High Court dismisses public interest standing claim for freestanding legislation validity under EPA Act 1992.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

THE HIGH COURT PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 87(10) OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ACT 1992, AS AMENDED [2025] IEHC 539 Record Number 2023/920 JR Between:

PETER SWEETMAN Applicant and THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Respondents and ANGLO BEEF PROCESSORS IRELAND UNLIMITED COMPANY Notice Party JUDGMENT OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND DELIVERED 16 OCTOBER 2025

Contents

JUDGMENT OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND DELIVERED 16 OCTOBER 2025.................................................... 1

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 2

Relief Sought and Grounds Asserted ............................................................................................................... 2

General Rule of Standing - Cahill v Sutton (1980) & State (Lynch) v Cooney (1982) .......................................... 4

Three-Step Framework for Analysis - s.87(10) of the EPA Act 1992 ................................................................... 5

The Matter the Subject of the Application .......................................................................................................... 5

Legislative Context .......................................................................................................................................... 6

Freestanding Issues? ....................................................................................................................................... 7

What is now the “matter” of this case? .......................................................................................................... 8

Mr Sweetman’s Asserted Interest ....................................................................................................................... 9

Sufficiency of Interest and Exceptions to the General Rule in Cahill – the Cases ............................................. 13

Crotty (1987) & Lancefort (1999) .................................................................................................................. 13

Mulcreevy (2004) .......................................................................................................................................... 16

Grace & Sweetman (2020) - ESB Wind, Tipperary) ....................................................................................... 17

Actio Popularis ............................................................................................................................................... 19

Digital Rights (2010), Mohan (2019), FIE (2020) ....................................................................................... 19

Aarhus & EIA Directive - Djurgården, LB & Case C-252/22........................................................................ 20

Comparison with NGOs ............................................................................................................................. 21

Digital Rights & FIE..................................................................................................................................... 21

Conway (2019) & Sweetman (2017) (ESB Wind, Kerry) ................................................................................ 23

LB (2021) ........................................................................................................................................................ 26

Odum (2023), Murphy (2025) & O’Meara (2025) ......................................................................................... 26

Enforcement Role of Commission ................................................................................................................. 28

Conclusion & Decision ....................................................................................................................................... 28

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

Introduction1

1. This judgment decides whether the Applicant, Mr Sweetman, has standing to pursue the remaining live issues in this case. I am grateful for the helpful written and oral submissions on that issue of counsel for Mr Sweetman and the State.2 This judgment should be read with my “Earlier Judgment” in this case - of 14 March 20253, in which I decided that Mr Sweetman lacks standing to impugn a decision of the EPA4 to grant an Industrial Emissions licence to the Notice Party (“Anglo Beef”).

2. This case relates to the statutory arrangements for Industrial Emissions licensing as they do or do not provide for EIA5 to inform the licensing process. The EPA Act 19926 governs the grant and review of Industrial Emissions Licenses - which processes are prompted by a variety of stipulated circumstances.7 The legislative regime provides for the possibility of EIA in some such circumstances. Mr Sweetman complains however, that in the particular circumstance which arose in this case – a review of the Notice Party’s Industrial Emissions License initiated by the EPA under in accordance with s.90(4)(a)(i) of the EPA Act 19928 “due to material changes in the nature and extent of emissions at the installation” – the statutory process does not provide for the possibility of EIA. That, he says, represents defective transposition to Irish law of Articles 1 to 6 of the EIA Directive.

3. Applicants for judicial review must prove all matters necessary to their success in such proceedings – Murphy.9 In particular, and though the rules as to standing are generally liberal, they must demonstrate their locus standi to prosecute the proceedings.

Relief Sought and Grounds Asserted

4. By his Amended Statement of Grounds dated 15 November 2023, Mr Sweetman sought the following reliefs:10

1. Certiorari quashing the Impugned Decision of the EPA on 22 June 2023 to grant11 an Industrial Emissions Licence12 to the Notice Party for the disposal or recycling of animal carcasses and animal

1 Headings are for the general assistance of the reader and are not determinative of substantive content.

2 The Second and Third Respondents.

3 Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 144. Defined terms used in that judgment are adopted here and signified by Capitalisation.

4 Environmental Protection Agency.

5 Environmental Impact Assessment as provided for in the EIA Directive - Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and

private projects on the environment as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU.

6 Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 as amended.

7 See generally the Earlier Judgment §11 et seq.

8 “(4) … a licence or revised licence — (a) shall be reviewed by the Agency if the Agency considers— (i) that emissions from the activity to which the

licence or revised licence relates are, or are likely to be, of such significance that the existing emission limit values, or equivalent parameters or technical

measures specified in the licence or revised licence need to be reviewed or new such values, parameters or measures, as the case may be, need to be

specified in the licence or revised licence, …”.

9 Murphy v An Bord Pleanála & Kilshane Energy [2025] IEHC 117. Cited in Earlier Judgment 45.

10 I have edited the text for brevity.

11 Pursuant to section 90(2) of the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992, as amended.

Reg. ref. P0040-03.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

waste, with a treatment capacity exceeding 10 tonnes per day, at Christendom, Ferrybank, County Waterford.

2. Such declaration(s) of the legal rights and/or legal position of the Applicant and/or persons similarly situated and/or of the legal duties and/or legal position of the Respondent(s) as the Court considers appropriate.

3. A Declaration that the State has failed to properly transpose Articles 1 to 6 inclusive of EIA Directive 2014/52/EU13 as it relates to the granting of development consent for projects requiring Industrial Emissions Licences in circumstances such as that challenged in the within proceedings.14

4. Mr Sweetman sought those reliefs on Core Grounds as follows:15

1. The Impugned Decision is invalid because the EPA granted an Industrial Emissions Licence without having first assessed the significant effects on the environment of the project in accordance with Articles 1 to 6 of the EIA Directive. The EPA had before it no objective information to support a

conclusion in EIA of no significant effects on the environment “and/or contained lacunae”.16

2. The Impugned Decision is invalid because the EPA, in failing to carry out an EIA of the project, failed to comply with the IE Directive.17

3. The arrangements in the EPA Act 1992, for Industrial Emissions Licence reviews initiated by the EPA are incompatible with the State’s obligations under Articles 1 to 6 inclusive of the EIA Directive and Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention18 in that they fail to make such licence reviews subject to the EIA Directive.

4. The State has failed to properly transpose Articles 1 to 6 of the EIA Directive in respect of the granting of development consent for projects requiring Industrial Emissions Licences such as the Impugned Decision.

5. The case against the State, for the declaratory relief described above, sought on Core Grounds 3 and

4 above, is pursued but was modularised and deferred. In my Earlier Judgment, for reasons set out therein, I decided only that Mr Sweetman lacks standing to prosecute his claim for certiorari of the Impugned

Decision. And so, Relief 1 and Core Grounds 1 and 2 fell out of the case.

13 This reference is incorrect. It should refer to EIA Directive 2011/92/EU as amended by 2014/52/EU. However, as the error does not mislead and could

readily be corrected be amendment I will ignore it for present purposes.

14 A fourth relief, as costs protection, was also sought but is not here relevant.

15 I have slightly edited the Grounds without changing meaning. Emphases added.

16 Sic.

17 Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial and livestock rearing emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (Recast) as amended by Directive

(EU) 2024/1785. Article 5(3) states: “3. In the case of a new installation or a substantial change where Article 4 of Directive 85/337/EEC applies, any

relevant information obtained or conclusion arrived at pursuant to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9 of that Directive shall be examined and used for the purposes

of granting the permit.” Directive 85/337/EEC was the predecessor of the EIA Directive.

18 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters done at Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

6. What remains in the case therefore is the claims for Reliefs 2 and 3 on Grounds 3 and 4. The nub of that case is the allegation that the State failed properly to transpose to Irish law Articles 1 to 6 of the EIA Directive in respect of review of Industrial Emissions Licences at the instance of the EPA pursuant to s.90(4)(a)(i) of the EPA Act 1992. So, this judgment addresses the question whether Mr Sweetman has, in these proceedings, standing to prosecute his claims for Reliefs 2 and 3 on Grounds 3 and 4. I will refer to those remaining issues in the case as the “Transposition Issues”.

General Rule of Standing - Cahill v Sutton (1980) & State (Lynch) v Cooney (1982)

7. Cahill v Sutton19 is the leading case on standing at Irish law – certainly as to challenges to legislation. It established that where a citizen alleges a statute unconstitutional, the “general rule” is “to require the person who challenges a particular legislative provision to show either that he has been personally affected injuriously by it or that he is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of it”. That is in appreciable part (though it not the only reason) because “without concrete personal circumstances pointing to a wrong suffered or threatened, the case tends to lack the force and urgency of reality.” In similar vein, in State (Lynch) v Cooney,20 Walsh J held that the question of sufficiency of interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and hence standing to litigate it, “must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case” and “is a mixed question of fact and law which must be decided upon legal principles”. However, he held, “there is greater importance to be attached to the facts because it is only by an examination of the facts that the court can come to a decision as to whether there is a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates”. These cases reflect the general necessity of a factual basis for litigation.

8. As observed in the Earlier Judgment,21 the general rule in Cahill is liberally interpreted and is subject to exceptions. Mr Sweetman addresses that general rule by citing Henchy J in that case to the effect that the

rule as to standing “being but a rule of practice must, like all such rules, be subject to expansion, exception or

qualification when the justice of the case so requires” and as to the constitutionality of a statute “may be overlooked if, in the circumstances of the case, there is a transcendent need to” permit the challenge to proceed, for example, where “those prejudicially affected by the impugned statute may not be in a position to assert adequately, or in time, their constitutional rights.” Henchy J made clear that that was only an example of the principle that the usual “rule of personal standing may be waived or relaxed if, in the particular circumstances of a case, the court finds that there are weighty contravening considerations justifying a departure from the rule.”

9. These citations are undoubtedly correct. Henchy J allowed for “weighty contravening considerations” which might create a “transcendent need” to permit a challenge to proceed despite the general rule not being satisfied. Cahill is the most important, but far from the last, word on standing and in many respects and contexts the standing rules are liberal – notably in cases of risk of substantive environmental harm. But these citations do not of themselves answer the question what contravening

19 [1980] IR 269.

20 [1982] IR 337 at p36.

§§47, 49, & 92(f).

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

considerations are so weighty as to constitute a transcendent need. It is nonetheless clear that departure from the general rule in Cahill merits description as exceptional.

To paraphrase an observation made by medics: what is general is general.22

10. Recently, in FIE,23 Clarke CJ described Cahill as the most important case as to, and the foundation of, the law of standing in constitutional cases. He emphasised as important the following, by Henchy J, in Cahill:

“This general, but not absolute, rule of judicial self-restraint has much to commend it. It ensures that normally the controversy will rest on facts which are referable primarily and specifically to the challenger, thus giving concreteness and first-hand reality to what might otherwise be an abstract or hypothetical legal argument. The resulting decision of the court will be either the allowance or the rejection of the challenge in so far as it is based on the facts adduced.”

Three-Step Framework for Analysis - s.87(10) of the EPA Act 1992

11. As recorded in the Earlier Judgment, Mr Sweetman’s standing to litigate any issue in this case depends, by s.87(10) of the EPA Act 1992, on his having “a sufficient interest in the matter which is the subject of the application”. This appears to me to imply a three-step analysis:

• First, it is necessary to identify the “matter which is the subject of the application”.

• Second, it is necessary to identify Mr Sweetman’s interest in that matter.

• Third, it is necessary to enquire whether that interest is “sufficient” – within either the general rule in

Cahill or an exception thereto.

The Matter the Subject of the Application

12. Identification of the matter the subject of the application for judicial review is important in this case. That matter undoubtedly includes the Transposition Issues. A question arises whether it also vestigially includes the challenge to the Impugned Decision or, put another way, whether it includes the Impugned

Decision to such an extent as to provide a factual basis to the Transposition Issues – a factual basis being, at least usually, necessary to standing.

22 Medics say as to diagnostics: “What is common is common”.

Friends of the Irish Environment v Ireland [2020] IESC 49, [2020] 2 ILRM 233.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

Legislative Context

13. These proceedings are entitled in the matter of s.87(10) of the EPA Act 1992. While that does not decide the present issue, it is a useful starting point. S.87(10) provides, as here relevant:

• “That a person shall not, by application for judicial review or in any other legal proceedings whatsoever, question the validity of a decision of the Agency to grant or refuse a licence or revised licence … unless the proceedings are instituted within the period of 8 weeks beginning on the date on which the licence or revised licence is granted or the date on which the decision to refuse or not to grant the licence or revised licence is made.”

• “The High Court shall not grant leave for judicial review under this section unless it is satisfied that:

(i) the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter which is the subject of the application, or

(ii) the applicant— (I) is a body or organisation … the aims or objectives of which relate to the promotion of environmental protection …”.

It will be seen that “the matter which is the subject of the application” is clearly “the validity of a decision of

the Agency to grant or refuse a licence or revised licence”.

14. Analogously, in the PDA 2000, section 50A(3)(b)(i) requires, as a condition of leave in planning and

environmental judicial review, “a sufficient interest in the matter which is the subject of the application”. The

“matter” in question is identified in that section 50A(1) defines “section 50 leave” to mean :– “… leave to

apply for judicial review under the Order in respect of a decision or other act to which section 50(2) applies”. Section 50(2) lists certain types of “decision made or other act done by” the Board or a local or planning authority.

15. Analogously also but more generally, Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts is illuminatory:

• Rule 18(2) provides that a declaration may be sought in judicial review, and the Court may grant the declaration if it considers that, it would be just and convenient for the declaration to be granted on an application for judicial review having regard to:

o the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by way of an order of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, or quo warranto;

o the nature of the persons and bodies against whom relief may be granted by way of such order; and o all the circumstances of the case.

I observe that “the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by way of an order of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, or quo warranto” are classically decisions of lower courts and administrative decisions (typically though not always statutory decisions) of administrative bodies affecting rights and/or interests.

• Rule 20(5) prohibits leave for judicial review unless the court “considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.”

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

16. In my view ,the foregoing account illustrates that, at least classically and generally,

• The subject matter of judicial review is decisions of lower courts and administrative decisions of administrative bodies affecting rights and/or interests. The Impugned Decision is one such.

• It follows that at least generally standing in judicial review is assessed by the relationship of the applicant for judicial review to the decision, of that type, in question.

• The criterion of sufficiency of interest applies and relates to that decision. These observations do not decide the present issue. But they are a proper starting point.

Freestanding Issues?

17. Mr Sweetman and the State both at times referred to the Transposition Issues as “freestanding”. By that, both meant freestanding of the Impugned Decision. But I remain unclear that they meant by the concept precisely the same thing. And it seems Mr Sweetman did not ultimately agreed that the Transposition Issues are freestanding.

18. The lay reader may find it confusing that the word “standing” is used in two different senses in this judgment. By “standing” I refer to the legal question whether, all other things being equal, Mr Sweetman is someone entitled, by reason of his situation and relationship to the issues in the case, to litigate those issues. By “freestanding” I refer to an issue in the case which stands apart from, unconnected to and unsupported by any other issue in the case. It also refers to what may be descried as abstract legal issues standing free of any subtending factual matrix.

19. Certainly, the State used the term freestanding in the sense that the Transposition Issues are now in effect unrelated to the Impugned Decision and unsupported by the challenge to the Impugned Decision inasmuch as it is established that that challenge fails for want of standing in Mr Sweetman to prosecute it. Put another way, the State in effect says that I must consider the issue of standing as to Transposition Issues as if the challenge to the Impugned Decision had never been part of the case. In light of the result of the Earlier Judgment, I accept that proposition.

20. As the State correctly observes, Mr Sweetman’s written submissions are self-contradictory as to whether he seeks to make a freestanding case as to the Transposition Issues. Those submissions argue variously:

• On the one hand, that the question for the Court is “whether in the absence of participation in a specific

decision-making process, can the applicant (or any other person) bring a freestanding challenge to legislation as failing to implement EU law and/or failing to protect the environment”. And Mr Sweetman is “not primarily interested in the specific development the subject of the proceedings and was instead

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

primarily concerned with the authorisation regime, and its failure to require the necessary environmental assessments”.24

• On the other hand, that he “evidently” is not seeking to bring a “free-standing” challenge as the Impugned Decision “is central to the case”.25

21. Ultimately, in oral submissions, Mr Sweetman shrank from the assertion that his case as to the Transposition Issues is freestanding of his case against the Impugned Decision – which latter case, for want of standing, he is now shut out from making. He asserts nonetheless that his lost case against the Impugned

Decision is still contextually relevant to his standing to litigate the Transposition Issues. He says that merely his loss of that case does not deprive him of standing as to the Transposition Issues. He argues that he is in no worse a position as to the Transposition Issues than someone who has lost a case to quash an Impugned

Decision after full argument but is permitted nonetheless to argue for declaratory relief as to a point of law.

22. Taking his argument at his height as I understand it, albeit rephrasing it somewhat, Mr Sweetman argues that the Impugned Decision remains part of the “matter” of the case – part of the Transposition Issues. In this regard, I note that Relief 3 in seeking a declaration of inadequate transposition of the EIA Directive invokes the granting of development consent for projects requiring Industrial Emissions Licences in circumstances “such as that challenged in the within proceedings”.

What is now the “matter” of this case?

23. There seems to me a difference between, on the one hand, the position of the loser of a claim to certiorari of an Impugned Decision by reason of failure of his/her substantive grounds of challenge who nonetheless seeks declaratory relief as to the law and, on the other hand, the position of a litigant who loses because (s)he lacks even the standing to seek certiorari of an Impugned Decision. In my view, the “matter” of this case is, by virtue of the Earlier Judgment, the Transposition Issues considered without regard to the Impugned Decision. These proceedings are shorn of the challenge to the Impugned Decision and are now a freestanding challenge to legislation for inadequate transposition of EU Law, unsupported by any factual matrix.

24. The phrase “such as that challenged in the within proceedings” cannot operate as a back door through which Mr Sweetman might strike when he may not wound the Impugned Decision. Given his lack of standing as to the Impugned Decision, that would equate to setting up, analysing and criticising hypothetical facts – which, for purposes of standing, are no facts at all. It is therefore illustrative to ask, could Mr Sweetman have started these proceedings to litigate the Transposition Issues on a freestanding basis without reference to any actual decision on an Industrial Emissions Licence? That, in effect, is the question I am now posed. If he cannot, one may ask rhetorically how it could be that he could gain such standing by the

24 Mr Sweetman’s written submissions §4.

Submissions §35.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

artifice of adding to the proceedings a challenge to an impugned decision in respect of which he lacks standing?

25. I would in any event take the foregoing view of the phrase “such as that challenged in the within proceedings”. But it is fortified by my view that the circumstances invoked by the plea are not particular to the factual matrix in which the Impugned Decision was made but rather consist in the fact that the Impugned Decision was made at the instance of the EPA pursuant to s.90(4)(a)(i) of the EPA Act 1992 and so without the possibility of EIA.

26. Though the observation does not dispose of the issue of standing now requiring decision, it seems to me counterintuitive, paradoxical, and so unlikely, that an issue on which a litigant lacks standing could nonetheless provide the footing for that same litigant’s standing on another issue. Though I would not overstress the point, the figurative concept of a footing seems at least congruent with the word “locus” – meaning “place”. Paraphrasing Archimedes, perhaps presumptively,26 one may say: “Give me a place to stand and I may move the Court”.

27. While arguments in the alternative are, of course permissible, I also think there is some weight in the State’s assertion that it is incongruous of Mr Sweetman to argue, as he did when asserting his standing to challenge the Impugned Decision, that it was necessary to challenge a concrete decision to avoid bringing a freestanding challenge on the Transposition Issues, but to argue now that his standing to challenge that concrete decision is unnecessary to his standing on the Transposition Issues.

Mr Sweetman’s Asserted Interest

28. Mr Sweetman asserts and relies exclusively on his interest as “an individual with a recognised and long-standing interest and involvement in environmental issues”.27 I have already accepted that he has such an interest and is not to be regarded for present purposes as a “meddlesome busybody” or the like.28 For present purposes I take him to be, in the phrase used by McKechnie J in Digital Rights,29 a “sincere and serious litigant”. Nor, for that matter, has the State argued otherwise.

29. However it is as well to repeat that, as he lacked the standing which he would undoubtedly have had had he participated in the process which resulted in the Impugned Decision, the nature of Mr Sweetman’s interest and its relationship to what was at that time the matter of the case – it undoubtedly included the Impugned Decision - was considered in the Earlier Judgment. When arguing for standing to challenge the Impugned Decision and seeking to get over the difficulties of his non-participation in the licensing process

Though I am not the first: see Snarecroft Ltd v Quantum Securities Ltd [2018] EWHC 2071 (Ch) and Taylor (on the demise of John Tracy Atkyns) v

Horde (1755) 1 Kenyon 143 96 E.R. 945.

27 Amended Statement of Grounds §31. See also my Earlier Judgment §32 & 33 for his elaboration of that interest and my analysis of that issue.

28 Earlier Judgment §33.

Digital Rights Ireland v The Minister for Communication, The Marine and Natural Resources [2010] IEHC 221, [2010] 3 IR 251.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

and his lack of physical proximity to the Rendering Plant, Mr Sweetman emphasised the general nature of his concern as to EIA in Industrial Emissions Licensing. The Earlier Judgment records his argument as follows:30

“35. Indeed, counsel for Mr Sweetman made clear that the mischief his litigation seeks to address is “this particular system that's being operated by the State and the EPA” – by which he means the exclusion of EIA from EPA-initiated IE licence reviews. He says:

o He is “somewhat indifferent as to the actual specific unit in this case”;

o “I think the primary point in the case is one that transcends this particular development. It's one of general importance and one that is of general importance to my client, who is, as I said, a well-known environmental activist …”;

o “Grace v. Sweetman … concerned hen harriers. There was a specific site-specific impact that was being dealt with in the context of a specific application for development consent and a specific Environmental Impact Assessment of that application. Here, Mr. Sweetman's complaint transcends the nitty-gritty of this application. … We're not down in the weeds … We're saying at a high level, as a matter of principle, the correct interpretation of the EIA Directive is contrary to the manner in which the EPA has been operating it and the manner in which the State has chosen to implement it. That's why I'm here seeking relief against the State and the EPA”;

o “What we are interested in transcends the particular development. I'm not concerned in relation to the particular impacts, I'm not concerned with the amenities of the area, I'm concerned with the principled exception from the need to obtain EIA for this category of development. That's my case and I say that I have a peculiar or particular or personal interest in that case. I am not arguing about the emissions or the smells or the water impacts and so on and how they haven't been addressed, I am seeking declaratory relief also against the State and I'm using this as an example …”;

o “I am not making any complaint about any amenity value. My case is not about the effects of this development on the locality or the area as it was” and he accepted that he lacked standing to complain about the project”;

o He is “not here complaining, as I was in Grace v Sweetman, about the individual impacts” and he has “no concerns that the Bord should have modified the development.” “He says – by counsel, but not in evidence - that the reason he made no submission to the EPA is because he had nothing to say to the EPA”;

o He has “said nothing about this development in these proceedings or otherwise. I have no complaint about this development. I am not criticising it”;

o “the nature of the legal challenge that is mounted here is not site or fact specific at all. It is a generalised

complaint about the licensing regime in this country. What Mr. Sweetman wants is a declaration that the manner in which these licences are being operated is incorrectly done”;

o “While there is no physical proximity and he undoubtedly has an interest in environmental matters, generally, generally, he has placed no evidence before the Court to show there is any particular interest in the specific amenity value that is he is seeking to litigate”.

Earlier Judgment §35. Footnotes omitted.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

30. The Earlier Judgment noted that:

• “At trial, counsel for Mr Sweetman indicated that this declaration31 was the primary relief which he sought. It became clear that he regarded the Impugned Decision and the environmental effects of the Rendering Plant as merely the occasion rather than the cause of this litigation – they are merely the vehicle for, and are not the substance of, his concerns. He maintained his claim for certiorari but it seemed, only on a precautionary basis in case its abandonment would imperil his claim for declaratory relief.”32

• “Mr Sweetman’s concern is not with the specifics of, nor with the specific environmental effects of, the licensed activity of the Rendering Plant … His concern is with what he considers to be a lacuna in the relevant legislation whereby EIA, in breach, he says, of the EIA Directive, is not provided for as to EPA- initiated IE licence reviews under s.90(4)(a)(i) of the EPA Act 1992.”33

• “Mr Sweetman has – indeed actively professes - no interest of consequence in the environmental effects of the Rendering Plant. Much less does he have a “sufficient interest” in it. Mr Sweetman’s concern as to a systemic flaw in the relevant legislation is removed from the environmental effects of the Plant.”34

31. However, the consequence of my Earlier Judgment, holding that he lacked standing to challenge the Impugned Decision, is that his precaution has failed him, his occasion and vehicle have dissolved and the peril he foresaw has eventuated. It is very difficult to reconcile the foregoing account of his earlier position as to standing to impugn the Impugned Decision, with Mr Sweetman’s present position that the Impugned

Decision is “central to the case”.35 It is impossible to conclude but that, when arguing for standing vis-a-vis the Impugned Decision, Mr Sweetman sought, paradoxically but perhaps understandably given the difficulty as to standing in which he found himself, to distance himself from the particularity of the Impugned Decision and emphasise his general concerns, whereas now when arguing for standing as to those general concerns he cleaves to the Impugned Decision as a plank in the shipwreck of the particular part of his case wreaked by the Earlier Judgment.

32. As I have said above, Mr Sweetman’s written submissions in this module were self-contradictory. As to an Impugned Decision he later described as “central” to his case on the Transposition Issues he had earlier said the following, on which I comment:

Sweetman Submissions 36 & My Comment thereon Submissions “… he was not primarily interested in the specific development the subject of the proceedings and was instead primarily concerned with the authorisation regime, and its failure to require the necessary environmental assessments.”

31 i.e. against the State.

Earlier Judgment §3.

33 Earlier Judgment §24.

34 Earlier Judgment §92c.

35 Submissions §35.

Submissions §4.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

Sweetman Submissions 36 & My Comment thereon

“Any participation in the process would therefore have been somewhat otiose and, would not in any way have advanced the applicant’s interests.”

Comment The second sentence is, as to the law of standing, a non-sequitur. Prior participation in the process, even if destined to fail, would undoubtedly have given Mr Sweetman standing as to both the Impugned Decision and the Transposition Issues - Grace & Sweetman.37

In the Earlier Judgment I took the view that this argument “ignore(s) the point that, if his argument against the State is correct, the EPA would have been bound as an emanation of the State to have performed EIA in any event or, if not, to have halted the licence review process. Nor do I think it assists him to say that others raised the absence of EIA with the EPA to no avail so his participation would have been pointless. It is entirely possible, for example, that those others lacked his expertise and knowledge of EIA law and his capacity to make weighty submissions – we do not know.”

Indeed, though Mr Sweetman’s primary concern is with the authorisation regime rather than the specific licensed activity, his prior participation in the licensing process would have been the opposite of otiose and would have crucially advanced his interests.

Submissions “That being so, the question arises as to how such participation could be a prerequisite to a challenge to the legislation.”

Comment As the premise is flawed so too is the question.

But in any event the issue is not specifically whether prior participation is a prerequisite to a challenge to the legislation. It is the more general question whether a challenge to the legislation may be mounted on a freestanding basis or must be mounted in accordance with the general rule in Cahill that the challenger to legislation must “show either that he has been personally affected injuriously by it or that he is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of it”. That general rule, if applicable, invariably requires a factual matrix underlying the challenge and standing to litigate that factual matrix – such standing being provided by the prospect of injury within that factual matrix. For this purpose I accept that a risk of environmental, as opposed to personal, harm might suffice but since the Earlier Judgment he can show neither.

Submissions “Put simply, the issue of the lawfulness of the legislation cannot be affected by the making of a submission to a competent authority.”

Comment That is clearly correct. But it does not answer the inquiry as to standing to challenge the legislation. Even prior participation hopeless as to the outcome of the licensing process would have given Mr Sweetman standing.

Submissions “That competent authority cannot effect change in the legislation.”

Grace & Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála, ESB Wind & Coillte [2020] 3 IR 286. Cited for this proposition in my Earlier Judgment §64.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

Sweetman Submissions 36 & My Comment thereon Comment For like reasons, this observation does not answer the inquiry as to standing to challenge the legislation.

Sufficiency of Interest and Exceptions to the General Rule in Cahill – the Cases

33. As to sufficiency of an interest to afford standing, some review of the caselaw, further to that in my Earlier Judgment, is required. In keeping with his self-contradictory view whether the Impugned Decision is central to the case on the one hand or, on the other, the Transposition Issues are freestanding, Mr Sweetman invokes the case law allowing standing exceptional to the general rule in Cahill that a subtending factual matrix is essential to standing.

34. By way of general observation, and as much of the caselaw concerns standing to assert constitutional rights, human rights and the unconstitutionality of legislation and the requirement as to standing of history or risk of adverse effect on the Plaintiff, I should say that I accept that the requirement of a subtending factual matrix in environmental law cases may in some circumstances satisfied by a history or risk of serious adverse effect on the environment as opposed to on the Plaintiff personally. What follows here should be read in light of that acceptance. But it must also be read in light of the absence in the present case of history or risk of adverse effect on the environment given the Earlier Judgment excluding review of the Impugned Decision.

Crotty (1987) & Lancefort (1999)

35. Mr Sweetman cites Crotty38 in which the challenge was to the constitutionality of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986. It was to effect certain parts of the Single European Act39 (“SEA”40). The SEA was an international treaty between the EU41 Member States to amend and expand the scope of the EU treaties and EU competencies. Mr Crotty complained that the SEA could not be enacted in domestic law without a referendum of the people as it was an amendment to the Constitution not covered by Article

29.4.3 of the Constitution.42 He sought to prevent by injunction the Government’s ratification of the SEA.

36. The State’s challenge, on Cahill grounds, to Mr Crotty’s standing was rebuffed by Barrington J in the High Court at the interlocutory injunction stage, first as Cahill related to private litigation and second, as the

38 Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] 2 CMLR 666, [1987] IR 713.

39 done at Luxembourg on the 17th day of February 1986, and at The Hague on the 28th day of February 1986.

40 Not to be confused with Strategic Environmental Assessment.

41 At that time, properly, the “European Communities”.

At the time it read: “3° The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (established by Treaty signed at Paris on the 18th

day of April, 1951), the European Economic Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March, 1957) and the European Atomic

Energy Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March, 1957). No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted,

acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or

measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State.”

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

dangers identified in Cahill, that unrestricted standing would be a charter for the busybody or the litigation of lost merely political battles, were absent in Crotty.

37. Barrington J held first that Mr Crotty had “raised matters which are common to him and to other citizens and which are weighty countervailing considerations which would justify, on their own, a departure from the rule43 in relation to locus standi.” But Barrington J held that in any event, Mr Crotty had locus standi within that rule because he alleged an amendment to the Constitution without a referendum and, so, that his right as a citizen to be consulted in such a referendum was being infringed. Barrington J granted interlocutory injunctions restraining ratification of the SEA. At trial, a divisional High Court (Barrington J) dismissed Mr Crotty’s claim, inter alia on standing grounds. The Supreme Court reinstated the interlocutory injunctions and later dismissed the appeal of the High Court’s dismissal of Mr Crotty’s claim for a declaration that the 1986 Act was invalid as unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court upheld44 Mr Crotty’s appeal that ratification of Title III of the SEA – which bound the State to conduct its international relations and foreign policy within the framework of European Political Cooperation - would be unconstitutional as an alienation of sovereignty which the 1986 Act had not incorporated into domestic law.

38. What may matter in Crotty for present purposes is that the Supreme Court, in notably brief terms, upheld Mr Crotty’s standing to impugn the constitutionality of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986. Finlay CJ said:

“In the High Court the plaintiff's claim was rejected on the grounds that because the SEA had not yet been ratified by the State and because the Act of 1986 had not yet been brought into effect the plaintiff failed to establish that he had a locus standi to challenge the validity of the Act of 1986 having regard to the provisions of the Constitution. The Court is satisfied, in accordance with the principles … in Cahill v Sutton … that in the particular circumstances of this case where the impugned legislation, namely the Act of 1986, will if made operative affect every citizen,45 the plaintiff has a locus standi to challenge the Act notwithstanding his failure to prove the threat of any special injury or prejudice to him, as distinct from any other citizen, arising from the Act.”

39. Mr Sweetman cites Keane J in Lancefort46 for the tension between two principles:

• First, that of ensuring that the enactment of invalid legislation, or the adoption of unlawful practices by public bodies, does not escape scrutiny by the courts because of the absence of indisputably qualified objectors.

• Second, that the critically important remedies provided by the law in these areas are not abused.

40. As an example of the latter principle, Keane J instanced the dangers of giving free rein to cranks, busybodies and the merely officious or men or women of straw who have nothing to lose by clogging up the

43 i.e. the general rule in Cahill v Sutton.

44 (Walsh, Henchy and Hederman JJ; Finlay CJ and Griffin J dissenting).

45 Emphasis added.

Lancefort Limited v An Bord Pleanála (#2) [1999] 2 ILRM 401, [1999] 2 IR 270 p308.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

courts with ill-founded and vexatious challenges – an issue which does not arise in the present case. He also cited Crotty for the view that a reasonably generous approach to the question of standing is particularly obvious in cases where the challenge relates to an enactment of the Oireachtas or an act of the executive which affects all citizens equally. He said that a severely restrictive approach to locus standi, where the

decision of a public body is challenged, would defeat the public interest in ensuring that such bodies obey the law. However, Keane J nevertheless noted that the requirement remains that, as a general rule, locus standi must be established where a person seeks to challenge the decision of a public body. Keane J held that since the applicant company “was not even in existence at the time the decision which is challenged was made, its interest in the subject matter of the proceedings is somewhat tenuous, if indeed it can be said to exist at all.”

41. Notably however, despite the expansive attitude recorded above, Keane J held, for the majority of the Supreme Court, that Lancefort lacked standing to seek certiorari of a planning permission for an hotel on a sensitive and important site in Dublin City centre.47

42. Mr Sweetman extensively cites the dissent by Denham J in Lancefort. In doing so Denham J, undoubtedly correctly, emphasises that, especially where environmental protection is at issue, litigants acting in the public interest may not have to show personal victimhood. This is so as environmental issues by their nature affect the community as a whole. It is important to add that in Grace & Sweetman48 the Supreme Court held that Lancefort no longer provides authority for any general preclusion of standing in the absence of prior participation or an appropriate explanation for the lack of it.

43. It seems to me important that Lancefort was not a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute – that case had been abandoned. It was a challenge to a planning permission as to which the prospect was, as assumed in considering standing, of actual environmental harm resulting from the permitted development. And, in a real sense, if the permission was immune from challenge by expiry of the time limit for judicial review, the risk of harm was threatened and imminent in the sense and degree in which Cahill requires. It seems to me that the judgment of Denham J falls to be considered in that light.

44. However, absent a permission or licence and even assuming the flawed transposition, no environmental harm susceptible to prevention by litigation is threatened or imminent in that sense and degree. And in the present case:

• The Impugned Decision is immune from such litigation at the hand of Mr Sweetman – given the Earlier Judgment. So even assuming for the sake of argument that it will cause environmental harm, such harm is not susceptible to prevention by litigation.

47 A triangular site bounded by College Street, Westmoreland Street and Fleet Street close to Trinity College, the Bank of Ireland and various other

protected structures.

See below.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

• More generally, any environmental harm by reason of the alleged flaw in transposition, other than by reason of the Impugned Decision, will inevitably be preceded by another licensing process in which the public may participate and, if needs be, litigate the flaw in transposition for the purpose of preventing the harm a licence would allegedly permit. To put it another way, the risk is low that the allegedly flawed transposition will escape scrutiny by the courts - whether because of the absence of indisputably qualified objectors or otherwise.

45. I accept that in Digital Rights49 McKechnie J accurately observed that “Mr. Crotty’s inability to point to any prejudice specific to him personally, as distinct from him as a member of the public, did not deprive him of the necessary standing.” But I do not read that observation or the relatively brief finding of the Supreme Court that Mr Crotty had standing in a matter of high constitutional importance as it relates to the sovereignty of the State and in respect of which he had, on the premise of his proceedings, a personal right to be consulted in a referendum, as carte blanche for freestanding challenges to measures of general application by anybody but the busybody. True, Mr Crotty’s right to vote in referendum was indistinct from the like rights of other citizens of full age and that, in that sense, his position was neither special nor particular. But it was a constitutional right of a kind which he was entitled to personally and positively exercise and to regard as in law, if not peculiar, at least precious to him. The right to vote, in election or referendum, is a cardinal right characteristic of a democratic society and none the less personal to the individual because it is common to all citizens. Nor do I read Digital Rights or Crotty as requiring the attribution of standing for freestanding challenges to measures of general application to individuals with merely50 a particular, deep and creditable interest in the general field of law or policy to which the measure of general application relates.

46. Not least, espousing such cartes blanches fails to recognise that the frustration of litigious cranks is not the only reason for standing requirements. Another rationale is also of great importance – adapting the phraseology in Cahill and Lynch to public law issues: as observed above, standing “must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case” as “without concrete circumstances pointing to a threatened harm, the case tends to lack the force and urgency of reality.”

Mulcreevy (2004)

47. In my view, Mr Sweetman’s reliance on Mulcreevy51 does not avail him. Mr Mulcreevy litigated “to ensure that the national monument is not damaged irreparably”,52 by the impugned decision53 to permit removal of part of Carrickmines Castle to enable construction of the south-eastern section of the M50 Motorway. A challenge to his standing failed.

Digital Rights Ireland v The Minister for Communication, The Marine and Natural Resources [2010] IEHC 221, [2010] 3 IR 251.

50 A word I use here to confine not to diminish.

51 Mulcreevy v Minister for Environment [2004] IESC 5, [2004] 1 ILRM 419, [2004] 1 IR 72.

52 Keane CJ §12.

Under Section 14 of the National Monuments Act 1930.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

48. I do not see Mulcreevy as adopting Denham J’s dissent in Lancefort or as resiling from the majority view in Lancefort. I of course accept the observation in Mulcreevy that it is “not in the public interest that decisions by statutory bodies which are of at least questionable validity should wholly escape scrutiny”. There were in Mulcreevy a factual matrix, an impugned decision and an allegation of the prospect of environmental harm. But, given the Earlier Judgment, the Impugned Decision is now not at issue in these proceedings and so the question of its escaping scrutiny does not arise. Nor will environmental harm ensue from any other licensing decision in the State without first a licensing process in respect of which, if needs be, the Transposition Issues can be litigated.

49. Mulcreevy is to be further distinguished from the present case. Mr Mulcreevy lived in Kerry and could not show any personal interest in Carrickmines Castle or that he would be peculiarly and personally affected by harm to it. In that his position is similar to Mr Sweetman’s. But Mr Mulcreevy had been in effect deprived of the other safe route to standing of which he would have been entitled to avail have it been available. That is, personal participation in the process leading to the impugned decision. The process under the National Monuments Act 1930 which resulted in the impugned approval of the removal of part of the castle, did not provide for public participation in the process. Nor, as Keane CJ observed, did the 1930 Act provide, unlike the planning code, for an elaborate appeals procedure.54 In contrast, Mr Sweetman could have participated in the procedure which resulted in the Impugned Decision and thereby could have copperfastened his standing. But he did not. And as Barniville J later observed in Conway, there were in Mulcreevy, unlike in the present case in which many objected to the Impugned Decision,55 “no obvious particularly directly affected persons to bring the proceedings”.56 As I observed earlier, this factor, though not decisive in itself of standing to impugn the IE Licence, was relevant.57

Grace & Sweetman (2020) - ESB Wind, Tipperary)

50. In the earlier hearing, counsel for Mr Sweetman himself distinguished Grace & Sweetman58 as relating to a specific development consent, a specific EIA and a site-specific impact on hen harriers. He said the present case “transcends the nitty-gritty” and is “not down in the weeds. … That's why I'm here seeking relief against the State and the EPA”.59 While the Supreme Court in Grace & Sweetman ultimately did not need to determine Mr Sweetman’s standing, it noted that EU Member States’ margin of appreciation as to

what constitutes a “sufficient interest”60 is such that the relatively liberal Irish standing rules are the starting

point of analysis. However, in FIE61 Clarke CJ explicitly emphasised that Irish standing rules are “flexible but not infinitely so” and emphasised also the “importance of standing rules in our constitutional order”.

54 Keane CJ §15.

55 Earlier Judgment §67.

56 Conway v An Bord Pleanála & Dublin City Council [2019] IEHC 525 §40.

Earlier Judgment §85.

58 Grace & Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála, ESB Wind & Coillte [2020] 3 IR 286. See Earlier Judgment §62 et seq.

59 Transcript Day 1 p140. Earlier Judgment §35.

60 Citing Gruber v Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat für Kärnten (Case C-570/13) EU:C:2015:231.

Friends of the Irish Environment v Ireland [2020] IESC 49, [2020] 2 ILRM 233.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

51. The Supreme Court in Grace & Sweetman observed that the general rule in Cahill that “a challenger

must establish adverse effect causing or likely to cause injury or prejudice” is subject to “the sort of general

extension of standing in particular exceptional cases identified in Cahill, where the interests of justice may

require it”.62 In that light, standing in environmental cases involved a “reasonably liberal approach” to “the

sort of interest which must be potentially affected in order to confer standing in environmental cases”.63 Assessing standing in environmental cases required “a broad assessment of whether the legitimate and established amenity or other interests of the challenger could be said to be subject to potential interference or prejudice having regard to the scale and nature of the proposed development and the proximity or contact of the challenger to or with the area potentially impacted by the development in question.”64 That assessment was required to have regard, in appropriate cases, to the legitimate interest of persons in seeking to ensure appropriate protection of important aspects of the environment or amenity generally.65 Indeed, Mulcreevy suggests that the nature of the measure under challenge may be such as to confer a right to challenge on a very wide range of persons (and possibly, in some cases, on all persons not motivated by bad faith or the like).66

52. All that said, unlike the present case in its present iteration after the Earlier Judgment, Grace & Sweetman was clearly set in the factual matrix of an impugned decision: the applicants sought certiorari of a wind farm permission. Further, the Supreme Court’s analysis clearly does not imply unlimited standing. Albeit obiter, the analysis tends appreciably against free-standing judicial review of transposition issues untethered to factual matrices such as impugned development consents and resultant environmental risks. As I observed earlier,67 the Court was clearly dubious of Mr Sweetman’s standing. It held that the nonprejudiced challenger who has not previously participated must show that his/her ground of challenge is “directed solely to the special protection of the site”68 (i.e. a European Site). In that light – even if one extracts the word “solely” - it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court noted in Grace & Sweetman that at

Irish Law “a mere interest in ensuring that the law is upheld is not, in itself, sufficient to confer standing (for if

it were then there would, in all cases, be the potential for a so-called actio popularis and standing rules might be of very little relevance save for excluding abuse of process and the like)”.69 Indeed this observation clearly implies that “excluding abuse of process and the like” – for example by cranks - is not the sole purpose of standing rules.

53. It seems to me that the following from Grace & Sweetman, said of Mr Sweetman, though obiter, are not to be dismissed as mere straws in the wind and can in substance be said of Mr Sweetman in the present case:

“He does not have any physical proximity to the site. While he undoubtedly has an interest in environmental matters generally, he has placed no evidence before the court to show that he has any particular interest in the specific amenity value which is potentially impaired by this development. Nor

62 Grace & Sweetman §34.

63 Grace & Sweetman §43.

64 Grace & Sweetman §45.

Grace & Sweetman §45.

66 Grace & Sweetman §41.

67 Earlier Judgment §68 & 69 citing Grace & Sweetman §57, 41 & 73.

68 Grace & Sweetman §57.

Noted also at Earlier Judgment §91c as cited in Murphy v An Bord Pleanála & Kilshane Energy [2025] IEHC 117.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

has he given any real explanation as to why he did not participate. If someone had a broad interest in a particular amenity value which they asserted was sufficient to give them standing, it might be expected that their general interest in the issue would have led them to participate or, at a minimum, that there would be some reasonable explanation for nonparticipation.”70

Actio Popularis

Digital Rights (2010), Mohan (2019), FIE (2020)

54. As to his standing on the Transposition Issues, Mr Sweetman invokes Digital Rights71 – asserting that McKechnie J found the plaintiff company to be a “sincere and serious litigant”. Mr Sweetman submits that “the same can be said” of himself. – which I have accepted. McKechnie J granted Digital Rights standing to bring an actio popularis in the circumstances of that case, But while sincerity and seriousness may be necessary to standing to bring an actio popularis, McKechnie J does not suggest that they, without more, are sufficient to merit such standing.

55. In my Earlier Judgment I tried to elucidate the meaning of the phrase “actio popularis” and the right to litigate one. I took the view that:

• “on the pleadings, evidence and submissions adduced for Mr Sweetman as recorded above, he embarked in these proceedings on an actio popularis.”

• “As is observed in Grace & Sweetman citing Cahill (the leading case on standing at Irish law), the Irish courts broadly require that a challenger establish adverse effect causing or likely to cause injury or prejudice but have typically applied a reasonably flexible standing rule in all judicial review proceedings …”.

• “There is no relevant distinction in this regard between a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation (as in Cahill) and an assertion that Irish law fails to properly transpose EU law in that it does not provide for EIA in EPA-initiated IE Licence reviews – which is, in the end, the central allegation in this case.”

• “… as Digital Rights demonstrates, an actio popularis may, if untypically, be permissible.” 72

• Litigation of an actio popularis by an individual is permissible only exceptionally at Irish law. Merely that an EU law issue arises, or that an environmental law issue arises does not, per se, render the circumstances exceptional.73

56. One may add mention here of the judgment of O’Donnell J in Mohan74 - which post-dates Digital Rights. He said:

70 Grace & Sweetman §59.

Digital Rights Ireland v The Minister for Communication, The Marine and Natural Resources [2010] IEHC 221, [2010] 3 IR 251.

72 Earlier Judgment §46 - 49.

73 Earlier Judgment §92.

74 Mohan v Ireland [2019] IESC 18, [2021] 1 IR 293. Mr Mohan alleged the constitutional invalidity of legislation providing for curtailment of funding for

political parties failing to meet minimum thresholds of male and female candidates.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

“Standing is not, as a general rule, established by a simple desire to challenge legislation, no matter how strongly the putative claimant believes the provision to be repugnant to the Constitution. It is now clear that there is no actio popularis (a right on the part of a citizen to challenge the validity of legislation without showing any effect upon him or her, or any greater interest than that of being a citizen) in Irish constitutional law,”

O’Donnell J also cited Henchy J in Cahill for his observation that a case should rest on facts giving concreteness and first-hand reality to it. Clarke J in FIE75 described Mohan as re-emphasising the

“need, ordinarily, for a plaintiff to be able to demonstrate that they have been affected in reality or as a matter of fact by virtue of the measure which they seek to challenge on the basis that it breaches rights.

That remains the fundamental proposition. The circumstances in which it is permissible to accord standing outside the bounds of that basic principle must necessarily be limited and involve situations where there would be a real risk that important rights would not be vindicated unless a more relaxed attitude to standing were adopted.”

57. While the analogy with challenges to the constitutionality of legislation is not precise, it is persuasive as to transposition issues. And, as will be seen, the analogy has been validated by authority.

Aarhus & EIA Directive - Djurgården, LB & Case C-252/22

58. Sharpston AG in Djurgården,76 Bobek AG in LB77 and the CJEU in Case C-252/2278 are clear that while EU Member States are free to permit actio popularis by individuals, the Aarhus Convention and the EIA Directive do not require them to do so. So, limits to their required wide access to justice are permissible.79 While Member States are free to allow wider standing, that the Aarhus Convention and the EIA Directive require them to only permit actio popularis to bona fide environmental NGOs and not to even wellintentioned individuals represents a “very sensible compromise” by the EU legislators. It is permissible in EU Law that the standing of an individual in litigation as to the EIA Directive depends on a legitimate private interest such that actions by persons with no specific connection to the administrative measure they wish to challenge are inadmissible. Moreover, the Earlier Judgment held that Irish standing rules in planning and environmental cases being typically, and in any event by s.10 of the EPA Act 1992, framed in terms of “sufficient interest”, represent the adoption of the compromise that standing in environmental litigation, though wide, may be somewhat more restricted than in litigation of issues of constitutional law and fundamental rights and of human rights.80

75 Friends of the Irish Environment v Ireland [2020] IESC 49, [2020] 2 ILRM 233.

76 Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla Vartans Miljoskyddsforening v Stockholms Kommun Genom Dess Marknamnd ECLI:EU:C:2009:421; and in Case C-

644/15 Protect Natur-, Artenund Landschaftsschutz Umweltorganisation EU:C:2017:760, §81.

§46.

78 Societatea Civilă Profesională De Avocaţi Plopeanu & Ionescu (C-252/22) EU:C:2024:13, [2024] Env LR 26 §55 citing the ‘The Aarhus Convention: An

Implementation Guide’ (2nd Ed’n, 2014).

79 Earlier Judgment §50 - 51.

Earlier Judgment §55.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

Comparison with NGOs

59. In considering Mr Sweetman’s reliance exclusively on his interest as “an individual with a recognised and long-standing interest and involvement in environmental issues”, it is useful to contrast his position with the special standing afforded environmental NGOs. As observed in the Earlier Judgment,81 citing Sharpston AG in Djurgården, such NGOs are explicitly “deemed” to have an interest and so given standing as, even though members of the “public” within Aarhus Article 2(4), they would not, but for Article 2(5),82 by reason only of their promotion of environmental protection have standing as members of the “public concerned”. That can only be because such promotion is not otherwise an “interest” within Aarhus Article 2(5) – much less a “sufficient interest” within the meaning of Aarhus Article 9(2). Or at least, remembering that sufficiency of interest is determined at national law, State parties to Aarhus are not obliged by it83 to recognise “promotion of environmental protection” as, per se, an interest – much less a sufficient interest. Yet that interest is the only basis on which, in these proceedings, Mr Sweetman asserts his standing. And, as I have held,84 citing Conway, there is no anomaly in a situation in which an NGO has standing to bring proceedings under Irish and EU law but an individual, even a member of that NGO, might not have standing.

Digital Rights & FIE

60. In this light, I return to Digital Rights. Decided 15 years ago, it has clearly not prompted a flood, or even a trickle, of decisions permitting actio popularis. While Irish law could apply more liberal standing rules than EU Law, at least as to issues of EU environmental law and given Djurgården, LB and Case C-252/22, the drought is unsurprising.

61. Digital Rights related to alleged wrongful processing of personal data relating to the plaintiff company, its members, and other mobile phone users contrary to statute, EU law and the Constitution. McKechnie J addressed standing as a matter of “informed discretion”.85 As he said: “the nature, extent, importance and application of the asserted right may be of high relevance”. Fundamental personal rights were at issue - matters of fundamental public importance regarding persons' human rights and affecting every citizen equally.86 A factual matrix of allegedly illegally processed and stored data was at issue affecting every citizen who used a mobile phone – “almost all of the population”.87 Yet “individual owners of mobile phones would be unlikely to litigate the matter.”88 Further, McKechnie J held that “The plaintiff is the owner of a mobile phone, and as such can be affected by issues relating to privacy and communications in relation thereto. Such privacy in the carrying out of business transactions, etc., is important for any company.”89 In these lights McKechnie J considered it,

81 Earlier Judgment §54 – also §55.

82 Aarhus Art 2(5) reads in part: “non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under national

law shall be deemed to have an interest.”

83 An even then, only at international law – not in domestic law.

84 Earlier judgment §88 citing Conway §85. See further as to Conway below.

§88.

86 §90.

87 §91.

88 §91.

§89.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

“clear that the plaintiff has, purely in its personal capacity, locus standi with regards to infringements of its rights to privacy and communication. This I would hold even if there were no other greater interests in the matter. However, given that the impugned legislation could have a possible effect on virtually all persons, I would also grant the plaintiff locus standi to litigate these matters generally as what might be termed an actio popularis.”

McKechnie J clearly took a pragmatic view also as “[w]ere the plaintiff only allowed to advance its arguments on the grounds that it would infringe a company's rights, it could leave open the question of whether natural persons' rights were nevertheless infringed.”

62. Notably, in FIE90 Clarke CJ emphasised the narrower basis on which Digital Rights was afforded standing. He said:

“… there was no question in Digital Rights of a corporate entity being permitted to assert rights which were only those of others. The rights were those of the company itself. I would, in any event, reserve my position on whether I would fully follow all of the reasoning in Digital Rights concerning standing.”

63. Beyond that the decision of the High Court in Digital Rights leaves the door ajar to actio popularis, the unanimous Supreme Court in FIE suggests it is only slightly ajar. In my view it is clear that litigation of an actio popularis by an individual is permissible only exceptionally at Irish law. Merely that an EU law issue arises or that an environmental law issue arises does not, per se, render the circumstances exceptional so as to confer standing in an actio popularis.

I confess to finding little similarity between the circumstances of the present case and Digital Rights Ireland. Digital Rights Ireland is an NGO. As has been seen, in EU environmental law, NGOs are privileged as to standing. That Digital Rights Ireland had standing does not imply standing in an individual to prosecute an actio popularis in EU environmental law. Also, there is no reason to believe it unlikely any that deficit in industrial emissions licencing law for want of adequate transposition of the EIA Directive will be litigated by someone else in a suitable case.

64. FIE appears to me also to explain the exceptions as to locus standi made in SPUC v Coogan91 and in Irish Penal Reform Trust92 as to the rights respectively to life of the unborn and of prisoners as to prison conditions, in terms of a dearth of individuals with standing actually able to litigate those rights. In contrast,

89 objectors could have done so in the present case. And in any event, there will inevitably be similar Industrial Emissions licensing review decisions in the future and, no doubt, more objectors whose standing in virtue of their participation in the process will be indisputable. As was said in FIE, albeit as to an NGO raising personal human rights issues, “[i]t is not suggested that the potential class of individual plaintiffs (which is very extensive indeed) suffers from any vulnerability or would face any difficulty in asserting the claim or that the claim would in any way be limited if brought by individuals.” Mutatis mutandis this reasoning appears to

90 Friends of the Irish Environment v Ireland [2020] IESC 49, [2020] 2 ILRM 233.

91 SPUC Ltd v Coogan (No.1) [1989] IR 734; [1990] ILRM 70 SC.

Irish Penal Reform Trust v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2005] IEHC 305.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

me to apply to Mr Sweetman’s attempt to argue freestanding Transposition Issues when there are and will be many others with standing to challenge actual licensing decisions in which those same Transposition Issues can be litigated in the context of a factual matrix. In the Earlier Judgment I considered that the presence of other possible objectors was relevant to standing to challenge the Impugned Decision but not decisive in itself. I think that factor weighs more strongly when what is at issue is a freestanding challenge to legislation.

Conway (2019) & Sweetman (2017) (ESB Wind, Kerry)

65. Conway93 is notable in that it is difficult to meaningfully distinguish the bases on which Mr Conway asserted standing from those on which Mr Sweetman now asserts standing. Mr Conway94 asserted a longstanding and passionate interest in the protection of the environment, directorship of an environmental NGO and a history of personal litigation in the interest of environmental protection. He said: “I strongly hold the view that public authorities should at all times comply fully with legislation concerning the carrying out [of] their duties, particularly where environmental matters are concerned”. Barniville J reviewed the Irish and EU authorities and concluded95 that Mr Conway, though he “undoubtedly possesses a particular interest in the environment”, lacked standing for want of sufficient interest. As said in the Earlier Judgment, Mr Conway’s failed reliance on his general environmental interest, activism and history of environmental litigation resonates strongly with Mr Sweetman’s argument here. And Mr Sweetman’s position is weaker than Mr Conway’s. As compared to the environmental harm feared in Conway, of the refusal of permission for a civic plaza at College Green, Dublin, Mr Sweetman’s case now lacks the factual focus of an impugned development consent.

66. In Sweetman (ESB Wind, Kerry) Haughton J gave two judgments.96 In the first, he set aside leave to seek judicial review of certain declarations, made under s.5 PDA 2000 97 that a proposed development was exempted development.98 Mr Sweetman nonetheless sought to continue to seek a declaration against the State that s.5 was contrary to EU law – in particular the public participation provisions of the EIA Directive, Birds Directive, Habitats Directive and the Public Participation Directive 2003/35/EC. The State argued that, as he was not entitled to challenge the s.5 declarations, Mr Sweetman lacked standing to seek such a declaration. In his first judgment, Haughton J held that Mr Sweetman, for want of sufficient interest, lacked standing to make a freestanding and general challenge to the validity of s.5. Haughton J said, inter alia:

“He99 will not be impacted personally by the windfarm project. Absent any leave to challenge the s.5 referrals his only interest is an individual with a general and well-informed interest in protection of the environment and ensuring that the State and planning authorities comply with their EIA/AA obligations

93 Conway v An Bord Pleanála & Dublin City Council [2019] IEHC 525.

94 Mr Conway had, deliberately, not participated in the relevant planning process and lived in Dundalk, over 80km from the site in question. He did not

assert that he would be directly prejudiced by the decision.

95 Conway §53 et seq.

Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála & ESB Wind [2017] IEHC 46 & [2017] IEHC 133.

97 S.5 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 as amended allows for a declaration by a planning authority or An Comisiúin Pleanála as to what, in

any particular case, is or is not development or is or is not exempted development.

98 Due to failure to start the judicial review within the applicable time limit.

Mr Sweetman.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

under domestic and EU law. In my view this is not “sufficient interest” to entitle him to make a general attack on s.5 itself.

This conclusion may also be reached by another route, namely by analogy to the test applied by the courts in assessing sufficiency of interest to bring a constitutional challenge. … a party only has locus standi to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision if “imminently affected by a decision made or about to be made under it …”.

In light of the strict regime established by the 2000 Act for the challenge of planning decisions, it cannot be accepted that a stand-alone challenge can be mounted to a provision such as s.5 without engaging any s.5 decision and independent of the time limits in s.50. His general section 5 challenge was dependent on the leave granted to challenge the second and third named respondents’ declarations, and when that leave is withdrawn his general claim that s.5 infringes European law is not one that he has sufficient interest to pursue in these proceedings.”

I respectfully agree with the foregoing – not least Haughton J’s analogising of the question of locus standi to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision to the question whether a statutory provision was consistent with EU law.

67. Haughton J made the obvious but worthwhile point that a criterion of sufficiency of interest necessarily implies “some constraints on what can suffice”. To my mind, this clearly means that not every interest – even if legitimate and genuine – will suffice for locus standi. Haughton J held that sufficiency of interest required consideration on a case-by-case basis and “some real connection between an applicant and

the matter in suit to give the ‘interest’ relevance or foundation … it is not ‘sufficient’ to bring a free-standing

challenge to a statutory provision without such connection. The leave must engage a particular planning

decision.” And absent leave to challenge the s.5 determinations in respect of the wind farm in question, “his only interest is an individual with a general and well-informed interest in protection of the environment and ensuring that the State and planning authorities comply with their EIA/AA obligations under domestic and EU law. In my view this is not “sufficient interest” to entitle him to make a general attack on s.5 itself.” Mr Sweetman had “singularly failed to establish how he personally … can maintain that he has been or would be adversely affected by s.5,100 as a matter of fact or law, if leave to challenge the particular s.5 declarations is set aside.”

68. After the first judgment in Sweetman (ESB Wind, Kerry), the Supreme Court had decided Grace & Sweetman – which I have considered above. Haughton J in his second judgment certified for appeal on a basis described by Barniville J in Conway101 as being that Grace & Sweetman had left open the questions whether Irish law, in light of the ‘wide access to justice’ requirements of Article 11 of the EIA Directive, allowed that a person with a general interest in environmental matters, but insufficient proximity or connection to/or specific interest in the amenity value of the site in question, may have standing as an exceptional case. However, it seems that the appeal never proceeded. So the decision of Haughton J remains an authority.

100 The judgment reads “the s.5” but the typo and its correction are readily apparent.

Conway §51 & 52. See also Earlier Judgment.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

69. Barniville J in Conway cited Haughton J’s first judgment on the issue of sufficient interest. He noted that Haughton J identified possibly relevant factors as follows:

• The proposed development fell within and adjacent to European sites and the habitat of protected species and might threaten protected species.

• Part of the proposed development might be remote with few, if any, residents who could directly point to injury, adverse effect or proximity.

• Mr Sweetman had not become aware of the relevant s.5 declarations within the required period for seeking judicial review and had attempted to appeal the s.5 declarations.

• Mr Sweetman had made observations to the Board in a related application.

Barniville J noted that none of these factors were present in Conway and, as has been noted above, held that Mr Conway lacked standing.

70. Such factors are also lacking in Mr Sweetman at this point of the present case. For example, Mr Sweetman’s case for standing lacks the “significant weight” of posited risk to a European Site - the protection of which sites “involve the legitimate interests of, arguably, every citizen”.102

71. And in the Earlier Judgment103 until which, as it were, the Impugned Decision remained in the picture, I cited the view taken by Haughton J as derived from a consideration of Mr Sweetman’s standing by reference to Cahill, Lynch and Nawaz.104 I also said and for present purposes repeat:

“On the facts, I cannot see relevant distinctions between the present case and the position in Conway and (perhaps unsurprisingly) in Sweetman.105 Mr Conway’s failed reliance on his general environmental interest, activism and history of environmental litigation resonates strongly with Mr Sweetman’s argument here. Haughton J ruled in Sweetman that he had no standing “to make a freestanding and general challenge to the validity” of s.5 PDA 2000 on the basis that it infringed EU law. Here Mr Sweetman makes a similar freestanding allegation of infringement of EU law. Haughton J did certify an appeal on the point but by reference, as I have said, to factors which Mr Sweetman cannot call in aid in the present case.”106

Conway §43.

103 Earlier Judgment §82.

104 Nawaz v Minister for Justice [2013] 1 IR 142.

105 i.e. Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála & ESB Wind [2017] IEHC 46 & [2017] IEHC 133 (Haughton J).

Earlier Judgment §92.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

LB (2021)

72. LB107 is considered in more detail in the Earlier Judgment.108 Here a briefer note suffices. Even as to an impugned development consent for a large pig unit on the ground of failure to do an EIA (i.e. in a case with a factual matrix), a veterinarian member of the public, not being a member of the public concerned, lacked standing even though by her profession and professional oath personally concerned with animal wellbeing.

73. Mr Sweetman’s position is similar but weaker. His asserted interest is similar - as a member of the public but not of the public concerned.109 But as compared to the feared effects of the pig unit, his case now lacks the factual focus of an impugned development consent.

Odum (2023), Murphy (2025) & O’Meara (2025)

74. Odum110 notes the close connection between the doctrines of locus standi and mootness - particularly in constitutional claims. Mootness can be viewed as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness). Standing is judged at the start of the proceedings whereas mootness is judged later. The essential issue as to mootness - the core principle - is based on “the importance in the common law system of the resolution of cases which can characterised as present, live controversies of the kind that must exist if the court is to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law … [c]ourts exist to resolve controversies of real importance to real people.”111 Indeed, in a sense, locus standi is the stricter doctrine as circumstances which would have deprived a litigant of lack of standing to commence proceedings may not, if they arise later (notably, pending appeal – as dismissal of a moot at that point may leave a lower court precedent in place), always lead to dismissal of a moot.112

75. Notably, in Murphy,113 Farrell J was “satisfied that the Irish rules do ensure” the “wide access to

justice” required by Aarhus and EU law and was “satisfied, as Barniville J was in Conway (No. 1), that it is not

necessary to suspend or disapply national rules to give effect to Article 11 of Directive 2011/92 …”. But wide access to justice is not unlimited. LB is authority that Aarhus and EU law do not require standing in an actio popularis and not every member of the public, as distinct from the public concerned, has standing or sufficient interest once merely an issue of EU law arises.114 None of the factors listed by Haughton J as having lead him to certify an appeal in Sweetman (ESB Wind, Kerry) were present in Murphy.115 The criterion of sufficient interest is not so broad “as to confer standing on any person who seeks to bring judicial review

107 C-826/18 LB & Stichting Varkens v Echt-Susteren [2021] PTSR 735 – the case is known variously as “LB”, “Stichting Varkens” and “Distressed Pigs”.

108 Earlier Judgment §56 et seq.

109 Earlier Judgment §92.

110 Odum v Minister for Justice [2023] IESC 3, [2023] 3 ILRM 164. O’Donnell CJ citing G v Collins [2004] IESC 38, [2005] 1 ILRM 1 citing Hardiman J, in

turn citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd Ed’n, Foundation Press 2000), at para.3-11.

Odum §37.

112 Odum §34

113 Murphy v An Bord Pleanála & Kilshane Energy [2025] IEHC 117. Cited in Earlier Judgment §45.

114 Murphy §94, 96. Earlier Judgment §91.

Murphy §63.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

proceedings to challenge a grant of permission on environmental grounds.” On this reasoning, it is all the less so broad as to confer standing on any person, such as Mr Sweetman, who seeks to bring judicial review proceedings to challenge environmental legislation absent a challenge to a permission on environmental grounds.

76. In O’Meara116 the applicant sought certiorari of a local authority proposal under section 179A PDA 2000 to residentially develop a site adjoining his property. As the procedure did not permit public participation, he asserted the unconstitutionality of the procedure and that it breached EU law. The local authority asserted that the issue had become moot by the expiry of a time limit for which s.179A provided, such that the project would not proceed. Mr O’Meara no longer needed certiorari of the council’s s.179A

decision. He sought, nonetheless, to proceed with the challenge to the constitutionality and compatibility with EU law of section 179A.

77. Farrell J, in finding and declining to hear a moot, invoked, inter alia, Odum, Mohan, G v Collins117 and Cahill – all of which consider locus standi either of itself or as analogous to mootness. She concluded that:

• The factual and evidential framework underpinning the application for declaratory relief had fallen away and the challenge to the validity of section 179A is moot.118

• “standing is not, as a general rule, established by a simple desire to challenge legislation, no matter how strongly the applicant believes the provision to be repugnant to the Constitution. The same is true for proceedings which seek to assert that legislation conflicts with EU law.”119

• And while exceptions are possible merely “the fact that a case raises an important point of law is not of itself sufficient to bring it within the exceptional category.”120 The question was not of exceptional public importance, nor were there special reasons in the public interest justifying its determination in the abstract by a court of first instance.121

78. It is fair to say that Mr O’Meara’s hurdle as to standing was higher than Mr Sweetman’s. Section 179A had expired – though he argued that section 161 PDA 2024122 is in similar terms. However, I consider the foregoing observations by Farrell J to apply to Mr Sweetman’s present case also.

116 O'Meara v Westmeath County Council & Ors [2025] IEHC 192.

117 G v Collins [2004] IESC 38, [2005] 1 ILRM 1.

O'Meara §71.

119 O'Meara §73.

120 O'Meara §42.

121 O'Meara §71.

Planning and Development Act 2024.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

Enforcement Role of Commission

79. The State argues, citing MacFhlannchadha,123 that it is relevant to Mr Sweetman’s standing in domestic litigation as to the Transposition Issues that the Commission has a role in the enforcement of Member States’ transposition obligations by infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU. Presumably the point is that exceptionally according standing to Mr Sweetman as to the Transposition Issues is unnecessary to the enforcement of such obligations. I have not found it necessary to decide the point and leave it to another case in which it might make a difference to the outcome. I express no view on the point.

Conclusion & Decision

80. In my judgement, Mr Sweetman lacks standing to further prosecute what I consider would be a freestanding challenge on the Transposition Issues. None of the caselaw I have analysed above seems to me to support the proposition, much less require, that he be accorded standing in what remains of the present case. I have sought to apply that caselaw to the present case as I analysed it and will not repeat the exercise here. However the following observations seem to me worthwhile as applicable in this case:

i. A criterion for purposes of according standing of sufficiency of interest necessarily implies that some interests are insufficient - Sweetman v ABP & ESB Wind.

ii. Cahill is authority that generally standing, while relatively liberally granted, requires both a subtending factual matrix giving concreteness and first-hand reality to the case and a sufficient interest in that matrix.

iii. Many of the authorities according standing in judicial review, despite lack of or extending the concept of sufficient interest, relate to cases which did not raise freestanding issues but included a factual matrix in the form of an impugned administrative or like decision and, in the case of development consents, an asserted risk of resulting environmental harm – for example, Mulcreevy.124 Given the Earlier Judgment there is no relevant impugned decision or risk of resulting environmental harm.

iv. Mohan125 is clear and FIE confirms that standing is fundamental to our constitutional order. It is flexible but not infinitely so and is not, as a general rule, established by a simple desire to challenge legislation no matter how strongly the putative claimant believes the provision to be repugnant to the Constitution. There is no actio popularis save exceptionally. Sweetman v ABP & ESB Wind and O’Meara apply the same reasoning to proceedings which seek to assert that legislation conflicts with EU law.

v. Murphy and LB confirm that Aarhus and EU law do not require standing in an actio popularis and not every member of the public (which Mr Sweetman is), as distinct from the members of the public

123 MacFhlannchadha v Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine [2022] IECA 1.

124 Mulcreevy v Minister for Environment [2004] IESC 5, [2004] 1 ILRM 419, [2004] 1 IR 72.

Mohan v Ireland [2019] IESC 18, [2021] 1 IR 293.

Sweetman v EPA & Anglo Beef [2025] IEHC 539

concerned (which Mr Sweetman is not), has standing or sufficient interest once merely an issue of EU law arises.

vi. Mr Sweetman’s position is weaker than Mr Conway’s and the interest asserted in LB. Their interests in environmental matters failed to gain them standing even as to an impugned decision and, in the case of LB at least, an asserted risk of environmental harm.

vii. There is in my view no relevant or significant risk that any doubt as to the Transposition Issues will go unlitigated. Other similar Industrial Emissions licensing decisions will provide that opportunity to participants in the licensing process and to others with a sufficient interest. And, in any event, even if EPA-initiated reviews under s.90(4) of the EPA Act 1992 are rare, any risk of environmental harm which might derive from the Transposition Issues (other than risk due to the Impugned Decision as to which the Earlier Judgment denies Mr Sweetman standing) cannot eventuate unless such an Industrial Emissions licensing decision is made and the opportunity of public participation therein is afforded.

viii. Grace & Sweetman, putting the matter at its lowest, tends to not assist Mr Sweetman in the present case.

ix. Sweetman v ABP & ESB Wind seems to me highly analogous as a rejection of standing on a freestanding issue of validity of legislation by reason of longstanding interest in environmental law – as it happens, the same applicant’s interest, though no doubt his credentials have been further burnished since that case was decided in 2017.

x. Mr Sweetman has failed to demonstrate the exceptionality required to justify a departure from the general rule as to standing laid down in Cahill.

81. For all the reasons set out above, I hold that Mr Sweetman lacks standing to prosecute the Transposition Issues. The proceedings will be dismissed accordingly.

82. I provisionally consider that there should be no order as to costs. The case will be for mention on 10 November 2025 for final orders.

16/10/25