the case may be, may give judgment for the relief to which the plaintiff may appear to be entitled or may dismiss the action or may adjourn the case for plenary hearing as if the proceedings had been originated by plenary summons with such directions as to pleadings or discovery or settlement of issues or otherwise as may be appropriate, and generally may make such order for determination of the questions in issue in the action or matter as may seem just.”

34. In particular, counsel relied on the phrase: “generally may make such orders for determination of the questions in issue in the action or as may seem just”, submitting that the justness of the proceedings before me required that the matter to be remitted back to a different Appeals Officer and in this regard counsel opposed the suggestion of restoring the initial decision on the grounds that, at the very outset, Redsberry had not been put on notice of the decision of the Appeals Officer and one of the reasons for the Appeals Officer reaching the 2016 decision was the lack of participation from Redsberry. He submitted it would be unjust, in the circumstances, to restore that decision.

Summary of submissions made on behalf of the State Respondents

35. It was submitted on behalf of the State Respondents that the decisions in Brightwater Selection (Ireland) Ltd and National Museum of Ireland were to be distinguished from the circumstances of this appeal because those cases concerned errors made by the deciding body: in National Museum, there were issues of fair procedures and, in Brightwater, the proceedings concerned a failure to apply the mutuality of obligations test properly.

36. It was further submitted that Redsberry had had the opportunity to come before the court, as they were on receipt of the Originating Notice of Motion, to make whatever arguments it wished to make in relation to the decision of 17th May 2016 and had chosen, for whatever reason, not to do so.

37. It was submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Castleisland Cattle Breeding v Minister for Social Welfare [2004] 4 IR 150, at paragraph 33, confirmed the jurisdiction of the High Court to re-instate the initial decision of the Deciding Officer, as follows:

“Accordingly, I would have no hesitation in dismissing the appeal from the High Court but with the following variation. The order should expressly state that the decision of the appeals officer ought to be set aside and the decision of the deciding officer restored and there should be a consequential declaration that the said Mr. Michael Walsh was not insurable employment with the respondents. The order should then provide that the appeal to the High Court from the Chief Appeals Officer and the appeal from the High Court to this court, in so far as it relates to that appeal from the Chief Appeals Officer, be struck out.”

38. Counsel for the State Respondents also made submissions to the court in terms of final orders and suggested, for example, that an Order be made striking out the appeal against the decision of the Chief Appeals Officer dated 15th December 2022; an Order be made extending the time for Ryanair to appeal the decision of the Appeals Officer; and an Order be made restoring the decision of the Appeals Officer dated 17th May 2016 that Paul Clements was in insurable employment with Redsberry and was insurable as a Class A contributor.

39. On behalf of the State respondents, submissions were made seeking a stay on the above orders (and, if necessary, a stay on any costs order that may be made) and that the stay should continue until the final determination of any appeal. Counsel also submitted that if a stay was not granted, that could give rise to a situation where the revived decision of the Appeals Officer (17th May 2016) would be instantly effective and that it would be undesirable that this should happen while an appeal against my decision was in being.

DISCUSSION & DECISION

40. Section 168(1) and O. 99, r. 1(1) of the LSRA 2015 regulates and confers a general discretionary power on the High Court to determine costs subject to the condition in section 169(1) of the LSRA 2015 that where a party is entirely successful in civil proceedings, that party is entitled to their costs unless the court orders otherwise. I must first consider, therefore, whether Ryanair was entirely successful in these civil proceedings. Here, Ryanair, in my view, was not ‘entirely successful’ in the context of the preliminary arguments which had to be addressed. These preliminary arguments were an important aspect of this appeal as they provided the gateway to deal with the question of insurable employment which was the subject of the substantive appeal.

41. Ryanair had argued, for example, that it was correct to invoke O. 84C of the RSC 1986 and that the appeal concerned a decision by the Chief Appeals Officer to revise rather than a decision not to revise. I held against those propostions. It was suggested on behalf of the State Respondents, in relation to the preliminary issues raised, that the principal judgment agreed with their interpretation of the applicable law and Rules of Court but not as to result, in that I had granted Ryanair an extension of time to appeal the Appeals Officer’s decision. I think that is a correct characterisation and represents the starting point for my consideration of the question of costs and distinguishes, in some resepcts, this appeal from the situation which applied, and the various decisions discussed, in the judgment of the High Court (Bolger J.) in Hanley v PBR Restaurants Ltd t/a Fish Shack Café [2025] IEHC 224 where the party in question was entirely successful.

42. Further, I do not consider the matters raised in this appeal come within the definition of public interest proceedings as defined by Murray J. in Little v Chief Appeals Officer [2024] IESC 53, where in summary, the following principles were identified:

(i) the requirement that the proceedings involve a point of law of general public importance which is either novel, or unclear or should be changed;

(ii) while it is not a requirement that the applicant obtains no personal advantage, it is a relevant consideration that the issues in the litigation are likely to have a significant effect on the category of persons affected by the legal issues;

(iii) the strength of the case for an exemption from costs is in proportion to the strength of the underlying claim, i.e., the point of law must be stateable and of real substance on the merits;

(iv) the systemic importance to the State of having the law clarified;

(v) a statable – if weak – case which arises in the context of avoidably unclear legislation;

(vi) in a ‘test case’ – i.e., one or more pathfinder cases selected from a larger cohort of pending claims for the purposes of determining issues of law that will govern all actions – a court may decide not to award costs against the claimant whose case is selected to go forward on this basis;

(vii) whether the subject matter of the litigation is such that costs are likely to have a significant deterrent effect on the category of persons affected by the legal issue.

43. By analogy, O. 105 of the RSC 1986 deals with appeals and references from the Labour Court. O. 105, r. 7 of the RSC 1986 provides that “No costs shall be allowed of any proceedings under this Order unless the Court shall by special order allow such costs.” Similarly, O. 90 of the RSC 1986 deals with appeals under the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1981 (as amended) and provides that “No costs shall be allowed of any proceedings under this Order unless the Court shall by special order allow such costs.”

44. In Power v HSE [2021] IEHC 454 (accepting the distinction in that case where Mr. Power had been ‘entirely successful’ in his appeal,) the High Court (Simons J.) explained the rationale underlying O. 105, r. 7 of the RSC 1986 as being that “parties to an employment law dispute should not normally be on hazard of having to pay the costs of the other side in the event of a statutory appeal to the High Court. The decision-maker at first instance, i.e. the Labour Court, does not have jurisdiction to award costs against a party under the Workplace Relations Act 2015. It would be anomalous were the costs position to change dramatically in the event that either side invoked its statutory right of appeal to the High Court under section 46 of the Act.”

45. As set out in the principal judgment, this was a statutory appeal brought by Ryanair pursuant to section 327 of the Social Welfare Act 2005 which concerned the insurability status for the purposes of the 2005 Act of the first named notice party (who did not participate in the appeal hearing) in the period between 15th February 2010 to 30th April 2014 (1st May 2014), during which time the first named notice party piloted scheduled aeroplane flights for Ryanair. In the principal judgment, I held that section 327 of the 2005 Act was the statutory successor to sections 299 and 300(4) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 1981 (as amended), which are the two provisions referred to O. 90 of the RSC 1986. I considered that the correct procedure under the RSC 1986 to appeal the decision of the Appeals Officer was to apply pursuant to O. 90 of the RSC 1986 rather than O. 84C of the RSC 1986, and having regard to O. 124 of the RSC 1986, for the reasons set out at paragraph (19) of the principal judgment, I did not consider that the adoption of an incorrect procedure in this case constituted sufficient grounds for dismissing the appeal in limine.

46. As stated earlier, an analogy can be drawn between the statutory appeals provided by the provisions of section 327 of the Social Welfare Act 2005 and O. 90, r. 6 of the RSC 1986, on the one hand, and section 40 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 (as amended), section 10A of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977 (as amended), section 46 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and O. 105, r. 7 of the RSC 1986, on the other hand.

47. I consider that they share in common the rationale that parties who engage their respective statutory appeal processes, in the context of disputes, should not normally be on hazard of having to pay the costs of the other side in the event of a statutory appeal to the High Court.

48. The appeal in this case was brought pursuant to the provisions of section 327 of the 2005 Act and in the principal judgment time was extended for Ryanair to appeal the decision of the Appeals Officer and it was subsequently found that the errors in the inferences made by the Appeals Officer included inter alia the status and weight given to the nature of the new evidence or new facts between the Appeals Officers’ initial

decision/determination dated 17th May 2016 and his revised decision dated 12th July 2021; the question of agency, i.e., that Brookfield acted in an agency capacity for Ryanair, the finding that there was an ‘implied contract’ between Mr. Clements and Ryanair; the failure of the Appeals Officer to have regard to the regulatory context and consequences of Mr. Clements operating Ryanair’s scheduled flights.

49. In the exercise of my discretion, including under sections 168 and 169 of the LSRA 2015 and O. 99 of the RSC 1986, I consider, therefore, that there should be no order as to costs in this appeal.

50. In terms of final orders, this appeal comes within that category of cases identified by the Supreme Court in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Department of Education & Ors [2024] IESC 38 where, in comparing the exercise involved with an appeal on a point law with the test applied on an appeal from the High Court, formerly to the Supreme Court and now to the Court of Appeal, set out most notably in Hay v O’Grady [1992] 1 I.R. 210, O’Donnell C.J. observed inter alia at paragraph 64 of his judgment that where the High Court concludes that there is an error of law, the order it may make depends upon the error identified, in the same way as the order the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal may make in an appeal.

51. The Chief Justice in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Department of Education & Ors [2024] IESC 38 (at paragraph 64) indicated that there may be a number of possible scenarios.

52. Insofar as the circumstances of this appeal are concerned, I do not consider that this case comes within that category of cases where the error identified cannot lead to the substitution of a final order by the court, and may mean that the case has to be remitted to the primary decision-maker.

53. Rather, the principal judgment in this case, for example, determined that the errors in the inferences made by the Appeals Officer, in his second decision, were ones that no reasonable decision making body could draw from the evidence and therefore, having regard to the observations of the Chief Justice An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Department of Education & Ors [2024] IESC 38 at paragraph 64, the appropriate order is to allow the appeal, set aside the order made the Appeals Officer and substitute the order which follows from that conclusion.

54. In those circumstances, therefore, I propose to make the following orders:

(i) An Order striking out the appeal against the decision of the Chief Appeals Officer dated 15th December 2022 refusing to revise the decision of the Appeals Officer dated 12th July 2021;

(ii) An Order extending the time for the appellant, Ryanair DAC, to appeal the

decision of the Appeals Officer dated 12th July 2021;

(iii) An Order pursuant to section 327 of the 2005 Act setting aside the decision of the Appeals Officer dated 12th July 2021 that the First Named Notice Party, Mr. Paul Clements, was an employee of Ryanair during the period from 15th February 2010 to 30th April 2014 for the social insurance purposes at Class A of the social insurance code;

(iv) A Declaration that Ryanair was not the employer of Paul Clements in the period from 15th February 2010 to 30th April 2014 for the purposes of the social welfare code;

(v) An Order restoring the decision of the Appeals Officer dated 17th May 2016 that Mr. Paul Clements was in insurable employment with Redsberry and was insurable as a Class A contributor for social insurance purposes for the period from 15th February 2010 to 30th April 2014;

(vi) I shall make no order as to costs in relation to the appeal and in relation to this application.

55. I shall put a stay on the orders made at sub-paragraphs (i) to (v) (above), in the event of there being an appeal to the Court of Appeal and to await the outcome of such appeal (subject to the Court of Appeal ordering otherwise).

56. In the event that any of the parties wish to raise any ancillary or consequential matters arising from this judgment, a date can be arranged by the respective solicitors for the parties contacting the Court Registrar.

CONLETH BRADLEY

23rd October 2025