High Court allows inference of lure type from rod behavior and seizure, affirming District Judge's decision.

[2025] IEHC 530

THE HIGH COURT

[2025/712/SS]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 52 OF THE COURTS

(SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961

BETWEEN:

INLAND FISHERIES IRELAND

PROSECUTOR

AND

JAMES JOSEPH CONNORS

ACCUSED

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Barry O’Donnell delivered on the 7th day of October, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1. On the 9 May 2025, District Judge Halpin in the Dublin Metropolitan District forwarded a consultative case stated to the High Court, pursuant to section 52(1) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961. In the case stated the learned judge seeks the opinion of the High Court on the following two questions:

(i) In a prosecution under the Bohernabreena and Roundwood Reservoirs (Angling) Bye-Law 635 of 1984, which prohibits the “use of any lure other than artificial fly for angling for any kind of fish with rod and line”, is it necessary to have direct evidence of the type of lure used by the accused or can I draw an inference as to the type of lure on the basis of the evidence before me?

(ii) Where evidence was given that the fishing rod and reel seized was unsuitable for fly fishing, and the action observed on the rod was inconsistent with fly-fishing, was my finding that this was sufficient to prove an offence under the Bohernabreena and Roundwood Reservoirs (Angling) Bye-Law 635 of 1984, without the necessity of producing the actual lure used as evidence, correct in law?

2. The court has been provided with the case stated signed by the learned judge, together with a transcript of the hearing that occurred before the learned judge on the 24 June 2024. The court also benefitted from succinct and focussed written and oral legal submissions from the legal representatives for the parties.

3. For the reasons explained in this judgment the court considers that each question should be answered in the affirmative.

THE RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISION

4. As noted in the questions presented to the court, the relevant provision under which the accused was prosecuted was section 3 of the Bohernabreena and Roundwood Reservoirs (Angling) Bye Law, No. 635 of 1984 (the Bye-Law). The Bye-Law was made by the Minister for Fisheries and Forestry on the 29 March 1984 pursuant to powers found in the Fisheries Acts 1959 to 1983. The operative provision states: “3. It is hereby prohibited to use any lure other than an artificial fly in angling for any kind of fish with rod and line in the waters of –

(a) Bohernabreena Reservoir, and

(b) Roundwood Reservoir.”

THE FACTUAL CONTEXT

5. The case stated commences by setting out the facts as found by the learned judge and which give rise to the questions of law on which clarification is sought. The court is tasked with answering the legal questions solely on the basis of those facts. The Supreme Court has made clear on a number of occasions that this factual foundation is of crucial importance. The parties are afforded an opportunity to make observations on the factual content of a case stated before it is finalised, and, absent agreement, the District Judge will find the necessary facts. As a result, this court and the parties are confined to addressing the issues by reference to those facts only; see, most recently, DPP (Varley) v. Davitt and the Attorney General [2023] IESC 17, paras 35 to 41.

6. The facts in this case are that the accused was charged with an offence contrary to the provisions of the Bye-Law. The offence was alleged to have occurred on the 17 May 2023. The case was heard by the learned judge on the 24 June 2024, and the prosecutor’s evidence was given by a Fisheries Officer, Carl Owens, of Inland Fisheries Ireland (the F.O.). The F.O.’s evidence, from examination, cross-examination and re-examination, was set out in the case stated.

7. I have summarised the evidence provided as follows:

• On the 17 May 2023, the F.O. was conducting fisheries protection duty at Bohernabreena Lower Lake with colleagues.

• At approximately 6.20pm he observed two males using spinning rods. He observed the accused casting out and retrieving a spinning lure multiple times.

• The F.O. stated that he first observed the accused from a distance of approximately 100 – 150 metres away, and then approached him.

• The F.O. gave evidence of observing the accused casting out and retrieving the lure multiple times. He observed the “plop” of the lure hitting the water and the retrieving action of the rod.

• When the F.O. reached the accused, he found that the tip of the rod was broken, and the line was tangled multiple times around the reel. The rod was a spinning rod, and the reel was a fixed spool reel.

• The view of the F.O. was that the rod and reel could not be used for fly fishing.

• The F.O. cautioned the accused and informed him that an offence had been committed and that a fixed charge penalty notice would be issued. The F.O. seized the fishing rod and reel.

8. Following the evidence of the F.O., defence counsel sought a direction on the basis that the F.O. had not produced real evidence of the actual lure used by the accused. This application was premised on the assertion that the Bye-Law placed an onus on the prosecution to prove that the lure was something other than an artificial fly, and to do so the actual lure should have been produced.

9. In response, the prosecution asserted that it was unnecessary to produce the actual lure. The evidence of the F.O. that (a) the rod was incapable of being used with an artificial fly, and

(b) the actions observed by the F.O. were inconsistent with the use of an artificial fly met the onus on the prosecution.

10. The learned judge held with the prosecution. The finding was that the accused was using a spinning rod which was inherently unsuitable for fly fishing, and that the accused was observed casting out and reeling in, while fly fishing involves casting out and tipping the lure off the water. The learned judge ruled that in light of the other evidence there was no need for the production of the actual lure.

ARGUMENTS

11. At the hearing, the issues netted down to the question of whether for the purposes of a prosecution for breach of the Bye-Law it was necessary to produce the actual lure used or whether the learned judge was entitled to draw inferences from the circumstances proved in evidence.

12. In that regard, counsel for the accused emphasised the need for strict interpretation of penal provisions and that there was no obligation on the accused to show his innocence. There was no dispute about those general propositions. Against that backdrop, counsel highlighted that the statutory prohibition in this case was expressly framed as a prohibition on the “use of any lure other than artificial fly” and was not directed to the use of a particular form of rod or reel.

13. Counsel for the accused accepted that production of the actual lure alleged to have been used was not strictly necessary. It was submitted however that it was necessary to have reliable and specific evidence of the type of lure used by the accused. Here, according to the submission, the absence of the actual lure combined with the absence of evidence of direct observation of the lure used by the accused significantly weakened the evidentiary foundation of the case, to the point where the learned judge could not convict solely on the basis of inferences drawn simply from the equipment and methods observed. In effect, the argument for the accused was that the approach of the learned judge crossed the boundary between legitimate inference and speculation.

14. There was an additional argument about whether the learned judge was correct to have treated the F.O. as an expert, however that issue does not form part of the case stated and was not pursued at the hearing.

15. For his part, counsel for the prosecution argued that the case was unremarkable and straightforward. It was submitted that some deference should be afforded to the learned judge’s appraisal of the evidence and that factual conclusions could be reached in a variety of ways. Counsel argued that there was nothing in the language of the Bye-Law that required the production of the actual lure used by an accused. The prosecution made the point that this was a prosecution that could be proved by circumstantial evidence, and that that proposition was unremarkable from the perspective of proving criminal offences.

16. In the circumstances of the case before the learned judge, counsel highlighted the following matters that were said to lead to a sound basis for the learned judge finding that the prosecution had proved its case:

(i) The FO. observed the accused casting and reeling in, which was consistent with the use of a lure other than an artificial fly.

(ii) The F.O. observed the “plop” of the lure as it hit the water, again consistent with the use of a lure other than an artificial fly.

(iii) The rod and reel apparatus seized by the F.O. could not be used for fly fishing, suggesting that it was not used with an artificial fly.

(iv) By the time the F.O. reached the accused the lure had been removed and the rod had been damaged, which permitted the learned judge to reach an adverse inference.

17. In essence, the prosecution seeks to stand over the approach adopted to the case by the learned judge on the basis (a) that there is no reason why the court could not convict on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and (b) that in the circumstances there was sufficient reliable factual matters identified in evidence by the F.O. to permit the learned judge to draw sufficient inferences.

DISCUSSION

18. As a matter of statutory interpretation, I do not consider that there is anything in the wording or overall scheme of the Bye-Law that requires the production of the actual lure used by a person accused of breaching the prohibition. The plain meaning of the provision is that a person angling with rod and reel in one of the identified reservoirs must only use an artificial fly as a lure. It is not necessary to consider exhaustively how a breach could be established to the criminal standard, save to observe that the critical fact in issue will be whether the accused person was using a lure other than an artificial fly while angling for fish with a rod and reel.

19. In this case, there does not appear to be any dispute that the accused was angling for fish with a rod and reel. The key fact in issue was the nature of the lure.

20. What is at issue in this case stated is whether the trial judge is entitled to draw inferences from the evidence that the lure was not an artificial fly. In effect, that question goes to the issue of whether a safe conviction could be secured by reference to circumstantial evidence.

21. As a general proposition the answer is uncontroversial and well established. It has been observed that “circumstantial evidence is not in any way inferior to direct evidence and both may serve to prove the existence of a fact in issue”, see McGrath, Evidence, (3rd edn, Round Hall 2020) para 1.20. At a level of principle, a person can be convicted of the highest crimes on the basis of circumstantial evidence. For instance, in People (DPP) v Nevin [2003] 3 IR 321 at p. 347 the Court of Criminal Appeal observed: “Without ever abandoning the presumption of innocence, the prosecution in proceeding against the applicant on the murder charge is perfectly entitled to rely on any piece of evidence which might be suspicious or uncannily coincidental and such items of evidence cannot just be viewed in isolation of each other. It is the combined effect of the circumstantial evidence which is of importance even though, in respect of each item of such circumstantial evidence, the jury has to consider whether it accepts it or not and also has to consider whether an inference suggested to be drawn from it is warranted or not.”

22. The second question relates to whether in the particular circumstances of the case before the learned judge the evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction. The first thing to be observed is that this is not an appeal. The point of the consultative case stated process is to provide answers to specific legal questions to permit the relevant judge to reach a final decision. The appraisal of facts and the application of the point of law to those facts are matters for the trial judge. Here, the learned judge heard all the evidence that was adduced before the application for a direction; and he was satisfied to convict subject to clarification that he was correct in his view that as a matter of law the production of the actual lure utilised was not a precondition for a safe conviction. That is matter to which some deference is owed. Arguably the better course of action for the accused, being dissatisfied with the outcome, would have been to avail of his right to appeal.

23. Nevertheless, in order to assist in understanding my answer to the second question, my view is that the trial judge’s decision as a matter of law to proceed on the basis that there was no need in the circumstances for the prosecution to produce the lure was correct.

24. The process of appraising circumstantial evidence has been described by the Court of Appeal in People (DPP) v Cumberton [2020] IECA 136 by Edwards J.: “The correct approach is for the tribunal of fact in their deliberations to sift and weigh all of the evidence before deciding on the ultimate issue. A tribunal of fact in its deliberations may of course consider the evidence in relation to different parts of the case, and sift and weigh that evidence, to assess its credibility and reliability, in whatever sequence and howsoever they see fit. However, assuming the circumstantial evidence at issue is prima facie credible and reliable, the potential relevance and possible significance of that evidence may only be apparent when it is considered in conjunction with all other evidence in the case. Accordingly, such decisions can only be made following a cumulative assessment of the evidence. A tribunal of fact, whether it be a jury or judge(s) would not be justified in rejecting or discarding a piece or pieces of circumstantial evidence on the grounds of relevance or significance, or simply because an innocent explanation may be open in respect of it, on a partial consideration of the case, or a consideration of the evidence in question in isolation. Nor should a jury be invited by defence counsel to consider it in that way, as regrettably still frequently happens.”

25. I have already set out the factual matters that were relied upon by the learned judge relied upon and from which he drew inferences. In my view, the approach adopted by the learned judge was reasonable and the inferences that he drew were legitimate. Using the distinction drawn by Edwards J. in DPP v Cumberton, I do not see a basis for impugning the inferences and conclusions on the basis that the learned judge moved from “legitimate inferences that can be drawn based on rational connection and common sense” to speculation or conjecture.

CONCLUSION

26. In the premises, the following answers will be given to the two questions:

(i) Yes

(ii) Yes

27. I will list this matter for final orders before me at 10.30am on Thursday, the 16 October 2025.