High Court dismisses discovery application for bankruptcy files due to lack of relevance and procedural non-compliance.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 532

Bankruptcy No. 2478

Record No. H.P.2025.0000466

BETWEEN

SEAN DUNNE, HARRISON DUNNE (SUING BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND

SEAN DUNNE), RYAN EMMET DUNNE (SUING BY HIS FATHER AND NEXT

FRIEND SEAN DUNNE) AND THOMAS JOSEPH DUNNE (SUING BY HIS

FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND SEAN DUNNE)

APPLICANT

AND

CHRISTOPHER LEHANE, MICHAEL IAN LARKIN, MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON,

INSOLVENCY SERVICE OF IRELAND, MINISTER OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND IRELAND

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Liam Kennedy delivered 10 October 2025.

1. These proceedings are related to bankruptcy proceedings In the Matter of Sean Dunne Bankruptcy No. 2478 and my simultaneous judgment in those bankruptcy proceedings provides background and context relevant to the current application in these proceedings in which the plaintiff primarily seeks to challenge the validity of the appointments of two former official assignees and the lawfulness of their actions on the basis of the alleged invalidity of their respective appointments. On 30 July 2025, Nolan J directed that the matter should proceed by modular trial with the first module concerning the validity of the appointments. The respondents were directed to make discovery by 19 September 2025 and to file legal submissions by 14 October 2025, the Applicant to file submissions by 21 October 2025 with a view to the early trial of the first module (which has been projected to take five or six days at hearing).

2. This judgment concerns a discovery motion dated 6 August 2025 issued by the first plaintiff (and next friend of the other plaintiffs) (“the Plaintiff”) seeking an Order compelling the Examiner of the High Court (“the Examiner”) and the Insolvency Service of Ireland (“the ISI”) to grant access and furnish his full bankruptcy file from July 2013 to the present ‘in a single, consolidated digital format within seven days”. The Notice of Motion includes reasons for the directions sought, namely, to allow him and the other plaintiffs to review and utilise any relevant documents in the proceedings.

3. There was correspondence between the Plaintiff and the respondents and other parties prior to issuing proceedings in which the Plaintiff made frequent intemperate and unreasonable summary demands for voluminous files spanning many years. In doing so, he asserted entitlements to such documentation without satisfactorily explaining the legal basis for his request. He also continued to impose arbitrary and unreasonable deadlines. However, at no stage did he deliver a valid request for voluntary discovery in accordance with the mandatory requirements of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”), a necessary precursor to an application to require other partes to the litigation (or, indeed, non-parties) to discover documents which are or have been in their power possession or procurement which are relevant to the matters in issue on the pleadings and necessary for the fair trial of the proceedings or for saving costs.

Affidavits

4. In brief, the Plaintiff’s affidavit recounts the circumstances of his adjudication and the proceedings, stating that; (a) given the length of time and amount of activity involved in his bankruptcy (which was commenced in 2013), the file is voluminous and will contain records of all petitions, orders, correspondence, reports, asset schedules, assets seized/disposed of, payouts to third parties, transfers to the American Trustee in Bankruptcy, court applications and other documents; (b) such documentation is significant as it details all the actions and decisions taken by the Official Assignee or Deputy Official Assignee (both of which, for brevity I will refer to as the “OA” unless there is a need to distinguish between them) which are impugned if the OA is improperly appointed; (c) a comprehensive examination of the file is thus relevant and necessary to identify such impugned actions; (d) access to the file is “essential for justice” because, if the appointment is invalid, then the effects will be profound and it is a fundamental aspect of the principles of audi alteram partem and equality of arms that he be provided with the relevant evidence and materials from his bankruptcy files;

(e) The State insolvency officials have access to his bankruptcy file at their leisure, while he is preparing his case “blindfolded”.

5. The OA’s replying affidavit; (a) provided greater detail as to the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy adjudication and the background; (b) noted that the court file is held by the “proper officer” of the Court pursuant to O.76 RSC and either the Examiner or the Courts Service would be the proper respondents to an application for the disclosure of the Court file, a point which the OA had repeatedly explained to the Plaintiff (exhibiting correspondence to that effect which the bankrupt had failed to exhibit and noting that the latter had waited until the vacation period to issue the present motion; (d) noted that the Plaintiff’s application did not explain why the first two respondent (formers OAs), the third respondent (Director of the ISI), or the ISI itself should bear the cost of obtaining the Court file and providing him with same; stated that the court file is not necessary to fairly dispose of the issues in these proceedings as they are to be progressed as a modular trial and the file is not relevant to the first module which concerns the validity of the OA’s appointment.

6. The respondent’s affidavit stated, in summary that: (a) Insolvency Service Ireland (ISI) does not have custody nor control over the bankruptcy file; (b) the Plaintiff is well aware of the fact that the OA, while an ISI employee, is independent of the ISI save for general administration; (c) the Examiner’s Office has offered to provide the Plaintiff with a copy of the file, subject to the usual conditions and appropriate fees. The Plaintiff has set out no basis in law as to why he should not be subjected to those fees; (d) the disclosure of the bankruptcy file is not relevant to or necessary for the fair disposal of the issues in the first modular trial.

7. On 30 July 2025, Nolan J directed that the case should proceed on a modular basis, with the first module being the issue as to the validity of the appointments impugned in the proceedings. It appears from pp.21-22 of the transcript of that hearing that, in the course of seeking directions in respect of the early trial of the validity issue, the Plaintiff said, "the only discovery I really need is the a contract of the (respondents), so that is the only documents I need…" and that "I just need to see the employer, who the employee and the role of the individual is, that's all." The transcript also records Nolan J’s comment to the effect that the respondents would not win their case if they didn't discover any documents they relied on to demonstrate the validity of the appointments and therefore it was in their interests to disclose everything that went to the appointments issue.

Law

Possession, Power or Procurement

8. Discovery applications are directed towards the disclosure of identifiable documents or categories of documents which are or have been in the possession, power or procurement of the party required to discovery them. Accordingly, the likelihood of such documents being or having been in the respondent’s possession is a basic premise of any such application or order from a party to the proceedings, as appears from O.31 r.12(1) RSC (“r.12”)) which states: “(1) Any party may apply to the Court by way of notice of motion for an order directing any other party to any cause or matter to make discovery on oath of the documents which are or have been in his possession, power or procurement relating to any matter in question therein. Every such notice of motion shall specify the precise categories of documents in respect of which discovery is sought and shall be grounded upon the affidavit of the party seeking such an order of discovery which shall:

(a) verify that the discovery of documents sought is necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs;

(b) furnish the reasons why each category of documents is required to be discovered, and

(c) where the discovery sought includes electronically stored information, specify whether such party seeks the production of any documents in searchable form and if so, whether for that purpose the party seeking discovery seeks the provision of inspection and searching facilities using any information and communications technology system owned or operated by the party requested.”

Voluntary Discovery

9. O.31 r.12(6) RSC makes clear that, unless a party seeking discovery issues a request for voluntary discovery, then a court shall not make a discovery order unless the matter is urgent, or there is consent from the parties, or the nature of the case or other circumstances make it appropriate for a court to make such an order. (There is no suggestion that any of those exceptional circumstances appear here). Rule 12(6) reads: “(6) An order under sub-rule (2) directing any party or under rule 29 directing any other person to make discovery shall not be made unless:

(a) the applicant for same shall have previously applied by letter in writing requesting that discovery be made voluntarily:

(i) specifying the precise categories of documents in respect of which discovery is sought,

(ii) furnishing the reasons why each category of documents is required to be discovered,

(iii) where the discovery sought includes electronically stored information, specifying whether the applicant seeks the production of any documents in searchable form and if so, whether for that purpose the applicant seeks the provision of inspection and searching facilities using any information and communications technology system owned or operated by the party requested, and

(b) a reasonable period of time for such discovery has been allowed, and

(c) the party or person requested has failed, refused or neglected to make such discovery or has ignored such request. Provided that in any case where by reason of the urgency of the matter or the consent of the parties, the nature of the case or any other circumstances which to the Court seem appropriate, the Court may make such order as appears proper, without the necessity for such prior application in writing.”

10. In Sheehy and McAuley v. The Government of Ireland and Ors. (Unreported, High Court, 30 July 2002), Kelly J stated:

“[W]ith the introduction of S.I. number 233 of 1999 a new regime was introduced. It was considered by Morris P. in the course of his judgment in Swords -v- Western Proteins Limited [2001] 1 ILRM 481 where he said “Accordingly I believe that S.I. no. 233 of 1999 imposed a clearly defined obligation upon a party seeking discovery to pinpoint the documents or category of documents required and required that party to give the reasons why they were required. Blanket discovery became a thing of the past. The new rule was brought into being to ensure in the first instance that the party against whom discovery was being sought would, upon receipt of the preliminary letter, be in a position to know the document or category of documents referred to and be able to exercise a judgment on whether the reasons given for requiring those documents to be discovered was valid. He would then be in a position to know if he was required to comply with the request. If he disputed his obligation to make discovery the court would know by reference to this letter precisely why the moving parties sought the documents in question and the grounds upon which the moving party believed that the documents sought to be discovered might help to dispose fairly of the cause or save costs.”

Relevance, Necessity and Proportionality

11. The court will not make an order for discovery unless it is satisfied that the documentation sought is (a) relevant; (b) necessary; and (c) the order is proportionate. Even then any such order is discretionary and its appropriateness will depend on the circumstances of the case.

12. The classic definition of relevance was framed by Brett LJ in Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co. (1882) 11 QBD 55: “It seems to me that every document relates to the matters in question in the action, which not only would be evidence upon any issue, but also which, it is reasonable to suppose, contains information which may–not which must either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring the affidavit either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary.” This formulation has been repeatedly adopted in Ireland, including by the Supreme Court in Ryanair v Aer Rianta [2003] 4 IR 264.

13. The necessity requirement is outlined in r.12(1)(a) which specifies that the documents be “necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs”. The Irish Courts may not order discovery (even if relevance is established) if the terms of any such order would be disproportionate. The requirement for the request to be proportionate was clearly expressed by Clarke CJ at para. 6.4 of his judgment in Tobin v Minister for Defence [2019] IESC 57; [2020] 1 IR 211: “The principle of proportionality has subsequently become an important criterion employed by the courts in order to avoid the imposition of excessive burdens on parties to litigation as a result of wide ranging orders for discovery. In Dome Telecom Ltd. v. Eircom Ltd. [2007] IESC 59, [2008] 2 I.R. 726, Fennelly J. examined whether ‘the unusual scale and extent of the burden’ arising from an order for discovery was likely to ‘produce genuinely useful evidential material’, and held that the court was required to have ‘a clear view of the litigious benefit to the plaintiff’ in light of the heavy burden and cost of the discovery sought. In Astrazeneca AB and Ors. v. Pinewood Laboratories Ltd. & Ors. [2011] IEHC 159, Kelly J. held that an assessment of proportionality in the context of orders for discovery ‘involves a consideration of the extent or volume of the documents to be discovered and the degree to which the documents are likely to advance the case of an applicant or damage the case of his opponent’.”

Fishing Expeditions

14. It is well-settled law that courts should not indulge discovery requests that amount to ‘fishing expeditions’. Murray J’s Supreme Court judgment in Aquatechnologie Ltd v National Standards Authority of Ireland & Ors [2000] IESC 64 observed: “An applicant is not entitled to discovery based on mere speculation or on the basis of what has been traditionally characterised as a fishing expedition.”

15. In Lombard Ireland Ltd v Kevin Devlin Transport & Anor [2014] IEHC 653, Donnelly J commented to similar effect:

“At paragraph 60 of Keating v. Radio Telefis Éireann & Ors. [2013] IESC 22, the purpose of discovery was said by the Supreme Court to ‘aid a party in the progress of litigation: it is not designed to identify grounds capable of establishing a cause of action.’ It is quite clear that a plaintiff cannot be permitted to launch his proceedings and then hope, by discovery, to be able to amend his pleadings and thereby make his case. Fishing expeditions or exploratory operations are prohibited. In my view, a defendant is not entitled to a fishing expedition or exploratory operations. On the other hand, a defendant is brought (almost invariably) unwillingly to court. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove the case. A defendant is entitled to insist upon that proof. In certain situations, that could result in a defendant being entitled to have discovery of the documents upon which the plaintiff will seek to prove his or her case.”

Non-Party Discovery

16. Applications for orders for discovery by non-parties are governed by O.31 r.29 RSC (“r.29”) which states: “Any person not a party to the cause or matter before the Court who appears to the Court to be likely to have or to have had in his possession custody or power any documents which are relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise out of the cause or matter or is or is likely to be in a position to give evidence relevant to any such issue may by leave of the Court upon the application of any party to the said cause or matter be directed by order of the Court to answer such interrogatories or to make discovery of such documents or to permit inspection of such documents”.

17. In Chambers v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 2 IR 424 Morris J described the requirements of r.29 as follows at p.429:

“In my view, however it is undesirable and the court should be slow to put someone, not a party to the action, to the trouble of making discovery if it can be avoided and I am satisfied that an order should only be made against a third party in circumstances where the documents in question are not readily available to be discovered by a party to the action or where in the particular circumstances of the case the court in the interests of justice requires that it should be done… I believe that as a general principle third party discovery, with all the inconvenience which it involves, should only be ordered when there is no realistic alternative available. In Fusco v. O'Dea [1994] 2 I.R. 93, Lynch J., in dealing with this matter in the High Court raised as an issue the question of whether discovery had been sought against the party to the action. Egan J. at p.

102 says:-

Furthermore, such an order [i.e. an order for third party discovery] is in the court's discretion and is not available as of right.’”.

18. I recently considered the rules governing non-party discovery in O’Sullivan & Anor v AIB & Ors [2025] IEHC 487 summarising the position at para. 6:

“[A party seeking non-party discovery] would need to demonstrate the relevance, necessity and proportionality of such orders against a non-party and to show that the discovery would not be accessible by other means, such as inter partes discovery against the parties to the relevant claim. Its failure to avail of proffered access would count against it in this context. [The applicant] may in due course seek Non-Party Discovery from [the respondent] … after exhausting other routes, including inter partes discovery and meeting the requirements of r.29 as explained in authorities such as Chambers v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 2 IR 424 at p.429”.

Order 76

19. O.76 r.64 RSC, provides that the O.31 rules governing discovery generally also apply in bankruptcy proceedings: “Any party to any proceeding under this Order may with the leave of the Court … obtain discovery of documents from any other party to such proceeding, and the provisions of Order 31 shall apply as far as practicable.”

Practice Direction HC86

20. This Practice Direction relates to access to court files in the Superior Courts stipulating:

“1. The purpose of this practice direction is to safeguard the integrity of court files maintained in the offices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal and the Central Office of the High Court. This practice direction arises in the context of the judgment delivered in the High Court (Kelly P.) in Michael and Thomas Butler Ltd & ors. -v- Bosod Ltd & ors. [2018] IEHC 702.

2. The files maintained in the aforementioned offices of the Superior Courts shall not be made available to any person attending at any of those offices. For the avoidance of doubt this includes the parties to the proceedings and the solicitors on record.

3. Nothing in paragraph 2. of this practice direction shall preclude the provision of a copy of a document on a file to a solicitor on record or a party to the proceedings where not legally represented upon payment of the relevant fee provided for in the Fees Order.

4. This practice direction is issued by each of the signatories hereunder in respect of the court of which he is President, and shall have application to files of proceedings before each such court accordingly.”

Analysis

The application fails on a number of grounds. Application for non-party discovery of Examiner’s Office and Court files

21. Firstly, the discovery which was the primary object of the application cannot be ordered on the basis of an inter partes discovery order as the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that documents held by the Examiner and/or the Court are or have been in the respondents’ power, possession or procurement. The application is misconceived to the extent that it seeks to require the respondents to the proceedings to discover the Examiner’s or Court files. Unless those files are or have been in the respondents’ power, possession or procurement there is no basis to require the respondents to discover them.

22. Nor as matters stand can such disclosure be sought by way of an order for non-party discovery since Rule 29’s requirements have not been met, including, for example; (i) the need for a voluntary discovery request complying with the requirements of rule 29;

(ii) the plaintiff must have exhausted other routes to obtain such documents, including inter partes discovery; (iii) the relevance and necessity of the discovery sought must be established; (iv) the applicant must undertake to pay the costs incurred by, in this case, the Examiner or the Court in producing the documents, irrespective of the outcome of the proceedings. Even if those requirements were met (which is not the case) an order would be discretionary and would not be granted if it is disproportionate.

23. A Rule 29 application would face further hurdles in view of the nature of the documents sought and the requirements of Order 76 and Practice Direction HC86 which determine the basis on which access to such files is permissible. Before bringing the current application, it was incumbent on the applicant to exhaust his entitlements to access the documents by all other means available to him, including pursuant to Order 76 and the Practice Direction and to satisfy the Court that such access was insufficient. The plaintiff has failed to do so. Accordingly, the application must fail insofar as it concerns documents or categories of documents, such as the Examiner’s Office and Court files, in absence of any evidence that the documents sought were or have been in the respondents’ power, possession or procurement.

Application for (inter partes discovery of) files and documents which are or have been in the respondents’ power, possession or procurement

24. Although this was not clear from his application, in response to questions from the Court, the plaintiff indicated that, in addition to the Examiner’s and Court files, he sought the discovery of relevant files and documents which were or had been in the respondents’ power, possession or procurement. Therefore, in ease of the plaintiff, I will also deal with that aspect of the application (on an inter partes discovery basis). For the reasons set out below, the application must also fail to the extent it seeks discovery by the respondents of documents which actually are or were in their power, possession or procurement.

25. Firstly, before seeking such voluntary discovery, the plaintiff was required to make a formal request of the applicants for the voluntary discovery of such documents in accordance with the requirements of r.12. Rule 12(6) in particular required the plaintiff to take certain steps before bringing the application. In particular, he should have written to the respondents inter alia identifying the documents or categories of documents sought, requesting the respondents’ agreement to discover the same and explaining the relevance and necessity for such disclosure by reference to the issues in the proceedings. However, the exhibited correspondence does not meet the requirements of a voluntary discovery request, nor is there any basis to dispense with that requirement in the current circumstances. Accordingly, the plaintiff was not entitled to issue the current application.

26. Nor, absent a valid request and in view of the generalised claims in his affidavit, has the plaintiff established that the documents sought are relevant to matters in issue in the proceedings. As noted above, on 30 July 2025, Nolan J directed that the case should proceed on a modular basis, with the first module concerning the validity of the appointments impugned in the proceedings. It is clear that the outcome of that first module may determine, one way or another, the extent to which the rest of the case needs to proceed and on what basis. It follows that discovery at this stage must be directed to that issue –the appointments. However, the current application is essentially directed at the disclosure of documents relating to respondents’ exercise of their alleged powers over the years since the order of adjudication. The plaintiff essentially says that all such purported exercise of the OA’s statutory powers were wrongful if their original appointments were invalid. However, the disclosure of such documents is neither relevant nor necessary to determine the validity issue itself, the issue in the first module.

27. In any event the wording of the request is too broad and vague to meet the requirements of rule 12. Applicants are generally not permitted to simply request the discovery of entire files. They must as identify specific documents or categories of documents and explain their relevance and the necessity for their disclosure. Nor has the plaintiff satisfied me that it would be either necessary or proportionate to require the respondents to discover 12 years of files in any event. The wording of the discovery request is impermissibly vague and, independently of the other issues I have identified, as currently constituted it constitutes a blatant fishing expedition. Such a wide-ranging order would not be made for that reason in any event.

28. Furthermore the likely cost of any order would need to be considered in terms of the exercise of the judicial discretion and, for the reasons noted by O’Donnell J (as he then was) in a different context in Bank of Ireland v O’Donnell [2016] IECA 227; [2016] 2 ILRM 441, the reality of the possible difficulty facing the respondents in recouping such costs from the plaintiff in the event that the claim failed could also be relevant. O’Donnell J observed that: “It is in my view, important to clarify what is in issue in this appeal. That consideration applies with particular force I think where it is asserted there are claims which can be brought by persons who have been adjudicated bankrupt. Such parties are not necessarily subject to the same discipline as litigants who may suffer the full burden of an award of damages or a costs order, and Courts should be astute to ensure that proceedings are clearly and precisely focussed.”

29. In summary, an inter partes discovery order would be inappropriate even in respect of the respondents’ files because, inter alia, the plaintiff has failed to; (i) comply with rule 12; (ii) sufficiently identify the documents or categories of documents sought; (iii) demonstrate reasonable grounds for believing that they are or have been in the plaintiff’s power, possession or procurement; and (iv) demonstrate the necessity and relevance of such documents by reference to the issues in dispute on the pleadings or to show that the orders would be proportionate.

30. The necessity, relevance and proportionality of the discovery order sought, and the proper exercise of the judicial discretion must be assessed in the context of the underlying proceedings, including the recent directions given by Nolan J, providing for a modular trial, with the validity issue being determined first. There is no evidence or submission before the Court which would suggest that such discovery is necessary or appropriate in the context of the first module. The contrary position appears from the transcript of the directions hearing before Nolan J on 30 July 2025 - the Plaintiff himself rightly acknowledged that limited disclosure would suffice for the purpose of the trial of the validity issue, discovery which the Examiner, in her email to the Applicant of 30 July 2024. has agreed to furnish subject to the usual conditions and fees that apply. The Plaintiff’s position on necessity is also undermined by the observations of Nolan J noting the Respondents’ dependence on discovery to support their claim to have been validly appointed; the absence of documents substantiating their claims would seem more likely to benefit the Plaintiff rather than the Applicant.

31. In any event, it appears to me that the validity issue can readily be determined by reference to documents already produced by the respondents in response to freedom of information requests or exhibited by the respondents as evidence of their appointment or in the voluntary discovery which they have already agreed to make as appearing from the 30 July transcript. The adequacy of the documents furnished by the respondents will fall to be assessed by reference to the applicable legislation with any lacuna potentially assisting the Plaintiff rather than the respondents for the reasons identified by Nolan

J. I consider that the current application is redundant, at least as far as the first module is concerned, and this is confirmed by the 30 July transcript. I do not see any necessity at this point for the wide-ranging discovery sought by the Plaintiff. Such discovery is not appropriate pending the resolution of the first module.

32. The application must also be dismissed in the absence of evidence that the files sought were likely to be or to have been in the respondents’ power, possession or procurement; nor had non-party discovery been sought; nor would there have been a basis for any such application in any event. The inter partes application was not properly constituted in the absence of a valid request sufficiently identifying the documents or categories and their relevance and necessity.

33. In any event it would be disproportionate to make such broad orders pending the resolution of the first module particularly since these proceedings were commenced so long after the relevant events in the bankruptcy proceedings. It is difficult to avoid the

conclusion that the broad terminology of the request was tactical – the Plaintiff was not seeking specific justifiable documents but was essentially demanding the production of the respondents’ entire files, apparently in the hope of finding an issue to agitate in future proceedings, which is not a sufficient basis for seeking discovery. The court will only exercise its discretion to order disclosure which is proportionate, and it will be slow to order disclosure of files except to the extent such disclosures relate to issues currently before the Court. That is not the case as matters stand.

34. The Plaintiff made no serious attempt to comply with rules 12 or 29. Although no solicitors or counsel were on record on his behalf, he is an experienced litigant and he also referred in his oral submissions to his obtaining or having obtained "legal advice"

- without specifying from whom such advice was taken. Any Irish lawyer would surely have advised him of the requirements of rules 12 and 29 but the Plaintiff has disregarded those requirements.

35. The application was unnecessary and inappropriate for reasons explained to the Plaintiff at an early stage. Depending on the outcome of the first module there may need to be further discovery applications, but the current application should not have been issued in its current form and at this stage of the proceedings.

36. In terms of other specific points raised by the Applicant in his affidavits or submissions. I would comment as follows: a. The extensive period in respect of which the discovery is sought, and the voluminous nature of the file as acknowledged by the plaintiff, are both reasons to consider the request disproportionate, in which case cogent reasons in terms of relevance and necessity would be required to justify the burden proposed to be imposed on the respondents. No satisfactory reasons have been advanced to justify the making of such an order at this time. b.

Even if, as the plaintiff expects, the file contains records of all petitions, orders, correspondence, reports, asset schedules, assets seized/disposed of, payouts to third parties, transfers to the American Trustee in Bankruptcy, court applications and other documents, the plaintiff has not demonstrated the relevance of such documents to the first module or the need for its discovery at this time if at all. c. The plaintiff argues that such documentation is significant as it details all actions and decisions taken by the Official Assignee (“OA”) which are impugned if the OA is improperly appointed, and the file is thus relevant and necessary to identify such impugned actions because the effects will be profound if the appointment is invalid.

However, it seems to me that that justification for disclosure cannot arise unless and until the outcome of the first module is known. If the Plaintiff fails on the first module it is difficult to see any basis for the request. If it succeeds on the first module, further discovery could be appropriate, but it is unlikely to be permitted in the broad and sweeping terms proposed by the Plaintiff. d. The Plaintiff has sought to invoke the principles of audi alteram partem and equality of arms but there is no basis to order discovery on the basis of those important principles unless and until the plaintiff submits a valid request in accordance with the RSC and establishes that the discovery sought is both relevant and necessary at this stage of the proceedings.

This he has failed to do. He has not established that the State has any inherent advantage in having access to the files in relation to their management of his estate in bankruptcy over the years since that is not the issue before the Court in the first module. The issue is the validity of the appointments - access to the bankruptcy file or the lack thereof will not convey an advantage on either side in the first module.

37. Finally, I should note the Court’s concern that the Plaintiff persisted in issuing this application notwithstanding; (a) its having been placed on notice by the DOA that the court file was held by the “proper officer” of the Court pursuant to O.76 RSC; (b) his apparent failure to avail of the provisions of the practice direction; (c) his failure to exhibiting all relevant correspondence; and (d) his failure to comply with the requirements of O.31. Most importantly, he failed to satisfactorily address the fact that the Examiner’s Office has previously offered to provide him with a copy of its file, subject to the usual conditions and appropriate fees. In the absence of any justification for exempting the Plaintiff from such requirements and fees that offer from the Examiner’s office appears to me to be a complete answer to that part of the application even leaving aside the other issues identified above.

An Observation

38. For the reasons outlined above, there is no basis for me to consider exercising my judicial discretion as to whether to make an order for inter partes or non-party discovery. However, if that point had been reached then the tone and content of the Plaintiff’s correspondence may have required consideration in that context. Litigants are entitled to bring or defend claims and applications and to seek appropriate remedies in accordance with the law and the RSC. However, if a litigant acts unreasonably before or during the bringing of applications before the Court, including in the tenor of their correspondence or in the imposition of arbitrary and unreasonable deadlines, then such matters may be weighed in the balance when the Court considers the exercise of any matters of judicial discretion. However, I did not need to reach a conclusion in that regard there was no basis to exercise the discretion in any event.

Conclusion

39. I will dismiss the application. I will deal with the costs of the application at 1030am on

24 November 2025. If the parties wish to make submissions in respect of such issues, then they may do so in writing, any such written submissions to be limited to 5,000 words and to be lodged on or before 20 November 2025.

APPEARANCES

Mr. Sean Dunne, appearing in person, the Applicant. Ms. Una Nesdale BL, instructed by Clark Hill LLP, for the Respondents. Mr. Declan Murphy BL, instructed by the Mason Hayes Curran LLP, for the Examiner.