High Court dismisses appeal against enforcement of Norwegian maintenance decision under Hague Convention 2007.
Legislator summary
AI generatedThe High Court dismissed the defendant's appeal against an enforcement order for child maintenance from Norway. The appellant argued he was unaware of the proceedings, but the court found proper notice had been served and the opportunity to challenge existed. The court refused to re-litigate the merits of the Norwegian authority's calculations, stating such matters fall outside the scope of enforcement appeals under the Hague Convention.
Legislator headnote
AI generatedHague Convention 2007, Articles 22 and 23: A challenge to enforcement must rely on specific statutory grounds such as public policy or fraud; the court cannot re-examine the merits of the foreign decision or second-guess the assessment of income and debt.
Keywords
AI generatedCited Legislation
AI generatedRelated Decisions
AI generatedFull text
THE HIGH COURT
[2025] IEHC 567
Record No. 2021 27 MCA
BETWEEN
K.W.
APPLICANT
AND
M.L.M.
RESPONDENT
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT delivered by Mr. Justice Sean Gillane on 17 October 2025
1. This is an application by the defendant/appellant appealing an enforcement order made by the Deputy Master of the High Court on the 14th of July 2023 in respect of a decision made by the Collection Agency of the Norway Labour and Welfare Administration (“NAV”) in relation to maintenance payable to the plaintiff/respondent in respect of a child of the parties born on the xxxxxxxxx 2013.
2. The Requested Central Authority in this jurisdiction is the Central Authority for Maintenance Recovery Abroad in the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration.
3. The legal basis for making an enforcement order is the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance 2007. Certain provisions of the 2007 Convention are of particular relevance to the appeal before the Court.
4. Article 20 sets out the bases for recognition and enforcement made in another contracting state.
5. Article 23 sets out the procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement. Before considering Article 23, it should be observed that Article 22 sets out the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement:
“Recognition and enforcement of a decision may be refused if -
a. recognition and enforcement of the decision is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (“ordre public”) of the State addressed; b. the decision was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure; c. proceedings between the same parties and having the same purpose are pending before an authority of the State addressed and those proceedings were the first to be instituted; d. the decision is incompatible with a decision rendered between the same parties and having the same purpose, either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that this latter decision fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition and enforcement in the State addressed;
e. in a case where the respondent has neither appeared nor was
represented in proceedings in the State of origin –
i. when the law of the State of origin provides for notice of
proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard; or
ii. when the law of the State of origin does not provide for notice of the proceedings, the respondent did not have proper notice of the
decision and an opportunity to challenge or appeal it on fact and law; or f. the decision was made in violation of Article 18.”
6. Article 18 relates to circumstances where “the creditor remains habitually resident in the State where the decision was made.”
7. Articles 27 and 28 also have a particular relevance in the context of this appeal. Article
27 provides that “any competent authority of the State addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the authority of the State of origin based its jurisdiction.” Article 28 provides that “there shall be no review by any competent authority of the State addressed of the merits of a decision.”
8. In relation to the documentary material which ought to be before the Court on such an application, Article 25 provides that “an application for recognition and enforcement under Article 23 … shall be accompanied by the following – a. a complete text of the decision; b. a document stating that the decision is enforceable in the State of origin and, in the case of a decision by an administrative authority, a document stating that the requirements of Article 19(3) are met unless that State has specified in accordance with Article 57 that decisions of its administrative authorities always meet those requirements;
c. if the respondent did not appear and was not represented in the proceedings in the State of origin, a document or documents attesting, as appropriate, either that the respondent had proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, or that the respondent had proper notice of the decision and the opportunity to challenge or appeal it on fact and law; d. where necessary, a document showing the amount of any arrears and the date such amount was calculated; e. where necessary, in the case of a decision providing for automatic adjustment by indexation, a document providing the information necessary to make the appropriate calculations; f. where necessary, documentation showing the extent to which the applicant received free legal assistance in the State of origin.”
9. In this case, a statement of enforceability of a decision, as required under Article 25(1)(b) of the Convention, was provided.
10. A statement of proper notice was also provided and transmitted, as required under Article 25(1)(c), confirming that the respondent had “proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard” as well as “proper notice of the decision and an opportunity to challenge or appeal it on fact and law.”
11. Further, the competent authority in Norway for establishing maintenance decisions is an administrative authority and, as required under Article 25(1)(b), Norway has confirmed “in accordance with Article 57 that decisions of its administrative authorities always meet [the requirements of Article 19(3)]” i.e., that they “may be made the subject of an appeal to or review by a judicial authority; and have a similar force and effect to a decision of a judicial authority on the same matter.”
12. Also provided was a letter headed ‘Confirmation’ dated the 28th of July 2020 certifying that the collection agency has the right to collect child support on behalf of one of the custodial parents under Article 5 of the Norwegian Act on Recovery of Maintenance Allowance of the 29th of April 2005. Indexation of child support was enclosed setting out the dates and change in percentage together with a document setting out the amount due each year with a reconciliation of same and the arrears due as of July 2020. Further up-to-date statements have been furnished by the Central Authority including a reconciliation dated the 18th of July 2024 setting out the arrears due.
13. The relevant decisions of the Requesting Authority are dated the 7th of November 2014, the 4th of August 2017 and the 9th of December 2020.
14. The defendant/appellant has sworn a number of affidavits in these proceedings dated the 12th of September 2023, the 13th of May 2024, and the 28th of February 2025.
15. I observe, and do no more than observe, that these affidavits are in English and that there does not appear to be an affidavit of translation. The defendant/appellant speaks Polish and presented his appeal personally in Polish with the assistance of an interpreter, who was sworn for that purpose, and a Mackenzie Friend.
16. He says that he lived in Norway briefly in 2013 when his son was born. The relationship with the plaintiff/respondent ended shortly thereafter and he moved to Ireland.
17. In summary, the defendant/appellant makes the case that that he was not aware of any orders made by the Norwegian National Office for Social Insurance regarding maintenance payments and that he was not notified, nor did he receive any documentation, about those decisions prior to 2020.
18. He also makes the case that he had informally made substantial payments directly to the ‘custodial parent’ i.e., the plaintiff/respondent, over a period of years and that this had not been taken into account by NAV in calculating the maintenance sums due.
19. He says that he was not trying to avoid paying maintenance and that he was in effect discharging his maintenance obligations directly to the mother of the child. He claims that this arrangement was agreed with the plaintiff/respondent, albeit there is no direct evidence of any such agreement and it is clear that she initiated the application to NAV for a determination in respect of maintenance. He also says that he incurred significant travel expenses in visiting his son which have not been taken into account.
20. He says that the calculations were based on an inaccurate and approximate assessment of his earnings. He says that he only became aware of the maintenance that he owes in November 2020 and that he never had a chance to ask for a recalculation of the sums owing or to appeal the decisions made by NAV.
21. He expressly asks the court to review his case and to take into account his previous and current financial situation in order to come up with “the best solution” and, in that regard, he has exhibited a large number of miscellaneous receipts and other documents in respect of what he says are payments connected to his son.
22. Two affidavits in reply have been filed by the Legal Aid Board on the instructions of the Central Authority: an affidavit of Yvonne Walsh dated the 15th of May 2024 and a further affidavit of Cassandra Egan-Langley dated the 30th of June 2025.
23. Of note, Ms. Walsh exhibits documentation from NAV which states that the defendant/appellant called NAV on the 6th of January 2014 after receiving “proper notice” to talk about the case and confirm receipt of the advance notice written in Polish. He also called NAV on the 24th and 25th of February 2015. On the latter occasion, it is suggested that the defendant/appellant said that he did not want to pay maintenance where he had no visitation rights. NAV also indicated that the defendant/appellant was informed on several occasions to stop making direct payments because of the risk that those payments would not be considered as child support.
24. The case history provided records that since 2020 this advice has been repeated on a number of occasions in communications with NAV, including through a lawyer acting on his behalf. Of some importance in relation to the 6th of January 2014 conversation about the advance notice, the defendant/appellant says that he does not recall the conversation but could not rule out that it took place. He also says that he does not recall the 25th of February 2015 conversation.
25. In the course of this appeal hearing, the defendant/appellant conceded that he had a lawyer acting on his behalf engage with NAV in late 2013 or early 2014.
26. Ms. Egan-Langley also exhibits the advance notice regarding claim for child support addressed to the defendant/appellant dated the 17th of September 2020 and the child support decision dated the 9th of December 2020. That decision refers, on its face, to tax returns submitted to NAV by the defendant/appellant.
27. She points out that the miscellaneous documents submitted by the defendant/appellant (some of which are not translated) establish at best small, sporadic, discretionary payments rather than arrears of maintenance. She also points out, and it was submitted to me in the course of this hearing, that in any event the Central Authority had set a ‘nil’ maintenance order for a period of time from the 1st of February 2017 and therefore suggested payments from 2018 to 2020 could not be regarded as double payments as alleged.
28. She also exhibits a letter from the Central Authority dated the 5th of April 2025 wherein it is clear that the question of direct payments was in fact considered by the Central Authority and further that the defendant/appellant was asked to document all direct payments he claims to have made during the period of the 1st of December 2013 to the 31st of January 2017. She further exhibits a statement of arrears from January 2021 which reflects the above and shows credit for a small number of direct payments.
29. The notice of motion initiating the appeal is somewhat bald and it is not clear from the papers filed what provisions of the Hague Convention the defendant/appellant is relying on.
30. Article 23(7) of the Convention provides that “a challenge or appeal may be founded only on the following – a. the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement set out in Article 22; b. the bases for recognition and enforcement under Article 20; c. the authenticity or integrity of any document transmitted in accordance with Article 25(1) a), b) or d) or (3) b).”
31. Article 23(8) further provides that “a challenge or an appeal by a respondent may also be founded on the fulfilment of the debt to the extent that the recognition and enforcement relates to payments that fell due in the past.”
32. The defendant/appellant does not appear to frame his complaint in terms of any of those identified bases. It is not suggested that recognition and enforcement of the decision would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of Ireland under Article 22(a) of the Convention. Further, it is not maintained, and certainly not established, that “the
decision was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure” under Article 22(b).
33. In relation to Article 22(e), it is undoubtedly the case that the defendant/appellant argues, in general terms, that he was unaware of the decisions being made in respect of maintenance and the sum of money owed.
34. However, it is clear that a statement of proper notice has been furnished to the Central Authority, as required under Article 25, confirming notice and the opportunity to challenge or appeal. It further appears to me that, even on the evidence submitted by the defendant/appellant himself, he must have at least been aware of the initiation of the process so he cannot now rely on the argument that he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard, particularly in circumstances where I find it established that he had a number of communications with and from the Central Authority, including communication through a lawyer acting on his behalf.
35. I am of the view that the defendant/appellant is in truth seeking to have the merits of the decision of the Requesting Authority revisited by this Court and re-litigated in a manner expressly prohibited by Articles 27 and 28 of the Convention. He may well feel aggrieved at the manner in which the sum calculated as due and owing was arrived at and the way in which his own income levels were assessed. However, these are classically matters for the decision maker and it is not the function of the High Court to second guess those assessments in an application such as this for enforcement under the Convention.
36. In the circumstances, I feel compelled to uphold the decision of the Deputy Master and refuse the appeal.