High Court dismisses judicial review by Georgian asylum seekers against IPAT decisions denying protection. The court rejects claims of state unavailability and procedural unfairness.

APPROVED

REDACTED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 578

Record No. 2023/898JR

BETWEEN/

N.S.

APPLICANT

-AND-

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENTS

-and-

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 2023/899JR

BETWEEN/

T.S.

APPLICANT

-AND-

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 23rd day of October 2025

INTRODUCTION

Preliminary

1. In two separate applications for judicial review, Ms. NS (“NS”) and Mr. TS (“TS”) (“the Applicants”), who are Georgian nationals and a married couple, seek to challenge the decision of the first named Respondent (the “IPAT”) made on 19th July 2023 which affirmed the recommendation of the International Protection Office (the “IPO”) to the Minister for Justice & Equality (the “Minister”) that the Applicants should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration.

2. The Applicants issued a joint appeal from the decisions of the IPO and their appeals before the IPAT were heard on the same day and by the same tribunal member and two similar, but separate decisions were issued by the IPAT, which is why two judicial review challenges have been brought.

3. Given the common facts and issues in each of their cases, this single judgment addresses each of the judicial review challenges brought by NS and TS which were heard before me at the same time.

4. The respective parties were represented by the same counsel in each case. In the presentation of both challenges, the parties relied primarily on the facts in the context of the case of NS and I adopt a similar approach in this judgment.

The proceedings

5. By separate orders dated 4th March 2024, the High Court (Hyland J.) granted the Applicants leave to apply, by way of judicial review, for orders of certiorari quashing the decisions of the IPAT dated 19th July 2023 affirming the recommendations made by the IPO that neither NS or TS should be given a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection declaration. In the context of the case of NS, her Statement of Grounds was date stamped 28th July 2023. Mr. Imran Khurshid’s Affidavit in compliance with Practice Direction HC81 was sworn on 28th July 2023. The verifying Affidavit of NS was sworn on 28th July 2023. The State Respondent’s Statements of Opposition are date stamped 25th November 2024.

The legislative provisions

6. The International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) gives effect to the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC which sets out the minimum standards required in order to qualify as a refugee or to be entitled to subsidiary protection and the Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC which governs the minimum standards in Member States for the procedures for the grant or withdrawal of refugee status.

7. The Applicants in these cases seek to challenge the decisions of the IPAT made under section 46(3)(a) of the 2015 Act. The IPO carried out a report of the examination of the Applicants’ applications for international protection and recommended pursuant to section 39(3)(c) of the 2015 Act that NS and TS should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration.

8. Those decisions were appealed to the IPAT pursuant to section 41(1)(b) of the 2015 Act and, the IPAT, pursuant to section 46(3)(a) of the 2015 Act decided to affirm the recommendations that the Applicants should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration. Those decisions were communicated to NS and TS under cover of correspondence dated 24th July 2023 from a Higher Executive Officer in the IPAT.

9. In addition to these central provisions of the 2015 Act, the following provisions are of relevance to the matters under consideration in these challenges brought by NS and TS.

10. Section 2 of the 2015 Act provides for a number of definitions, as follows.

11. A “refugee” is defined as meaning a person, other than a person to whom section 10 (of the 2015 Act – exclusion from being a refugee) applies, who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.

12. “Serious harm” is defined as meaning (a) death penalty or execution, (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in his or her country of origin, or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict.

13. “International protection” is defined as meaning status in the State either (a) as a refugee, on the basis of a refugee declaration, or (b) as a person eligible for subsidiary protection, on the basis of a subsidiary protection declaration.

14. A “person eligible for subsidiary protection” is defined as meaning a person (a) who is not a national of a Member State of the European Union, (b) who does not qualify as a refugee, (c) in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, if returned to his or her country of origin, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, and (d) who is not excluded under section 12 of the IPA 2015 from being eligible for subsidiary protection.

15. Sections 2 and 7(1) of the 2015 Act inter alia define acts of persecution for the purposes of that Act as being (a) sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or (b) an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights, which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in paragraph 7(1)(a).

16. Section 7(2) of the 2015 Act provides non-exhaustive examples of acts which may amount to acts of persecution for the purposes of section 7(1) as including: (a) acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence; (b) legal, administrative, police or judicial measures, or a combination of these measures, that are in themselves discriminatory or are implemented in a discriminatory manner; (c) prosecution or punishment that is disproportionate or discriminatory; (d) denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment; (e) prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes or acts of a kind referred to in section 10(2) of the IPA 2015; (f) acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature.

17. Section 7(3) of the 2015 Act provides that for the purpose of the definition of “refugee” in section 2 of the 2015 Act (referred to above), there must be a connection between the reasons for persecution and the acts of persecution or the absence of protection.

18. It is insufficient for an applicant seeking international protection under the IPA 2015 to establish, without more, that they have a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the Convention grounds or reasons. An applicant must rebut the presumption that adequate state protection for the type of persecution feared by that person would not be available if returned to their country of origin, in this case Georgia, i.e., there is a presumption of state protection absent a situation of complete breakdown of the State apparatus: see, ABO v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 191 per Birmingham J. (as he then was); XS & Anor v IPAT & Anor [2022] IEHC 100 per Ferriter J. at paragraph 36.

19. The availability or absence of protection, i.e., State protection, is an important factor in assessing whether or not a person is entitled to refugee status. Accordingly, if a Convention nexus has been established, the IPAT member is required to carry out a State protection analysis.

20. Section 28 of the 2015 Act addresses ‘the assessment of facts and circumstances’, as follows:

“(28)(1) An international protection officer shall, in co-operation with the applicant, assess the relevant elements of the application.

(2) The Tribunal shall, for the purposes of an appeal under section

41 in co-operation with the applicant, assess the relevant elements of the application.

(3) The elements referred to in subsections (1) and (2) consist of the applicant’s statements and all the documents submitted by him or her regarding his or her—

(a) age,

(b) background, including that of relevant relatives,

(c) identity,

(d) nationality or nationalities,

(e) country or countries, and place or places, of previous residence,

(f) previous asylum applications, whether made in the State or

outside it,

(g) travel routes,

(h) identity and travel documents, and

(i) reasons for applying for international protection.

(4) The assessment, by the international protection officer of an application, and by the Tribunal of an appeal under section 41, shall be carried out on an individual basis and shall include taking into account the following:

(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied;

(b) the relevant statements and documentation presented by the

applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm;

(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the

applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age,

so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm;

(d) whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether those activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country;

(e) whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail

himself or herself of the protection of another country where he or she could assert citizenship;

(f) the general credibility of the applicant.

(5) (a) In the assessment of an application, an international

protection officer shall, in the case of an applicant who was a child at the time of a relevant occurrence or at any time during which a relevant circumstance existed, take account of the applicant’s age at that time and the level of understanding that could reasonably be expected of a child of that age.

(b) In the conduct of an appeal under section 41, the Tribunal shall, in the case of an applicant who was a child at the time of a relevant occurrence or at any time during which a relevant circumstance existed, take account of the applicant’s age at that time and the level of understanding that could reasonably be expected of a child of that age.

(c) In this subsection—

“relevant circumstance” means, in relation to an application, a circumstance that falls to be considered in the assessment of the application; “relevant occurrence” means, in relation to an application, an occurrence that falls to be considered in the assessment of the application.

(6) The fact that an applicant has already been subject to

persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such serious harm, is a serious indication of the applicant’s wellfounded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

(7) Where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation where the international protection officer or, as the case may be, the Tribunal, is satisfied that—

(a) the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his or her application,

(b) all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given,

(c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case,

(d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so, and

(e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established.”

21. Section 30 of the 2015 Act defines actors of persecution or serious harm as including “(a) a state, (b) parties or organisations controlling a state or a substantial part of the territory of a state, and (c) non-state actors, if it can be demonstrated that the actors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide protection against persecution or serious harm.”

22. Section 31 of the 2015 Act provides for the actors of protection as follows:

“(1) For the purposes of this Act, protection against persecution or serious harm can only be provided by— (a) a state, or (b) parties or organisations, including international organisations, controlling a state or a substantial part of the territory of a state, provided that they are willing and able to offer protection in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) Protection against persecution or serious harm—(a) must be

effective and of a non-temporary nature, and (b) shall be regarded as being generally provided where—(i) the actors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm, and (ii) the applicant has access to such protection.

(3) When assessing whether an international organisation controls a state or a substantial part of its territory and provides protection as described in subsection (2), the Minister, the international protection officer or, as the case may be, the Tribunal, shall take into account any guidance which may be provided in relevant European Union acts.

(4) The steps referred to in subsection (2)(b)(i) shall include the operating of an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm.”

23. An application from a safe country of origin is defined in section 33 of the 2015 Act as “A country that has been designated under section 72 as a safe country of origin shall, for the purposes of the assessment of an application for international protection, be considered to be a safe country of origin in relation to a particular applicant only where

(a) the country is the country of origin of the applicant, and (b) the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his or her particular circumstances and in terms of his or her eligibility for international protection.”

BACKGROUND

24. As mentioned, the Applicants are Georgian nationals who applied for international protection and/or subsidiary protection in Ireland. They are aged respectively 27 (NS) and 26 years of age (TS). Their parents and families are of the orthodox Christian faith in Georgia. Generally (save as to the status of ‘IK’, a policeman who was betrothed to NS by her family without her agreement), the salient facts as presented by the Applicants are not disputed in these judicial review challenges and were largely accepted by both the IPO and the IPAT. Furthermore, there was no issue as to the credibility of the Applicants.

25. The Applicants knew each other growing up, as did their respective families. They were in a relationship when they were younger which developed into a more serious relationship which they kept secret from their respective families until NS’s parents became aware of it in or around February 2021. The Applicants are now a married couple notwithstanding the serious objections from their respective families. It is their relationship and their family’s reaction to it which informs the context to the events which culminated in these proceedings.

26. The mother of TS is also the godmother of NS. This goes to the heart of the issues which arose. It was submitted, for example, that both the IPO and the IPAT accepted that the Country of Origin Information report suggested that in an orthodox Christian faith society, such as in Georgia, the relationship of godmother and godchild is considered to be similar to that of a blood relative relationship and consequently any relationship between the Applicants would be deemed to be unacceptable and marriage, for example, was forbidden. Despite this, the Applicants were married on 4th August 2021 in Georgia in a civil ceremony.

27. NS’s parents had in fact promised her in marriage to a man, who was six or seven years older and a senior police official. He is referred to in this judgment as ‘IK’. Arranged marriages are not unusual in Georgia and the Country of Origin Information indicates that forced marriages, where a bride is an unwilling participant but is forced to proceed, also occur. However, as stated, notwithstanding their respective families’ objections and the fact that their relationship was forbidden in the Georgian Orthodox Church, and by social custom as the mother of TS was also the godmother of NS, NS married TS on 4th August 2021.

28. When they initially discovered that NS and TS were in a relationship, their respective families went to extreme measures to end it, bearing in mind that it had been arranged for NS to marry IK and the relationship of NS and TS was disapproved of for the religious and societal reasons just outlined.

29. When they found out about her relationship with TS, NS was assaulted by both her parents. They took her phone, locked her up at home and gave her only water. She was discovered unconscious by her family after three days and was hospitalised. While in hospital, on 18th July 2021, NS discovered that she was pregnant and her mother told her that her baby would be taken away and she would be sent to a monastery to become a nun. With the help of a nurse, NS contacted TS and they moved to a rented apartment in Dighomi.

30. Sometime earlier, on or about 7th July 2021, because of his relationship with NS, TS was assaulted by IK and his associates. He was hospitalised with a head injury, an eye injury and concussion. While in the hospital, TS sought to make a complaint to the police and when they were informed about the involvement of IK, they told TS that he should be thankful that he was still alive and no police investigation took place.

31. TS states that after he was discharged from hospital, he received a threatening letter and threatening text messages.

32. TS stated that both he and NS had been forced to leave their jobs as a result of the attacks and abuse and threats and moved around Tbilisi, Dighomi and Borjomi. On 30th July 2021, their car was smashed up a few blocks from their apartment. They believed IK was following them and changed their phone numbers and social media accounts.

33. When they moved to a hotel in Borjomi a receptionist informed them that the police were looking for them, which they understood to mean that IK had tracked them down.

34. It appears that the Applicants left Georgia and went to Istanbul on 30th August 2021. They travelled from Istanbul to Manchester on 1st September 2021 and stayed in Manchester until November 2021. While in Manchester, NS had a miscarriage. The Applicants then travelled to Ireland via Belfast in November 2021.

THE APPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

35. The Applicants applied for international protection in Ireland on 22nd November 2021 during the period of the Covid pandemic. The processing of their applications and assessment were broadly similar.

36. Taking the example of NS’s application, as indicated earlier, she marked “religion” as the reason she feared persecution on the IP05 form.

37. NS had a section 13(2) preliminary interview (pursuant to s. 13(2) of the 2015 Act) on 22nd November 2021 and a section 15 interview on 14th December 2021 (pursuant to s.

15 of the 2015 Act). She completed her IPO questionnaire in or around January 2022 and had a section 35 substantive personal interview on 19th October 2022.

38. A s. 39 report issued on 17th November 2022 and recommended that she be granted neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration.

39. In this report, at section 2 “claim summary and documentation” under the subheading “Persecution”, it is stated that NS claims a fear of persecution in Georgia for reasons of religion.

40. Under the subheading “Serious harm”, it is stated that NS claims that if returned to Georgia she may face serious harm by: death-penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in his or her country of origin or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict.

41. At p. 3 (of 21) of the IPO report, the following is stated: “Under section 72 of the International Protection Act 2015 and the International Protection Act 2015 (Safe Countries of Origin) Order 2018 (No. 121 of 2018), the Minister for Justice and Equality has designated certain countries as safe countries of origin. Georgia is one of these countries. As a result, the applicant's country of origin would be considered to be a safe country of origin in relation to her application where the applicant does not submit any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in her particular circumstances and in terms of her eligibility for international protection.”

42. Later, on p. 6 of the IPO report prepared pursuant to s. 39 of the 2015 Act under section

3 “Legal basis for assessment”, the following is stated: “Section 72 of the 2015 Act provides that the Minister may, by order, designate a country as a safe country of origin. In deciding to make such an order the Minister must be satisfied that, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution, no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. Under Statutory Instrument No. 121 of 2018, of 16th of April 2018, the Minister for Justice and Equality has made an order designating certain countries as safe countries of origin. Georgia is one of these countries.”

43. At section 5 of the IPO report, the issue of credibility is addressed. This assessment is done in accordance with s. 28 of the IPA 2015 and it addresses two central matters: NS’s nationality and personal circumstances and that she was threatened and assaulted because of her relationship with TS.

44. In summary, in addressing the first issue of NS’s nationality and personal circumstances, the IPO accepted that NS was a national of Georgia and was (then) a 25-year-old married female from Tbilisi in Georgia and was married to TS who was also living in Ireland with her. It was accepted that her parents and brother were living in Georgia, and her religion was Orthodox Christian. The report stated that “[n]othing arose to call into question the credibility of her claims in relation to her personal circumstances, therefore they are accepted as material facts”.

45. The IPO report dealt extensively with the second issue, which was that NS was threatened and assaulted because of her relationship with TS. The report set out in full what NS had stated in her questionnaire. By way of example, the report stated that when asked at her section 35 interview why she was seeking international protection in Ireland, NS stated:

““As you know my husband’s mother is my god mother and Georgia is a very religious country and in religion me and my husband have to be like brother and sister. My family couldn’t accept that we were in love with each other. It cannot be possible and they said it was Satan [sic.]. We did what we could, we were hiding this relationship we didn't want to have any more problems but my families were mentally and physically abusing us. This relationship was unacceptable to them.” (S. 35, Q15)”.

46. Other references were made to the questionnaire dealing with various aspects of NS’s account including the time she first met TS.

47. NS sets out details of how her family were thinking of different ways to stop the relationship, including forcibly engaging her to IK on 1st April 2021. She referred to TS being attacked by IK and three or four other men, who physically assaulted him resulting in TS’ hospitalisation and the report states that:

“On another occasion [NS’s] father slapped her in the face and locked her in her room with no food only water. She was depressed and very worried. She lost consciousness and after 3 days she woke up in hospital and found out that she was pregnant. While she was in her room she stated “My father brought some liquid from [sic.] Church and that if I drank it he was thinking the devil would come out from [sic.] my body and I wouldn't be in a relationship with him.” (S. 35, Q15)”.

48. The quotation continues:

“When the applicant’s mother found out that she was pregnant, she wanted [the applicant] to go off to a monastery and become a nun and that the church would take care of her child. “she wanted me to have no contact with my child and that the child would grow up without me.” (S35, Q15)”.

49. These and other matters are set out in the IPO report which includes the following statement:

“The applicant’s account of this material fact is supported by documentation furnished to this office by her. While this office cannot verify the authenticity of this documentation, it is noted that the said documentation is consistent with the material fact that the applicant was threatened and assaulted because of her relationship with [TS]. The applicant’s account and interview of this aspect of her claim is consistent with the account that she provided in her International Protection Questionnaire. Nothing arose in her account that on the balance of probabilities would call the credibility of this aspect of her claim into question. Accordingly, this aspect of her claim is accepted as a material fact.

For the reasons outlined above, the material elements of the applicant’s claim are found to be credible on the balance of probabilities, coupled with, where appropriate, the benefit of the doubt. As a result, they provide a foundation for assessment of a well-founded fear of persecution/real risk of serious harm.”

50. In section 6 of the report under the sub-heading “Refugee Status Determination Analysis” the IPO stated that:

“Details of [NS]’s claim in respect of “persecution” are outlined in Section 2 (Claim Summary and Documentation). The accepted facts underlying the analysis to follow are set out in sections 4 (Nationality)

and 5 (Credibility) above. This section provides for an

analysis of the of the following issues:

6.1 Persecution and Objective Basis

6.2 Nexus

6.3 State Protection

6.4 Internal Protection/Relocation Alternative

6.5 Exclusion under Article 1F [Section 10 of the IPA 2015]

6.6 Conclusion on Refugee Status”.

51. Under (6.1) Persecution and Objective Basis, the IPO stated as follows:

“Section 7 of the International Protection Act 2015 provides guidance on the acts which may amount to persecution.

In this section I have considered, on the basis of the accepted facts, whether the feared persecution claimed by the applicant as well as the other accepted facts in this case along with relevant country of origin information establish that if the applicant is returned to her country of origin she will face a reasonable chance of persecution.

With respect to the feared persecution and the accepted facts in this case, I find that the applicant would not face a reasonable chance of persecution if returned to her country of origin for the following reasons.

- The applicant is a national of Georgia.

- She is a 25 year old married female from Tbilisi in Georgia. Her religion is Orthodox.

- She is married to [TS] who is living here in Ireland.

- Her husband’s mother is her god mother and because of this, both her and her husband [was][sic.] threatened and assaulted by their families, [IK] and his friends.

- When it was put to the applicant in her Section 35 interview that her country is a safe country of origin and asked why she would not be able to avail of help or protection there she stated, “Well honestly I disagree and as far as I know in 2021, part of Georgia was taken out from the safest country and I know there was international studies I think by BBC about the priesthood and inhuman treatment. Like violence and woman violence. Georgia is not a safe country to live and even in the international studies, real Georgians knows what is happening in Georgia and in other countries there is different perceptions, there are connections with criminals people are always being killed and dying and an Irish citizen was killed in Georgia and from many other countries as well.” (335, Q27)

[These] [sic.] accepted facts are not considered to give rise to risk that the applicant will face a reasonable chance of persecution under this section.

Available country of origin information from the United States

Department of States Georgia 2021 Human Rights Report (Ref 1) and Freedom House (Ref 2) do not suggest that the applicant will face a reasonable chance of persecution in Georgia under this section as a consequence of accepted facts in this case.”

52. The report then assessed nexus, State protection, internal protection/relocation alternative, exclusion under Article 1F as “N/A” and under the sub-heading “Conclusion on Refugee Status” found as follows:

“In light of the foregoing analysis, I am satisfied that the applicant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution as required by Section 2 of the Protection Act 2015. I am also satisfied that the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for considering her country of origin not to be a safe country of origin in her particular circumstances and in terms of her eligibility for refugee status. This report will now proceed to undertake an analysis of subsidiary protection.”

53. The IPO carried out a “Subsidiary Protection Determination Analysis” in section 7 of the report and considered the following issues:

“7.1 Serious Harm and Objective Basis

7.2 State Protection

7.3 Internal Protection/Relocation Alternative

7.4 Exclusion under Article 1F [Section 12(1)-(3) of the IPA 2015]

7.5 Conclusion on Subsidiary Protection”.

54. By way of example, under paragraph 7.1, Serious Harm and Objective Basis, the IPO referred to section 2 of the 2015 Act and addressed in detail matters under the following sub-headings (a) Death penalty or execution (b) Torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in his or her country of origin (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict and (i) Is there indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict in Georgia. Under State protection, internal protection/relocation alternative, exclusion, the IPO found “N/A” and stated the following at “(7.5) Conclusion on Subsidiary Protection”:

“In light of the foregoing analysis, I find that substantial grounds have not been shown for believing that the applicant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to her country of origin. I also find that the applicant has not submitted any serious grounds for considering her country of origin in her particular circumstances and in terms of her eligibility for subsidiary protection.”

55. In its section 39 report dated 17th November 2022, therefore, the IPO found that NS had not established a well-founded fear of persecution and that she was not eligible for subsidiary protection.

56. On 23rd February 2023, a joint notice of appeal, and submissions in support of an appeal, were made on behalf of both NS and TS to the IPAT.

THE APPEALS TO THE IPAT

57. NS and TS brought a joint appeal from the decision of the IPO refusing their application for international protection dated 17th November 2022.

58. In their joint appeal, the Applicants placed reliance upon the fact that their marriage was within the prohibited degrees of relationship for the Georgian Orthodox Church. It was inter alia submitted by NS and TS, for example, that “the applicants families disapproved of their relationship as they are related through religion. See country of origin information which supports this: http://orthodoxinfo.com/praxis/relationshipdue to baptism.aspx”, and their appeal sets out a subheading “Prohibited Marriages” and lists four categories of marriages which are prohibited.

59. The separate reports in relation to the Applicants, NS and TS, prepared pursuant to section 39 of the IPA 2015 by the IPO dated 17th November 2022, under the subheading “Claim Summary and Documentation” and “Persecution”, state, in relation to both NS and TS, that they claimed “a fear of persecution in Georgia for reasons of: Religion.”

60. At the hearing before me, whilst it was accepted on behalf of the State Respondents that the families’ objections (especially the family of NS) to the Applicants’ relationship were based on religious grounds and the religious context of the godparent/godchild relationship, it was also submitted that this ultimately was not accepted by the IPAT as meeting the requirement of establishing a Convention nexus.

61. In the Applicants joint-appeal under the sub-heading “Persecution Feared” it was stated that “Our client fears that she will be subject to further physical abuse and or threats by state agents, or possibly killed, and that they and their baby will be kidnapped if they return to Georgia” and under the sub-heading “Convention Ground” that “[NS] fears persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group, that she is a woman, and was also promised in marriage, and may be subject to gendered violence, namely further physical and or sexual abuse, stalking or threats. [TS] fears persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group, that he is an Orthodox man who has married his mother’s god-daughter, who was promised in marriage to a police officer.”

62. Under the subheading “Objective Basis”, the Applicants joint-appeal states that “Their claim has an objective basis, in that the country of origin information suggests that corruption is rife amongst state officials in Georgia, and also that violence towards women is prevalent in Georgia.”

63. Under “State Protection” the appeal stated that “It is entirely credible that the applicant[s’] [sic.] lack of trust for the police led them to resist seeking their protection.

In circumstances where an agent of the state attacked and stalked them, it is not an option for the applicants that they would seek state protection. Moreover, the country of origin information suggests that there is little to no protection available for women who are promised in marriage.”

64. Under “Internal Relocation” the appeal stated that “It is submitted that the applicants cannot reasonably be expected to safely relocate in Georgia. Georgia is a small country with a population of just 3.7 million. They attempted to move and were found.”

65. In the Applicants’ joint appeal from the decision of the IPO, they relied on (and provided online links to) County of Origin Information and other reports, including inter alia Human Rights Watch. In their joint appeal, the Applicants presented this information as follows:

““Other harmful traditional practices: Kidnapping women for

marriage occurred in remote areas in ethnic minority communities but was rare. The Public Defender’s Office reported some cases of kidnapping for forced marriages and early marriage in its 2020 report.”

The public defender’s office report notes that “However, the State has no effective mechanisms up to now, to engage family members, community and religious leaders in the dialogue.” [re forced and child marriages].

The claim that therefore the applicants could seek state protection is irrational. The COI the IPO referred to itself does not support there being sufficient mechanisms to address forced marriages in Georgia.

Moreover, this Human Rights Watch document, available at the

following link, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2002236.html

confirms that abuse by law enforcement officials remains a problem in Georgia. It states:

“Lack of Accountability for Police, Security Service Abuse

Impunity for abuse by law enforcement officials remained a

persistent problem. Investigations, if launched, often led to

charges that carry lesser, inappropriate sanctions and rarely

resulted in convictions. Authorities routinely refused to grant

victim status to those who alleged abuse, depriving them of the

opportunity to review investigation files.

By September, the Ombudsman’s Office received 149 complaints

of ill-treatment by prison staff or police and petitioned the

prosecutor’s office to launch investigations in eight cases. None resulted in criminal prosecution.

In July, parliament adopted a law creating a State Inspector’s

Office, a separate body in charge of investigating abuses by law

enforcement. The law grants the prosecutor a supervisory role

over this body’s investigations, including the right to give

mandatory directives on any investigative procedure, or change

investigative decisions, which compromises the body’s

independence.

In May, a court’s partial acquittal of suspects in the stabbing to death of two 16-year-olds in a December 2017 brawl among 15 high school students prompted mass protests about law enforcement bias. The victims’ families claimed that the Prosecutor’s Office had deliberately concealed or manipulated evidence. The protests led to the chief prosecutor’s resignation and the creation of an interim parliamentary commission.

Opposition parliamentarians made up the majority of the

commission.

In September, the commission concluded that a former employee

of the Prosecutor’s Office who is related to two of the brawl

participants helped conceal some elements of the crime. In a

dissenting opinion, the commission’s ruling party members

claimed that the investigation’s flaws were due not to any

individual, but rather to the “flawed system of investigation.” [ZS], father of one of the victims, criticized the ruling party’s

conclusion as an attempt to protect those who falsified the

investigation. Public protests resumed. Authorities arrested [S]

in October on charges of assaulting a police officer, after he

struck an officer who tried to stop him from erecting a tent

outside the parliament building. Released on bail, [S] could face up to seven years’ imprisonment.

In December 2017, State Security Service (national intelligence

agency) officers shot to death [M], 18, an alleged terror suspect, during an operation in Pankisi Gorge, which neighbours Russia’s Chechnya. According to an official account, [M]tried to detonate a hand grenade during arrest, an allegation vehemently denied by his family, who claimed that he was sleeping when the officers entered his room and opened fire. Authorities eventually launched an investigation into [M’s] killing, which was still pending at time of writing. Authorities refused to grant [M’s] family victim status, limiting their access to the investigation files.

In May, three-day public protests took place over alleged heavy-

handed police behaviour during drug raids on two night clubs in

the capital, Tbilisi. Two leading rights groups, the Georgian

Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) and the Human Rights

Education and Monitoring Center (EMC), documented excessive

use of police force against spontaneously gathered protesters

outside the clubs immediately after the raids, and arbitrary

detention of many.

In a commendable move, authorities created a human rights

department under the Interior Ministry, overseeing

investigations into domestic violence, hate crimes, and crimes

committed by and against children.

“This country of origin information confirms that corruption is rife within the Georgian police force. The report therefore corroborates the applicants’ claims regarding their to secure the assistance of the Georgian police.”

In addition, National study on Violence against Women in Georgia was released jointly by UN Women and GEOSTAT with EU financial support, available at the following link https://eca.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/03/one-in-sevenwomen-in-georgia-experiences-domestic-violenace-new-nationalstudy-finds comments on the prevalence of sexual harassment and stalking of women in Georgia:

“The key findings of the study were released by UN Women, the EU and GEOSTAT together with partners from the Government, the development sector and civil society at a presentation of the study’s summary report in Tbilisi on 6 March 2018. The study findings provide data on the prevalence of domestic violence and nonpartner physical and sexual violence, as well as the perceptions and awareness of women and men on gender and violence in Georgia. For the first time in Georgia, the study also generated data on the prevalence of sexual harassment and stalking at the national level. This is the first nationwide research initiative on violence against women conducted in Georgia since UNFPA’s 2009 study (UNFPA)

The study was implemented throughout 2017 and combined

quantitative and qualitative research methods. In total, 6,006

women aged 15-64 and 1,601 men aged 15-64 were interviewed

across the country. If one combines all forms of violence, the study found that one in every four women has experienced gender-based violence in their lifetime. Among those, some 15,000 women have experienced physical violence from an intimate partner during pregnancy, and 9 per cent of women in Georgia have admitted to being subjected to sexual violence during their childhood, before the age of 18.

The study findings indicate that women and men show a high degree of tolerance and acceptance towards the use of physical violence against women in relationships, and they also share inequitable views on sex and sexual violence. Of those surveyed, almost one quarter of women (22 per cent) and one third of men (31 per cent) believe that wife-beating is justified under certain circumstances. Moreover, almost one quarter of all women (23 per cent) and nearly half of all men (42 per cent) believe that a wife should obey her husband even if she disagrees.

The study indicates some positive trends as well. There has been a significant increase in the percentage of women who have reported to the police an act of violence committed by an intimate partner:

18 per cent in 2017, compared to 1.5 per cent in 2009. Also, the

percentage of women who believe that domestic violence is a private matter and that no one should interfere has decreased from 78 per cent in 2009 to 33 per cent in 2017.

“The study findings fill the gap in the nationally representative data on the prevalence of violence against women in Georgia and provide baseline data for the nationalized Sustainable Development Goals indicators,” stated Erika Kvapilova, UN Women Country Representative in Georgia. “The data analysis will further inform policymaking as well as awareness-raising interventions aimed at prevention and effective response to violence against women and girls in Georgia.”

Gogita Todradze, Deputy Director of GEOSTAT, highlighted the

importance of the technical assistance provided by UN Women to

GEOSTAT in developing national capacity to conduct studies on

violence against women in line with the globally established

methodologies and standards, stressing that this will “enable

GEOSTAT to replicate similar prevalence surveys in the future as

prescribed by the obligations undertaken under the Istanbul

Convention.”

The National Study on Violence against Women in Georgia was

conducted by UN Women in partnership with GEOSTAT under the

EU-funded project “Unite to Fight Violence against Women”.””

66. The Applicants’ joint-appeal against the decision of the IPO referenced further reports which had been commissioned into the high levels of sexual violence experienced by women in Georgia and referenced a Council of Europe Report (https://www.coe.int/en/web/tbilisi/-/new-research-will-analyse-response-to-cases-ofsexual-violence-against-women-in-georgia) which stated that research had been commissioned into exploring the barriers women who have been subject to sexual assault faced in accessing the justice system in Georgia:

““On 1 May 2019, the Council of Europe and the Public Defender’s Office co-organised a roundtable meeting with various legal professionals. The working meeting aimed at presenting and discussing the concept and methodology of the planned research on sexual violence against women, which will be conducted by the Public Defender’s Office together with the Council of Europe. The research will analyse current practices in relation to the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cases of sexual violence against women. This work will be conducted in the light of the Council of Europe standards, notably the Istanbul Convention. Moreover, the research will explore reasons for the law reporting rates of women who experience sexual violence, and barriers they face in accessing the justice system in Georgia.

The meeting brought together specialised prosecutors, judges,

representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Public Defender’s office. These institutions had an opportunity to share information and experience, including statistics, and discuss difficulties they face in handling cases of sexual violence, such as rape. The meeting was held in the framework of the project “Preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence in Georgia”.””

67. In their appeal, the Applicants submitted that this report was consistent with their claims that they were stalked and threatened in Georgia by state agents and demonstrated that it could not reasonably be concluded that State protection would be available to NS if she was returned to Georgia and that they were entitled to refugee status and/or subsidiary protection.

68. In the typed note, on behalf of the Applicants, of the hearing before the IPAT, in answer to a question from the IPAT, NS does not appear to know what a public defender is and TS confirmed, when asked about the public defender in Georgia, that “We have not went to such an organisation especially because they are in public. We cannot say our story in public because we would be in even more danger”.

69. Mr. O’Dwyer SC, for the Applicants, placed emphasis on the circumstances of the Applicants’ cases and particularly the reaction, including the familial, societal and community reaction – which in the case of NS and TS, he submitted, was extreme – to their relationship and it is this, which he submits, that led to persecution and serious harm.

70. It was submitted, for example, that the negative reaction, of NS’s family to news of her relationship (they were not married at this point) with TS was extreme. It is stated, for example, that they considered it was “the work of the devil” and such was their annoyance that NS was assaulted by both of her parents, and in or around April 2021, in order to stop the relationship with TS, her parents forcibly engaged NS to IK, who was then aged 32 or 33 years old and approximately six or seven years older than NS. NS and TS continued their relationship although it had been forbidden by both their families. NS’s mobile phone was seized, she was locked up at home and given only water. When discovered unconscious by her family after three days, she regained consciousness in hospital, and when in hospital on 18th July 2021, NS discovered that she was pregnant.

71. It was further submitted that on or about 7th July 2021, by reason of the relationship, TS was assaulted by IK (the police officer) and others and was hospitalised. TS sought to make a complaint to the police and because IK was so influential within the police, they refused to investigate the matter. After TS was discharged from hospital, he also received a threatening letter.

DECISIONS OF IPAT

72. Although both Applicants were from Georgia, which had been designated a safe Country of Origin and was therefore subject to accelerated procedures, the IPAT directed an oral hearing in each of their cases which took place on 30th June 2023.

73. NS gave evidence in TS’s application and TS gave evidence in NS’s application.

74. The decisions of the IPAT were dated 19th July 2023 and were issued under cover of correspondence dated 24th July 2023. It is these decisions which NS and TS seek to challenge in these judicial review applications.

75. Amongst the grounds relied upon by the Applicants, they inter alia contend that there was an error in how nexus or Convention nexus was determined by the IPAT in both cases.

DISCUSSION & DECISION

76. In the case of NS, it was submitted on behalf of the Respondents that the consideration of section 28(6) of the 2015 Act was to be found at paragraphs (24) to (28) of the report and decision of the IPAT dated 19th July 2023 (the reference to “the Appellant” is a reference to the Applicant in these proceedings).

77. Insofar as NS’s parents are concerned, the IPAT found as follows at paragraphs (24) and (25) of its report and decision:

“24. The report from the Public Defender of Georgia (Ombudsman) on Child, Early and Forced Marriage in Georgia (2018) shows that a few forced marriages still occurred in Georgia in 2016 and 2017. The Appellant, however, is now civilly married (the only type of marriage recognised by the state) to her husband and cannot be married to someone else regardless of what her parents might want.

25. The Appellant does not now have a well-founded fear of being

persecuted in the form of a forced marriage. The country of origin information suggests (without expressly saying so) that devout members of the Georgian Orthodox Church would disapprove of a marriage such as the appellant’s and so there is a reasonable chance that she will be shunned by her family. However, that does not amount to such a severe violation of human rights to amount to persecution as defined in section 7 of the International Protection Act, 2015.”

78. It was submitted on behalf of the Applicants that NS’s concern is not the “shunning” referred to, but rather, the fear of physical violence.

79. The IPAT found, however, that because the Applicants were now married, there was no basis for them having a fear of being persecuted by way of a forced or arranged marriage because that could now not happen.

80. On behalf of the Applicants it was submitted that this was too narrow and formulaic an approach and ignored the fact that the persecution and serious harm was consequential upon finding out about the Applicants relationship with each other, i.e., the persecution and serious harm arose from the reaction of finding out about the Applicants’ relationship and it was submitted that the IPAT did not explain, in the context of accepting the facts as presented by the Applicants (save a query over the status or rank of IK), the acceptance of their credibility, the contents of the Country of Origin reports, and how the fact of their marriage now lessens the threat of a potential negative reaction.

81. The Applicants were critical of the approach adopted by the IPAT in these cases and his consideration that (i) persecution or (ii) serious harm could not now arise because

(a) a forced (arranged marriage) could not now happen because of (b) the fact of the Applicants’ lawful civil marriage to each other, and (iii) the IPAT’s assessment that the Country of Origin information “suggests (without expressly saying so) that devout members of the Georgian Orthodox Church would disapprove of a marriage such as the Appellant’s and so there is a reasonable chance that she will be shunned by her family. However, that does not amount to such a severe violation of human rights to amount to persecution as defined in section 7 of the International Protection Act, 2015”.

82. Further in this regard, it was submitted that there had been an acceptance of the Applicants’ credibility and an acceptance by the IPAT (at section D, paragraphs 13 and

14 of his report and decision dated 19th July 2023) that NS is a female Christian and a national of Georgia who was born on 14th November, 1997 and that the core elements of her claim are that she married her godmother’s son, she had been promised in marriage to IK, a policeman, her husband TS was threatened and assaulted by IK, the police were looking for NS in Borjomi and that “those factual elements were accepted in the section 39 report and were accepted by the Presenting Officer at the outset of the hearing. The assault and threats are corroborated by documents submitted. The Tribunal accepts those factual elements on the balance of probabilities”.

83. Similarly, in the context of the IPAT’s separate decision and report in relation to TS, also on 19th July 2023, it was recorded in that report that IK assaulted TS on 7th July 2022 which resulted in him being hospitalised for three days. The police started an investigation but when they heard that IK was involved the police told TS that he was lucky to be alive and dropped the investigation. TS’s car was damaged in a separate incident. Similar to the finding of the IPAT in relation to NS, the IPAT accepted the following facts at “D Assessment of Facts and Circumstances” at paragraphs (15) and

(16) of his report and decision dated 19th July 2023, namely that TS was a male Christian and a national of Georgia who was born on 27th April 1998. The core elements of his claim were that he married his mother’s goddaughter, who was promised in marriage to IK, a policeman, he was threatened and assaulted by IK, the police were looking for TS in Borjomi and (as with TS) “those factual elements were accepted in the section 39 report and were accepted by the Presenting Officer at the outset of the hearing. The assault and threats corroborated by documents submitted. The Tribunal accepts those factual elements on the balance of probabilities”.

84. Insofar as IK (the policeman) is concerned, the IPAT found that “where [IK] is unhappy with that state of affairs [NS] is at risk from him. Although that risk is not as high as that faced by her husband, the test for a well-founded fear of persecution is the low one of a reasonable chance. The Tribunal finds that [NS] has a reasonable chance of being assaulted by [IK] to the extent of constituting persecution.”

85. Therefore, the IPAT in effect found that both NS and TS had a reasonable chance of being assaulted by IK to the extent of constituting persecution.

86. However, at paragraph (27) of his report and decision dated 19th July 2023, the IPAT found that there was no Convention nexus as follows:

“27. With regard to nexus, the evidence was that [IK’s] hostility to [NS] and her husband is because he wanted to marry her, and not, e.g. because he disapproves of the marriage for religious reasons. The fear of persecution does not exist independently of the threat and so [NS]’s fear of persecution is not because of membership of a social group. There is not a nexus between the fear of persecution and a Convention ground.”

87. The IPAT goes on then at paragraph (28) of his report and decision dated 19th July 2023 to affirm the decision of the IPO that NS not be declared a refugee.

88. In the IPAT’s assessment of the “Analysis of Well-Founded Fear” in its report on TS, the assessment of IK at paragraphs (28) and (29) is similar to the assessment which was carried out in the report of NS. At paragraphs (28) and (29) of this report dated 19th July 2023 on TS, the IPAT stated:

“28. [TS] fears being killed or assaulted by [IK]. He was assaulted by him on 7th July, 2022. He was assaulted because [TS] married [NS]. As set out above, [TS] is now civilly married (the only type of marriage recognised by the state) to his wife, who cannot be married to someone else regardless of what [IK] might want. Where [IK] is unhappy with that state of affairs [TS] is at risk of violence from him to the extent that the [TS] has a well-founded fear of persecution.

29. With regard to nexus, the evidence was that [IK]’s hostility to [TS] and his wife is because he wanted to marry her, and not, e.g. because he disapproves of the marriage for religious reasons. The fear of persecution does not exist independently of the threat and so [TS]’s fear of persecution is not because of membership of a social group. There is not a nexus between the fear of persecution and a Convention ground.

30. The Tribunal affirms the decision of the International Protection Officer that [TS] not be declared a refugee.”

89. Again, similar to the report in relation to NS, the report and decision of the IPAT of TS’s appeal at paragraph (26) makes the same finding in relation to the non-availability of forced or arranged marriage now that TS and NS are civilly married:

“26. The report from the Public Defender of Georgia (Ombudsman) on Child, Early and Forced Marriage in Georgia (2018) shows that a few forced marriages still occurred in Georgia in 2016 and 2017. The Appellant, however, is now civilly married (the only type of marriage recognised by the state) to his wife, who cannot be married to someone else regardless of what his parents might want”.

NS & Subsidiary Protection

90. At section F of his report and decision, paragraphs (29) to (42) in the case of NS, the IPAT addresses the subsidiary protection application under the heading “Analysis of Serious Harm.”

91. A person cannot be granted subsidiary protection unless they have not qualified for refugee status. The analysis of subsidiary protection, therefore, follows sequentially where a person has not been granted refugee status. Subsidiary protection is granted where a person is at risk of serious harm. Whilst the IPAT appears to accept that both NS and TS are at risk of serious harm, he considers that state protection is available in these cases, because the Public Defender or Ombudsman system which operates in Georgia deals with, for example, police corruption.

92. In his analysis of serious harm in the context of NS’s claim for subsidiary protection beginning at sub-heading “F Analysis of Serious Harm”, the IPAT at paragraph (29) of his report effectively refuses the claims in the context of NS’ parents or the family context by stating that “(29) The issues relating to [NS]’s parents do not give rise to a real risk that she would suffer the death penalty or execution or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in Georgia for the same reason that she does not have a wellfounded fear of persecution for that reason as discussed above” and he then addresses these matters in the context of IK, the betrothed policeman, beginning at paragraph (30) of his report, as follows: “(30)The facts found by the Tribunal regarding [IK] give rise to a real risk that [NS] would suffer inhuman or degrading treatment in Georgia for the same reason that that she has a well—founded fear of being persecuted, as discussed above.” (Exactly the same analysis occurs in the IPAT’s report in relation to TS).

Safe country of origin

93. Notwithstanding that Georgia is designated a safe country, the IPAT directed an oral hearing of both the appeals of NS and TS based on the facts of their cases and this hearing took place on 30th June 2023.

94. The report’s analysis of ‘Safe country of origin’ in relation to TS is the same as NS as is the analysis in relation to ‘State protection’.

95. The IPAT addresses the question of a safe country of origin when dealing with NS’s application for subsidiary protection/analysis of serious harm, particularly at paragraphs 31 to 33 and effectively finds that the evidence of NS has rebutted the presumptions associated with being a safe country of origin in section 33 of the IPA 2015.

96. Accordingly, in relation to both of the Applicants, the IPAT, in its reports dated 19th July 2023, under the sub-heading “Safe country of origin ?” found, at paragraph (33) of NS’s appeal decision, in the context of section 33 of the 2015 Act, that “The police investigating the assault on [NS]’s husband [TS] did not continue their investigation when they heard that [IK] was involved. That constitutes a serious ground to [displace] [sic.] the presumption that Georgia is a safe country of origin for [NS]” and at paragraph (35) under the sub-heading “State protection”, “That the police investigating the assault of [NS]’s husband, [TS], dropped the investigation, is relevant to the availability of state protection. It suggests that [IK] is able to stop some policemen investigating a crime. However, [NS]’s husband did not go to another police station; [NS] never made a police report. Neither reported what happened to the Public Defender’s Office.” (Further in his analysis of “State protection”, the IPAT stated at paragraph (38) of his report that “The impression given is that there are procedures in place to try cases of police misconduct, which are effective except in some cases of a party political nature, and even then it is necessary for a law to be passed to provide impunity. There is not a political overlay to this case, which involves a young policeman assaulting a man who married a woman to whom he was promised, and then getting his colleagues to drop an investigation.”)

97. After its finding in paragraph (33) State protection is then addressed by the IPAT from paragraphs 34 to 42 of its report and decision dated 19th July 2023 and given its previous finding that NS has displaced the presumption that Georgia is a safe country of origin, the IPAT assessed state protection without the presumption that Georgia was a safe country of origin.

98. On behalf of NS, three central points are made in relation to what it is submitted are flaws in the IPAT’s approach to State protection. First, because of the finding that there was no persecution or serious harm arising from the actions of her father, it is submitted that issue could never have been considered in the context of assessing the question of State protection; second – and as a corollary to that first point – it is submitted that the manner in which the IPAT member assessed this familial issue of persecution or serious harm from NS’s parents was incorrect in law and therefore rendered its non-assessment in the analysis of State protection likewise to be incorrect; third, in terms of State protection and its assessment by the IPAT member from the perspective of IK’s role as a policeman, it was submitted on behalf of NS that there was evidence that when TS went to the police for assistance he was in fact rebuffed which was an indicator that State protection was not available. Further, reference was made to the Human Rights Watch Report which, it was submitted, on behalf of NS, confirmed that abuse by law enforcement officials remained a persistent problem in Georgia.

99. It is, I believe, important, when assessing all of the Applicants’ grounds of challenge, to consider the sequential nature of how the IPAT addressed the applications of NS and TS, in his reports dated 19th July 2023.

100. The format of the IPAT report in NS’ case, for example, is as follows: at section A from paras. 1 to 5 the “Introduction and Case History” is set out; at section B from paras. 6 to

11 the “Case, Facts and Documents” are set out; at section C at paragraph 12 the “Country of Nationality or Habitual Residence” is set out; at section D from paras. 13 to

17 the “Assessment of Facts and Circumstances” are set out; section E deals with the “Analysis of Well-Founded Fear” in the context of (a) NS’s parents (from paras. 18 to 25) and (b) IK, the policeman with whom the parents wanted NS to have an arranged marriage (from paras. 26 to 28); section F at paras. 29 to 42 address the “Analysis of Serious Harm”, including the “Safe country of origin?” which is addressed at paras. 31 to 33 and “State protection” is then addressed at paras. 34 to 42. Section G of the report at paragraph 43 provides for an “Overall Conclusion”.

101. The sequencing of the issues in the IPAT report addresses whether the harm feared by NS and TS constitutes persecution or serious harm in the event that it was to happen and, if so, whether there is sufficient State protection to meet that threat.

102. Section 28(6) of the 2015 Act provides that the fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such serious harm, is a serious indication of an applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. It is not – in and of itself - however, dispositive of the question as to whether an applicant is entitled to either a declaration of refugee status or a declaration of subsidiary protection.

103. In this regard, arising from inter alia the decisions of the High Court (Heslin J.) in TA v IPAT & Ors [2023] IEHC 390 as applied by the High Court (Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan) in NG v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535, Phelan J. summarised, at paragraphs (19) and

(20) of her judgment, the approach to protection claims, including state protection, as follows:

“(20)…I agree with Heslin J. that in deciding on a protection claim the

decision maker must consider, as separate elements, both whether the kind of harm apprehended could constitute persecution or serious harm were it to come to pass and also whether the State is safe and there exists effective State protection. The fact that an applicant demonstrates a justified apprehension of a risk of treatment which would constitute serious harm were it to occur does not alone establish an entitlement to international protection. It is also necessary to demonstrate that there is no effective State protection in respect of the said apprehended serious harm before an entitlement to protection is triggered.

(20)…The question of State protection only becomes a relevant

consideration where a threshold risk of harm (be it persecution

or serious harm) capable of triggering an entitlement to protection is found to exist. Furthermore, the nature of the apprehended risk requires to be established in order to properly assess whether effective State protection exists or might reasonably be accessed by an applicant as whether such protection exists may well depend on the particular risk established. Indeed, as recognised by Heslin J. in reliance on the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection in T.A. v. IPAT & Ors.[2023] IEHC 390 (at para. 70) “wellfounded” fear involves both a subjective and objective element and whether a person is in fear subjectively is wholly distinct from an analysis of such State protection as may or may not exist. In this case, however, the Tribunal found the fear to be “objectively” well founded. I understand this to mean that the Tribunal concluded that the apprehended harm as disclosed in the Applicant’s narrative was at a level which constitutes persecution or serious harm and the risk of such harm had been established making the fear “wellfounded” in the sense of being a reasonably held fear. Such wellfounded fear of harm does not give rise to an entitlement to international protection if effective State protection is available”.

104. In their joint appeals before the IPAT, both NS and TS claimed a “Convention nexus” based on religion and belonging to a particular social group, such as to entitle them to a declaration of refugee status. The IPAT concluded that NS and TS had not established a nexus with any of the grounds of persecution under the Geneva Convention and therefore regardless of the well-foundedness of their fears, they could not be deemed to be refugees.

105. In the Applicants’ joint appeals against the decision of the IPO dated 17th November 2022, NS, for example, had stated that she feared persecution on the basis of membership of a particular social group, that she was a woman, and was also promised in marriage, and may be subject to gendered violence, namely further physical and or sexual abuse, stalking or threats and also the Respondents accepted, at the hearing before me, that NS’s parents initial hostile reaction arose from religious grounds. The Applicants also referred to Country of Origin Information and other reports, including inter alia Human Rights Watch which were included in the Applicants’ appeals before the IPAT referenced inter alia high statistical evidence of domestic violence, non-partner violence and sexual violence, tolerance and acceptance of physical abuse against women in relationships in Georgia, including, for example, that one in every four women had experienced genderbased violence in Georgia in their lifetime.

106. The CJEU has brought a focus on the protection needs of persons fleeing gender-based violence in a number of recent cases.

107. In K, L v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, (Case C-646/21), ECLI:EU:C:2024:487, for example, the CJEU endorsed the approach of (then) Advocate General Collins who inter alia observed that “in some societies, women in general may constitute a particular social group because they face systemic discrimination in the enjoyment of their fundamental rights as compared to men.” The CJEU found that equality between women and men entails, inter alia, the right of every woman to be protected against all gender-based violence, the right not to be forced into marriage, the right to subscribe or not to a belief, the right to have her own political opinions and to express them and the right to make her own life choices freely in relation to, inter alia, education, career or activities in the public sphere: see Articles 1 and 3 and Article 4(2) of the Istanbul Convention; Articles 3, 5, 7, 10 and 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“the CEDAW”).

108. In a similar vein in WS C-621/21, Advocate General Jean de la Tour observed that “the concept of ‘distinct identity’ of a group, in that it is perceived differently by the surrounding society, cannot be interpreted as entailing a quantitative assessment” and that “women, solely on account of their condition as women, are an example of a social group defined by innate and immutable characteristics liable to be perceived differently by society, according to their country of origin, by reason of the social, legal or religious norms of that country or the customs of the community to which they belong.”

109. The IPAT did not consider that such circumstances arose in these cases.

110. The IPAT found that the fact of the Applicants’ marriage (a civil marriage which was the only type of marriage recognised by the state of Georgia) eliminated any forced or arranged marriage and therefore there was no basis for any well-founded fear of being persecuted in the form of a forced marriage and that “country of origin information suggests (without expressly saying so)” that arising from the disapproval of the Applicants’ marriage from devout members of the Georgian Orthodox Church, there was a reasonable chance that NS would be “shunned” by her family.

111. In the context of marriage and treatment by her family, the IPAT found that NS did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the form of a forced marriage (as she was now civilly married) but that she may be shunned by her family which did not amount to persecution as defined in section 7 of the 2015 Act.

112. Whilst it might be argued that a more detailed assessment of these matters could have been carried out, counsel for the Respondent submitted, even assuming, for example, that the Applicants had been successful in establishing a Convention nexus (on the above basis), the issue of State protection would still have been required to be assessed, and that was in fact carried out at the end of the process in both the appeals of NS and TS.

113. As Phelan J. found in NG v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535, applying the judgment of Heslin J. in TA v IPAT [2023] IEHC 390, an initial finding of a risk of persecution, or serious harm, along the spectrum of decision-making, are necessarily threshold findings which activate or trigger an assessment of State protection as the next step in the consideration of matters. In these cases, the IPAT moved to an analysis of State protection after finding that there was no risk of persecution (as a Convention nexus had not been established) but that there was a risk of serious harm.

114. Further, the IPAT did find that NS had a fear of being killed and assaulted by IK although, her husband, and not NS herself, had been seriously assaulted by IK (and hospitalised for three days). The IPAT found that NS’s well-founded fear of (potential) assault by IK was not one of the reasons set out in the definition of a refugee, i.e., it was held that there was no Convention nexus and the well-founded fear of persecution did not arise “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group”. Rather, at paragraph (27) of his report dated 19th July 2023, the IPAT found that no Convention nexus had been established and held that “With regard to nexus, the evidence was that [IK]’s hostility to [NS] and her husband is because he wanted to marry her, and not, e.g. because he disapproves of the marriage for religious reasons. The fear of persecution does not exist independently of the threat and so [NS]’s fear of persecution is not because of membership of a social group. There is not a nexus between the fear of persecution and a Convention ground.”

115. There was a basis, therefore, for the submission which was made on behalf of the Respondents at the hearing before me, that NS’s fear of persecution and serious harm arose because IK was angry at her as a thwarted would-be spouse and, therefore, his threat was informed by a vengeance, anger or possessiveness which did not fall into the category of a Convention ground, reason or nexus, i.e., it was submitted that the evidence was that IK’s hostility to NS, and her husband TS, was because he wanted to marry her (was now unable to do so) and not, for example, because he disapproved of her marriage to TS for religious reasons.

116. In BA v IPAT [2020] IEHC 589 the IPAT, in that case, found that there was a reasonable chance that if BA were to be returned to her country of origin, Nigeria, she would face a well-founded fear of persecution from her ex-partner and then proceeded to consider whether state protection was available to her. The IPAT had accepted that BA had a wellfounded fear of persecution on the basis of the threat of gender-based violence from her ex-partner, if she were returned to her country of origin but determined that state protection would be available to her.

117. A similar approach was applied in ES. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613, TA v IPAT [2023] IEHC 390, ZM (MZ) v IPAT [2023] IEHC 637 and NG v IPAT [2023] IEHC 535.

State protection

118. The issues concerning the availability of State protection are the same notwithstanding their application to a claim for refugee status or for subsidiary protection.

119. In terms of State protection, in LAA (Bolivia) & Ors. v RAT & Ors [2016] IEHC 12, the High Court (Stewart J.), at paragraph 19 of her judgment, referred to the test for State protection by reference to the decision of the High Court (Clarke J.) in Idiakheua v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] IEHC 150,1 as follows:

“(19) In Idiakheua v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] IEHC 150, Clarke J. held “the true test is whether the country Clarke J. had referred to the decision in Noone v Secretary of State for the Home Department (unreported, CA, 6th December 2006). concerned provides reasonable protection in practical terms” This is in line with article 7(2) of the 2004 Qualification Directive, which provides the following guidance as to the standard of protection that states are expected to provide:

“Protection is generally provided when the actors [of

protection] take reasonable steps to prevent the

persecution or suffering of serious harm, inter alia, by

operating an effective legal system for the detection,

prosecution and punishment of acts constituting

persecution or serious harm, and the applicant has access

to such protection.”

State protection can never be perfect protection. The existence of legislation proscribing certain practices is not enough to show the existence of state protection. These laws must also be enforced by the state. An applicant for a grant of refugee status must show that the state authorities are failing in some way to protect persons, and this will be with particular regard to their claim, region and other such circumstances.”

120. At paragraph 58 of her judgment in ES v IPAT & Ors [2022] IEHC 613, Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan applied the approach endorsed by the High Court (Barrett J.) in BC v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 (at paragraph 10) where the court held that in considering whether it had been shown that the correct test for State protection had been applied in substance, the following questions were relevant: (1) Does the State in question take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of the serious harm feared by a particular applicant; (2) Do such steps include the operating of an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm; (3) Is such protection effective and of a non-temporary nature; (4) Does the particular applicant have access to such protection.

121. Here, the IPAT addressed the issue of State protection in the context of the specific circumstances as they affected NS and TS.

122. The IPAT, for example, found at paragraph 33 of his report dated 19th July 2023 that “The police investigating the assault on [NS]’s husband [TS] did not continue their investigation when they heard that IK was involved. That constitutes a serious ground to [displace] [sic.] the presumption that Georgia is a safe country of origin for [NS]” and at paragraph 35 of his report that “the police investigating the assault of [NS]’s husband, [TS], dropped the investigation, is relevant to the availability of state protection. It suggests that [IK] is able to stop some policemen investigating a crime. However, [NS]’s husband did not go to another police station; [NS] never made a police report. Neither reported what happened to the Public Defender’s Office.”

123. The analysis of state protection carried out by the IPAT is exactly the same for NS (paragraphs 34-42) and TS (paragraphs 36-44).

124. The following extract is taken from the IPAT report dated 19th July 2023 in the case of NS:

“State protection

(34) Accordingly, the Tribunal will assess state protection without the presumption that Georgia is a safe country of origin. In assessing the availability of state protection the standard of protection need not be absolute: the duty is one to take reasonable steps. The general position is set out in the United States State Department Human Rights Report (2021). Georgia has an effective police and judicial system, although concerns have been expressed about poor treatment of suspects and politically-motivated prosecutions. Neither of those two issues go to the effectiveness of state protection for [NS].

125. As just mentioned, at paragraph (35), the IPAT states:

“That the police investigating the assault of [NS]’s husband, [TS], dropped the investigation, is relevant to the availability of state protection. It suggests that [IK] is able to stop some policemen investigating a crime.”

126. He then states that “However, [NS]’s husband did not go to another police station; [NS] never made a police report. Neither reported what had happened to the Public Defender’s Office.”

127. Beginning at paragraph 36 of his report and decision dated 19th July 2023, the IPAT refers to the role of the public defender’s office in relation to corruption.

128. The IPAT, at paragraphs (38) to (40) of his report and decision dated 19th July 2023, states as follows:

“(38) The impression given is that there are procedures in place to try cases of police misconduct, which are effective except in some cases of a political involvement and even then, it is necessary for a law to be passed to provide impunity. There is not a political overlay to this case which involves a young policeman assaulting a man who married a woman to whom he was promised and then getting his colleagues to drop an investigation.

(39) Even if the police wanting to speak to the [Applicants] in Borjomi was part of [IK]’s efforts to harm [NS] and her husband [TS], the procedures referred to above are in place to provide state protection.

The Tribunal has also considered whether the disapproval of the

Georgian Orthodox Church of [NS]’s marriage could cause state

protection to be ineffective. The country of origin does not support that contention.

(40) The Tribunal finds that Georgia operates an effective and stable police and judicial system which provides effective protection against police misconduct, and which is available to [NS]. That is so notwithstanding that [sic.] the particular policemen who the Appellant’s husband encountered were unwilling to proceed against their colleague…

(41) [NS] did not rely on Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

Nevertheless, the Tribunal has considered the United States State Department Human Rights Reports for Georgia (events of 2021 and events 2022) in that context. The country of origin information does not disclose either indiscriminate violence or the existence of an internal or international armed conflict affecting Georgia (with the ceasefire in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remaining in place). Article 15(c) does not apply to [NS]’s case.

(42) The Tribunal finds that there are not substantial grounds for believing that if she were to be returned to [her] country of origin [NS] would face a real risk of suffering serious harm.

G. Overall Conclusion

(43) For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that [NS] is not entitled to subsidiary protection. Therefore, the Tribunal affirms the recommendation made by the International Protection Officer that [NS] should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration.”

129. I consider that the IPAT’s assessment of State protection in both the cases of NS and TS met the legal requirements set out in the case law and reviewed, for example, by the High Court (Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan) in ES v IPAT & Ors [2022] IEHC 613, where at paragraph (57) of her judgment, Phelan J. stated that “While protection must be effective it is not required to be perfect in order to qualify as effective. Under s. 31 a State is only required to take “reasonable steps” to achieve effective protection and it appears from the terms of s. 31(2)(a) and (b) that protection is to be regarded as being available where reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm are taken and the applicant has access to such protection. Given that what is generally required is that “reasonable steps” are taken to make protection available and that where such steps are taken protection “shall” be regarded as generally provided, it must follow that for the Tribunal to conclude that State protection is available, it is not the case that there must be evidence that both crime and corruption are completely or even substantially under control in a state. Were this the standard there would be few enough states, if any, which might be considered capable of passing the test. Instead, the test turns not on success rates in preventing crime or corruption but on the nature of the measures put in place and whether they can be characterized as “reasonable steps.”

130. Finally, a discrete issue was raised at paragraphs 39 and 40 of NS’s Statement of Grounds, where it is stated that the following proposition was not put to NS during the course of the hearing before the IPAT, which is a reference to the IPAT stating that: “The police were looking for the appellant in Borjomi is equivocal. The appellant believes that [IK] was looking for her; however … There is another possibility … It is plausible they [the applicant’s parents] had reported her missing”.

131. This matter is addressed at paragraph 32 of the IPAT’s report dated 19th July 2023 in the following context and under the sub-heading “Safe country of origin ?”: “(32)That the police were looking for [NS] in Borjomi is equivocal. [NS] believes that [IK] was looking for her; however, the hotel receptionist who spoke to the Appellant and her husband did not describe [IK] (a young man with a bald head). There is another possibility: [NS]’ evidence was that she left hospital surreptitiously to avoid her parents and so it is plausible that they had reported her missing. That the police wanted to speak to [NS] and her husband does not provide a serious ground for finding that state protection is not available to her”.

132. In addition, I do not consider that this amounts to a breach of fair procedures. In his reports assessing both the applications of NS and TS, the IPAT afforded the Applicants the benefit of the rebuttable presumption or evidential advantage in section 28(6) of the 2015 Act and ultimately concluded in both cases that State protection was available (see also the observations of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan at paragraphs (27) and (28) of her judgment in NG v IPAT & Ors [2023] IEHC 535).

133. Accordingly, for the reasons set out in this judgment, I shall refuse each of the Applicants the reliefs claimed by way of judicial review.

PROPOSED ORDER

134. In the circumstances, I shall refuse the applications for relief by way of judicial review in the proceedings entitled Record No. 2023/898 JR and Record No. 2023/899 JR.

135. My initial view is that as the Respondents having been entirely successful, they are entitled to their costs, including reserved costs.

136. I will, however, hear the parties in relation to these matters and any ancillary or consequential matters which arise and whether having regard to the Legal Services Act 2015, including ss. 168 and 169, and the (re-cast) Order 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986, a different costs order should be made.

137. I shall put the matter in for mention on Thursday 30th October 2025 at 10.30am.

APPEARANCES

138. In the proceedings with Record No. 2023/898 JR, Colm O’Dwyer SC and Harriett Burgess BL appeared for the Applicant instructed by Daly Kurshid Solicitors; Helen- Claire O’Hanlon BL appeared for the Respondents instructed by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office.

139. In the proceedings with Record No. 2023/899 JR, Colm O’Dwyer SC and Harriett Burgess BL appeared for the Applicant instructed by Daly Kurshid Solicitors; Helen- Claire O’Hanlon BL appeared for the Respondents instructed by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office.

CONLETH BRADLEY

23rd October 2025