High Court refuses leave for judicial review challenging the constitutionality of the 2025 presidential nomination process.

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

[2025] IEHC 561

RECORD NO. 2025/1412JR

BETWEEN

CORA M. STACK

APPLICANT

-AND-

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, IRELAND, THE MINISTER FOR HOUSING

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HERITAGE, THE PRESIDENTIAL

RETURNING OFFICER AND THE TÁINISTE

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Mark Heslin delivered on the 23rd day of October 2025

Introduction

1. According to the applicant's submissions, she seeks “declarations and orders…recognising that the 2025 presidential nomination process was unconstitutional, unfair and undemocratic, contrary to express and implied provisions of Bunreacht na hEireann”.

2. On 24 September 2025, the respondents were put ‘on notice’ of the application for leave to seek judicial review. I heard that application throughout Tuesday 14 October and, at the conclusion of the hearing, I committed to delivering a decision by 10:30 a.m. on Thursday, 23 October.

3. Before going further, I want to acknowledge the time and energy which the applicant has clearly devoted to the pleadings and to extensive written submissions which she provided to me on the day of the hearing (supplemented by further written submissions on 21 October). Although not a legal professional, the applicant (who represented herself, with assistance from a ‘McKenzie friend’) also made oral submissions during the hearing with great energy, obvious conviction and, at times, heightened emotion, reflecting what would appear to be her passionate belief in the correctness of her position. I also want to expressing my thanks to Ms. O'Neill S.C. who provided detailed written submissions for the respondents, supplemented by oral submissions of great clarity. All submissions were carefully considered by me in order to reach the decision which follows. Reference to the applicant’s written submissions is to those provided to me and relied upon by the applicant during the hearing on 14 October, unless otherwise indicated.

The applicant’s position

4. The applicant summarises matters in the following terms at para. 9 (page 12) of the final version of her written submissions:

“The 2025 presidential nomination process failed to satisfy constitutional minima:

- Article 12: the right to seek nomination existed only on paper.

- Article 40.1: substantive equality was displaced by structural inequality.

- Articles 1 and 6: the people's sovereignty was supplanted by party command through a categorical national directive.

- Article 34: access to justice was obstructed by design and omission.

- Combined effect: these failures constitute a constructive denial of constitutional justice and reached the state’s duty under article 40.3.1° “to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen”.

- The applicant's experience: Dr. Stack’s own experience demonstrates how an ordinary citizen can be excluded from public life through procedural manipulation and institutional neglect. This application seeks to restore constitutional integrity so that every citizen, regardless of party affiliation, as a genuine and equal opportunity to stand for president.

- Real access. Real equality. Real democracy. Real justice.”

The question for this court

5. The question for this court is whether the applicant is entitled to leave to seek judicial review, the following being the reliefs sought at paragraph D of the applicant’s statement of grounds:

"1. A declaration that the presidential nomination process has been conducted unlawfully and in breach of Article 12 of the Constitution.

2. A declaration that the direction of the Tánaiste, Mr Simon Harris, instructing all Fine Gael councillors nationwide to block independent candidates from being nominated was unlawful, unconstitutional, and a breach of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended).

3. An order restraining the respondents from proceeding with the current defective process.

4. An injunction requiring the nomination process to be conducted lawfully, fairly, and constitutionally.

5. A declaration that the blocking of candidates amounts to wrongdoing and severe penalisation within the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act.

6. Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems just.

7. An order for costs.”

The test for leave

6. With regard to the current test for leave to seek judicial review, O'Donnell C.J. stated the following at para. 39 of his judgment in O’Doherty v. Minister for Health & Others [2023] 2 I.R. 488 at 517; [2022] IESC 32 (“O’Doherty”):

“It is clear that the threshold of arguability in G. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 I.R. 374 is a relatively low bar, but, as Birmingham P. said in the Court of Appeal, it is not a non-existent threshold. It is worth recalling in this context the observation of Charleton J.

in O.O. (a minor) v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2015] IESC 26:

“15. …Any issue in law can be argued: but that is not the test. A point of law is only arguable within the meaning of the relevant decisions if it could, by the standards of a rational preliminary analysis, ultimately have a prospect of success”.

7. Later in O’Doherty, at para. 40, the Chief Justice went on to state:

“It is also well-established, and now provided for by O. 84, r. 24(1) RSC, that a court may direct that an application for leave to seek judicial review be heard on notice to the respondent. This permits a respondent to put evidence before the court and to advance argument. However, it must also be taken as established that this procedure does not alter the threshold test, and which remains that set out in G. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 I.R. 374 (see the observations of Denham J. in D.C. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] IESC 77, [2005] 4 I.R. 281). The question remains, therefore, whether an arguable case has been established. But moreover, and importantly, that decision must now be made in the light of the evidence submitted by a respondent, and the arguments adduced.”

8. In the present application the respondents have not adduced evidence but have advanced a range of arguments as to why the applicant’s case fails to reach the relatively low ‘bar’ of arguability. My judgment looks closely at the case for which the applicant seeks leave, in order to determine, by the standards of a rational preliminary analysis, whether it has a prospect of success.

9. Before leaving the Supreme Court's decision in O’Doherty, it is appropriate to note that, at para. 108, the Chief Justice stated:

“It is, I think, an important principle, that if a person seeks to challenge a measure they must show, at a minimum, that they were adversely affected by it, or reasonably anticipated such adverse impact: see Mohan v. Ireland [2019] IESC 18, [2021] 1 I.R. 293.”

10. Throughout this application, the applicant seeks to rely on the position of others who sought to be nominated, as the following averments illustrate:

“I say that in Meath County Council on 23 September 2025, independent candidate Gareth Sheridan's nomination was lost narrowly by 14 votes to 13, with five abstentions and eight absentees (Roscommon Herald, September 2025)…”

(Paragraph 8 of the applicant's second affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

“I say that only two councils, Kerry and Tipperary, nominated an independent candidate, Gareth Sheridan. This fell short of the four required. No other independent succeeded in obtaining counsel nominations.”

(Paragraph 15 of the applicant's second affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

“In Kilkenny, a candidate was curtailed mid speech and prevented from completing his remarks…”

(Paragraph 12 of the applicant's second affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

“Independent candidates were obstructed by arbitrary rules, imposing scheduling, exclusion, and silent blocking.”

(Paragraph 6 of the applicant's third affidavit sworn on 30th September 25);

“In Wexford on 19 September, more than a dozen candidates presented. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael councillors voted as a block to prevent any nomination…”

(Paragraph 11 of the applicant's third affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

“In Laois on 15 September, Gareth Sheridan was proposed and seconded but defeated 11 to 8 under block voting…”

(Paragraph 12 of the applicant's third affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

“In several counties, no meeting was held at all, denying Independents any opportunity to be considered.”

(Paragraph 14 of the applicant's third affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025).

Jus tertii

11. As Henchy J. explained in Cahill v. Sutton [1980] IR 269 (at p. 280) an applicant is not “…allowed to conjure up, invoke and champion the putative constitutional rights of a hypothetical third-party…”. The foregoing was an expression of the well-established jus tertii principle (the Latin phrase meaning “the right of a third party”). In the present application, it is clear that the applicant repeatedly seeks, in breach of the jus tertii principle, to rely on the position of other would-be candidates.

12. Furthermore, and with respect to her own position, it is impossible to understand how any of the complaints she articulates in her statement of grounds could conceivably have had any material bearing on her prospects of being nominated. This is in circumstances where, despite having sworn three affidavits, the applicant does not provide any evidence of even the most basic matters such as (i) what Councils required a proposer and seconder; (ii) whether any Councillor proposed her; (iii) whether she had a seconder on any Council; (iv) what, if any, efforts she went to in order to try and secure the foregoing.

13. Given the state of the evidence - which, as I say, does not disclose even the minimum level of support represented by a proposer/seconder on any Council - I am not satisfied that the facts averred by the applicant would be sufficient, if proved, to support a stateable ground for the various reliefs which the applicant wants leave to seek by way of judicial review. This is by no means the end of the analysis, however. I know turn to the various “Grounds” which, according to the applicant, constitute the basis for the relief she wishes leave to see. It is convenient to address grounds A and G together.

Grounds A and G

A. The Tánaiste, Mr Simon Harris, unlawfully interfered with the constitutional process of council nominations by instructing all Fine Gael councillors nationwide to block independent candidates from being nominated. This directive not only violated Article 12 of Bunreacht na hEireann but also constituted penalisation of candidates engaged in, or preparing, protected disclosures, contrary to the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended).

G. Councillors affiliated with Fine Fail and Sinn Féin were likewise believed to be subjected to party whip instructions and under undue pressure not to nominate independent candidates.

14. Turning to the applicant’s written submissions, she asserts inter alia:

“The Fine Gael block (whip) block order ‘instruction to Councillors not to nominate’ and other political party strategic blocking of non-party candidates was a disproportionate measure, an extra bar only for non-party candidates outside the political party candidates in the presidential race, which is not constitutional…

The block order (whip) should be struck down as an unconstitutional, disproportionate measure which was excessively onerous for non-party candidates who are not ‘politicians’ or members of these political parties. Neither is the President a political role, it's meant to be independent from politics. The block was arbitrary, harsh and severe and arguably oppressive against non-party candidates (minorities)…

The block has implemented without any regard for constitutional rights of those that with a lawful right to seek nominations…

It represented an undue impediment on the otherwise lawful right of the candidate to be nominated…”

[p. 3 (of 17) of the applicants legal submissions (emphasis added)];

“A party whip (block order) should never be used against unelected ordinary citizens…

Using whip to not nominate, to oppose to block non-party candidates was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. Whether it was done to protect party candidates who were perceived as vulnerable or out of bias towards anyone not espousing establishment views remains uncertain. Perhaps it was both.”

[p. 5 of the applicant's legal submissions (emphasis added)]

15. As the foregoing makes clear, the applicant contends that the 2025 presidential nomination process is unconstitutional and unlawful by reason of the treatment of “non-party

candidates”; “those” seeking nomination; “ordinary” citizens; and “minorities” and it is not necessary

to explain again the significance of the jus tertii principle. In terms of evidence, the applicant makes inter alia the following averments:

"I am a prospective independent candidate for the 2025 Presidential Election"

(para. 2 of the applicant's 24 September 2025 affidavit);

"I hold a PhD in mathematics and was awarded the 2025 Ramanujan Memorial Award for excellence in academic leadership"

(para. 1 of second affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

"I say that in 2025, independent candidates were systematically blocked from securing the four Council nominations required under Article 12 of the Constitution and s.16 of the Presidential Election Act 1993"

(para. 3 of the applicant's second affidavit, sworn on 30 September 2025);

"I say that the consistency of outcomes across Councils, the direct instruction from Fine Gael HQ to councillors to block independence, and block voting by Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein in certain Councils established a coordinated pattern of obstruction.

I say that the effect was to close down the only viable path for independent candidates who could not access 20 Oireachtas nominations, thereby distorting the constitutional process envisaged under Article 12.

I say that the wholesale departure from the precedent of 2018, where independents were considered and nominated by councils, further supports the inference of deliberate manipulation."

(Paragraphs 18–20 of the applicant's second affidavit);

"Independent candidates were obstructed by arbitrary rules, impossible scheduling, exclusion, and silent blocking"

(para. 6 of the applicant's third affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025);

"I respectfully say that beyond the balance of probability, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, Sinn Fein, and the Social Democrats engaged in coordinated silent blocking of independents.

The practical result was that in many councils there was no candidate to vote for, a constitutional distortion unprecedented in Presidential Elections"

(para. 15 and 16 of the applicants third affidavit);

"Councillors who might vote with conscience fear retaliation from party whips"

(para. 24 of the applicant's third affidavit);

"Articles 12, 34, 40.1 and 40.3 guarantee equality before the law, fair procedures, and access to justice.

Blocking practices and the legislative vacuum breached these guarantees.

They also breach Article 3, Protocol 1 of the ECHR (Free elections) and articles 39 and 47 of the EU Charter (right to stand, right to an effective remedy)"

(paras. 26 to 28 of the applicant's third affidavit).

16. As can be seen from the foregoing, the applicant objects to the role played by political parties in the nomination process. That being so, two issues seen to deserve emphasis. First, no specific evidence is needed for me to say that the existence and operation of political parties stretches back centuries before the enactment of the Constitution. As the learned authors explain in “JM Kelly: The Irish Constitution” (Hogan & Whyte, 4th Edition, Tuttle Publishing at P. 1804 [7.5.192]):

“Political parties as such are not mentioned in the Constitution – the right to form and join political parties is taken for granted as simply a normal product of the right of association, or, in the terms of the older common law, as part of the range of activity which, not being unlawful, was therefore inferentially lawful…”

17. Second, the role of the ‘whip’ in relation to decision making by members of a political party, also predates the enactment of the 1936 Constitution by generations. Indeed, half a century earlier as revered a political figure as Charles Stewart Parnell was renowned for imposing ‘iron’ discipline on party members. As the celebrated historian F.S.L. Lyons wrote in his definitive biography of Parnell:

“Undoubtedly the most important commitment entered into by a successful candidate, and to which he had to give his written assent before nomination – was the party pledge. In and after 1885 it was required in principle of all candidates…and the essence of the undertaking was that the candidate pledged himself, if elected, to ‘sit, act and vote with the Irish Parliamentary Party’. In addition the candidate promised to resign his seat if at a specially convened meeting a majority of the whole party decided that they had not fulfilled the pledge.“ (“Charles Stewart Parnell”; F.S.L. Lyons; Oxford University Press; p. 256)

18. Given that the role of the ‘whip’ in political decision-making cannot have been unknown to the drafters of the 1936 Constitution, it is appropriate to look at what is contained in Art.12, including:

“12.4

1° Every citizen who has reached his thirty-fifth year of age is eligible for election to the office of President.

2° Every candidate for election, not a former or retiring President, must be nominated either by

i not less than twenty persons, each of whom is at the time a member of one of the Houses of the Oireachtas, or

ii by the Councils of not less than four administrative Counties (including County Boroughs)

as defined by law.

3° No person and no such Council shall be entitled to subscribe to the nomination of more than one candidate in respect of the same election.

4° Former or retiring Presidents may become candidates on their own nomination.

5° Where only one candidate is nominated for the office of President it shall not be necessary to proceed to a ballot for his election.

5. Subject to the provisions of this Article, elections for the office of President shall be regulated by law…”

19. Three points seem to me to arise. First, Art. 12 imposes a specific restriction relevant to

decision-making by Councils (and, thus, binding on the Councillors who, collectively, comprise the

decision-makers in each Council) in relation to the nomination of candidates for a Presidential election, i.e. under Art. 12.4. 3°, no Council can nominate more than one candidate for the same election. That being so, it seems to me that if the will of the Irish people was to impose another restriction, i.e. the condition that no political party ‘whip’, direction, or request shall apply to

decision-making by Councillors, with regard to Art. 12.4.3°, it was open to the People to specify same in Art. 12. The People made no such choice.

20. Second, “Local Government” is specifically referred to in Art. 28A of the Constitution, which begins:

1. The State recognises the role of local government in providing a forum for the democratic representation of local communities, in exercising and performing at local level powers and functions conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives the interests of such communities.

2. There shall be such directly elected local authorities as may be determined by law and their powers and functions shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the so determined and shall be exercised and performed in accordance with law (emphasis added)

21. Bearing in mind that local authorities are comprised of directly-elected politicians, there is nothing in 28A which excludes the use of a ‘whip’, direction, or request by a political party, of which a local Councillor may be a member, with regard to the carrying out, by a Council, of its “powers and functions”. This is despite the fact that Art. 28A makes explicit that the performance by local authorities of their powers and duties shall be “subject to the provisions of the Constitution”.

22. Third, in the manner mandated by Art. 12.5, the regulation of Presidential elections is set out in legislation. Similarly, as Art. 28A provides, the powers and functions of a Council shall be exercised and performed in accordance with law. Despite this, the applicant can point to no law passed by the Oireachtas which prohibits individual Councillors from voting in accordance with any ‘whip’, direction, or request by any political party of which that Councillor may be a member, to support, or not, the party’s nominee, and/or not to support an alternative candidate or would-be candidate. Nor, as I say, does any such restriction appear in the very places in the Constitution where such a restriction would naturally be found (i.e. Art. 12 and/or Art 28A).

23. In short, no law imposes the restrictions on Councillors which the applicant contends for. Thus, in substance, she seeks to have this court write laws which do not reflect the will of the Irish People, as expressed in the Constitution itself and by means of legislation enacted by the Oireachtas. I have no hesitation is saying that this court has no jurisdiction to do what the applicant urges.

24. Turning to the law as duly enacted on behalf of the People, s. 16 of the Presidential Elections Act, 1993 ("the 1993 Act") provides:

“(1) A council of a county or a corporation of a county borough may, by resolution (of the intention to propose which not less than 3 clear days’ notice has been given in writing to every person who, at the time when such notice is given, is a member of the council or the corporation, as appropriate) resolve to nominate one named person to be a candidate at a presidential election.

(2) A resolution under this section shall not be passed before the date of the making of the presidential election order in respect of the presidential election to which the resolution relates and, subject to sections 30 and 31, such a resolution shall not be rescinded…”

25. Thus, s. 16 of the 1993 Act deals with notice requirements and the applicant does not allege that any of these requirements have been breached. Nor does the applicant contend that any other provisions in the 1993 Act have not been complied with. Furthermore, it should be noted that s. 16(1) of the 1993 Act empowers but does not require a Council to nominate a candidate, the words employed being “may…resolve to nominate” (emphasis added).

Interpretation

26. Whilst acknowledging that there are various different approaches which can be taken to interpreting the constitution, a starting point is the ‘literal’ approach. In the People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. O'Shea [1982] IR 384, O’Higgins CJ stated (at 397):

“The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the State, must be accepted, interpreted and construed according to the words which are used; and these words, where the meaning is plain and unambiguous, must be given their literal meaning. Of course, the Constitution must be construed as a whole and [not] merely in parts and, where doubts or ambiguity exists, regard may be had to other provisions of the Constitution and to the situation which obtained and the laws which were in force when it was enacted. Plain words must, however, be given their plain meaning unless qualified or restricted by the Constitution itself.”

(emphasis added)

27. The plain meaning of the words used in Art. 12.4 is not qualified or restricted elsewhere in the Constitution. Thus, underpinning grounds A and G is the assertion that Art. 12 contains an unexpressed restriction i.e. the prohibition upon Councillors acting in accordance with a decision by their political party as regards the nomination, or not, of candidates for a presidential election.

28. Regardless of how ‘broad’ or ‘purposive’ the approach to Constitutional interpretation (i.e. with the focus on the ‘spirit’ rather than the ‘letter’ of the document) it is impossible to discern in the Constitution the restriction which the applicant seeks leave to argue for.

29. What has been called the ‘harmonious’ method of interpretation (i.e. one which emphasises that different parts of the Constitution must be read, not in isolation from each other, but as a set of complementary principles to be interpreted in light of the whole document) produces no different outcome and cannot assist the applicant, in my view.

Checks and balances

30. Among the oral submissions made by the applicant was to contend that the ability of County Councils to nominate presidential candidates amounts to essential ‘checks and balances’ on the power of members of the Oireachtas. With respect, there is simply nothing in the Constitution, or legislation, which offers any credible basis for this submission. Nor has the applicant furnished any authority which would render this submission anything more than a ‘bald’ assertion.

31. Similarly, the applicant made oral submissions to the effect that “It is perfectly possible and right for the whip to be used in the normal way in the Dail, but not in relation to the Presidential election”, because, contends the applicant, it would interfere with the Councils’ “checks and balances” on Oireachtas power. For the reasons explained in this judgment, this is also a mere assertion, lacking any support in fact or law.

Political decisions

32. It also seems to me that the applicant’s intended claim faces another fundamental and insurmountable difficulty, in circumstances where it seems to me that a decision to support, or not, the nomination of a candidate for election for the office of President is quintessentially a political

decision.

33. In David Kavanagh v. The Coalition Government of Ireland and Another [2023] IESC DET 61, (“Kavanagh”) the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal against a decision by this court (Meenan J.) to refuse leave to seek judicial review. In Kavanagh, the applicant wished to challenge the constitutionality of the agreement reached in 2020 by the parties involved in the then government as to the successive nomination of the leaders of the two larger parties for the position of Taoiseach. At para. 8 the Supreme Court stated:

“The reasons why the individual members of the Dáil vote for a nominee have no relevance to the constitutional validity of the nomination. This is not, as a matter of law, affected by any political agreement that may have been entered into between individual members-such an agreement is of political significance only…” (emphasis added).

34. The principle at play in Kavanagh seems equally relevant in the present case. I acknowledge that the position in question was that of Taoiseach and any political agreement that may have been entered into was between members of the Dáil who made up the political parties in question. However, the same principle seems to me to apply to decision-making within a political party as between political parties. In other words, if agreements between political parties as to who would be nominated are “of political significance only” giving rise to no claim “as a matter of law”, the same must be the case in relation to any decisions made within a political party as to whom they may or may not nominate to contest an election. In other words, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kavanagh seems to me to make the following clear. A decision by the leader of a political party that only its nominee will be supported; a decision communicated to party members to support no other would-be candidate(s); and an individual decision by a local politician to support, or not, a wouldbe candidate are all political decisions. They are decisions of political significance only. They give rise to no claim as a matter of law.

35. Counsel for the respondent also directed my attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Beades v. Ireland [2019] 2 IR 582 (“Beades”) wherein (at 607) Dunne J. stated that following, at para. 61:

“The learned trial judge in this case noted that there was nothing in the pleadings to suggest or contend that the Government had acted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution in nominating Kelly J. for appointment as President of the High Court. Clearly, the decision of the Government to nominate a person as President of the High Court is a function within the remit of the Government. It is a decision that falls within the boundary of political choice, to use the language of Charleton J. referred to above in Garda Representative Association v. Minister for Finance. As such, being a matter of political choice it is simply not possible for the Court to interfere with the discretion of the Government exercised in an area of political decision making. It seems to me that the decision of the Government to nominate an individual as President of the High Court could only be regarded as a 'political' decision of the Government and one in which the Government is at large, subject to ensuring that the person concerned meets the eligibility requirements for such office, and secondly, provided that the Government has complied with the statutory obligation to first have regard to sitting judges.”

36. In the present case, the relevant constitutional and statutory requirements have been complied with, in full. In substance, the applicant seeks leave to argue that political decision-making rendered the nomination process unlawful. Having regard to the principles articulated in Kavanagh and in Beades, I take the view that the applicant’s claim is simply not arguable.

37. I am fortified in this view by the decision of Kearns P. in Doherty v. Government of Ireland [2011] 2 IR 222 (“Doherty”) wherein (at p.71) the learned judge stated: “… the court has no right to conduct any sort of watchdog role over events which call for consideration within the political arena”.

38. In circumstances where, in the manner set out in the foregoing authorities, decisions within the boundary of political choice are not justiciable, the same must hold true in relation to (i) decisions within a given political party of which a particular councillor may be a member as to what candidate may be supported or not; and (ii) the effect, if any, on such political choice as the individual councillor may make in the context of Art. 12.4. 2° decision-making.

39. Counsel for the respondents also drew my attention to the decision in Lennon v. Minister for Environment (Irish Times, 23 October 1990) (“Lennon”). Commenting on the decision, the learned author of “Politics, Elections and the Law” (Whelan, Blackhall Publishing, at p. 67) stated:

“In Lennon v. Minister for the Environment, it was argued that the provisions of the Constitution were contrary to the common good in that they gave elected politicians an unfair hold over the choice available to the people. The plaintiff's application for an injunction to halt that year's Presidential election was rejected.”

40. It is clear (from the admittedly very brief report) that the argument made by Mr. Lennon three and a half decades ago, and rejected, is strikingly similar to that which the applicant wishes to advance. As the report of the case states, the applicant in Lennon:

“… said the provisions of Article 12.4.2 of the Constitution were contrary to the common good of the Irish people in that they permitted elected politicians to unfairly limit the choice of the people who could be elected as President.”

41. The applicant avers inter alia that “councillors who might vote with conscience fear retaliation from party whips”. The applicant has adduced no evidence that even a single Councillor wished to, but did not, support her out of “fear” of “retaliation from party whips”. Leaving that aside, and at the risk of repetition, I take the view that the principles articulated in Doherty; Beades; and Kavanagh mean that the imposition, or not, by a political party, of a ‘whip’ in respect of a decision to support, or not, a would-be Presidential candidate, and the consequences, if any, for the wouldbe candidate and for the member of the political party, are simply not matters for this court. In other words, grounds A and G raise political, as opposed to legal, questions which are non-justiciable (i.e. they are not matters this court has jurisdiction to deal with).

42. In addition to the foregoing analysis, on Monday of this week, Mr Justice Cregan delivered judgment in Byrne v. The Tainiste & Ors (“Byrne”), wherein the plaintiff had issued plenary proceedings and brought a motion seeking the following relief:

(1) A declaration of unconstitutional interference under Article 28A. The Tánaiste in instructing local governments and councillors to block or discourage the nomination of independent presidential candidates.

(2) A declaration that the presidential nomination process was void and repugnant to Articles 1, 3, 5 and 12.4.5 of the Constitution, which affirm Ireland’s democratic character and the people’s right to choose their own government.

(3) An order that the entire nomination and election process be rerun democratically, without interference from any political party or national direction, to uphold constitutional fairness and the sovereignty of the people.

(4) In the alternative, a declaration that the plaintiff, having lawfully declared candidacy and having refused to participate in an unconstitutional process, is the only validly nominated candidate under Article 12.4.5, and is therefore duly elected without a vote, as no other valid nominations exist, and will hold the office until a constitutional referendum is held to make amendments to Article 12 and remove the undemocratic nomination process.

(5) A declaration that the overall process appears undemocratic, giving the impression that the government is choosing the government, rather than allowing the people to make that choice through free and fair nomination (emphasis added)

43. It will immediately be apparent that there are parallels between the relief sought in Byrne and the case for which the applicant seeks leave. At the ‘heart’ of both applications is the contention that the nomination process was unfair; unlawful; undemocratic and unconstitutional by reason of a direction or ‘block’ by a political party, or parties, to discourage or prevent the nomination of independent candidates. I gratefully adopt, as equally relevant in the present application, the finding of Cregan J at para. 42 of his decision in Byrne:

“…it is clear that the action which is being challenged in this case (i.e. the direction by Mr.

Harris, as Fine Gael leader, to Fine Gael councillors to discourage the nomination of independent candidates) is a purely political action which is not justiciable.” (emphasis added)

44. This conclusion was preceded by careful analysis by the learned judge (from paras. 24 – 37 in Byrne) which I also gratefully adopt.

45. On the morning of Tuesday 21 October, the applicant furnished additional written submissions, the central theme of which was to argue that Mr. Justice Cregan’s decision in Byrne was of no relevance to her application. My judgment has taken full account of these additional submissions.

46. The fact that my judgment concerns an application for leave to seek judicial review does not render the findings by Cregan J. at para. 42 any less relevant.

47. Whereas the applicant argues that there was a distortion of the constitutional process envisaged under Art. 12, the only evidence before this court is to the effect that the constitutional process envisaged under Art. 12 was followed to the letter.

48. Insofar as the applicant complains that she “could not access 20 Oireachtas nominations”, she has chosen to put forward no evidence whatsoever as to such efforts, if any, made by her to garner this support. I say this bearing in mind that it is common knowledge that there are more than 20 independent members of the current Oireachtas. Thus, it seems uncontroversial to say that at all material times the applicant had available to her a ‘route’ to nomination, in relation to which which the role played by any party-political ‘whip’ or decision was entirely irrelevant.

49. I take the view that grounds A and G are simply not arguable.

Ground B

50. I now turn to ground B, which is pleaded as follows:

“Councils curtailed presentations to 5 minutes, often cut short, denying fair opportunity."

51. The first observation to make in relation to ground B is that the applicant's criticism is directed to “Councils”, whereas none of the respondents is a Council. Nor has the applicant put forward any evidence to suggest that the respondents, or any of them, have any responsibility for how any Council operated. Thus, I am not satisfied that an arguable case in law can be made that the applicant is entitled to the relief she wishes to seek. Even if I am wrong in the foregoing view, the applicant faces additional insurmountable difficulties.

52. Underpinning ground B is the proposition that the applicant enjoys a right to make presentations to Councils and a right for those presentations to be of a particular duration. During the hearing, counsel for the respondents opened schedule 10, section 44 of the Local Government Act 2001 (“the 2001 Act”) which concerns “Meetings and Proceedings of Local Authorities”. “Standing orders” are dealt with at sub-section 16, which provides inter alia:

“(1)(a) A local authority shall, subject to this Act and by resolution for which at least onehalf of the total number of members of the authority vote in favour, make standing orders for the regulation of its meetings and proceedings.

(b) A local authority may include in standing orders all such incidental, consequential or supplementary provisions as may appear to the local authority to be appropriate for that purpose…” (emphasis added)

53. In light of the foregoing, local authorities are independent in their functions as regards the regulation of meetings and proceedings. In other words, it is entirely up to each Council to make provisions in relation to issues such as (i) when meetings will be scheduled; (ii) what business will be dealt with; and (iii) how each meeting will proceed, including commencement, adjournment and termination of meetings. Thus, even if the applicant's complaints against Councils could be ‘laid at the door’ of the respondents’ (and they cannot) there is not a shred of evidence that any Council acted other than in accordance with the powers conferred by the 2001 Act. Nor is this the end of the analysis.

54. Whilst the applicant makes a vague reference to “multiple local authorities”, it is in entirely unclear which, or how many, she has in mind. A careful consideration of the applicant's affidavits reveals that she directs criticism at only three Councils. These are named in the (second) para. 11 of the applicant's second affidavit, sworn on 30 September 2025, wherein the applicant avers:

“… Dublin City Council, Cork City Council, and Kilkenny County Council imposed a rigid five minute cap on candidate presentations with an additional five minutes for questions”.

55. On p.7 of the applicant’s written submissions, she stated inter alia: “most councils allowed only 5 minutes for presentation and 5 for questions”. Commenting on the manner which councils chose to organise meetings, the applicant made oral submissions including “you’d get a heart attack or a stroke”, arguing that these limitations “put our health and safety at risk”. There is not a shred of evidence to support the foregoing submissions in relation to health risks. Nor is this an aspect of the pleaded claim for which leave is sought.

56. Furthermore, given that the applicant identifies only three Councils said to have imposed a five minute limit on presentations with an additional five minutes for questions, and it is not in dispute that there are 31 Councils which can nominate candidates, the position in relation to the other 28 Councils is simply unknown.

57. However, even if the applicant had established, in evidence, that all 31 Councils imposed a

5 minute limit on presentations with an additional 5 minutes for questions, the applicant has put forward no arguable basis in law to suggest that this was a breach of her rights. On the contrary, the will of the Irish people, as expressed in legislation passed by the Oireachtas, is that the timing, content and conduct of Council meetings is a matter for each Council, in the manner provided for in the 2001 Act.

58. It also must be said that the applicant does not aver whether she, in fact, made a presentation to each of the three Councils named by her. The vagueness in her evidence is illustrated by the following averment which appears at para. 3 of her grounding affidavit, sworn on

24 September 2025:

“On [date], (sic) I was restricted to 5 minutes at [council], (sic) curtailed before completing my presentation.”

59. Assuming, for present purposes, that the applicant did make presentations to the 3 Councils which she names in her application, she made oral submissions to the effect that addressing Councils was like “going into the firing line”. She went on to submit, inter alia, that there was “‘gas-lighting’ in the questions put” to her, which she characterised as “humiliating”. Three comments seem appropriate in relation to these submissions.

60. First, there is no evidence whatsoever to support these submissions. Second, it would hardly be surprising if there was robust questioning of a would-be candidate for the office of Presidential candidate, by those from whom the aspiring candidate sought nomination. Third, in light of the evidence before this court, even if it were to be assumed that robust questioning of the applicant occurred, it discloses no arguable claim against the respondents (and that is not to suggest that an arguable claim against any councils is disclosed).

61. As noted earlier in this judgment, there is no evidence before me to the effect that even a single Councillor within the State voted to nominate the applicant, or whether any Councillor seconded any such nomination. Absent this, it is impossible to understand how the applicant's complaint, in relation to limited time for presentations/questions, could have had any material bearing on her prospects of securing, or not, support from at least four councils.

62. Given the state of the evidence, any argument that the applicant would have been nominated by majorities on not less than four Councils, had she being permitted to speak for, say, 15 minutes (instead of 5) followed by, say, 10 minutes for questions (as opposed to 5) is unstateable, in my view, being an argument which lacks either a legal or factual basis.

15 minutes

63. I deliberately refer to 15 and 10 minutes, respectively, given that, according to the applicant's submissions, these are the time limits which, in her view, should apply. Under the heading “6A.6 Proposed Safeguards:”, the applicant argues the following in her written legal submissions:

"1. Formal declaration and circulation of candidate lists.

2. Candidate information pack (CV and statement) distributed simultaneously.

3. No advance pledges; nominations only after all heard.

4. Minimum 15 min presentation +10 Q & A (in-person or online tested access).

5. Regulated canvassing to ensure equality and avoid block commitments.”

[See pages 11 and 12 of the applicant’s written legal submissions (emphasis added)]

64. I do not doubt the sincerity with which the applicant urges the foregoing. The fundamental point, however, is that the applicant is seeking, impermissibly, to substitute her views for the will of the Irish people, as expressed in legislation enacted by the Oireachtas, and in the provisions of the Constitution adopted, enacted and given to the People by the People.

65. If the will of the Irish people was that each and every would-be candidate for nomination in accordance with article 12.4.2° ii would undergo and would enjoy the right to undergo a quasiinterview process involving a presentation to, and questions from, every one of the 31 local authorities in the State, to which at least 25 minutes would be devoted, this would have been set out in legislation. It has not been.

66. Contrary to the alleged deficiencies in the nomination process which, according to the applicant, should be cured by the imposition of what she describes as “Proposed safeguards”, there is simply nothing in the Constitution, or in legislation, however broadly interpreted, which offers any support for the case she seeks leave to bring.

67. Far from conferring any right on the applicant to make presentations to Councils, it is perfectly clear that Art. 12 envisages a situation where there might not even be an election for the office of President in certain circumstances. It will be recalled that Art. 12.4.4° provides that “Former or retiring Presidents may become candidates on their own nomination”, whereas Art. 12.4.5° provides that “Where only one candidate is nominated for the office of President it shall not be necessary to proceed to a ballot for his election”. The fact that the constitutional ‘architecture’ is so constructed fortifies me in the views previously expressed to the effect that, regardless of what approach is taken to constitutional interpretation, the applicant does not have the constitutional ‘rights’ she asserts, in relation to making presentations to Councils.

68. The applicant submits inter alia that "…the nomination process is structurally unfair or subject to centralised political control that excludes independents…”. In support of the claim for which she seeks leave, the applicant also emphasises the fact that no independent candidate received the support of four councils in this year’s Presidential election. Yet the Constitution itself contemplates a situation where, as occurred in relation to the upcoming election, no independent candidates garnered the requisite support. This is readily seen from the following.

69. Art. 12 identifies three potential routes for nomination, namely, (i) nomination by at least

20 Oireachtas members; (ii) nomination by at least four Councils; or (iii) self-nomination by a former or retiring President. Furthermore, Art. 12.4.5° contemplates a situation where only one candidate is nominated for the office of President, in which case no election is necessary. Thus, Art. 12 plainly anticipated a situation where, for the purpose of a given presidential election, it might be the case that no candidate was nominated via the ‘four Councils route’ or, for that matter, by at least 20 member of the Oireachtas.

70. Consequently, far from evidencing what the applicant describes, variously, as structural unfairness; illegality; a breach of her rights; or a denial of the People’s sovereignty, the fact that no candidate received the support of four councils for the 2025 Presidential election is simply an example of the provisions of Art. 12 operating, in this ‘election cycle’, in a manner contemplated and authorised by the People, when adopting and enacting the constitution.

71. In other words, the applicant contends that a nomination process which, on the evidence before me, has proceeded precisely as envisaged by Art. 12 of the Constitution, is itself unconstitutional. The ‘circularity’ in this argument is obvious. With respect, it is an argument wholly lacking in merit. In this regard I gratefully adopt, as equally relevant in the present application, the analysis of Cregan J in Byrne, (at para. 74(2)) where the learned judge stated:

“…the plaintiff’s argument that the nomination process set out in Article 12.4 is unconstitutional is clearly doomed to failure; such an argument is, in effect, an argument that certain Articles of the Constitution are unconstitutional and is unstateable;”

Audi alteram partem

72. Irrespective of whether a decision by an individual Councillor reflected the stance taken by any political party to which they might belong, be that stance expressed in a 'whip' or otherwise, the decision by each individual Councillor to support, or not, the nomination of a would-be presidential candidate can only be a political decision. The applicant has not advanced any stateable basis for the proposition that administrative law requirements, such as audi alteram partem (i.e. the principle that an affected party must be given the opportunity to be heard prior to the making a

decision which affects them) applies to political decision-making by individual Councillors, concerning the nomination, or not, by the Council of which they are members, of a would-be candidate for election to the office of President.

73. By contrast, counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garda Representative Association v. Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform [2018] IESC 4 (“GRA”) wherein Clarke CJ articulated a principle which seems to me to be relevant. The then Chief Justice stated (at para. 8.5):

“… It has long been accepted that primary legislation does not carry with it any entitlement on the part of persons, who might be affected by such legislation, to be heard in the process leading up to the enactment of the legislation concerned. The Constitution confers on the Oireachtas the sole power to make legislation. It is the democratic process itself which affords any interested parties such entitlement as they have to seek to influence the outcome of the legislative process. Persons who may be adversely affected by proposed legislation can seek, through a whole range of legitimate ways, to influence legislators prior to the proposals becoming law.”

74. By analogy, Art. 12 confers upon Councils and members of the Oireachtas, the sole power to nominate presidential candidates (with a former or outgoing President having the power to selfnominate). Further applying the principle articulated in GRA, it is the process itself which affords interested parties, such as the applicant, the avenue to seek to influence the outcome of the nomination process, not an asserted ‘right’ to be heard (still less a right to be heard for a total of 25 as opposed to 10 minutes, in the manner the applicant contends for).

75. Even if it is the case that Councils limited presentations to 5 minutes per candidate plus 5 minutes for questions, not only was this lawful having regard to the provisions of the 2001 Act, there was a practical reason for it, which is clearly illustrated by the applicant’s averments. For example, at para. 10 of the applicant's third affidavit, sworn on 30 September 2025, she avers inter alia: “In Roscommon on 15 September, 14 candidates presented” (emphasis added). Even if not a single second elapsed between the end of one 5-minute presentation and the beginning of 5-minutes of questions, followed by the next presentation, with it would have taken well over 2 hours for the 14 presentations to be made.

6 hours

76. It will also be recalled that, on the case which the applicant seeks leave to make, anything less than 15 minutes per presentation plus 10 minutes for questions and answers, amounts to an “unconstitutional, unfair and undemocratic” nomination process. Applying the foregoing to the Roscommon example cited by the applicant would mean, in the example given by the applicant, the Council having to devote approximately 6 hours, at a minimum, to would-be candidates. I am satisfied that the applicant has not made out an arguable case that there is any such obligation on a council’s part and corresponding right enjoyed by her as a would-be candidate.

Ground C

77. I now turn to ground C, namely:

“Multiple Councils convened simultaneously on 15 September 2025, making attendance impossible.”

78. At the risk of repeating certain points which arose in respect of ground B, the applicant has named no Council as a respondent. Nor has the applicant advanced any basis upon which the respondents could be considered responsible for how any Council conducted its business. For these reasons alone, I am obliged to refuse leave to pursue this ground.

79. In the manner previously examined, with reference to the 2001 Act, it is within the power of each Council to decide when to arrange their meetings. The applicant has cited no legislation or legal principle to the effect that Councils are obliged to coordinate with each other in relation to the date of any meeting convened by Councils in the context of Art. 12.4.2° ii.

80. The People have not decided that, for the purposes of Art. 12, Councils must convene meetings in a consecutive manner. Once again, the applicant is, with respect, advancing a personal view which does not reflect the will of the Irish People as expressed in the Constitution and in legislation.

81. During the hearing, I was furnished with a copy of the Presidential Election Order, which issued on 3 September 2025 and provided inter alia:

“The 24th day of September 2025 shall be the last day on which the presidential returning officer may receive nominations for the election.”

19 days

82. It is not in dispute that the nomination period began on 5 September and ended on 24 September 2025, being a period of 19 days. Thus, it is a matter of fact that 22 September was, itself, very close to the deadline for nominations. Bearing the foregoing in mind, it will be recalled that s. 16 (1) of the 1993 Act requires “not less than three clear days” notice to be given to every Councillor of the intention to propose a resolution at their Council nominating a candidate.

83. The 22 September was a Monday and, in light of the foregoing ‘timeline’, it is entirely unsurprising that multiple Councils held meetings on the first working day of the week during whtihc the deadline for nominations would expire.

84. I regard as entirely baseless and unsupported the applicant's assertion (at para. 16 on the final page of her second affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025) that “…the unprecedented clustering on 22 September 2025 points strongly to orchestration by central authorities, including the presidential returning officer and/or other officials charged with over-sight of the process” (emphasis added). The thrust of the applicant’s argument is to that matters were orchestrated with a view to excluding her. There is not a shred of evidence to support this assertion.

85. Looking closely at the evidence upon which the applicant seeks to rely, it is entirely unclear what times various meetings were held on 22 September 2025; and the extent to which the applicant attended or could have attended, be that personally or ‘online’. However, the fact that the applicant “…was only able to attend two meetings…” on 22 September 2025 (as she avers at para. 5 of her first affidavit sworn on 24 September 2025) does not constitute any breach of her constitutional rights or breach of any legislative provision. The proposition that it amounts to wrongdoing on the part of any of the respondents (or, for that matter, the Councils involved) is unstateable in my view.

86. During the hearing, the applicant made oral submissions to the effect that attempting to attend multiple meetings with Councils would require “a helicopter”; “would give anyone a heart attack”; and constituted “a risk to health and safety”. The applicant has proffered no evidence whatsoever of any risk, or damage, to health. More fundamentally, she has not made any arguable case that any of her rights were breached. In the manner explained in this judgment, I regard as entirely unstateable, the applicant’s assertions that she has a right (i) to address all Councils in the State; (ii) to do so during successive meetings; and (iii) for each presentation by the applicant, and the time allocated for questions, to be for a minimum duration of her choosing.

Engagement

87. Furthermore, the applicant's affidavits reveal nothing about when she first began to engage with Councillors, with a view to seeking nomination. Whilst s. 16 (2) of the 1993 Act makes clear that a Council may not resolve to nominate a candidate prior to the making of the Presidential Election Order, nothing in the 1993 Act prohibits a would-be candidate from engaging with Councillors at an earlier stage, should they so wish.

88. It should be recalled that a presidential term is a known quantity, i.e. 7 years. Thus, it is open to anyone who aspires to that high office to take such steps as they regard as appropriate, in good time, with a view to garnering the support required by Art. 12. This brings me back to the reality that a decision by an individual Councillor to support, or not, the nomination of a would-be candidate is a political decision. No evidence is needed for me to say that, unless a would-be candidate already has a public profile, a political decision to support them is unlikely to be made unless the aspiring candidate has made themselves and their qualities known to Councillors. Plainly, that requires engagement, in the context of what might be called the would-be candidate’s personal political campaign for nomination.

Publicity

89. On this topic, one of the criticisms articulated by the applicant during her oral submissions was to bemoan the fact that there was “no publicity for independents, bar two; the rest of us have no publicity at all”. Without intending any disrespect, the foregoing complaint forms no part of the relief which the applicant seeks. Furthermore, just as the applicant enjoys no right to be nominated, she enjoys no right to publicity in the context of a personal political campaign to seek nomination to contest the presidential election.

90. In a similar vein, the applicant complains on page 8 of her written submissions that: “Partybacked candidates had teams; Independents did not” and during the hearing the applicant added “not even finances”.

91. The foregoing submissions were made for the purposes of arguing a breach of Art. 40.1, which holds all citizens equal before the law. The insurmountable difficulty from the applicant’s perspective is that a would-be candidate for the office of President has no right to be provided with a “team” of supporters or “finances” for what is, until nomination is secured, a personal political campaign, motivated by their choice to seek nomination for office.

Practical difficulties

92. The fact that it is likely to be far more difficult for an individual (who has neither a national profile based on their achievements nor the backing of a political party) to secure nomination by way of Art. 12, to be a candidate for the office of President, than for, say, a politician (who has already put themselves before an electorate and may have a national profile as a consequence of prior election success or ‘track record’ in the Oireachtas), is entirely unsurprising. However, this practical difficulty does not breach any constitutional rights enjoyed by the would-be independent candidate, be that under Art 40.1, or otherwise. On the contrary, it reflects the will of the People when adopting and enacting the Constitution, which includs the Art. 12 process.

93. In other words, the People’s will is not that every individual who wishes to become President shall have the right to contest such an election, or that it will be easy to secure nomination. Rather, there is ‘built into’ the Constitution a “filtering mechanism” in the manner described as follows by Cregan J (at para. 47) in Byrne:

“The sovereignty of the people is reflected in the Irish Constitution. It is clear that the people, in a referendum, expressed their approval for an office of the President which contains a filtering mechanism to ensure that any candidate has some minimum level of political support” (emphasis added)

94. However, the People, when adopting the constitution, did not mandate that there be a process to facilitate a citizen achieving political support.

95. On page 8 of the applicant’s written submissions, she asserts that there has been “displacement of popular sovereignty; decision moved from local councillors to party command”, and, in her oral submissions, the applicant stated “This is the most important of all points; that’s what happens in a Communist State”.

96. The insurmountable difficulty for the applicant is that her would-be claim is based on a complete misunderstanding of the state of the law. No Article of the Constitution and no legislative provision constrains Councillors, be they independents or members of a political party, in relation to their decision-making for the purpose of Art 12.4.2°ii. At the heart of the applicant’s case is the proposition that they should be constrained (i.e. that individual councillors are constrained from acting along ‘party lines’ in respect of decision-making by Councils concerning the nomination of would-be candidates for a Presidential election).

Substance -v- Form

97. Rather than the applicant having made out any arguable case for a breach of any constitutional rights, the substance of her claim is that the law should be changed, in a manner of her choosing, so as to make it easier for her to secure nomination.

98. Thus, in terms of ‘form’, the applicant champions the sovereignty of the People but, in ‘substance’, the applicant’s claim utterly ignores the will of the People as currently expressed in the Constitution and in Statute.

99. However, any change in the law is a matter for the People, with their will to be expressed either through legislation enacted by the Oireachtas, or by way of amendment to the Constitution following referendum.

100. Returning to the wording of Ground C, I am entirely satisfied that the applicant enjoyed no right to make presentations to Councils (be that a right found in the Constitution; in legislation; or at common law). Furthermore, it should be recalled that there are 31 Councils which can nominate candidates. The applicant has not demonstrated in evidence that, even if a number of Councils met at the same time, she lacked the opportunity to address others on different dates.

101. The reality, however, is that the applicant has not evidenced support from any Council, or Councillor. That being so, any argument that she would have been nominated as a presidential candidate if Councils had met sequentially, as opposed to meeting on the same day, lacks any materiality.

102. It must also be said that, insofar as the applicant argues for Council meetings to be held sequentially, and bearing in mind that 31 Councils can make nominations, the logic of her contention is that, in order for the nomination process to be valid, no presidential election can take place in which the nomination period is less than 31 days.

103. Again, the foregoing does not reflect the will of the Irish people as expressed in the Constitution and in legislation. As the respondents point out in their legal submissions, previous elections (1945, 1966, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1983, 1990, 1997 and 2004) all had nomination periods the same length or shorter than the 19-day nomination period for the 2025 presidential election.

104. I now turn to ground D, being:

“On 22 September 2025… several candidates were locked out of the Meath County Council meeting… miscarriage of justice”

105. Recalling the jus tertii doctrine, it is simply not open to the applicant to try and make a case on behalf of those others she describes as “several candidates”.

106. Turning to the evidence, the applicant makes inter alia the following averments at para. 5 of her first affidavit:

“… I and several other candidates were locked out of the Meath County Council meeting altogether…”.

107. However, Meath County Council is not named as a respondent and, insofar as the applicant contends that actions imputed to that Council amount to a miscarriage of justice, no stateable claim against these respondents is disclosed.

108. At para. 8 of the applicant's second affidavit, she refers again to Meath County Council and to press-reporting of a complaint by a third party “…alleging that the meeting was chaotic, that abstentions resulted from confusion or technical failures, and that the outcome amounted to blocking of democratic choice…”. (emphasis added)

109. In circumstances where, since 2020, the Courts Service has facilitated ‘online’ or ‘remote’ participation in a range of hearings, and having been involved, personally, in countless ‘hybrid' applications involving participants in court and online, I can take judicial notice of the fact that confusion or technical failures are not at all uncommon.

110. The applicant has not proffered a shred of evidence to suggest that any inability to participate ‘online’ was other than due to confusion or technical failure, as opposed to a deliberate intention to exclude her. Indeed, at para. 2.2 of the applicant's submissions, she summarises her criticisms of the 2025 presidential nomination process in the following terms: “a short window, overlapping meetings, technical failures, refusals of accommodation and a party directive which made the process unworkable”. (emphasis added)

111. Furthermore, during the hearing, the applicant's submissions were to the effect that she did not know whether technical failures were deliberate or not. She also made clear during oral submissions that “we’ve nothing against the officials” and the applicant did not impute a malign motive to any Council officials with regard to such confusion or technical failures as occurred.

112. In the circumstances, there is no evidential basis for the assertion that the applicant was deliberately “locked out” of the Meath County Council meeting.

113. Quite apart from the foregoing, even if Meath County Council had been named as a respondent, it is impossible to understand what might be achieved by the claim articulated at Ground

D, in circumstances where (i) none of the other 30 Councils decided to support the applicant; and

(ii) there is no evidence of even a proposer or seconder, be that in Meath County Council or in any other Council. In short, there is no evidential foundation for the claim, nor does it constitute an arguable point of law.

Ground E

114. Ground E is pleaded in the following terms:

“The applicant further says that the blocking, lockouts, and manipulation of schedules were calculated not only to frustrate independent candidacies but also to suppress whistleblowers. In particular, the commissioner's office under the 2014 Act lacks power to refer constitutional issues to the courts, a lacuna that leaves discloses vulnerable. The respondent's conduct therefore constitutes penalisation expressly prohibited under the Act.”

115. In the manner previously explained, it is not open to the applicant to make a claim on behalf of any third parties, be they unsuccessful candidates or “whistleblowers” or “disclosers”.

116. On p. 6 of the applicant’s written submissions, she states inter alia that the 2014 act “… is unconstitutional by omission, as it bars judicial oversight of certain categories of disclosure”, something which she described as ‘treason’ during the course of her oral submissions.

117. Despite the foregoing, and fatal to the application, is the fact that no challenge is made to any of the provisions of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014 (as amended by the Protected Disclosures Act, 2022), notwithstanding their criticism of “the 2014 Act” made by the applicant.

118. Turning to the evidence, at para. 5 of her grounding affidavit sworn on 24 th of September 2025, the applicant refers to candidates, including herself, being “locked out of the Meath County Council meeting…” going on to say that this is a matter which “…has been raised in a protected disclosure lodged in respect of Meath…”. At para. 8 of the same affidavit, the applicant makes the following averments:

“I exhibit hereto marked ‘A’ the protected disclosures lodged with the Commissioner on this issue and marked ‘B’ the further protected disclosure concerning Meath County Council of

22 September 2025”

119. Exhibit ‘A’ to the applicant’s grounding affidavit is a 19-page document entitled “The implementation of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014-2018 Ireland and acts of omission: (in preparation)”. Having identified the applicant and a named university, this document begins as follows:

“Abstract

The Protected Disclosures (Whistleblowers) Act was enacted in Ireland in August 2014. In this paper we examine its implementation so far and expose serious flaws with the current implementation. We argue this needs current addressing and reform by legislators. We argue that acts of omission may be the key legal method used by some in the law profession with others to reduce the rights of redress to whistleblowers thus far but unless addressed could lead to very serious consequences for employers…”

120. It is impossible to see what relevance this academic ‘paper’, which appears to date from 2018, can have to the applicant's intended claim.

121. Exhibit ‘B’ comprises a document entitled: “Protected disclosure under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 and the Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022”. Over the course of three pages, the document (which also encloses a copy of the applicant's 2018 paper) refers to 4 numbered protected disclosures which are addressed to the Commissioner and to Meath County Council, respectively.

122. The state of the evidence before me is that fact and nature of the response by the Commissioner or by Meath County Council is entirely unknown. Furthermore, this court is unaware of what, if anything, is said by the applicant to be wrong with any response provided.

123. Insofar as the process under the 2014 Act is ‘in train’, it is plainly a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the legislation.

124. Furthermore, and at the risk of stating the obvious, neither the Commissioner nor Meath County Council have been named as respondents in the present application.

125. With regard to what exhibit ‘B’ describes as “Protected disclosure to Meath County Council”, the document states inter alia (under the heading “Nature of the wrongdoing”) that:

“The actions of Meath County Council constitute 1. a breach of constitutional rights, including the right to fair procedures (article 30.3), the right to freedom of expression (article 30.6.1)

and the right to participate equally in democratic processes (article 16); an abuse of authority and maladministration…; a breach of statutory obligations under the Local Government Act 2001 and related legislation…; and suppression of democratic participation in a manner that calls into question the validity of the election process itself”.

126. The document proceeds to set out what is described as “grounds for nullity of the election process”, which begins:

“The exclusion of duly registered speakers is not a minor procedural error but a fundamental breach of democratic fairness. On constitutional grounds, this alone is sufficient to render any related electoral process null and void”.

127. With regard to the applicant's “status as a ‘worker’ under the Act”, the protected disclosure directed to Meath County Council states:

“As a registered public participant/speaker, I qualify as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of section 3 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (as amended), given that:

- I engaged with Meath County Council through official structured process;

- I was authorised to perform a defined function (presentation to the Council);

- I provided services directly to a local authority in a recognised participatory role.

Should the council contest this, the burden lies on them to prove otherwise in proceedings. The Act is intended to be interpreted broadly and protectively.”

128. Without intending to interfere in any ongoing process under the 2014 Act, but for the purpose of determining whether any arguable claim is disclosed in this application, it is appropriate to state the following. To the extent that the “services” provided by the applicant comprise of a presentation to the Council as to why she should be nominated as a presidential candidate, it is impossible to understand how the applicant could qualify as a “worker” for the purposes of the protected disclosures legislation (in the absence of any evidence that the applicant is a current or former employee; volunteer; independent contractor; trainee; or candidate for a job with the Council).

129. As to what the applicant called upon Meath County Council to do, this included a request for “a full independent investigation…; the election process be suspended pending such investigation, and deemed null and void if constitutional breaches are confirmed; and a clear remedial plan to be set out to guarantee equal participation and democratic integrity in all future proceedings”.

130. To the extent that the applicant seeks to argue that the ‘failure’ on the part of either the Commissioner or Meath County Council to take the action which she called for “constitutes penalisation expressly prohibited under the Act”, this is simply unstateable and does not constitute an arguable claim.

131. Turning to the applicant's second affidavit, she makes the following averments on the penultimate page:

“10. Section 12 of the 2014 Act prohibits penalisation of any worker or official who discloses such wrongdoing. Penalisation includes disadvantage, intimidation, or the creation of conditions designed to deter disclosure. The compression of the nomination process created such disadvantages for candidates and officials alike”

132. Recalling the jus tertii principle, it is not open to the applicant to assert purported rights of “any worker or official” and the applicant has proffered no evidence to the effect that she comes within either of these cohorts. Nor has the applicant adduced any evidence which could conceivably amount to “penalisation”.

133. During the hearing, the applicant made oral submissions to the effect that local politicians were “subject to serious sanctions” if they acted other than in accordance with the decision made by their political party; that “their jobs were at risk”; and their chances of “future promotion” were jeopardised. Two points deserve emphasis.

134. First, the applicant has adduced no evidence of the foregoing “sanctions”. Second, it is not open to the applicant to make complaints on behalf of unnamed politicians who, themselves, make no complaint. Third, there is nothing in the Constitution or legislation which prevents a political party from making a political decision, and the extent to which it imposes party-discipline is an internal matter which cannot conceivably amount to an arguable claim maintainable by the applicant.

135. Insofar as the applicant describes as “penalisation” the refusal of elected politicians throughout the State to nominate an independent candidate for President, this gives rise to no stateable claim. In short, I am satisfied that ground E is not arguable and has no prospect of success.

Ground F

136. Ground F is articulated as follows:

“The presiding officer failed to establish a fair, transparent nomination procedure.”

137. The fourth named respondent is the presidential returning officer (“PRO”). Under the 1993 Act, the PRO’s functions are specific and limited. Insofar as the nomination process is concerned, s. 19(1) of the 1993 Act specifies that when the PRO receives a nomination paper, they shall give notice to the person nominated and give public notice of the receipt of the nomination paper. S. 19(2) concerns the failure of the nominated person to receive notice. However, the 1993 Act simply does not confer on the PRO either the power or obligation to “establish” the type of nomination process which the applicant argues for.

138. In the applicant’s written submissions (p. 4) she criticises the PRO in the following terms: “… they took no action to stop or prevent the Party Block (communicated by Simon Harris and informal block Micheal Martin (sic) and communicated widely by Councils on radio regarding the whip to oppose any candidates out (sic) their political parties)…”. This criticism is entirely unfair of the PRO and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the will of the Irish people, who did not confer on the PRO any power or obligation to take the “action” which the applicant refers to.

139. In short, the applicant seeks leave to pursue a claim against the PRO for not doing what the PRO has no legal obligation or power to do. Once again, this is a claim entirely without foundation which has no prospect of success and is not arguable.

140. As counsel for the respondents submit, the exercise of powers of nomination conferred on the Council of a county is a reserved function for the purposes of the County Management Acts 1940 to 1991 and, in the case of the corporation of a county borough, a reserved function for the purposes of the Acts relating to the management of the county borough (see s. 16(9) of the 1993 Act). Thus, the PRO has no function in the exercise of powers of nomination conferred on local authorities. Rather, this is a sphere of power devolved to local authorities, in the exercise of which they are autonomous.

141. The respondent has not adduced a shred of evidence to the effect that the nomination process was carried out other than in accordance with law and I am bound to refuse leave in respect of this ground, also.

142. Earlier in this decision, I dealt with grounds A and G together, given that both relate to the applicant's objection to the role which party discipline may have played in the political decision making by individual Councillors. Ground A named Fine Gael, whereas ground G named Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin. At the risk of repetition, notwithstanding the various complaints which the applicant seeks to level against these and other political parties, none of the relief for which the applicant seeks leave is directed at any political party. Similarly, whilst making complaints in relation to the actions of unnamed Councillors, no relief is sought against any Councillor.

ECHR

143. Not forgetting the foregoing, the applicant pleads at ground G, that acts by “councillors affiliated with Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin…” constituted inter alia a “breach of Article 3, Protocol 1 ECHR (free elections)”. Article 3 provides:

“The high contracting parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. (emphasis added)

Free elections

144. Whereas the focus of Article 3 is on the holding of “free elections…under conditions that will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people…”, the 2025 presidential election will undoubtedly be a free one. There is not a shred of evidence to the contrary and, as counsel for the respondents points out, the conditions governing it permit all nominated candidates to compete, with extensive media coverage of the State-wide ballot which will ensure the free expression of the people.

145. Counsel for the respondents also drew my attention to the Strasbourg Court's “Guide on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1”, revised on 28 February 2025, which states at para 6:

“As regards presidential elections, the court has taken the view that the powers of the head of State cannot as such be construed as a form of ‘legislature’ within the meaning of Article

3 of Protocol No. 1. It does not exclude, however, the possibility of applying Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to presidential elections. Should it be established that the office of the head of State in question had been given the power to initiate and adopt legislation or enjoyed wide powers to control the passage of legislation or the power to censor the principal legislation-setting authorities, then it could arguably be considered to be a ‘legislator’ within the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1…”

146. Under the Constitution, the President of Ireland does not have “the power to initiate and adopt legislation”, nor does an Irish President enjoy “wide powers to control the passage of legislation”. Therefore, as counsel for the respondent submits, significant doubt must arise as to whether Irish presidential elections engage Article 3, at all.

147. Without prejudice to the foregoing, as counsel for the respondents submits, with reference to the decision in McD v. L [2010) 2 IR 199, the ECHR only enjoys effect within Ireland subject to the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 (“the 2003 Act”). The long title to the 2003 Act makes clear that it gives effect to the ECHR within the State “subject to the Constitution”.

148. It is simply not open to the applicant to assert that the provisions in Art. 12 of the Constitution governing the nomination of presidential candidates is, itself, unconstitutional. Nor can the applicant assert that the provisions of Art. 12 contravene the ECHR.

149. To the extent that the applicant seeks to argue that decisions by politicians to support, or not, a would-be candidate for election offends the ECHR, the applicant has not made out any arguable case in law.

150. Bearing in mind that under national law (see Beades etc, discussed earlier) it is not possible for this court to interfere in a matter of political choice, the argument made with reference to Article

3 ECHR has no prospect of success, in my view.

151. Paragraph 12 on the penultimate page of the applicant's second affidavit sworn on 30 September 2025 contains the following averments:

“Strasbourg jurisprudence (Kovach v. Ukraine 2008; Tahirov v. Azerbaijan 2014; Bowman v. UK 1998; Zdanoka v. Latvia 2006) confirms that administrative arrangements which deprive candidates of a genuine chance to stand are violations of A3P1.”

152. None of these decisions offer any support for the case which the applicant seeks leave to make. Dealing with them in turn, Kovach v. Ukraine (2008) which concerned a finding by the Strasbourg Court, on the particular facts, that “the decision to annul the vote in the four electoral divisions must be considered as arbitrary” is of no relevance to the present application.

153. Tahirov v. Azerbaijan (2015) concerned the rejection by the respondent's electoral board of the applicant's candidature on the basis of the alleged invalidity of the signatures provided in respect of his nomination, where the boards safeguards were held to be insufficient. Again, this is simply of no relevance to the situation in this application.

154. Bowman v. UK (1998) concerned a violation of freedom of expression, in circumstances where, prior to a general election, a campaigner was prosecuted following the distribution of leaflets concerning abortion. Again, this is of no relevance.

155. Finally, Zdanoka v. Latvia (2006) concerned the repeated rejection of the applicant's candidature for election, in circumstances where she had been a member of the Communist Party which had attempted a coup d'etat in 1991. In short, the factual circumstances and the principles at play in these authorities are of no relevance to the case which the applicant seeks to make purported reliance on these decisions cannot avail her. The case she seeks to make with reference to the ECHR is simply not arguable.

156. With regard to the applicant's purported reliance on the decisions in Redmond v. Minister for the Environment & Others [2001] 4 IR 61 (“Redmond”) and King v. Minister for the Environment & Others (No 2) [2007] IR 296 (“King”), both judgments related to elections to Dáil Eireann and have no relevance to the constitutional provisions in Art. 12 concerning the nomination of presidential candidates.

New election

157. What the applicant argues for is expressed in the following terms in her second affidavit:

“Remedies and solutions proposed In light of the above breaches and systemic failings, I respectfully submit that:

1. Council of State intervention

• The Council of State should assume oversight of matters of State for a period of 60 days.

• This period would safeguard the constitutional order, ensure oversight, and provide time to prepare a new and fair election.

2. Fresh election

• A new election should be held under conditions that guarantee fairness, equal access, and transparency for all candidates, including independence…”

158. In arguing for the foregoing, the applicant’s oral submissions during the hearing included to say: “We are going through a model of sociopathic narcissism”; “We cannot allow the State to be ruled by command”; and “We are not only highlighting problems, we are giving solutions so that what occurred this time will not happen again”. As to what the applicant asserts to be “fair nomination procedures”, she set out the following at s. 8 (p.12) of her written legal submissions, in the context of a new election being held:

“…Fair rules in plain terms

8.1 Scheduling: meetings published 30 days in advance and sequenced on different days to avoid clashes.

8.2 Participation: minimum 15 minutes to speak +10 for questions; in person or online with guaranteed tested access.

8.3 Transparency: agendas, packs and links published centrally on one official national site.

8.4 Freedom of conscience: councillors free to nominate any candidate without party discipline in relation to facilitation of nomination.

8.5 Fast-track appeals: procedural disputes referred to a designated election judge within 48 hours with power to grant practical remedies…”

159. Without intending any disrespect to the applicant who asserts, with obvious sincerity, that the presidential nomination process was undemocratic, what she argues for is the very opposite of democracy, in the manner I hope to explain, as follows.

160. The will of the Irish people as expressed in article 12.3.3° is that “an election for the office of President shall be held not later than, and not earlier than the sixtieth day before, the date of the expiration of the term of office of every president…”. The term of President Higgins expires on 10 November 2025. What the applicant seeks leave to argue for would ‘derail’ a process which has been conducted in accordance with the requirement of the Constitution and relevant legislation, depriving the Irish people of the opportunity to cast their vote in a free and fair election for their head of State.

161. The applicant's contention that “oversight of matters of State” should be assumed by the Council of State also runs contrary to the clearly expressed wish of the People.

162. Similarly, the applicant's submission to the effect that this Court can and should input into the re-design of what the applicant regards as a suitable nomination process, constitutes the antithesis of democracy. Judges are appointed in the manner provided by the Constitution, and, on appointment, declare to uphold the Constitution and the laws. However, it is the preserve of the Oireachtas, comprising democratically-elected members, to make legislation.

163. It is for the People, not this court, to amend the provisions of the Constitution. By the same token, this Court has no jurisdiction to write into Art. 12.4.2° of the Constitution the various conditions and restraints which, according to the applicant, should apply to decision-making by Councils. To do so would be entirely undemocratic. Why? It would frustrate the will of the People. It would be for the court to act without jurisdiction and in breach of the oath taken on appointment. It would amount to a tearing up of the fundamentally important 'separation of powers’ principle.

164. For the reasons set out in this decision, I take the view that the facts averred by the applicant would not be sufficient, if proved, to support any stateable ground for any of the relief for which she seeks leave. Furthermore, I satisfied that, on the facts averred to, no arguable case in law can be made that the applicant is entitled to the relief she wishes to seek by way of judicial review.

Sincerely wrong

165. In her written submissions, the applicant characterises herself, no doubt sincerely, as: “…an ordinary citizen…excluded from public life through procedural manipulation and institutional neglect”. With respect, this is a situation where the applicant is sincere, but sincerely wrong. Rather, she failed to emerge from the ‘filtering’ mechanism specified in Art. 12, as she did not garner either the support of at least 4 councils or at least 20 Oireachtas members. That reality does not provide the basis for any arguable claim.

166. In view of this decision, the application for injunctive relief falls away. In other words, because of my decision to refuse leave to seek judicial review, there can be no question of an injunction being granted pending the hearing of an application for judicial review. There will be no such hearing. That said, and for the sake of completeness and clarity, I want to make clear (mindful of the principles outlined by the Supreme Court in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v. Clonmel Healthcare Limited [2020] 2 I.R. 1) that I am very satisfied that no ‘serious issue’ arises (sometimes described as a ‘fair issue’, or ‘arguable case’). Not having made out any arguable case, there no question of an injunction being granted.

167. For the sake of completeness, it should be said that counsel for the respondence also referred me to the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzgibbon v. Ireland [2001] IESC 207 (“Fitzgibbon”). There, the plaintiff brought proceedings seeking an injunction to defer or postpone three referenda, arguing that the procedures and/or practices used to ensure a fair and balanced debate on the relevant questions were inadequate. This Court (Murphy J.) was satisfied that the application was misconceived in law and dismissed it. In his judgment delivered ex tempore, Keane CJ described Mr Justice Murphy’s decision as “entirely correct”. With reference to the judgment in Slattery v. An Taoiseach [1993] 1 IR 286, a case in which the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the holding of a referendum, Keane CJ went on to state the following (on p.3) in Fitzgibbon:

“In the case of Slattery the Supreme Court dismissed the application, Mr Justice Hederman saying the real point in this case was to ask this Court to prevent the operation of legislative and constitutional procedures which are in train. This is something this Court has no jurisdiction to do. Mr Justice McCarthy said in the same case at p. 301:

‘In my judgment the application made by the plaintiffs has no foundation whatever. To grant an order such as is it sought would be a wholly unwarranted and unwarrantable intervention by the judiciary in what is clearly a legislative and popular domain. See Finn v. Attorney General and Others [1983] IR 154.’

Mr Justice Egan said that the appellants were seeking the aid of the courts to interfere in a legislative process. In his opinion it would be totally wrong if the courts were to intervene in a process authorised by the Constitution.

Now I have to say that in my view all those considerations are fully applicable to this application…” (emphasis added)

168. It seems to me that the principles outlined by the then Chief Justice in Fitzgibbon are of equal relevance to the case for which the applicant sought leave. In the present case, there is not a scintilla of evidence to the effect that the nomination process did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution. No arguable case has been made out. Furthermore, there is no precedent for an Irish court restraining an election by popular vote. Indeed, having regard to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Fitzgibbon, there would appear to be a serious question over whether the Courts even have the jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief of the kind which the applicant sought. As Denham J (as she then was) stated in her judgment in Fitzgibbon:

“… This application is not a commercial matter, it seeks to restrain the counting of the votes of the referenda. The order sought is to restrain an exercise in direct democracy, to intervene on the basis of the alleged actions of the executive. In all these circumstances it is not apparent that the court has jurisdiction in this application. I would dismiss the appeal.” (emphasis added)

169. By way of concluding observations, I cannot improve on the analysis by Cregan J at paras.

55 – 57, inclusive, of his judgment in Byrne, wherein he stated:

“It is clear that the plaintiff has concerns about the nomination process for the Office of the Presidency. These concerns are not new. As is stated in Kelly: The Irish Constitution (5th ed.) at paragraph 4.1.12

‘[4.1.12]. Both the Constitution Review Group and the Oireachtas All-Party Committee on the Constitution agreed that the existing provisions for nominating presidential candidates were too restrictive and in need of democratisation. [27] The latter body recommended that Article 12.4.2º be amended to allow for the nomination of presidential candidates by not less than 10 members of the Oireachtas or by not less than 10,000 registered presidential electors, whilst retaining the existing provisions relating to nomination by county councils.[28] The Constitutional Convention voted overwhelmingly in favour of having some citizen participation in the nomination process, but no specific recommendation was made as to how this should be done.’

However, whether and how the nomination process for the presidency should be reformed is a political matter to be decided by the People and their elected representatives. If there is to be any amendment to the nomination procedure for candidates for the presidency, such an amendment to the Constitution would have to be approved by the people in a referendum.

These matters are clearly within the preserve of the democratically elected members of the Oireachtas and the People; they are not matters for the court.

It is clear that the plaintiff’s real case is to bring about an amendment to the Constitution by means of a referendum. If he wishes to do this, then he must engage with the political process. Such an outcome cannot be achieved through the courts.”

170. Standing back, the applicant’s position can fairly be described as that of a citizen unhappy with the nomination process mandated by Art. 12 of the constitution. That is obviously a view which the applicant is entitled to express. Given the recent decision in Byrne, others may well share this view. What the applicant cannot do, however, is to seek to change provisions in the constitution (or, for that matter, to effect a change in legislation) by means of an application to court. Why? Because there is no arguable basis for the application which, at its ‘core’ seeks to persuade the court to make law.

171. Any change in Art. 12 concerning the nomination process for presidential election candidates is exclusively a matter for the People. Any new legislation is exclusively a matter for the People’s elected representatives. The role of the courts is to serve the People by interpreting and administering the law. The courts do not have the power to make the law.

172. For the reasons set out in this judgment, leave to seek judicial review is refused. In circumstances where the respondents have been entirely successful in opposing the application for leave, my preliminary view, subject to hearing such submissions as either side may wish to make, is that the respondents are entitled to their costs.