High Court dismisses planning application review where personal needs do not override statutory development plan policies.

THE HIGH COURT PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT [2025] IEHC 510 Record No: 2023/1445JR IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000, AS AMENDED -and- IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 50 and 50A OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000, AS AMENDED BETWEEN:

KARLA MORAN Applicant -and- AN BORD PLEANALA Respondent -and- KILDARE COUNTY COUNCIL -and- ANN GUIDEN Notice Parties

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Emily Farrell delivered the 26th day of September 2025

Introduction

1. This case illustrates the difficulty that the sympathetic personal circumstances of an applicant are not in themselves automatically sufficient to override planning considerations.

While I have every sympathy for the Applicant, the merits of a given application, and the weighing of such interests, is a matter in the first instance for planning decision-makers, subject to legality and reasonableness. While the courts can ensure that due consideration is given to relevant issues, and that adequate reasons are provided, the courts cannot override the evaluative judgement of a statutory decision-maker based on a merits disagreement dressed in legal form. The Oireachtas has provided the statutory framework for the making of planning decisions. The role of the courts, on judicial review, is limited to the review of the lawfulness of any such decision.

2. The Applicant is an adult who has special or additional needs by reason of medical conditions. Her mother is her registered carer. The Applicant applied for the retention of change of use of a detached garage, situated on the site of her family home, to the rear thereof, into family-flat accommodation, where she would live more independently but with the support of her mother (the second Notice Party) who consented to the application. The application involves the retention of works including windows to the front elevation and roof windows on the side elevation of the garage and the construction of a 20 metre glazed link from the garage to the family home. The Planning Report submitted with the application stated inter alia “as it is a planning authority requirement that ‘the proposed unit it should be linked directly to the main dwelling by a connecting door’, this application includes the erection of a link between these units.”

3. The existing garage has a floor space of 100 sqm, split over two floors.

4. The application was made by the Applicant, who enclosed a letter of consent for the application from her mother, who is the owner of the property and second Notice Party to these proceedings. No objections were made to Kildare County Council, nor any objections raised on appeal. The sole observation made on the appeal was made by the Applicant’s mother. The Applicant’s mother was joined as a notice party to the proceedings, but she did not take part in the proceedings.

5. The application was refused by Kildare County Council, and appealed to An Bord Pleanála, which also refused the application on 31st October 2023. (ABP-317357-23). Whilst the Board refused the application, it acknowledged that the Applicant had a genuine need.

Having noted the Applicant’s circumstances, the Inspector considered the provision of a family flat at that location was “acceptable in principle subject to compliance with the requirements of the current Development Plan.”

6. The Board decided the appeal generally in accordance with the Inspector’s Report and refused the application for the following reason:

“Having regard to the scale of the development and to Section 15.4.14 of the Kildare County Development Plan 2023-2029, which describes a family flat as a temporary subdivision or extension of an existing dwelling unit to accommodate an immediate family member, it is considered that the structure at a distance of c.20m from the main dwelling, and the proposed c20m glazed link, fails to address the "temporary" nature of such arrangements and future reintegration into the main dwelling when no longer required, and furthermore the proposed glazed link would have a significant impact on the rear amenity open space and visual amenity. To permit the proposed development would be contrary to the provisions of Section 15.4.14 of the Kildare County Plan 20232029. The retention of the development would set an undesirable precedent for similar types of development and would seriously injure the residential amenities of properties in the vicinity and would therefore be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”

7. In the appeal documents the Applicant referred to the sole reason for refusal by the Council, which was that it would be contrary to the provisions of Section 15.4.14 of the Kildare County Development Plan and that it would set an undesirable precedent in the area. The Council had stated that the structure, at a distance of 20 metre from the main dwelling and the proposed 20 metre glazed link fails to address the temporary nature of the arrangements and future reintegration into the main dwelling when it is no longer required. The Council found that the proposed glazed link would have a significant impact on the rear amenity open space and visual amenity.

8. The questions which the Applicant submitted to the Board, that needed to be answered, were who would be affected by the development and secondly, how would loss of amenity arise.

The Applicant relied on the fact that no third-party submissions have been lodged. It was also submitted that the issue of non-compliance with the Development Plan could easily be resolved through the imposition of a planning condition limiting the duration of the permission and therefore it was stated that the Applicant did not share the Council’s view that the structures would not facilitate the future reintegration into the main dwelling when no longer required. As the garage is a separate stand-alone building, 20 metres from the house, it is clear that the return of the structures to pre-development position could not be regarded as reintegration of the garage /family flat into the main dwelling.

9. The Applicant seeks certiorari of the Board’s decision refusing the permission sought, and declaratory relief.

Some general principles in relation to judicial review

10. The general principles of judicial review have been summarised in numerous decisions, and recently, for example by Humphreys J. in McGowan v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405. While McGowan was not referred to at the hearing, having been delivered subsequently, I refer to it as it helpfully draws the general principles of judicial review together. The relevant principles of judicial review include the following, which I have summarised briefly.

11. Judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the correctness of the decision:

per Clarke J. in Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 at paras. 3.8 – 3.15. It is not an appeal on the merits and it is not for the court to substitute its view for that of the decision-maker: per Finlay C.J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642 at p.

654; per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 IR 701 at p. 743; Lady Hale in R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [2012] 1 AC

663 in which she stated, at para. 47: “it is not difficult to dress up an argument as a point of law when in truth it is no more than an attack upon ... factual conclusions”.

12. Insofar evaluative conclusions are concerned, the weight to be given to the evidence is quintessentially a matter for the decision-taker: per Keane C.J. in Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] IESC 44 [2002] 2 IR 169, [2003] 1 ILRM 24 and Birmingham J. in M.E. v.

Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2008] IEHC 192 at para. 27. Generally speaking, evaluative judgements involving a significant degree of planning judgement, which are not tainted by other procedural, legal or factual errors, are reviewable on an irrationality standard: Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 and by analogy, Baby O.

13. A decision must be read in the round and in its context. One must not parse or over-analyse an administrative decision: OAA v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Anor [2007] IEHC 169; JBR v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors. [2007] IEHC 288; IR v. Minister for Justice [2015] 4 I.R 144, 152; MR (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41, at para. 6. A decision should be read not solely from an applicant’s point of view (an impossible standard), but from the starting point of it being valid rather than invalid where possible. One has to stand back and ask what the decision is fundamentally saying: O’Donnell & Ors. v. An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381 at para. 54;

St. Margaret’s Recycling v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 94 at para. 57.

14. With only defined and limited exceptions, in judicial review the onus of proof is on the applicant at all times: per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 IR 701, 743.

15. To put the same point another way, there is a rebuttable presumption of validity for administrative decisions: In re Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann, Unreported, High Court, Finlay P., 5th December 1977, and Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2)

[1983] I.R. 88, 102 per Keane J..

16. In general terms, the validity of a decision is to be viewed through the prism of the material before the decision-taker at the relevant time, and not with the benefit of further evidence in hindsight, although there are defined exceptions: ISOF v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 457, and numerous subsequent cases.

17. A decision should not be read as invalid if a valid reading is reasonably open, as Humphreys

J. held in MR (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 and McGowan. This principle is also clear from numerous other judgments of the Superior Courts.

Summary of main issues

18. The main issues are, in summary, as follows.

(a) The issue of regard being had to the scale of the project;

(b) The distance from/ relationship with the main house;

(c) The proposed glazed link;

(d) The possible temporary nature of the development;

(e) The definition of residential amenity in the context of whether the link was contrary to proper planning and sustainable development.

The scale issue

19. The Applicant complains generally that:

“No part of the Report of the Inspector, or the Board Direction or the Order identified any planning, amenity or environmental harm as a result of the distance between the house on this site, on one hand and this family-flat accommodation. In opposing the proposed unit on this ground, the Bord essentially applied a development standard which is not contained within the statutory Kildare County Development Plan 2023 – 2029 (the “Development Plan”).”

20. Unfortunately, this is an excessively restrictive and reductionist view of the evaluative planning judgement of the Board. The Applicant in effect reads the relevant provisions of the Plan narrowly, reads the Board’s decision in a sense that contradicts that narrow interpretation, and assumes that anything not contained in the specific policy must be contrary to the Development Plan. None of these three propositions are a correct approach to interpretation. The Development Plan should be read by reference to its text, context and purpose, and on such a reading the scale of the flat and its distance from the main house are clearly relevant factors, something I will discuss in further detail below. The Applicant reads the Board’s decision in a way that departs from the Development Plan, but a harmonious reading is available. Finally, any one policy is not exhaustive of planning considerations. A Development Plan frequently includes policies which point in different directions, and which need to be reconciled. That is further complicated by various regional and national policies and principles which likewise can be suggestive of different outcomes. The reconciliation and balancing of these, within the bounds of legality, is in the first instance a matter for a planning decision-maker. The fact that in this case, the Board exercised planning judgement in a way that, in the Applicant’s view, is not spelled out in a particular clause of the Development Plan does not render the decision a material contravention of the Plan.

The starting point is the presumption of legality, which an Applicant must displace, and which this Applicant has not displaced for reasons I will set out further below.

21. The Applicant’s next more specific complaint, as summarised in the Statement of Case, is that:

“The first clause, or principal, in the Board’s reason for refusal identifies ‘the scale of the development’ as a consideration, no part of section 15.4.14 of the Development Plan, which governs this proposal, controls the floorspace of a family-flat, with the sole limitation(s) on the size of such a unit being a restriction on the number of bedrooms (which this particular development complies with) and a requirement for the unit to be subsidiary to the main house. - The proposal satisfies both of these stipulations.

Therefore the scale of the building is not a relevant consideration in the circumstances as it will not increase the size or scale of the existing buildings. the Respondent seeks to argue that scale and size of development are unrelated and that scale must be understood “in the context of Boards reasons for refusal as a whole” , which we submit is giving the reasons that Bord provided an unnatural meaning and is incorrect.”

22. The Development Plan provision referred to is as follows:

“15.4.14 Family Flat Family flats (often known as granny flats) refer to a temporary subdivision or extension of an existing dwelling unit. They are a way of providing additional accommodation with a level of semi-independence for an immediate family member (dependent on the main occupants of the dwelling).

Applications for a family flat shall have regard to the following requirements:

• The applicant shall be required to demonstrate that there is a genuine need for the family flat.

• An occupancy condition may be applied.

• The proposed unit should be linked directly to the main dwelling by a connecting door.

• Accommodation must be subsidiary to the main dwelling in scale and only in exceptional cases will more than one bedroom be permitted where a need has been demonstrated.

• The design standards for house extensions shall be applied to the family flat.

• Any external doors permitted (to provide access to private / shared open space or for escape from fire) shall be limited to the side or rear of the house.

• Where required, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the existing on-site wastewater treatment system serving the main dwelling can facilitate the additional loading from the family flat. Where this cannot be demonstrated, it will be necessary for the on-site wastewater treatment system to be upgraded as part of the development proposal.

It is normal procedure to include conditions in any grant of permission that the family flat cannot be sold, conveyed or leased separately from the main residence, and that when the need for the family flat no longer exists the dwelling must be returned to a single dwelling unit.”

23. The Inspector’s reason for recommending refusal of the application included the following:

“7.4.2 I refer to Section 15.4.14 of the Kildare County Plan 2023-2029 as set out full in Section 5.0 above. Essentially this section of the Development Plan provides detailed requirements that any application for a family flat shall have regard to. Further a family flat is defined as a temporary subdivision or extension of an existing dwelling. This section of the Development Plan is considered clear, reasonable and appropriate.

7.4.3. As stated above I am satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated a genuine need for the family flat. However, the scheme to be retained is a stand-alone structure that is removed from the existing dwelling and is not directly linked to the main dwelling by a connecting corridor. The proposed 20m glazed link is unacceptable and of itself is symptomatic of the unsuitable nature of the proposal before the Board. The scheme cannot be considered subsidiary to the main building as it is a stand-alone structure.

The design of the unit is acceptable, and I am satisfied that it will not detract from the amenities of the main building. However, this of itself is not sufficient to set aside the foregoing concerns. No issues pertaining to wastewater treatment have been raised.

7.4.4. Overall, I agree with the Case Planner that in the case of family flats, the rationale is that when the need for the family flat no longer exists, it would be fully integrated with the main dwelling house to be occupied as a single dwelling. Having regard to the distance of the existing dwelling to the detached structure, this would not be possible.

7.4.5. It is considered the proposed development does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of a family flat, as stated in the County Development Plan 2023-2029.

Refusal is recommended.

7.4.6. I note that the applicant has put forward other similar schemes which have not always adhered to the planning code. However, the scheme before the Board is considered de novo.”

24. Unfortunately, a difficulty for the Applicant is that she is endeavouring to read the decision as more complicated, if not more problematic, than it is. I agree with the Board that the

decision is capable of being read, and should be read, as using the term “scale” in a sense that refers to “(i) the nature of the garage conversion as a stand-alone structure, rather than a temporary subdivision or extension of an existing dwelling unit, and (ii) the scale of the proposed 20 metre glazed link, and its effect on rear amenity open space and visual amenity.” These are matters that the Board was permitted to consider.

25. In any event, scale, even in terms of floorspace or number of bedrooms, is an inherently relevant planning consideration which must inform the overall judgement of a planning

decision-maker even if not referenced in the policies of a specific Development Plan.

26. To put it another way, certain matters are inherently proper planning considerations. I am satisfied that scale is one of them. The scale of a development is always a relevant factor in determining whether a proposed development is consistent with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area. To suggest otherwise makes little sense as a practical proposition.

Distance from Main House

27. The Applicant’s second argument, as summarised in the Statement of Case, is that:

“No part of the Report of the Inspector, or the Board Direction or the Order identified any planning, amenity or environmental harm as a result of the distance between the house on this site, on one hand and this family-flat accommodation. In opposing the proposed unit on this ground, the Bord essentially applied a development standard which is not contained within the statutory Kildare County Development Plan 2023 – 2029. Section 15.4.14 of the County Development Plan, which is precise in character, does not require ancillary accommodation of this type to be provided within an existing house or, if located in a separate building, to be situated within a specific distance of that principal dwelling. The distance from main house is circa 20 m, the applicant argues that a previous decision described the issue of having a family flat connected to the main house as not mandatory”.

28. I consider this to demonstrate a clear misreading of the provision of the Development Plan quoted above. That provision is replete with references to the relationship with the main house – it refers to “subdivision or extension”, the proposed unit must be “linked directly to the main dwelling by a connecting door” and must be “subsidiary”. Once the flat is no longer required “the dwelling must be returned to a single dwelling unit.” All of this implies that distance from the main house is clearly a relevant consideration and indeed one which may cause a proposed development to contravene the Development Plan.

29. To the extent that the Applicant has shown that the Board failed to comply with this provision in a previous case, that does not give rise to a right to require the Board to continue to fail to comply with the Development Plan. There is no principle of continuity which requires that breaches of the legal framework must be allowed to continue merely because they have happened in the past. Insofar as the Applicant complains that the Board did not consider (or failed to give reasons for not following) the previous decision in appeal PL09.315309, the difficulty for her is that the Board was correct to consider the present application de novo. I am also satisfied that the Board did not misinterpret Section 15.4.14 of the Plan in this case.

30. The argument that the Board failed to consider or provide reasons for making a different

decision to a previous one is based on a misunderstanding. The Board or any appellate body has to deal with the main issues in the given application, which includes differing on a material issue from the first-instance decision-maker, or an Inspector. But the Board is not obliged to examine the planning history of the site or indeed any other comparable site for the purpose of having to give reasons for disagreeing with any and every previous decision.

Previous decisions relate to the policy context and planning judgement exercised in respect of a specific planning application at that time, but such matters can change, and no reasons are generally necessary in terms of differing implicitly from previous decisions. There may of course be particular cases where there is some necessity for explanation as to inconsistent planning decisions (see e.g. Grealish v. An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 310, Porter v An Bord Pleanála, [2017] IEHC 783) but in principle there is no general doctrine of precedent for an administrative decision-maker, because that would be unworkable and could also create a serious chilling effect to the necessary review, refinement and improvement of policy approaches. In the absence of a doctrine of stare decisis there can be no obligation on administrative decision-makers to provide reasons for differing from such previous decisions.

The Proposed Glazed Link

31. I can now turn to the heading of reasons. The leading authority on reasons is the Supreme Court decision in Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752. Clarke C.J. said, at para. 6.15:

“First, any person affected by a decision is at least entitled to know in general terms why the decision was made. This requirement derives from the obligation to be fair to individuals affected by binding decisions and also contributes to transparency. Second, a person is entitled to have enough information to consider whether they can or should seek to avail of any appeal or to bring judicial review of a decision. Closely related to this latter requirement, it also appears from the case law that the reasons provided must be such as to allow a court hearing an appeal from or reviewing a decision to actually engage properly in such an appeal or review.”

32. Observations of participants in a process may range from the relevant to the marginal or even irrelevant. The Board can assess the relevance of submissions in the first instance but within the bounds of what is reasonable (Friends of the Irish Environment CLG & Anor. v.

Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage & Ors [2025] IECA 128) and of course with due regard to other aspects of the process that make certain issues inherently relevant.

33. In practice this amounts to providing the main reasons on the main issues: O’Donnell v An Bord Pleanála [2023] IEHC 381, read in the light of the other caselaw I have referred to.

34. Furthermore, a decision should not be quashed for lack of reasons if nobody could be in any real doubt as to what the reasons were: Killegland Estates v. Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39.

35. Insofar as “It is submitted that no reasons have been provided as to why the Respondent did or should depart from the local development plan”, this is a misconception because the Board was not departing from the Plan, and the Applicant has not overcome the onus to show that it did so.

36. As regards the glass link, the Applicant “contends that the glass link and the duration of the development, could have been addressed by condition(s), wherein the glazed connection could have been omitted and lifespan of the dwelling could have been limited, furthermore the Applicant contends that a link between the main house and flat is not mandatory as confirmed in appeal PL09.315309.”

37. I have already addressed the issue of the previous appeal. The fact that policies were not complied with in an earlier case does not create binding precedent to allow them to be set aside in an ongoing way.

38. The argument under this heading essentially is that if the glazed link was problematic, it could and should have been omitted by condition. The Applicant refers to the Development Management Guidelines in particular, Section 7.3.1 thereof, (which is entitled ‘Conditions should be necessary’). It states ‘One useful test of need is whether, without the condition, either permission for the proposed development would have to be refused, or the development would be contrary to proper planning and sustainable development in some identifiable manner.” This does not require the Board to consider whether permission which would otherwise be refused, as it does not accord with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area, should be granted by altering the development proposed in a manner which would render it consistent with the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.

39. The general problem with that is that the Board is not under an obligation to help applicants for permission by reconfiguring their projects in a more acceptable format. While sometimes there are cases where it would be beneficial to do so, there is no basis to suggest that this is a legal requirement.

40. The more specific problem here is that omission of the glazed link by condition would then bring about a breach of the Development Plan requirement that the flat be connected to the main house, so that application would have had to be rejected on that basis. I note that in the Applicant’s appeal to the Board, it was stated “Due to a somewhat artificial requirement for a link between a principal dwelling and a family-flat, which has not always been adhered to within the planning code2, the proposal includes a new connection, in the nature of a glazed corridor, between this dwelling and the garage building.” At that point, the Applicant also considered that the absence of a connection between a family flat and the main dwelling was inconsistent with the Development Plan.

41. I agree with the Board’s submission that “Without the proposed 20 metre glazed link the requirement of Section 15.4.14 that the family flat is connected to the main dwelling is not satisfied.”

42. The Applicant has not succeeded in her contention that the manner in which the Board considered the glazed link was unlawful.

Possible temporary nature of development

43. The Applicant’s next complaint is that:

“The Respondent asserts that due to the development being 20 m from the main dwelling and a stand alone structure that it is incapable to revert to being an integrated part of the main house . This is rejected by the Applicant who claims that the current situation can be restored upon the cessation of use of the family flat. The Respondent has applied an impossible standard to the test of temporary nature of development in the circumstances, or has failed to consider or adequately consider the circumstances of the Applicant and her family. Either way, the Respondent has failed to detail the reasons why it considers that the development cannot contain a condition as to the duration of the development, as is common is developments of this type”.

44. There are a number of difficulties with this argument. Firstly, whether a flat is capable of being reintegrated into a main house is not a black-and-white issue – it requires evaluative judgement. That is entrusted by the Oireachtas to the Board in this instance. The Applicant’s disagreement with the merits of that decision does not give rise to a legal ground of complaint. The Applicant has not shown any legal infirmity in the decision by reference to reasons or otherwise.

45. Secondly, it is not a legal ground of complaint to say that the Board has “applied an impossible standard ... in the circumstances”. That is in essence an argument that the Applicant must be allowed to have permission. The Board is permitted to set a standard by the exercise of evaluative judgement even if a particular applicant is not going to satisfy that in a specific application. Calling rejection of an application the imposition of an “impossible standard” is simply a merits-based disagreement framed in legal form.

46. Thirdly, the suggestion that the Board has failed to consider the Applicant’s family circumstances has not been made out evidentially – indeed the Applicant’s need is expressly acknowledged by the Inspector as noted above. The word “adequately” is a merits-based disagreement – which in effect suggests that consideration would only be adequate if it resulted in permission being granted. The Board’s obligation was to consider the Applicant’s circumstances, and this was clearly done. The difficulty for the Applicant is the fact that her sympathetic circumstances do not in themselves give rise to a right to the grant of permission. The Board’s task was to view the issues not solely from the Applicant’s point of view but through the prism of proper planning and development, and in doing so they concluded that a standalone dwelling 20 metre away from the main house did not comply with Section 15.4.14 of the Development Plan. That has not been shown to be unreasonable or otherwise unlawful.

47. The Board is not obliged to condition an application in a way that would bring a development proposed in an application into compliance with the relevant Plan, rather than refusing that application. In any event, a condition limiting the duration of the permission would not have brought about compliance with the Plan. I agree with the Board that “A condition requiring the converted garage to revert back to being used as a garage, after a specified period of time, would therefore not address the concerns identified by the Inspector and the Board, by reason of the garage conversion being a stand-alone structure not connected to the main dwelling.”

Definition of residential amenity

48. The Applicant argues that “the Bord’s Inspector takes no issue with design of proposed family flat or will not detract from main dwelling and its location is in principal (sic)

acceptable. The Respondent argues that it is the proposed “glass link” that is the issue and this is addressed above.”

49. The Applicant is taking an over-positive interpretation of the Inspector’s Report, which characterised the glazed link as “unacceptable” (section 7.4.3). Reasons were provided by the Inspector and in the Board’s Direction: “the proposed glazed link would have a significant impact on the rear amenity open space and visual amenity.”

50. These are quintessentially matters of evaluative planning judgement. The Applicant must discharge the onus to show that such judgement has been exercised in an unreasonable or otherwise unlawful manner, and while I have every sympathy for her, that onus has not been discharged.

51. Calling the exercise of planning judgement a matter of adopting an erroneous “definition”

of residential amenity does not overcome this problem. Impacts on open spaces and visual amenity do not exceed the “definition” of residential amenity and indeed on any definition these issues are well within the concept. The fact that the Inspector found that the design of the unit (garage conversion) would not detract from the amenities of the main building, or dwelling, is not inconsistent with the Board’s findings. I am not satisfied that the Board erred in interpreting residential amenity.

Conclusion

52. In summary, the issue of scale in the sense adopted by the Board was not an irrelevant consideration. Scale is a quintessentially relevant consideration for the assessment of what accords with the proper planning and sustainable development of an area.

53. The distance from the main house and the relationship with it was not an irrelevant consideration and indeed could not have been more relevant given the specific terms of the Development Plan in relation to family flats.

54. The Board did not fail in its duty to give reasons. There is no doctrine of precedent applying to the Board and it was not obliged to explain why it did not comply with the Development Plan in a previous appeal or why a different decision was made in the instant case.

Furthermore, there were material factual differences between the nature of the development permitted in the previous case and the development for which the Applicant sought permission, including in relation to scale and distance from the main house.

55. The Board did not fail to give reasons in relation to the proposed 20 metre long glazed link and was not obliged to grant permission subject to a condition in order to bring it into compliance with the Development Plan. Indeed, omitting the glazed link would still have given rise to a breach of the Development Plan.

56. The Board’s rejection of the concept that the flat was temporary was not unlawful given that the standalone nature of the flat or structure would remain following the cessation of use by the Applicant. The reversion of the structures to their pre-development condition could not bring about the reintegration of the family flat into the main house.

57. The Board did not err in its analysis or understanding of the concept of residential amenity or in giving reasons in that regard.

58. I appreciate that the outcome will be disappointing for the Applicant. I repeat that while I have every sympathy for her, the individual circumstances of individual applicants, however pressing, do not as a matter of principle give rise to a right to disregard or override planning law or the specific policies of the applicable Development Plan. The Board’s obligation is to consider such circumstances properly, insofar as they are relevant to considerations of proper planning and sustainable development, to give reasons for its decision and to comply with any other relevant justiciable standard. In this case, no infirmity in consideration or in reasons has been made out.

Order

59. For those reasons, I shall make an order dismissing the proceedings.

60. The matter is to be listed before me on 13th October 2025 at which point application can be made for any consequential orders.