High Court grants anti-suit injunction against JSC but refuses broader orders binding third parties or future proceedings.

APPROVED [2025] IEHC 524

THE HIGH COURT

Record No.: 2023/88 COS

IN THE MATTER OF GTLK EUROPE DAC (IN LIQUIDATION)

-AND-

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2014

-AND-

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 631 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2014

BETWEEN:

JULIAN MORONEY AND DAMIEN MURRAN (AS JOINT LIQUIDATORS OF

GTLK EUROPE DAC (IN LIQUIDATION))

Applicants

-AND-

JOINT STOCK COMPANY ‘STATE TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY’

Respondent

-AND-

STLC EUROPE TWENTY EIGHT LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE ELEVEN LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE TWENTY SEVEN LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE TWENTY TWO LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE FOUR LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE TWO LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE ONE LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE FOURTEEN LEASING LIMITED, STLC EUROPE SIXTEEN LEASING LIMITED

Notice Parties

NO REDACTION REQUIRED JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Rory Mulcahy delivered on 6 October 2025

Introduction

1. This judgment concerns an application by Julian Moroney and Damien Murran as joint liquidators (“the joint liquidators”) of two companies, GTLK Europe DAC and GTLK Europe Capital DAC (together “the Companies”) for orders seeking to restrain the respondent (“JSC”) from progressing three sets of proceedings in a separate jurisdiction, Russia, a so-called anti-suit injunction.

2. The Companies are part of a group of companies operating an international transport leasing business known as the GTLK Europe Group. GTLK Europe Group is a division of a wider group of GTLK companies that are ultimately owned and controlled by JSC, which is owned by the Russian Federation. The Companies own a large fleet of vehicles, including aircraft, either in their own right or through subsidiaries.

3. The Companies were placed in liquidation by order of the High Court (Dignam J) on

31 May 2023.

4. In November of 2023, the joint liquidators issued an application pursuant to section 631 of the Companies Act 2014, as amended (“the Act”) seeking to have various pledge agreements purportedly made by the Companies in favour of JSC declared void (“the pledge proceedings”). In an ex tempore judgment dated 19 December 2023, I concluded that the Irish courts had jurisdiction to determine the question of the validity of the pledge agreements pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Recast Insolvency Directive (EU 2015/848). I made orders declaring the pledge agreements void and/or voidable on a number of grounds (“the pledge orders”).

5. Despite not having participated in the application before the High Court, JSC sought to appeal those orders and entered an unconditional appearance for the purpose of so doing. The Court of Appeal concluded that the JSC had thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts. Moreover, it concluded that JSC’s non-participation before the High Court had been “tactical” rather than due to any error on JSC’s part and, accordingly, it would be an abuse of process to permit JSC to raise grounds of appeal before the Court of Appeal which it had elected not to pursue before the High Court. JSC’s appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from that decision.

6. Notwithstanding the existence of the pledge orders declaring the pledge agreements void and/or voidable, which JSC unsuccessfully sought to challenge in the Irish courts, it has pursued five separate sets of proceedings in Russia where it relies on the pledge agreements as valid and, in terms, disputes the decisions of the Irish courts. In simple terms, JSC contends that the pledge agreements remain valid and that, by operation of their terms, it has acquired ownership of the Companies’ aircraft.

7. In particular, JSC issued proceedings on 30 November 2023 before the Arbitrazh Court of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District (“the Yamal Court”) against the joint liquidators in which it obtained an anti-suit injunction against them (“the Russian anti-suit injunction”). In fact, that order was in place at the time that the application to have the pledge agreements declared void was heard and was referenced in my judgment.

8. JSC has also issued three separate sets of, almost identical, arbitral proceedings against a number of the notice parties to these proceedings, which are wholly owned by GTLKE, and against GTLKE itself (“the arbitral proceedings”) before the Arbitration Centre of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (“the Arbitral Tribunal”). Awards have been made in each of the arbitrations (“the arbitration awards”).

9. Finally, proceedings issued before the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow (“the Moscow Court”) against the joint liquidators, GTLKE and GTLK subsidiaries seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the joint liquidators to revoke correspondence it has sent to various airports and airlines regarding the aircraft the subject of the purported pledge agreements and the pledge orders (“the mandatory injunction proceedings”). Those proceedings were due to be heard on 30 July 2025, shortly after the hearing of the application the subject of these proceedings but, it seems, did not go ahead on that date. The mandatory injunction proceedings are next listed before the Moscow Court on 8 October 2025.

10. I will refer to the all the foregoing proceedings together as “the Russian proceedings”.

11. The joint liquidators seek orders restraining JSC from continuing with the mandatory injunction proceedings, from relying on or taking steps to enforce the arbitration awards or the anti-suit injunction (a sort of anti anti-injunction), and requiring it to take steps to

discontinue the Russian proceedings. They seek orders against JSC, its servants or agents and “all other parties having notice of” any order made by this court.

12. The application was heard on 25 July 2025. Detailed submissions were filed on behalf of the joint liquidators regarding the jurisdiction to grant orders of the type sought. On 29 July 2025, I indicated that I was satisfied that I did have jurisdiction to make the anti-suit type orders sought by the joint liquidators and that I was further satisfied that it was necessary to grant some form of order in order to protect the integrity of the liquidation process. I indicated an intention to make orders broadly in terms of paragraphs (a) and (b)

of the Notice of Motion. I also indicated that I had considerable reservations about making orders against any party other than JSC. I stated that the precise form of order could await the delivery of a written judgment setting out my reasons. This is that judgment.

History of Irish proceedings

13. On 31 May 2023, the High Court made an order winding up the Companies and appointing the joint liquidators on foot of an application by a number of creditors of the Companies. The application had been opposed by the Companies.

14. On 29 September 2023 JSC wrote to the joint liquidators contending that it was now the owner of 37 aircraft owned by the Companies and/or its subsidiaries, pursuant to JSC’s out-of-court enforcement of ten separate pledge agreements entered on 29 March 2022.

Having made enquiries, the joint liquidators formed the view that the pledge agreements were invalid and/or unenforceable for a number of reasons. They wrote to JSC on 6 November 2023 advising it of this view and explaining their position.

15. On 22 November 2023, the joint liquidators issued an application pursuant to section

631 of the Act seeking to have the pledge agreements declared void and/or unenforceable.

The proceedings were served on JSC, as is apparent from a letter from JSC dated 28 November 2023, in which it stated that the Irish courts lacked jurisdiction to rule on the pledge agreements and, in particular, that the issue of the enforceability of the pledge agreements was a matter exclusively within the purview of the Russian courts. The letter also raised concerns about getting a fair hearing from the Irish court. JSC indicated that it would be making an application in the Russian courts for an anti-suit injunction in relation to any disputes regarding the pledge agreements. As appears from the discussion of the Russian proceedings below, JSC commenced anti-suit proceedings in the Yamal Court on

30 November 2023.

16. The joint liquidators application was heard on 14 December 2023. The court was advised that JSC had issued proceedings in Russia on 30 November 2023 and had been granted an interim anti-suit injunction in Russia purporting to restrain the joint liquidators from taking any steps in relation to the pledge agreements.

17. I delivered judgment on the joint liquidators’ application 19 December 2023. Although JSC was not represented at that hearing, in light of its letter of 28 November 2023 asserting that the validity of the pledge agreements was a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Russian courts, the judgment addressed the issue of jurisdiction. I referred to Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Recast Insolvency Directive (EU 2015/848) which make clear that the applicable law in an insolvency is the law of the member state in which the insolvency proceedings are opened and which expressly identifies various matters which are determined pursuant to that law. I formed the view that the Irish courts “self-evidently” had jurisdiction to address the issues raised in the joint liquidators’ application.

18. I noted the existence of the anti-suit injunction obtained by JSC in the Yamal court but concluded that “that in personam order does not displace the jurisdiction of this court conferred by the opening of the winding up proceedings here pursuant to the Directive and by Irish law.”

19. In light of that conclusion, I considered the merits of the joint liquidators’ application and made various orders declaring the pledge agreements void and/or voidable, the pledge orders.

20. Solicitors for JSC entered an appearance on 17 January 2024 and filed an appeal against the pledge orders on 14 February 2024. JSC sought a stay on the pledge orders from the High Court, which I refused in a decision dated 21 March 2024. It then issued an application seeking a stay from the Court of Appeal. That application was heard on 19 April 2024 and was refused in an ex tempore ruling delivered that day. In its appeal, JSC sought to maintain

an objection to jurisdiction. In her ruling on the stay application in the Court of Appeal, Costello J (as she then was) concluded as follows:

“… it is not open to the appellant to seek an injunction or a stay from the court while still maintaining that the party has not submitted to jurisdiction. In this sense the application could be described as an abuse of the process of the courts and should be refused in the sense that one cannot both approbate and reprobate the jurisdiction of the court.”

21. The stay application was refused, inter alia, on this basis. Nonetheless, JSC maintained the same approach on the hearing of the full appeal. By that stage, as the Court of Appeal was advised, the interim anti-suit order of the Yamal Court had been made permanent. In his judgment dismissing the appeal, Noonan J concluded as follows:

“50. I therefore find myself in full agreement with the views expressed by Costello J.

on the stay application that the entry of an unconditional appearance by JSC in this case amounts to a clear and unequivocal submission to jurisdiction, which of necessity precludes JSC from thereafter purporting to challenge that jurisdiction.”

22. Having concluded that JSC had unequivocally submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts by entering an appearance, Noonan J considered whether it should be entitled to advance arguments in its appeal which it had not advanced before the High Court. Noonan J agreed with Costello J’s conclusion that the non-appearance by JSC in the High Court was “tactical” and a “manifest abuse of process” and concluded that, in those circumstances, it would not be in the interests of justice to permit, in effect, a first instance hearing before the Court of Appeal.

23. JSC sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court. In its determination dated 18 October 2024, leave was refused on the basis that the Court of Appeal’s finding, that JSC’s tactical decision not to participate in the Irish proceedings and instead seek to injunct the proceedings before the Russian courts rendered the appeal a manifest abuse of process, had been reached following “well-established principles.”

The Russian proceedings

24. The first set of Russian proceedings, the Russian anti-suit injunction proceedings, have been described above. They were commenced by JSC after it was notified of the application by the joint liquidators in relation to the pledge agreements. As noted above, final orders have been made in those proceedings. The Yamal Court has issued a number of writs of execution. The joint liquidators did not participate in the Russian proceedings, i.e. they did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Yamal Court.

25. By the terms of the order of the Yamal Court, the joint liquidators are forbidden from initiating or continuing any legal proceedings the subject of which is the pledge agreements, any action to enforce the pledge agreements, or ownership of the aircraft the subject of the pledge agreements. The order imposes a financial penalty for non-compliance of RUB83,509,877,000, approximately €850 million.

26. On 19 June 2024, JSC issued three separate sets of arbitral proceedings seeking, inter alia, declarations that the pledge agreements are valid, that JSC’s foreclosure of the aircraft pursuant to the pledge agreements was lawful, and penalties of approximately US$20 million. The three sets of proceedings related to the 37 aircraft the subject of the pledge agreements and were issued against the owners of the aircraft: the first proceedings against a number of the subsidiaries owning 25 aircraft, the second proceedings against other subsidiaries owning 3 aircraft, and the third proceedings against GTLKE itself as owner of

9 aircraft.

27. The respondents to the arbitration filed a limited submission challenging the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. Further submissions on jurisdiction were exchanged, but the objections to jurisdiction were dismissed by the Arbitral Tribunal in decisions dated

15 and 16 July 2024. The respondents did not engage further with the Arbitral Tribunal thereafter, save to re-submit the jurisdictional objections.

28. The Arbitral Tribunal issued awards in each of the arbitrations in August and September 2024. JSC’s claims were granted almost in full, i.e. the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the pledge agreements were valid and that JSC had lawfully foreclosed on foot of those agreements and was therefore the owner of the aircraft.

29. The final set of proceedings, the mandatory injunction proceedings, were commenced on 24 June 2024 and are directed towards steps being taken by the joint liquidators in the liquidation. In brief, the joint liquidators have been writing periodically to both the lessees of the aircraft the subject of the pledge agreements, and to the operators of airports to which the aircraft are flying, asserting ownership of the aircraft. The letters request the lessees to return the aircraft, and asked the relevant airports to take steps to prevent aircraft which land at their airports from leaving.

30. The mandatory injunction proceedings seek orders requiring the joint liquidators to revoke the previous correspondence and to refrain from sending further correspondence, or from seeking recognition of the orders made in the pledge proceedings.

31. The mandatory injunction proceedings were initially scheduled for hearing in December 2025. However, on application by JSC, the hearing date was brought forward to

30 July 2025. It is that acceleration which appears to have prompted the joint liquidators to bring this application. As it happens, it seems that these proceedings have been adjourned from time to time, for reasons unknown to the joint liquidators, and are next scheduled for

8 October 2025.

32. The joint liquidators’ position is that the mandatory injunction proceedings have not been formally served on them. They have not participated in those proceedings.

The liquidation

33. The joint liquidators have continued to progress the liquidation and have received claims from various purported creditors of the Companies. These include JSC which has submitted claims totalling €2.3 billion. The joint liquidators and JSC’s solicitors have exchanged correspondence on this issue.

34. Solicitors for JSC wrote to the joint liquidators on 24 July 2024, criticising them for not having admitted JSC’s status as a liquidation creditor. The letter also sought a “detailed and couched” report on the current status of the liquidation.

35. The joint liquidators’ solicitors replied by letter dated 8 August 2024. In a detailed letter, they stated as follows:

“It is neither permissible nor appropriate for your client to seek to avail of the Irish liquidation processes on a wholly selective basis. In particular, your client cannot demand information in relation to its purported status as a creditor of the GTLK Companies, whose liquidation is supervised by the Irish High Court, while at the same time purporting to deny orders made in the same liquidations which address fundamental issues affecting the assets of the GTLK Companies. The High Court Pledge Order confirmed that each of the Purported Pledge Agreements is void and that GTLK Europe and the nine GTLK subsidiaries are the owners of the legal title to the Aircraft. In spite of this, your client continues to take steps in defiance of the High Court Pledge Order.”

36. In light of what the joint liquidators contended was JSC’s contradictory position, the letter set out their position:

“The Joint Liquidators will consider whether they can progress to adjudicating creditor claims while your client maintains its assertion of ownership of the Aircraft that are unequivocally assets of GTLK Europe and certain of its subsidiaries. In circumstances where your client now seeks to participate actively in the liquidations of the GTLK Companies, please confirm that your client will:

(a) refrain from taking any and all steps to undermine the terms of the High Court Pledge Order;

(b) take any and all such steps as may be necessary to reverse those steps which have already been taken, including those outlined above; and

(c) refrain from taking any further steps whatsoever which might undermine the orderly and efficient progression of the liquidations.”

37. JSC’s solicitor replied by letter dated 30 September 2024, describing the joint liquidators position as “extraordinary and a matter of serious concern, but also frankly nonsensical.” The letter pointed out, correctly, that the orders made in the pledge proceedings did not include an order that the Companies were owners of the aircraft, taking issue with a statement in correspondence from the joint liquidators to the airports that “there is now an order of the High Court of Ireland confirming the legal title”.

38. The letter contended that, accordingly:

“... and relating to our Client taking enforcement steps with regard to the Orders made in the Russian Proceedings or otherwise, would clearly not be “in defiance of” and/or “in direct contradiction of” the High Court Pledge Order or its terms. In this regard we are referring to the actual Order made by the High Court, not the fictitious order being contended for in your firm’s letters.”

39. The joint liquidators responded in a letter dated 22 October 2024, which followed the Supreme Court determination refusing leave to appeal. It addressed the contention that JSC’s actions in pursuing the Russian proceedings were not in defiance of the orders made in this jurisdiction:

“[The joint liquidators’] emphatic position remains that the Irish Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes in relation to the validity of the Pledge Agreements and the ownership of the Aircraft, and indeed that your client has submitted to the same jurisdiction. If your client seeks to enforce any orders of the Russian Courts or arbitral awards of the RSPP outside of the Russian Federation, the Joint Liquidators will make their position on jurisdiction known to the relevant authorities in any non-Russian jurisdictions and will provide them with a copy of the High Court Pledge Order, the Court of Appeal Order, the Supreme Court Determination and any other relevant documentation. For the avoidance of any doubt, the High Court Pledge Order, the Court of Appeal Order and the Supreme Court Determination remain in full force and effect as a matter of Irish law notwithstanding the above-mentioned steps taken by your client in Russia.

We note your client’s refusal to confirm, amongst other things, that they will refrain from taking any and all steps to undermine the terms of the High Court Pledge Order.

Your client’s refusal to facilitate the return of the Aircraft to the possession of GTLK Europe and its subsidiaries, as well as the various Court actions brought before both the Irish and Russian courts in this regard, amount to clear denial of the terms of the High Court Pledge Order by your client.”

Relevant jurisprudence

40. In opening the application, counsel for the joint liquidators stated that they had been unable to identify any relevant written decision of the Irish courts on an application for an anti-suit injunction. However, the joint liquidators contend that there is “no doubt that the jurisdiction to grant anti-suit injunctive relief is recognised in Irish law.” They point out that the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 confers an express power to prohibit the initiation of proceedings. Section 27(5) provides as follows:

No cause or proceeding at any time pending in the High Court of Justice, or before the Court of Appeal, shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction; but every matter of equity on which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might have been obtained, if this Act had not passed, either unconditionally or on any terms or conditions, may be relied on by way of defence thereto: Provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall disable either of the said Courts from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it if it shall think fit; and any person, whether a party or not to any such cause or matter, who would have been entitled, if this Act had not passed, to apply to any Court to restrain the prosecution thereof, or who may be entitled to enforce, by attachment or otherwise, any judgment, decree, rule, or order, contrary to which all or any part of the proceedings in such cause or matter may have been taken, shall be at liberty to apply to the said Courts respectively, by motion in a summary way, for a stay of proceedings in such cause or matter, either generally, or so far as may be necessary for the purposes of justice; and the Court shall thereupon make such order as shall be just.

41. More generally, the joint liquidators contend that the principles governing the grant of anti-suit relief developed in other jurisdictions, in particular, the English courts, apply with equal force and logic in this jurisdiction. They refer to the leading English textbook on the

subject, The Anti-Suit Injunction, Raphael (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed.), on the history of the remedy:

“2.03 The anti-suit injunction originally evolved from ‘the common injunction’, by which the English Court of Chancery had restrained litigants before the English common law courts from obtaining judgments which were contrary to the principles of equity. A common injunction could be granted in two situations: where the common law would fail to protect an equitable right; and where the ends of justice required interference, for example to put an end to vexatious and oppressive litigation or a multiplicity of suits. Equity did not accept any principle of initial deference to the common law courts, since as between the Courts of Chancery and common law, no considerations of the comity of nations were involved.

2.04 Foreign courts might also grant judgments which contravened English principles of equity and so it was inescapable that the Court of Chancery would eventually have to consider whether an injunction could be granted to restrain litigants from pursuing foreign proceedings. The point appears to have been tested for the first time in the seventeenth-century case of Love v Baker, where Lord Clarendon LC feared that such a remedy might be ‘a dangerous Case’ and on the advice of judges dissolved the injunction, but the reporter remarked ‘sed quaere for all the bar was of another opinion.’”

42. Raphael references a number of types of anti-suit injunction reliefs which are potentially available. The most straightforward is a prohibitory injunction, requiring a party not to commence or progress foreign proceedings. This may include an anti anti-suit injunction, prohibiting the bringing of an application for anti-suit relief in another jurisdiction. More “invasive” is a mandatory injunction, requiring a party to take steps to discontinue foreign proceedings. Finally, in particular cases, a court may grant antienforcement relief, prohibiting a party from taking any steps to enforce a judgment already obtained in foreign proceedings. The joint liquidators’ position is that despite differences in the nature of those orders, similar principles govern the grant of each type of injunction.

43. It is appropriate, in light of the absence of a written Irish decision dealing with the jurisdiction sought to be invoked here, that the foreign authorities relied on are considered in a little detail.

44. One early case relied on by the joint liquidators was Ellerman Lines Ltd v Read [1928]

2 KB 144, which concerned an application for anti-enforcement relief. In that case, the jurisdiction to grant relief was grounded in the necessity to prevent fraudulent conduct. The judgment was pithily summarised in the headnote:

“The fact that a British subject has actually obtained judgment in a foreign Court does not prevent an English Court from granting an injunction restraining its enforcement where it is shown to have been obtained by a breach of contract or by fraud. In granting an injunction in those circumstances the English Court does not seek to assert jurisdiction over the foreign Court; it proceeds upon the principle that the person seeking to enforce the judgment is in conscience debarred from attempting to do so.”

45. The case concerned a claim for compensation for ship salvage which was properly to be brought before the English courts. Notwithstanding agreement to the English courts as the proper seat for the litigation, the party who had effected the salvage sought to have the ship arrested in Constantinople. At first instance, the plaintiff was granted an injunction restraining enforcement of the Turkish order in England, but not otherwise, on the basis that the English court had no jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. The Court of Appeal (Scrutton LJ) disagreed in a judgment which explained the nature of, and reason that, a jurisdiction to restrain proceedings in a foreign country must exist (at p. 151):

“I am, however, unable to share the learned judge's doubts as to his power to grant the injunction in its wider form. Here we have an English contract, considerable portions of which were to be performed in England, entered into by a naturalized British subject;

that naturalized British subject is proved to have broken that contract and by fraud obtained a foreign judgment which he proposes to enforce against the property of the other contracting party. He has been properly served with the writ in this action and is a party to the proceedings. In such a case, as I understand the decisions, the English Courts have always professed, and asserted, their power to act. They do not, of course, grant an injunction restraining the foreign Court from acting; they have no power to do that; but they can grant an injunction restraining a British subject who is fraudulently breaking his contract, and who is a party to proceedings before them, from making an application to a foreign Court for the purpose of reaping the fruits of his fraudulent breach of contract.”

46. Atkin LJ in his judgment, agreeing with Scruton LJ, expressly rejected the respondents’ contention that the jurisdiction ended once judgment had been delivered in the foreign proceedings. He explained (at p. 155):

“The principle upon which an English Court acts in granting injunctions is not that it seeks to assume jurisdiction over the foreign Court, or that it arrogates to itself some superiority which entitles it to dictate to the foreign Court, or that it seeks to criticize the foreign Court or its procedure; the English Court has regard to the personal attitude of the person who has obtained the foreign judgment. If the English Court finds that a person subject to its jurisdiction has committed a breach of covenant, or has acted in breach of some fiduciary duty or has in any way violated the principles of equity and conscience, and that it would be inequitable on his part to seek to enforce a judgment obtained in breach of such obligations, it will restrain him, not by issuing an edict to the foreign Court, but by saying that he is in conscience bound not to enforce that judgment.”

47. Elektrim Holdings SA v Vivendi Holdings 1 Corp [2008] 2 CLC 564 involved a devilishly complex nest of proceedings arising from bonds guaranteed by Elektrim, a Polish conglomerate which had become bankrupt and, in particular, a dispute as to the ownership of Elektrim’s interest in a Polish telephone service provider. During the course of this wider dispute, two parties sought anti-suit injunctions to restrain proceedings in the United States said to have been commenced in breach of a “no action clause” in the bonds. The injunctions were granted by the High Court and upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal. In addition to addressing the contractual grounds for the grant of the injunctions, Lawrence Collins LJ addressed a more general jurisdiction (at pp. 599/600):

“159. I also consider that there is no arguable basis for an appeal from the judge’s

conclusion that the injunction was justified on the ground of protection of the jurisdiction of the English court. Vivendi chose not to apply to the English court to challenge the Order of 1 May 2007 or seek to restrain distribution of the €525m.

Vivendi was served with notice of the 1 May 2007 order and was given the opportunity to apply to set it aside. The Part 8 proceedings were between the Trustee, Elektrim, and all of the bondholders and concerned the circumstances of receipt of the €525m and whether the monies should be distributed, and in particular whether the Trustee might be liable in respect of the events of October 2006. England was plainly the natural forum for any disputes concerning the bonds. Instead Vivendi attacked the decision collaterally by having VH1 acquire bonds and issue the Florida proceedings, a jurisdiction having no substantial connection with the dispute, with the object of preventing the distribution.”

48. Thus, the English courts recognise a jurisdiction to grant anti-suit relief to restrain foreign proceedings which represent a collateral attack on its own proceedings.

49. One of the leading judgments of the English courts, Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd [2009] QB 503, was one of a number delivered in those proceedings in which the plaintiff pursued claims in the English courts regarding an interest in a Yemeni oil concession. The defendants, having lost a jurisdictional challenge, participated fully in the English proceedings. When judgment was awarded against them, they issued proceedings in Yemen disputing their liability. The plaintiff sought and obtained an antisuit injunction. The Court of Appeal concluded that it had jurisdiction to make such an order because the defendants had submitted to the jurisdiction of the English courts.

50. In so doing, the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that a claim for an anti-suit injunction was a separate claim based on a different cause of action from the main proceedings:

“31. In my judgment the answer to these points is, first, the type of anti-suit injunction granted in these proceedings is not one which is founded in English law on a cause of action separate from the claims in the main proceedings which gave rise to the judgment debt. Second, the claim for an anti-suit injunction did not involve CCIC being “sued” for the purposes of the Brussels I Regulation , nor did it involve “a claim” for the purposes of the heads of jurisdiction in CPR r 6.20 . Third, the judgment debtors'

submission to the jurisdiction gave the English court power to make any incidental

orders in the litigation, irrespective of whether, in the case of CCIC, the order was a provisional or protective measure.”

51. The court (Lawrence Collins LJ) summarised its conclusions on the jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction (at p. 516):

“26. For reasons on which I will expand, in my judgment the English court has power over persons properly subject to its in personam jurisdiction to make ancillary orders in protection of its jurisdiction and its processes, including the integrity of its judgments. That power is of course a discretionary one, to be exercised in accordance with the requirements of international comity.

…

27. The starting point is that an anti-suit injunction binds only the party enjoined, in personam, and is effective only in so far as that party is amenable to the jurisdiction of the English courts so that the order can be enforced against him: Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871 , 892, per Lord Goff of Chieveley; Turner v Grovit [2002] 1 WLR 107, para 23, per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough, and Donohue v Armco Inc [2002] 1 All ER 749, para 19, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.”

52. Under the heading “Protection of the Jurisdiction”, the court analysed a number of cases relied on by the defendants and concluded as follows (at pp. 533/534):

“94. These decisions show that it will be a rare case in which an injunction will be granted by the English court to prevent reliance abroad on, or compliance with, a foreign judgment, or an injunction which will indirectly have that effect. But there is no general principle that even in such a case no injunction will be granted. In Ellerman Lines Ltd v Read [1928] 2 KB 144 (a case to which this court was not referred in argument) the Court of Appeal specifically rejected an argument that, while the English court could grant an injunction restraining the institution or continuance of proceedings in a foreign court, there was no power, after the foreign court had given judgment, to grant an injunction restraining the person who had obtained it from reaping its fruits: pp 152, 155 and 158, per Scrutton LJ, Atkin LJ and Eve J. No doubt

the power will only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, as they were in that case, where the party enjoined was a British subject who had obtained the judgment by fraud.

95. But the present case is not a case where the foreign court has given a judgment with which an English injunction will be inconsistent. It is simply a case in which the judgment debtors are seeking to relitigate abroad the merits of a case which, after a long trial, they have lost in England. In my judgment it is a classic case of vexation and oppression, and of conduct which is designed to interfere with the process of the English court in litigation to which the judgment debtors submitted.”

53. The joint liquidators argue that, as in Masri, JSC has unequivocally submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts in these liquidation proceedings and, accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to make the orders sought as an incident of that litigation.

54. They contend that, in any event, the court has jurisdiction because JSC has submitted a proof in the litigation. In this regard, it refers to the decision in Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, 283:

“In English law there is no doubt that orders may be made against a foreign creditor who proves in an English liquidation or bankruptcy on the footing that by proving the foreign creditor submits to the jurisdiction of the English court.”

55. The rationale for the existence of an anti-suit jurisdiction in liquidation proceedings is discussed in Stichting Shell Pensioenfunds v Krys [2015] AC 616, a decision of the Privy Council concerning the grant of an anti-suit injunction to prevent a creditor obtaining the benefit of a garnishment or attachment order from the Dutch courts, secured against a company in liquidation in the British Virgin Islands. The Privy Council considered that, in the context of a liquidation, it was not necessary to establish that the foreign proceedings are vexatious or oppressive (at p. 630):

“The conduct of a creditor or member in invoking the jurisdiction of a foreign court so as to obtain prior access to the insolvent estate may well be vexatious or oppressive, in which case an injunction may be justified on that ground. An example is provided by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Bloom v Harms Offshore

AHT “Taurus” GmbH & Co KG [2010] Ch 187, where a creditor used a foreign attachment order in a manner which the court regarded as amounting to sharp practice.

However, vexation and oppression are not a necessary part of the test for the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction in a case where foreign proceedings are calculated to give the litigant prior access to assets subject to the statutory trust. In the Board’s opinion there are powerful reasons of principle why this should be so. The whole concept of vexation or oppression as a ground for intervention, is directed to the protection of a litigant who is being vexed or oppressed by his opponent. Where a company is being wound up in the jurisdiction of its incorporation, other interests are engaged. The court acts not in interest of any particular creditor or member, but in that of the general body of creditors and members. Moreover, as the Board has recently observed in Singularis Holdings v PriceWaterhouseCooper [2015]

2 WLR, para. 23, there is a broader public interest in the ability of a court exercising insolvency jurisdiction in the place of the company's incorporation to conduct an orderly winding up of its affairs on a worldwide basis, notwithstanding the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. In protecting its insolvency jurisdiction, to adopt Lord Goff's phrase, the court is not standing on its dignity. It intervenes because the proper distribution of the company's assets depends on its ability to get in those assets so that comparable claims to them may be dealt with fairly in accordance with a common set of rules applying equally to all of them. There is no jurisdiction other than that of the insolvent’s domicile in which that result can be achieved. The alternative is a free-for-all in which the distribution of assets depends on the adventitious location of assets and the race to grab them is to the swiftest, and the best informed, best resourced or best lawyered.”

56. In SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2020] 1 CLC 820, the Court of Appeal considered an argument that anti-enforcement injunctions would only be granted in exceptional cases. Males LJ made clear that although the circumstances giving rise to such an injunction might be rare, there was no separate jurisdictional requirement of exceptionality.

57. This was reiterated in JP Morgan Securities plc v VTB Bank PJSC [2025] EWHC 1368 (Comm) in which the court noted that the grant of such injunctions was becoming increasingly common in cases concerning proceedings in Russia because of the risk that the Russian courts will not permit proceedings to be discontinued.

58. The final case relied on by the joint liquidators was another recent decision of the English High Court, Alsaady v Al Hamadani [2025] EWHC 1801 (Ch). In that case, the court referred to a portion of Toulson LJ’s statement of applicable principles set out in Deutsche Bank AG v Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP [2010] 1 WLR 1023 (at pp. 1036/1037):

“(1) Under English law the court may restrain a defendant over whom it has personal jurisdiction from instituting or continuing proceedings in a foreign court when it is necessary in the interests of justice to do. (2) It is too narrow to say that such an injunction may be granted only on grounds of vexation or oppression, but, where a matter is justiciable in an English and a foreign court, the party seeking an anti-suit injunction must generally show that proceeding before the foreign court is or would be vexatious or oppressive. (3) The courts have refrained from attempting a comprehensive definition of vexation or oppression, but in order to establish that proceeding in a foreign court is or would be vexatious or oppressive on grounds of forum non conveniens, it is generally necessary to show that (a) England is clearly the more appropriate forum (“the natural forum”), and (b) justice requires that the claimant in the foreign court should be restrained from proceeding there. (4) If the English court considers England to be the natural forum and can see no legitimate personal or juridical advantage in the claimant in the foreign proceedings being allowed to pursue them, it does not automatically follow that an anti-suit injunction should be granted.

For that would be to overlook the important restraining influence of considerations of comity. (5) An anti-suit injunction always requires caution because by definition it involves interference with the process or potential process of a foreign court. An injunction to enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause governed by English law is not regarded as a breach of comity, because it merely requires a party to honour his contract. In other cases, the principle of comity requires the court to recognise that, in deciding questions of weight to be attached to different factors, different judges operating under different legal systems with different legal policies may legitimately arrive at different answers, without occasioning a breach of customary international law or manifest injustice, and that in such circumstances it is not for an English court to arrogate to itself the decision how a foreign court should determine the matter.

The stronger the connection of the foreign court with the parties and the subject matter of the dispute, the stronger the argument against intervention. (6) The prosecution of parallel proceedings in different jurisdictions is undesirable but not necessarily vexatious or oppressive.”

59. In Alsaady, the claimant commenced proceedings in England, which were largely unsuccessful, and also sought to prosecute the same claims in Iraq. The court (Thompsell J) concluded that this amounted to vexatious or oppressive conduct and, accordingly, granted an anti-suit injunction to restrain the Iraqi proceedings.

60. In Alsaady, Thompsell J referred to the decision in Star Reefers Pool Inc v JFC Group Co Ltd [2012] 1 CLC 294 to highlight the discretionary nature of the remedy being sought. In Star Reefer, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against an injunction restraining the defendant from litigating proceedings in Russia. Of particular significance for the Court of Appeal was the fact that the respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the English courts. The court (Rix LJ) accepted the claimant’s argument that submission to jurisdiction was not a “condition precedent”, but this did not mean that it was not a critical consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion (at p. 306):

“However, where a foreign defendant, impleaded in England, does not submit to the jurisdiction, and has not agreed to litigate or arbitrate in England, it is not obviously easy to visualise how his foreign proceedings will impede the English proceedings or why an anti-suit injunction will be necessary to protect the English claimant's legitimate interest in his English action.”

61. The court was unable to conclude that the respondent’s conduct was vexatious (at p. 307):

“32. In my judgment, looking at these materials, I am unable, with respect, to agree with the judge's finding that JFC's conduct was vexatious. His first reason was that the Russian proceedings were commenced with a view to frustrating the determination of the dispute in England. However, this conclusion is unjustified. There was nothing which JFC could do in commencing proceedings in Russia to frustrate any proceedings in England. At the time of JFC's issue of its claim in Russia, no valid proceedings had been commenced in England, only Star Reefers' invalid claim to commence an arbitration against JFC. Even if that claim was to be viewed as a harbinger of future English court proceedings, the consequences of that would lie in the future. If JFC refused to submit to such proceedings, which is what in the event it has shown it would do, those English proceedings would take their own course, unaffected by the Russian proceedings. It is possible that an earlier judgment in Russia would interfere with Star Reefers' attempt ultimately to enforce an English judgment against JFC in Russia: but, if JFC refused to submit to the English jurisdiction, Star Reefers would always find it difficult to enforce its English judgment in Russia without litigating anew in Russia. Moreover, in Russia, an English judgment in which JFC had not participated would presumably not constitute any res judicata or estoppel. In effect, JFC's Russian proceedings anticipate such possible, but problematic, enforcement proceedings.

However, there is nothing unconscionable about that. JFC has not promised to litigate or arbitrate in England, and thus to accept the decision of the English courts or of an English arbitration award. It is entitled, so far as international understandings about such matters go, to stand aloof from English litigation. That may present difficulties for it in international commerce, but there is nothing unusual about such tactics. The enforcement of an English judgment is ultimately a matter for Russia and its courts, subject to any relevant treaty, about which we have been told nothing.

Arguments

62. The joint liquidators argue that the principles governing the exercise of the anti-suit jurisdiction developed in the English and other common law case law must apply equally in this jurisdiction: that the Irish courts have jurisdiction to grant anti-suit relief in order to protect the integrity of its own processes or to prevent fraudulent, vexatious, or oppressive conduct, and, in the case of a liquidation commenced in this jurisdiction, to protect the interests of all creditors in the liquidation.

63. They identify two ‘gateways’ to the exercise of the jurisdiction in this case. First, that JSC has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts, by entering an unconditional appearance in these liquidation proceedings, a fact definitively determined by the decision of the Court of Appeal. And second, that by seeking to prove in the liquidation, JSC has submitted to the Irish courts’ jurisdiction. In this latter regard, argue the joint liquidators, JSC cannot both approbate and reprobate, that is, rely on the liquidation process by seeking to be admitted as a creditor of the Companies in the liquidation, while at the same time disregarding orders of the Irish courts made in the liquidation.

64. The joint liquidators contend that the Russian proceedings represent an attempt by JSC to undermine, circumvent and/or contravene binding orders of the Irish courts. It is clear that in the Russian proceedings JSC relies on pledge agreements which have been determined to be void by the Irish courts. The joint liquidators also contend that the Russian proceedings represent an attempt to unlawfully interfere with the orderly conduct of the liquidation, and an attempt to secure a preferential position in relation to the distribution of the Companies’ assets.

65. Counsel referred to the timing of the various steps taken in relation to the Russian proceedings and suggested that they were often responsive to developments in this jurisdiction. Most obviously, the joint liquidators contend that the anti-suit injunction proceedings were clearly issued in response to the pledge proceedings, but they also highlight that the arbitration proceedings and the mandatory injunction proceedings were issued following the substantive hearing in the Court of Appeal and, in respect of the mandatory injunction proceedings, immediately prior to judgment being delivered.

66. They refer to JSC’s pleadings and submissions in the Russian proceedings and, in particular, the arbitration proceedings, where JSC expressly relies on purported errors in my judgment in the pledge proceedings. They argue that the Russian proceedings are clearly, therefore, a collateral attack on decisions of the Irish courts which are now final.

67. The joint liquidators note the onerous effect of non-compliance with the orders made in the Russian proceedings. In addition to the massive financial penalties referred to above for non-compliance with the anti-suit injunction referred to above, they provided evidence from a lawyer still practising in Russia that criminal penalties could be imposed for noncompliance with the mandatory injunction now being sought, including imprisonment, correctional labour, or compulsory labour. This, it is argued, evidences the oppressive nature of the Russian proceedings.

68. Against that backdrop, the joint liquidators say that there are a variety of grounds which warrant the relief sought in these proceedings.

69. Of particular note, they express a concern that so-called neutral jurisdictions, those neither friendly nor unfriendly to Russia, might be influenced by the orders made in the Russian proceedings to refuse to recognise the effect of the orders made in the pledge proceedings. It is contended that the grant of the type of relief sought here might improve the joint liquidators position in such countries.

70. Perhaps most significantly, they say that the grant of such relief will have an effect on JSC’s participation in the liquidation and will prevent JSC from seeking to both approbate and reprobate in the liquidation.

71. The joint liquidators express understandable concern about their personal exposure to various forms of liability in Russia on foot of the Russian proceedings. However, counsel fairly accepted in his submissions that the joint liquidators had been prepared to let things lie in relation to the Russian proceedings when the orders obtained there could only “bite” in Russia. There is no suggestion that the joint liquidators have any intention of submitting to the jurisdiction of the Russian courts.

72. Finally, the joint liquidators make absolutely clear, consistent with the case law, that the orders sought are not directed to the Russian courts, or the arbitral tribunal, and do not reflect any criticism of the conduct of the proceedings by those tribunals. Rather, what is sought are in personam orders against JSC on the basis that it has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts and, by pursuing the Russian proceedings, is seeking to undermine the liquidation process here, and that it is guilty of an abuse of process by ignoring final orders of this court which are binding upon it.

73. JSC, although on notice of this application, did not file any affidavits or make any submissions. A solicitor appeared as a matter of courtesy to make clear that JSC did not intend to take part.

Discussion

74. As appears from the discussion of the case law discussed above, the English courts have recognised a jurisdiction to grant orders restraining parties from prosecuting or enforcing proceedings in another jurisdiction in, at least, two distinct circumstances.

75. The first is where the continuation of the foreign proceedings would undermine the jurisdiction of the domestic court or would expose a party properly before that court to vexatious proceedings, abuse of process or fraudulent conduct by the party to be restrained.

76. The second arises where liquidation proceedings have been commenced before the domestic court and the bringing of proceedings in a foreign court would undermine the proper conduct of that liquidation. This jurisdiction is said to exist irrespective of whether the conduct of the party to be restrained is abusive or vexatious.

77. In both cases, the entitlement to exercise an in personam jurisdiction arises where the party being restrained has submitted to the jurisdiction of the domestic court, either by agreeing to the English court’s jurisdiction (e.g. in an exclusive jurisdiction clause), participating in proceedings before the domestic court, or by seeking to prove in a liquidation. Although the Court of Appeal in Star Reefer expressed the view that submission to jurisdiction was not a condition precedent, it struggled to see how relief could be justified absent such submission.

78. Although the question of whether a similar jurisdiction exists here has not, it seems, been the subject of a written decision of the Irish courts, the joint liquidators asserted that it must exist for the same reasons that have been identified by courts in other jurisdictions. I am quite certain that that is so. As a matter of principle, an Irish court must have jurisdiction to protect the integrity of its own processes by ensuring that parties properly subject to its jurisdiction do not take steps to undermine that jurisdiction or to breach or ignore its orders.

Its jurisdiction to do so in cases of contempt of court is well established. Moreover, an Irish court supervising a liquidation properly commenced before it also must have jurisdiction to ensure that the interests of all creditors are protected and the integrity of the winding up process is not undermined by a multiplicity of actions regarding the assets of the company in a variety of jurisdictions. The joint liquidators did not suggest any reason why courts in other countries should have such a jurisdiction and the Irish courts should not, and I cannot conceive of any such reason.

79. The precise parameters of the jurisdiction will have to be developed on a case by case basis. For the purpose of this application, it seems to me that the following principles, derived from the above case law, should apply in this jurisdiction.

80. The Irish court’s jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction is an in personam jurisdiction, which can properly be exercised against a person subject to the Irish courts’ jurisdiction. A person may be subject to the Irish courts’ jurisdiction by virtue of an agreement (e.g. an exclusive jurisdiction clause), by submitting to jurisdiction (entering an unconditional appearance), or, in the case of liquidation proceedings, by seeking to prove in the liquidation.

81. An order may be granted to restrain fraudulent conduct, to prevent foreign proceedings which are an abuse of an Irish court’s process or are vexatious or oppressive, or which seek to undermine or circumvent orders of the Irish courts. An order may also be granted where foreign proceedings undermine liquidation proceedings commenced in this jurisdiction.

82. As an in personam order, an anti-suit injunction is not directed to the foreign tribunal before which proceedings are sought to be restrained. The order does not involve any criticism of that foreign tribunal or, indeed, involve any consideration of how the foreign tribunal has, or will, conduct the proceedings. It may, however, involve a consideration of whether the party against whom the injunction is sought is seeking or could obtain orders which, in the context of the proceedings, would be considered oppressive of the party seeking the injunction.

83. There is no difference in principle between an anti-suit injunction and an antienforcement injunction, or between mandatory and prohibitory orders. However, the jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction is discretionary and different considerations may apply depending on the nature of the remedy sought. In particular, delay will likely be a factor in considering the appropriateness of anti-enforcement relief.

84. The question, therefore, is whether this is an appropriate case in which to make the orders sought. It is helpful to consider each of the gateways in turn.

85. It is manifestly the case that JSC’s actions in pursuing the Russian proceedings, and in particular the arbitral proceedings and the mandatory injunction proceedings, is an abuse of process of the Irish courts, and is intended to circumvent the final orders made in those proceedings. At the time that those proceedings were commenced, JSC had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts by entering an unconditional appearance for the purpose of pursuing an appeal against the pledge orders. Having submitted to the jurisdiction in which the invalidity of the pledge agreements had been determined, it was plainly abusive of JSC to commence and maintain foreign proceedings in reliance on the validity of those pledge agreements. In this regard, JSC’s conduct is similar to that of the defendants in Masri, described as “a classic case of vexation and oppression, and of conduct which is designed to interfere with the process of the English court in litigation to which the judgment debtors submitted.” The only difference is the extent of JSC’s engagement with the Irish proceedings when compared with that of the defendants in Masri. In Masri, the defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the English courts, lost that challenge, and then participated fully in the trial. Here, JSC did not participate at first instance at all, although its objections to the Irish courts’ jurisdiction, communicated in correspondence, were addressed. However, it did subsequently submit to jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded that its non-appearance before the High Court was “tactical”. Its conduct, therefore, in commencing the arbitral and mandatory injunction proceedings after submitting to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts must be regarded as an attempt to interfere with the process of the Irish court in litigation to which JSC had submitted. The jurisdictional basis for the relief sought in relation to those proceedings is therefore made out.

86. Slightly different considerations arise in respect of the Russian anti-suit injunction proceedings. Those were commenced before JSC submitted to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts, although at a time when it had been notified of the application in relation to the pledge agreements. Although its non-appearance before the High Court was subsequently determined by the Court of Appeal to be tactical, there must be considerable doubt as to whether the commencement of the anti-suit injunction proceedings could be regarded as abusive or oppressive, or whether an Irish court would have had any jurisdiction to make an in personam order against JSC preventing it from so commencing. On one view, if JSC were

acting bona fide in asserting the jurisdiction of the Russian courts, an application for an antisuit injunction by it there was an appropriate step for it to take.

87. However, JSC, having obtained an anti-suit injunction from the Russian courts, subsequently submitted to the Irish court’s jurisdiction. In those circumstances, any steps which it takes to give effect to the order of the Yamal Court would involve an interference in the Irish litigation, and would be oppressive of the joint liquidators. The jurisdiction of this court to make an anti-enforcement order is, accordingly engaged.

88. Even if there were some doubt as to whether the Russian proceedings were being pursued improperly in light of JSC’s submission to jurisdiction here, it is clear that the court’s jurisdiction to grant anti-suit relief is engaged through the second gateway, its obligation to supervise the liquidation in the interests of all the creditors of the companies. Aircraft owned by the Companies are amongst its most valuable assets. It is in the general body of creditors’ interests that those assets are capable of being realised by the joint liquidators and the proceeds made available for distribution to all creditors. If any creditor were permitted to bypass the normal process of realisation and distribution by pursuing proceedings in another jurisdiction to obtain a priority interest in particular assets, that would undermine the liquidation process. The Irish courts, as the proper seat of the liquidation, must, therefore, have jurisdiction to restrain such proceedings. By the Russian proceedings, JSC seeks to assert ownership of aircraft which the joint liquidators claim as assets of the Companies and its subsidiaries. JSC’s sole claim to ownership arises from the pledge agreements which this court has declared void. It is true that there was no declaration in the pledge proceedings that the Companies own the aircraft, but the necessary consequence of the pledge orders is that JSC does not own them. The joint liquidators seek to make them assets available for distribution in the liquidation. Having concluded that the pledge agreements on which JSC basis its claim to ownership are invalid, it would wholly undermine the liquidation process and be a clear injustice if JSC, which seeks to be proved as a creditor in the liquidation, were at the same time permitted to rely on foreign proceedings to assert ownership of assets which might otherwise be available to the creditors in a liquidation.

89. It has to be acknowledged that the joint liquidators delayed significantly in bringing this application, or put more neutrally, did not bring an application for anti-suit relief at the earliest opportunity. It appears, as was effectively acknowledged by counsel for the joint liquidators, that the risks to the joint liquidators and the liquidation presented by the antisuit injunction and the arbitral awards were not sufficient for them to consider that anti-suit relief was required. But in so concluding, the joint liquidators permitted JSC to continue the Russian anti-suit injunction proceedings and to commence and conclude the arbitral proceedings. Although the joint liquidators now rely on the potential adverse consequence for them in Russia from the orders made in those proceedings if no anti-suit relief were granted, that concern must be treated as a less than compelling basis for relief in circumstances where they took in excess of a year before seeking a remedy. Taking a practical view, it must be doubted whether obtaining anti-suit orders against JSC in an Irish court would, in any event, materially improve the joint liquidators’ position in Russia in light of JSC’s apparent willingness to disregard orders of this court when pursuing litigation there. Although the exposure to sanctions in Russia is no doubt a real concern for the joint liquidators, if that were the only basis upon which they sought relief, I would have some hesitation as to whether the orders sought were, in fact, necessary or whether, in the exercise of my discretion, they should be refused on account of the joint liquidators’ delay.

90. However, there are two further considerations which make the case for anti-suit relief compelling. The mandatory injunction proceedings sought by JSC may well have an impact outside of Russia. The orders sought require the joint liquidators to revoke correspondence sent to the aircraft lessees and airports in which the aircraft land in which the joint liquidators assert ownership of the aircraft and advise that JSC’s claims to ownership by virtue of the pledge agreements have, in effect, been rejected by the Irish courts. As things stand, third parties, and the courts and administrative authorities in neutral jurisdictions, will be met with competing orders of the Irish courts and Russian courts regarding ownership of the aircraft. That is an unenviable position and it is far from clear how any given third party might attempt to resolve matters. However, the joint liquidators argue, which I accept as plausible, that orders of the type sought here could be of significant assistance in persuading those courts and administrative authorities to recognise the orders previously made by this court and, accordingly, the Companies’ title to the aircraft. Considered from a different perspective, if JSC obtains the mandatory injunction it seeks, the joint liquidators’ position in neutral jurisdictions may well be undermined if it is not in a position to rely on further orders of this court granting it an anti-suit remedy.

91. This concern as a basis for justifying relief is, of necessity, somewhat speculative. There is nothing, however, speculative about the other basis for relief. JSC claims to be a creditor in the liquidation in the staggering sum of €2.3 billion. It has, through its solicitor, demanded detailed updates on the progress of the liquidation. However, it is, at the same time, pursuing the Russian proceedings, which disregard the effect of court orders made in the liquidation, in fact, which directly challenge the correctness of those orders. It therefore seeks to avail of the liquidation process while at the same time rejecting its outcome, or, in the case of the anti-suit injunction proceedings, while challenging the joint liquidators entitlement to have sought the pledge orders. The grant of the relief sought in this application by the joint liquidators will facilitate them in dealing with this contradiction and, depending on JSC’s response to any orders made, will enable it to determine how to address JSC’s claim in the liquidation. It would be entirely unrealistic for the court to ignore the possibility that JSC, having disregarded or rejected the pledge orders when pursuing its claims in Russia, may well ignore orders requiring it to discontinue or not enforce those Russian proceedings. That is not, however, a basis for refusing to make the orders sought. Rather it is a basis for making them, so that the joint liquidators are not deprived of the full benefit of the pledge orders.

92. One final matter to consider is the scope of the orders to be made. At paragraph (a) of the Notice of Motion, the joint liquidators seek an order restraining JSC “and all other parties having notice of the said order” from taking any steps to maintain, continue or prosecute any of the Russian proceedings. Paragraph (b) seeks orders restraining JSC “and all other parties having notice of the said order” from taking steps to enforce, obtain recognition of, or rely on any order in the Russian proceedings.

93. In my view, it is appropriate to make such orders against JSC for the reasons stated above. It is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Irish court process, to prevent abusive litigation conduct by JSC, and to protect the interests of creditors in the liquidation. However, I do not consider it appropriate to make an order which would purport to bind persons having notice of the said order. Quite apart from my concern that such an order could potentially bind persons engaged in good faith to represent JSC, such as lawyers (which concern, the joint liquidators suggest, could be met by a “carve out”), I have considerable doubt that there exists any jurisdiction to make such an order.

94. As is clear from the case law discussed above, the jurisdiction to grant anti-suit relief is an in personam jurisdiction, premised, at least in this case, on the submission to jurisdiction by the party to be restrained. JSC has unquestionably submitted to jurisdiction by its unconditional appearance in the litigation and by proving in the liquidation. It is, therefore, a party against whom relief can be granted. That would plainly not be so in relation to any third party, merely because they are made aware of this court’s orders.

95. The joint liquidators did not press this aspect of their application with any great force, though they did refer to the decision in Acrow Ltd v Rex Chainbelt Inc [1971] 1 WLR 1676. In that case, a plaintiff, a licensee had obtained an injunction against a licensor, restraining it from terminating an agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff manufactured certain equipment. The licensor advised the defendant with which it was “closely associated” not to supply certain parts to the plaintiff. The plaintiff successfully obtained an injunction against the defendant from aiding and abetting the licensor from breaching an injunction of which the defendant was well aware.

96. The orders made in Acrow are very far removed from the type of orders sought here, against any person having notice of the orders, and does not provide a jurisdictional justification for such an order.

97. In the circumstances, I will, as previously indicated, grant orders in the terms of paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Notice of Motion, save that there will be no reference to “and all other parties having notice of the said order” in either order.

98. There are additional orders sought by the joint liquidators, including an order requiring JSC to take steps to discontinue the Russian proceedings, and restraining it from bringing the claims in the Russian proceedings in any other jurisdiction. Having regard to the concern expressed in the recent English cases regarding the unwillingness of Russian courts to discontinue proceedings upon request, I consider that I have insufficient evidence of the consequences of such an order to justify making it at this time. Similarly, there is no evidence of any intention on the part of JSC to initiate proceedings in any jurisdiction other than Russia, and thus the quia timet-type relief sought at paragraph (d) of the Notice of Motion is likewise not justified at this time.

99. As previously indicated, this matter will be listed before me at 10.30 am on Friday, 10 October 2025 for the purpose of making final orders and dealing with the question of costs.