High Court dismisses mandatory injunction to reinstate suspended social media account due to user breach of platform terms.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 514 [2025 No.4914 HP]

BETWEEN:

EDUARDO JARDEL FURLAN FARINA Plaintiff

-and-

X INTERNET UNLIMITED COMPANY Defendant

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Max Barrett delivered on 24th September 2025.

Summary

In this judgment, I explain why I will not grant the interlocutory injunction sought by Mr Farina (and why I will vacate the already stayed interim injunction that was previously granted).

1. By ex parte motion of 7th September 2025, the plaintiff, Mr Farina, sought the following reliefs: (a) an interim injunction restraining the defendant, X, from suspending his account on the platform; (b) an interim injunction requiring X to suspend, block, or otherwise prevent from appearing any accounts which impersonate or purport to pass themselves off as his account, or which use an account name confusingly similar to his; and (c) in the alternative, directions concerning his motion for interlocutory relief and related matters.

2. Relief (a), though framed as negative, would, in practice, require X to take positive steps, namely the reinstatement of the suspended account. Both reliefs (a) and (b) therefore amount to mandatory injunctive relief. I do not understand this to be disputed, but, for the avoidance of doubt, I so find. As will be seen later below, this has implications in terms of the test to be applied in deciding whether to grant the interlocutory injunction now sought.

3. The ex parte application was heard on 11th September, and the interim injunction was granted. The following day, when counsel for both parties appeared, I stayed that order. On 16th September, the plaintiff issued a notice of motion seeking interlocutory relief, in which he sought reliefs (a) and (b) above together with ancillary orders. I heard the interlocutory application on 17th September. This judgment sets out my reasons for refusing the interlocutory injunction sought.

4. The relevant facts are as follows.

5. Mr Farina opened an account on X (then Twitter) in or around 2012. By doing so, he entered into a contractual relationship with the platform. For convenience I refer to the platform as “X” throughout this judgment, whether or not it was operating under that name at the material time.

6. By his own account, Mr Farina built a successful presence on Twitter, providing advice on cryptocurrency investments. He also operates related TikTok and YouTube accounts and is a co-founder of a website offering training in cryptocurrency and property investment. (I do not know whether Mr Farina provides or “passports” such services into Ireland, and if so on what basis. I have not factored this into my considerations.)

7. In March 2022, Mr Farina impersonated a ‘blue tick’ verified account on X. He accepts that he did so, explaining that his purpose was to test the strength of X’s protections against impersonation of verified accounts.

8. I do not consider that this impersonation automatically disqualifies Mr Farina from equitable relief. It is, however, a relevant consideration to be brought to bear in terms of deciding whether to grant the interlocutory injunction now sought. In weighing the factors, I cannot ignore that he now seeks relief from conduct of the very same kind as that in which he previously engaged: he who seeks equity must do equity.

9. Two sets of terms of service are relevant. The September 2009 Terms operated between 18th September 2009 and 16th November 2010. The November 2024 Terms have applied since 24th November 2024. It is not, I understand, in dispute that the plaintiff’s act of impersonation in March 2022 breached X’s then applicable terms of service. As to the present terms of service, they provide, among other matters, as follows, in the section headed “Authenticity”:

• “Accounts on X must be authentic….[Y]ou may not create, operate or massregister accounts that are not legitimate, genuine and transparent as to their source, identity, and popularity.”

• “You may not impersonate other identities of individuals, groups, or organizations to deceive others. Although you are not required to display your real identity on your profile, your account should not use false profile information to impersonate others. We allow compliant Parody, Commentary and Fan (PCF) accounts….If you believe an account is posing as you or your brand, you can file a report here [link].”

10. At the interlocutory hearing, a letter dated 17th September 2025 from A&L Goodbody, solicitors for X, was placed before me. It identified twelve further accounts said by X to be operated by Mr Farina and to breach X’s policies. As the letter was not exhibited on affidavit, I have disregarded it.

11. Where a user alleges impersonation, X’s platform directs them to the reporting link referred to above. There are two routes whereby the basis of complaint may be explained: the Impersonation Reporting Form and the Post Reporting Form. Any complaint must be supported by proof of identity, in the form of a screenshot of the complainant and their government-issued ID. Mr Farina objects that he must provide this verification on each occasion. But this requirement is applied to all users, not just him, and X has explained its rationale for this requirement. Thus Ms Paparozzi avers, “This [identification requirement] helps to ensure that only genuine impersonation reports are made.”

12. X has also explained why it insists that impersonation (and other issues) be reported through designated forms. Thus, Ms Paparozzi avers:

“46. [I]t is important that users report such concerns through the appropriate reporting mechanisms, given the significant volume of communications that the Defendant receives on a daily basis regarding content on the X platform….[T]here are normally over 400 million new posts each day from a user base of hundreds of millions. [T]here are a myriad of reasons why users may want to contact the Defendant….To manage and engage effectively with the volume of [such] daily communications…it is important that users use the appropriate reporting channels.

It is for that reason that the reporting channels are expressly stipulated in the Terms.”

13. On 17th July 2025, X suspended the Farina Account. Mr Farina continues to question the precise basis of this decision. I find this somewhat puzzling. After all, Mr Farina now openly accepts that he engaged in impersonation, thus entitling X to apply various sanctions, including account suspension. So, he is complaining about the detail of X’s reasoning in taking a step which its terms entitle it to take post-impersonation. Mr Farina also complains that suspension was delayed, imposed in 2025 for conduct in 2022. However, I see no term which: prevents X from suspending an account after such a lapse of time; obliges X to allow a proven impersonator to remain on the platform after a certain point; or renders X in breach of its terms if the reason it gives for suspension is imprecise in detail, provided the underlying basis (here, impersonation) is established, and here it is not even denied. I note, too, that X operates an appeals mechanism. This provides a route to challenge a suspension decision and, where appropriate, to secure correction or other curative action. That includes cases where the precise basis of a suspension may be mis-stated and requires clarification or correction, even if the platform user is (as here) a self-acknowledged impersonator and now knows the substantial truth as to why the suspension has been applied in his case.

14. At this interlocutory stage, I am not required to decide whether the precise reasons provided for the suspension on 17th July were correct, and I decline to do so.

15. On the plaintiff’s account (or at least on that of his solicitor, who swore the grounding affidavit in these proceedings), Mr Farina did not at first understand why his account had been suspended. The explanations became clearer as the proceedings progressed. Initially, Mr Farina received some standardised but, in truth – or so they seem to me – relatively informative responses from X, stating that he had engaged in ban evasion and breached monetisation standards. Dissatisfied, he instructed his solicitors to correspond with X which they duly did.

16. At the hearing of this matter, Mr Farina’s legal team expressed dissatisfaction that the reply to their solicitors’ correspondence appears to them to have been generated by a computer system, perhaps using AI. At the conclusion of the interim hearing, they even sought an order for costs against X to register the Court’s disapproval of this practice. I declined to do make such an order. There is no legal requirement that a solicitor’s letter must be answered by a human, rather than by way of computer-generated response. In any event, how X chooses to respond to legal correspondence received by it is for it. I see no basis for judicial criticism that it would use computer or AI technology to do so. Indeed, given the scale of its global operations I see every reason why it might wish legitimately to do so.

17. By 11th September, when the matter first came before me, the Farina Account had been impersonated several hundred times. On 12th September, X told me of the difficulties it has faced in addressing impersonation at such a scale. Yet, to my surprise, by 17th September, when the interlocutory application was heard, all those impersonation accounts had been removed notwithstanding the alleged difficulties presenting. On 16th September, X was informed of several dozen further impersonation accounts. These too were removed by the following morning. This demonstrates that when X directs its resources to a specific impersonation problem it can act quickly and effectively. (In fairness, it also suggests that if X is approached in the manner that it requires [a requirement the rationale for which has been explained by Ms Paparozzi] it can so direct its resources. Whether in fact X generally does so following on a legitimate complaint duly received in accordance with its terms of service, I do not know.)

18. X has explained that in this case it was able to act because the plaintiff had, albeit in an unorthodox way, identified himself to the platform. More generally, Ms Paparozzi for X avers as follows:

“55. I say and believe that hundreds of thousands of new accounts are opened on the X platform every day, over 400 million posts are made per day, and there

was an average of over 94 million monthly active recipients of the X platform in the EU between 1 October 2024 and 31 March 2025.

56. I say that a user’s accounts will have a username, a display name, a profile photo and a biography line….

57. I say that users have the ability to change their username, their display name, their profile photo, and their biography line at any time.

58. Given the breadth of the Proactive Monitoring Order and the significant rate at which new accounts are opened and new posts are made on the X platform, and the fact that users can change their [details]…the Defendant would not be in a position to confirm that it had fully complied with the Proactive Monitoring Order.

59. Such confirmation would require the constant ongoing monitoring of all accounts on the X platform to address whether [the said details]…could be interpreted as seeking to impersonate the Plaintiff’s account or to pass themselves off as the Plaintiff’s account.

60. Indeed, I say that it is not necessarily clear which ‘account operated by the Plaintiff’ the Plaintiff’s order would refer to; the Defendant has identified at least five accounts which appear to be (or have been) operated by the Plaintiff.

61. In addition, there could be thousands of permutations of the account name…that could subjectively be considered to be ‘confusingly similar’...

62. If such an order was to be made, the Defendant could not comply with the order by using automated tools. While automated tools are useful for flagging potential impersonation accounts, they cannot fully account for all the creative or subtle variations bad actors might use. Bad actors often use subtle variations such as special characters, emojis or visually similar symbols to evade detection.

63. In any event, I see and believe that the proposed Proactive Monitoring Order is so broad and unspecific that it is unclear what parameters could be given to the automated tools to achieve the aims of the proposed order.

64. I say and believe that using automated tools also carries a real risk of suspending legitimate accounts in error, which happen to fall within the search parameters….

65. Accordingly, I say that the proposed Protective Monitoring Order would necessarily require humans to constantly review accounts flagged by automated systems and then to make subjective judgments as to whether such flagged account potentially fell within the scope of the Proactive Monitoring Order.

66. However, such an Order is not required for another reason. X provides the specific tools outlined above [and in this judgment] which can be used by an account holder to complain that another account is impersonating their account. That allows the account user to identify the basis for the alleged impersonation and establish their own identity. That avoids the onerous burden which [the] Proactive Monitoring Order would impose on X….

67. As framed the Proactive Monitoring Order would require the…suspension of accounts of genuine users…despite those accounts in no way seeking to impersonate or pass themselves off as being the Plaintiff’s account.

68. In addition, I say that such suspensions would occur in a context where the user in question had not breached any of the Defendant’s rules, policies or terms of service and had not breached any Irish laws. Accordingly, while a matter for legal submissions, such suspensions could constitute a significant interference with users’ freedom of expression as guaranteed by [law]….

69. I say and believe that if the Defendant complies with the Protective Monitoring Order…the risk of reputational damage it faces it would not be compensable by damages, In addition, the Defendant may face legal proceedings arising from the suspension of legitimate user accounts.”

19. I accept that it is arguable there may come a point at which, as was posited in Douez v.

Facebook, Inc., [2017] 1 SCR 751 (Supreme Court of Canada), §56, non-participation in a social media network may become ‘important for the exercise of free speech, freedom of association, and for full participation in democracy’ and that ‘Having the choice to remain “offline” may not be a real choice in the Internet era.’ Counsel for Mr Farina contended in this regard that ‘This is not an issue about a plaintiff operating some social media account as a distraction from their working life. This is the plaintiff’s working life.’ I note too that counsel for Mr Farina intends to amend the pleadings in this matter to suggest that Facebook has interfered with Mr Farina’s freedom of expression. Whether it has or not will be a matter for whomever hears the substantive hearing in these proceedings.

20. For my part, I have considered the proportionality of the present suspension in light of Mr Farina’s claimed constitutional and other basic rights. As touched upon above, it is arguable in principle that exclusion from a major social media platform may raise issues of free expression. However, to this time Mr Farina has not established a strong case that his suspension constitutes a disproportionate interference with any such rights aforesaid. He accepts that he engaged in unpermitted impersonation; and he retains other significant channels to communicate. On the current record, therefore, no strong case has been made out on proportionality grounds.

21. In addressing this issue, I have not overlooked the fact that, at the interlocutory stage, courts must ensure that basic rights are not rendered nugatory before trial. However, the threshold remains whether the applicant has established a strong case that such rights have been disproportionately curtailed. Here, the admitted impersonation, the continued availability of multiple alternative channels for expression, and the absence of evidence that exclusion from X has foreclosed Mr Farina’s ability to communicate on matters of public concern, all suggest to me that X has not crossed the applicable threshold at this time.

22. A question perhaps arises as to whether there is a ‘floodgates’ element to Ms Paparozzi’s evidence, i.e. that the burden she describes could, in reality, be managed by a carefully crafted court order. Setting aside for the moment whether such an order is permissible under law (a matter to which I turn later below), counsel for the plaintiff submitted, in effect, that X has overstated matters. In his submissions, he made the point that if X can (and I understand from his submissions that it does) have monitoring technology to counter use of X’s platform for the circulation of child pornography, then it can surely monitor for impersonation purposes. But this was by way of submission only.

Submissions, however skilfully put (and they were skilfully put), are not evidence. In the absence of any sworn material challenging Ms Paparozzi’s averments, I cannot conclude that Mr Farina has established a strong case that X’s description (via Ms Paparozzi) of the burden and risk presenting for X by way of the proposed interlocutory injunction is inaccurate.

23. At the interlocutory hearing, X explained that, on an exceptional basis only, it was satisfied in this case to treat Mr Farina as having identified himself on the basis that he is represented by a solicitor in these proceedings (presumably as that solicitor would have had to identify Mr Farina for AML/ATF purposes). It did not therefore insist on its usual process of personal identification before considering the impersonation complaints. That said, I cannot but note that X accepted one solicitor identification as good for all the complaints made, rather than requiring separate solicitor identification for each.

24. In his most recent affidavit, Mr Farina makes the following observation regarding new impersonation accounts that appeared after the suspension of those referred to at the ex parte hearing:

“The continued appearance of such new impersonation accounts on the Defendant’s platform, based purely on a search for the exact name of my account, reinforces the fact that I cannot be expected to make individual complaints every time an impersonation account is created, as it would place an absurdly unreasonable burden on me to follow the reporting requirements to complain about every single such account. The appearance of these new impersonation accounts instead supports my contention that the onus of preventing these accounts from appearing by blocking them should be placed on the Defendant.”

25. No provision of X’s terms and conditions imposing such an obligation has been identified to me. The argument appears to be advanced on the basis of an implied duty, howsoever arising. In terms of assessing the strength of Mr Farina’s argument so as to decide whether or not to grant the injunction now sought, I note that the vexing may not always be unlawful or point necessarily to a breach of some legal obligation.

26. Mr Farina has monetised his X account in several ways: (i) he receives direct payments from X based on engagement with his verified account; (ii) he benefits from commercial partnerships across his social media accounts, with X being a principal driver; (iii) he earns through sponsored referrals to cryptocurrency-related websites;

and (iv) he directs users from X to his educational website. I have given careful consideration to his contention that damages would not be an adequate remedy. It is helpful to quote his position directly (the affidavit was sworn by his solicitor, so the “I”

refers to the solicitor):

‘17. I say that the Plaintiff is suffering financial losses in the region of €[STATED AMOUNT] per month while his X account is suspended….

18. I say that damages would not be an adequate remedy if the Plaintiff were refused interim relief and succeeded in his claim at trial. I say that if the Defendant is allowed to continue to suspend the Plaintiff’s account, this will cause irreparable damage to his livelihood and reputation. The X account is the central aspect of the Plaintiff’s online presence, as it is the hub from which users are directed to his other social media accounts currently in operation on the X platform. It is likely that the Plaintiff’s followers will increasingly start to follow the said impersonation accounts. Said accounts are often set up for malicious purposes so as to defraud users, and followers of the Plaintiff already appear to already have suffered considerable financial loss on account of them having mistakenly believed that they were engaging with the Plaintiff….

19. On the other hand, I say and believe that if interim relief were granted and the Defendant ultimately succeeds at the trial of the action, damages would be an adequate remedy for any prejudice they have suffered in the intervening time. The re-instatement of the Plaintiff’s account by the Defendant and the removal of the various impersonation accounts, will not cause them any financial loss. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that any prejudice that would be caused to the Defendant should they reinstate the Plaintiff’s account, but ultimately be found to have acted lawfully in having suspended it.’

27. Separate, to his X-related income, I note that Mr Farina operates other monetised platforms and has diversified revenue streams, albeit that his primary online portal may be his X account. So, on the materials before me, Mr Farina has not established a strong case that damages would be inadequate.

28. Before moving on to consider some law, it may be useful if I now state a number of points that might usefully be made arising from the foregoing. First, Mr Farina has not, at this time, established any legal entitlement to the reinstatement of his suspended account, or any enforceable right to compel X to remove accounts said to impersonate his own. Second, I do not see that the contractual framework governing the relationship between the parties expressly imposes such obligations on X (though I am mindful that Mr Farina appears to press that an implied contractual or other obligation to this effect presents). Third, Mr Farina cannot therefore demonstrate a strong case on the merits, as required in applications for mandatory interlocutory relief. Fourth, I am satisfied that damages would constitute an adequate remedy were the Plaintiff ultimately to succeed at trial: since he has himself quantified the losses allegedly arising from the suspension, this suggests that they are quantifiable. Fifth, the fact of Mr Farina’s cancellation of other X accounts on the day of the ex parte hearing, the fact of his being suspended for impersonation (of which he rather vaguely avers in his unsworn affidavit to having become aware ‘sometime later’ [after the suspension]) were not brought to my attention at the ex parte hearing. (I make no criticism of the lawyers for Mr Farina in this regard for I do not see any to be owing). Sixth, respectfully, I do not consider that there is any realistic prospect of Mr Farina securing a permanent injunction at trial. Even if a legal basis for his claim could be made out (and I do not see that it has been) the appropriate remedy would lie in damages, not in equitable relief.

29. I turn now to consider some applicable law and bring that law to bear on the application now before me.

30. In Merck Sharp and Dohme Corp. v. Clonmel Healthcare Ltd. [2020] 2 I.R. 1, O’Donnell J. explained that the role of an interlocutory injunction is to provide a just solution pending the hearing of the action. That principle applies with modification where, as here, a mandatory interlocutory injunction is sought. In Maha Lingham v.

HSE [2005] IESC 89 (at p.5), Fennelly J. stated, inter alia, that “it is necessary for the applicant to show at least that he has a strong case that he is likely to succeed at the hearing of the action.” (See also Ryanair DAC v. Skyscanner Limited & Ors. [2022] IECA 64, §33). Mr Farina, with all respect, has not done so.

31. For completeness, I note that even if the lower ‘serious issue to be tried’ test were applicable, Mr Farina would still fall short. He has not identified any contractual term, statutory obligation, or settled duty requiring reinstatement of his account or proactive monitoring of impersonators.

32. In passing, I note that Mr Farina’s account was suspended in 2022 for impersonation.

The current suspension is a consequence of that earlier event. It is not in real dispute that X was entitled under its terms of service to impose the suspension. At its highest, the plaintiff says that X could have chosen a different form of censure. That does not advance his present application.

33. This application came before me with some urgency. As a consequence, certain of the affidavit evidence was not yet sworn. I understand that this will be regularised, if it has not already been regularised. I accept that, e.g., the pace at which this application came on for hearing, may have made it difficult to place sworn affidavit evidence before me on the day of the hearing, and I have, in an abundance of fairness, had regard to all affidavit evidence as though it were sworn. I did not have regard to the A&L Goodbody letter as it was not attached even to an unsworn affidavit; indeed counsel for X acknowledged the frailty of merely handing it up as was done.

34. Here, the sole evidence of harm to Mr Farina is the evidence in the affidavit of a solicitor for Mr Farina that the suspension will damage Mr Farina’s livelihood and reputation. It is not clear to me that any such harm would be irreparable. X has likewise shown how the second limb of the injunction would cause harm, e.g., it would (i) be at risk of suspending genuine accounts of users with similar names, raising freedom of expression issues, and (ii) exposed to reputational and legal risk, including claims from legitimate users wrongly suspended. So any harm to Mr Farina would essentially be harm to himself whereas the harm that the desired injunction would cause on the defendant’s side would be both to X and, potentially, to a presently unknown number of X users who may be innocent of any wrongdoing in the operation of their respective X accounts (unlike Mr Farina who has a self-acknowledged past history of impersonation).

35. There was some discussion of Arts 6 to 8 of the Digital Services Act at the interlocutory hearing. Critically, Art.8 provides that providers of intermediary services cannot be made subject to general monitoring or pro-active fact/circumstance finding or obligations. I have also been referred in this regard to, e.g., Glawischnig-Piesczek v.

Facebook Ireland Limited (Case C-18/18) and Peterson v. Google LLC & Ors. (Joined Cases C-682/18–C-683/18).

36. It appears to me from Ms Paparozzi’s uncontroverted averments that to grant the interlocutory injunction now sought would be to impose a general or pro-active obligation in breach of Art 8. That said, because, for the reasons stated elsewhere herein, I am not in any event going to grant the interlocutory injunction now sought, I do not see that I have to decide whether I am precluded from doing so under Art8 or the related question as to how far it is possible to go in terms of crafting a form of injunction that would bring one outside the prohibitions in Art 8 (Nor, for like reason, do Arts 6-7 fall to be considered).

37. I should perhaps add that even if one sought to tailor the order narrowly, Mr Farina has not proposed any workable formulation of such a narrowed order. Absent such specificity, the only proposed order before me would in substance amount to a general monitoring obligation, which Article 8 squarely prohibits. It is not the role of the court to re-design the relief sought into a form that might avoid a legal bar or issue presenting.

On the application and evidence as advanced, a finding of incompatibility with Art.8 is, with respect, unavoidable.

38. The Farina Account was suspended on 17th July 2025. The plaintiff acted reasonably quickly thereafter. I do not find there to be delay on his part. It takes time: (i) to realise that one’s dealings with, e.g., X, seem unlikely to yield a desired result; (ii) that one may as a consequence, have a legal complaint; (iii) then to source a legal advisor, and

(iv) for that advisor to consider matters, give advice, and draft the pleadings necessary to bring a matter before the courts. I do not see on the facts before me any unreasonable delay in this regard. It is the case that Mr Farina’s counsel accepted that these proceedings could have been commenced earlier but that does not necessarily equate (and here I do not see that it does equate) to there having been unreasonable delay as regards when the proceedings were brought. Here some of the alleged unreasonable delay seems to have been to allow time to liaise with X and – surely desirably – to seek to secure a resolution of matters without coming to court. Even if I accept that the suspension of the account had an immediate effect on Mr Farina’s business, I believe that a court can take judicial notice of the fact that an immediate (and logical) response of a relatively small sole trader in such circumstances may not be to hurry to commence potentially expensive court proceedings, if an alternative approach may bring about the same end at less expense.

39. The Court of Appeal in Ryanair DAC (§33, point (iii)) said that, if all else is even, a court faced with an application such as the one now before me should lean towards preserving the status quo ante. However, that principle presupposes a lawful baseline.

Here, Mr Farina’s admitted impersonation placed him in breach of contract and exposed him to suspension under the terms and conditions he accepted. The suspension in July 2025 cannot therefore be characterised as an arbitrary disruption of a settled position.

The ‘status quo’ that equity protects is not one that is tainted by breach. To restore Mr Farina’s account now would be to reinstate a state of affairs to which he had no continuing entitlement under terms and conditions which, on his own account, he has both accepted and breached.

40. Having regard to all of the foregoing, I respectfully decline to grant the interlocutory injunction sought and will vacate the stayed interim order.

41. I emphasise that nothing in this judgment should be read or construed as indicating any view as to how the substantive proceedings in this matter will be decided should they proceed to hearing in due course.

42. I will hear the parties as to costs during the course of the Michaelmas Term.