High Court dismisses tenant's appeal for possession of land after finding 40-day notice reasonable despite harassment claims.

APPROVED

THE HIGH COURT

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

[2025] IEHC 509

Record No. 2025/96CA

BETWEEN/

JOHN McGINN AND JULIE McGINN

PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS

AND

SEAN DAVIS

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered this 19th day of September 2025 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 3 ESTABLISHED FACTS ....................................................................................................................... 5 NOTICE OF TERMINATION DATED 22ND MAY 2023 .................................................................. 9 DISCUSSION AND DECISION ........................................................................................................ 12 PROPOSED ORDERS ....................................................................................................................... 21

INTRODUCTION

1. This is the defendant’s appeal arising from the decision and Order of the Circuit Court (Her Honour Judge Fiona O'Sullivan) dated 6th March 2025, which was perfected on 12th March 2025.

2. On that occasion, Her Honour Judge O'Sullivan dismissed the defendant’s defence and counterclaim and granted the plaintiffs the following reliefs:

(1) An order for possession of the two fields situate within the land at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226;

(2) An order directing the defendant, his servants and agents to vacate forthwith the two fields situate within the land at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226;

(3) An order directing the defendant, his servants and agents to remove forthwith from the two fields situate within the land at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226 all livestock, animals, vehicles, equipment, structures and all items brought onto the two fields within a period of two months from the date of the court order.

3. The court also made an Order restraining the defendant, his servants or agents and all persons acting in concert with him and all persons having notice of the making of the orders herein from trespassing on the two fields situate within the land at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin in folio DN1226 (“the fields”). The court also directed that the defendant pay the sum of €7,500 in general damages, plus €2,000 in exemplary damages which was to be offset by the sum of €850 in respect of fencing and other minor works carried out by the defendant for the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were awarded the costs of the proceedings to be taxed in default of agreement.

4. As this is an appeal from the Order of the Circuit Court, it is a de novo rehearing of all matters.

5. The plaintiffs are father and daughter, the second named plaintiff is the carer of the first named plaintiff, and both live in a property located at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin. It is common case that the first named plaintiff is the registered owner of the lands located at Hanlon’s Lane contained in folio DN 1226, including the fields the subject matter of these proceedings.

6. The defendant is a tree surgeon.

7. The subject lands comprise 3.72 hectares and the issues in this case relate to two of the plaintiffs’ fields.

8. The second named plaintiff has, for a number of years, been responsible for maintaining and managing her father’s lands and has done so with his authority and on his behalf.

9. The plaintiffs were represented by Chris Oonan BL and Mr. Sean Davis represented himself.

ESTABLISHED FACTS

10. I heard evidence in this matter from the second named plaintiff/respondent, Ms. Julie McGinn and from Mr. Rory O'Connor, Engineer, who was retained on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Davis made submissions but did not give evidence.

11. I find the following facts as being established.

12. From around 1980, the first named plaintiff had licensed the use of the two fields to a John Kelly, who died in 2003. Following the death of Mr. Kelly, his son Mark Kelly took over under an agistment or conacre agreement basis, which allowed Mark Kelly to graze animals. This agreement was renewed every 11 months.

13. In or around May 2020, following the death of Mark Kelly’s horse, it was agreed by the plaintiffs and Mark Kelly that Sean Davis, the defendant, would replace him and take over the remaining months of the agistment agreement they had in relation to the said fields.

14. In or around 1st June 2020, in accordance with the agistment agreement, and with the consent of the plaintiffs, the defendant moved his horses onto the McGinn fields.

15. In or around January 2021, following the end of Mark Kelly’s agreement with the plaintiffs (which the defendant had previously stepped into), the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a further agreement in which the plaintiffs agreed that the defendant’s horses would be allowed to graze on the fields and, in consideration for this, the defendant would supply coal and wood to the plaintiffs and carry out miscellaneous maintenance work.

16. The evidence of the second named defendant was that in subletting the use of the fields to the defendant under this agistment/conacre agreement, the defendant did not pay money but offered benefit-in-kind including, supplying coal and wood, the cutting down and lopping of trees and other miscellaneous maintenance work.

17. The defendant had requested the second named plaintiff to ask the first named plaintiff if the defendant could put a caravan/Portakabin up in the yard on the plaintiffs’ lands for a period of approximately 10 years in exchange for €50,000. The first named plaintiff refused to do so and the e-mail evidence from the second named plaintiff states that the main reason for refusing this proposal was the first named plaintiff’s concerns that, in his view, it would be necessary to get planning permission for a septic tank and water treatment, etc., and this position was communicated to the defendant by the second named plaintiff in or around June 2021.

18. The relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant during 2021 and 2022 appeared to be cordial.

19. In or around March 2022, for example, the second named plaintiff agreed that the defendant could move three sheep and their lambs onto the subject fields for a temporary period during which time the defendant was doing works on lands he had recently purchased at Curtlestown Lower, County Wicklow. The second named plaintiff's evidence was that while this was on the understanding that it was for a temporary period only, which she understood to be a period of approximately four to five months, the defendant continues to put his sheep on these fields and his sheep continue to graze there.

20. In the summer of 2022 (in or around July 2022), the defendant requested the assistance of the second named plaintiff with purchasing security cameras for the land that he had purchased at Curtlestown Lower in County Wicklow, as the second named plaintiff was familiar with purchasing items via the internet.

21. The second named plaintiff's evidence is that she purchased approximately three security cameras at about €250 each on the second named defendant's behalf for use on his lands at Curtlestown Lower in County Wicklow with money provided to her by the defendant for that purpose.

22. The relationship between the parties deteriorated, however, in or around January 2023.

23. It was in or around this time, without the consent of the plaintiffs, that the defendant had in fact installed the security cameras (which Ms. McGinn had purchased for Mr. Davis on the internet) at various locations on the subject fields, which the second named plaintiff had understood were to be deployed on the defendant’s lands at Curtlestown Lower in County Wicklow.

24. Thereafter, in or around April 2023, consequent upon the installation of these cameras on the subject fields without the plaintiffs’ consent, the defendant began to send text messages and screenshots of the second named plaintiff to her, which had been taken from the security cameras, including when the second named plaintiff was walking and/or working on the lands at Hanlon Lane.

25. The second named plaintiff’s evidence is that she felt harassed and intimidated by the defendant making such recordings of her and sending her text messages and screenshots of her on her land taken from the security cameras. I accept that to be the case.

26. Further, the second named plaintiff’s evidence was that the defendant’s sheep remain grazing on the plaintiffs’ fields without permission and have not been removed, despite the request to do so.

27. The oral and written evidence of Rory O’Connor, Engineer is that he attended and walked the lands at Fox Hill, Hanlon’s Lane, Ticknock, Dublin 18 on 17th October 2024 and observed and referred to photographs of three sheds which had been constructed by the defendant since he went on to the fields.

28. Shed 1, the largest shed, has dimensions of 4.8m x 6.6m, giving it an area of 31.68 square metres; Shed 2 was approximately 28 square metres; and Shed 3 was a small shed approximately 4m long and 1m deep.

29. Mr. O’Connor’s evidence, which I accept, was that the sheds were poorly constructed using second-hand materials, were a visual eye-sore, and were of little value other than what might be retrieved for use as firewood and with the steel sheeting fit for scrap. He also raised possible health and safety considerations in that the roof of the smaller of the large sheds was made of unprotected plywood/wood material which he stated would rot and collapse in due course. No engineering evidence was called by Mr. Davis and Mr. O’Connor disagreed vehemently with an engineering report that had been prepared previously on behalf of Mr. Davis. Mr. O’Connor did not look at the gates. Previously, in their solicitor’s letter dated 23rd May 2023, the plaintiffs had indicated that they were prepared to pay the sum of €750 in relation to the retention of the gate which the defendant had installed to the yard on the opposite side of the road and had asked that the lower red gate would be replaced.

NOTICE OF TERMINATION DATED 22ND MAY 2023

30. Under cover of correspondence dated 23rd May 2023, the plaintiffs’ solicitors, Fahy Bambury Solicitors, served a Notice of Termination dated 22nd May 2023 of the verbal agreement dated July 2020 by registered post on the defendant at his address.

31. The solicitor’s letter dated 23rd May 2023 referred to the plaintiffs’ request that the defendant vacate the property by 1st July 2023. Having regard to these proceedings, and the defendant’s right to oppose the plaintiffs’ claims, initially before the Circuit Court and then in this de novo appeal, the fact remains that as of the date of this judgment, the defendant has not removed his property or sheep from the subject lands, over two years after the Notice of Termination was served.

32. The letter dated 23rd May 2023 stated that the plaintiffs were requesting that the items which the defendant had placed on the property be removed, including Belfast sinks, fence pieces and that other items would be returned on vacation of the premises and that the plaintiffs would be prepared to pay the defendant the sum of €750 in relation to the gate installed to the yard on the opposite side of the road and also requested that the lower red gate would be replaced. The letter stated that the plaintiffs were prepared to offer the sum of €500 in respect of the purchase of the foal of the horse named on the equine passport as Bridget McGinn and that in the event that the defendant was agreeable to the sale of the foal, the plaintiffs would arrange for it to be neutered, microchipped and passported.

33. The Notice of Termination dated 22nd May 2023 was signed by the plaintiffs and sent to the defendants. It stated that in relation to the July 2020 verbal agreement between the parties – which provided that the defendant would be allowed to graze horses on the subject fields (“the McGinn land”) in exchange for coal and wood and certain maintenance work – the defendant had “demonstrably moved outside the boundaries” of the verbal agreement and had “in the last three months, carried out the following acts in breach of the verbal agreement and without the consent of the McGinns … installation of security cameras … upset neighbours … increased the number of sheep grazing … [w]e are further instructed that you have engaged in a campaign of harassment against Ms. McGinn and we have now advised Ms. McGinn to make an official complaint to An Garda Síochána in regard to your ongoing harassment”.

34. The Notice of Termination further terminated the verbal agreement of July 2020 allowing the defendant to graze horses on the McGinn land. It required that the defendant vacate the McGinn Land by 1st July 2023 and remove all his animals currently grazing on the property, as well as any items and objects that he had installed and/or constructed on the McGinn Land, within a 40 day time period.

35. By correspondence dated 26th June 2023, solicitors replied on behalf of the defendant and inter alia stated that before the defendant could consider the “purported termination” of the agreement, he required “recognition of the expenses he has gone to and some form of restitution” inter alia in relation to the shed structures which the defendant had constructed on the subject fields.

36. The solicitors for the plaintiffs responded on 29th June 2023 and inter alia stated that the plaintiffs had no objection to the defendant dismantling and relocating the structures to the defendant’s own lands. The letter stated that the first named plaintiff and his wife were pensioners aged in their eighties with severe health problems and that these events were causing considerable stress. The letter further stated that the defendant must vacate the fields by 1st July 2023.

37. By letter dated 6th July 2023, the plaintiffs’ solicitors wrote to the defendant’s solicitors and stated that horses and sheep remained on the land notwithstanding that the plaintiffs had requested that same be removed by 1st July 2023 and inter alia notified the defendant’s solicitors that Civil Ejectment Proceedings would be issued.

38. On 13th October 2023, the plaintiffs’ solicitors served on the defendant’s solicitors under cover of an e-mail, an Equity Civil Bill together with an Indorsement of Claim and confirmed that it was sent by registered post on 13th October 2023.

39. By letter dated 20th October 2023, the defendant’s solicitors acknowledged receipt of the plaintiffs’ solicitors’ letter dated 13th October 2023 and noted “that proceedings have been served on our client and we are seeking formal instructions to come on record in the matter”.

40. As stated earlier, in the appeal which was heard before me, the defendant represented himself.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

41. I am satisfied, having regard to the evidence adduced by the second named plaintiff, that both her and her father, the first named plaintiff, were fully justified in serving the Notice of Termination dated 22nd May 2023 which terminated their previous verbal agreement with the defendant in July 2020.

42. Whilst the initial commercial relationship between the parties was cordial, it is unfortunate that from early January 2023 this no longer was the case and from then on relations deteriorated and the defendant engaged in unacceptable behaviour towards the plaintiffs, in particular towards the second named plaintiff.

43. I accept that the defendant has gone beyond the boundaries of the initial verbal agreement which, in a quite straightforward manner, had provided that in exchange for allowing his horses to graze on the subject fields (as had been the case with the previous arrangement prior to the agreement with the defendant) the defendant would supply coal and wood and carry out miscellaneous work for the plaintiffs. Indeed, the plaintiffs, when asked by the defendant, were prepared to facilitate the defendant by allowing, temporarily, some of the defendant’s sheep and lambs to graze in the subject fields. However, the defendant has continued to put sheep on these lands notwithstanding that this facility was a temporary one.

44. The defendant’s actions towards the plaintiffs in the period prior to the Notification of Termination were completely unacceptable.

45. I accept the second named plaintiff’s evidence, supported by a number of recorded copy text messages which were referred to in evidence, that the initial installation of the security cameras at various locations on the subject fields, without the plaintiffs’ consent in or around January 2023, was completely objectionable.

46. This unauthorised activity however went further and I accept the second named plaintiffs’ evidence that the sending by the defendant of messages and screenshots of recordings taken from the security cameras of the second named plaintiff from April 2023, which showed the plaintiff walking and working on their lands, was such as to amount to unacceptable harassment and intimidation and behaviour which comes within the principle referred to in the judgment of the High Court (Hogan J.) in Sullivan v Boylan & Ors (No. 2) [2013] IEHC 104, [2013] 1 I.R. 510, where he held that damages arose for breach of the plaintiff’s personal right to integrity, and his right to enjoy his personal dwelling without interference.

47. In circumstances where the issue of quantum arises, the facts of each case will, of course, dictate the measure of damages to be awarded and the facts in Sullivan v Boylan & Ors were, as recorded in the two judgments of Hogan J., particularly egregious.

48. In Sullivan v Boylan & Ors (No.2) [2013] IEHC 104, [2013] 1 I.R. 510, Hogan J. discussed the appropriate level of damages and stated as follows at paragraphs 45 to 50:

“(45) It is not easy to calculate the appropriate level of damages in unusual cases of this kind. In Raducan v Minister for Justice [2011] IEHC 224, [2012] 1 I.L.R.M. 419 I awarded €7,500 to the Moldovian plaintiff who had been falsely detained by immigration officials as a result of a bureaucratic error following her arrival in Dublin airport on a fight from Bucharest. This meant that the plaintiff was unlawfully detained at a detention centre for three days. While the error was bona fide and the plaintiff herself very fairly acknowledged the fact that she was well treated while in prison, the sum was designed to compensate her for the loss of liberty for three days.

(46) In the present case the interference with the plaintiff’s freedom was nothing as far-reaching as in Raducan. Nevertheless, whereas the deprivation of liberty in that case was the result of a bona fide mistake contrast, the defendant’s conduct here has been outrageous, contumelious and malicious. The offending conduct, moreover, lasted for a three week period as compared with the three days in Raducan.

(47) In Herrity v Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2008] IEHC 249,

[2009] 1 I.R. 326 the defendant newspaper published detailed

transcripts of the plaintiff’s private telephone conversations which had apparently been obtained by her estranged husband. The transcripts showed that the plaintiff had a romantic relationship with a Roman Catholic priest and the details of these transcripts were then published by the defendant newspaper to the plaintiff’s immense distress.

(48) Dunne J. held that the defendant had thereby violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy. Addressing herself to the question of damages Dunne J. concluded ([2009] 1 I.R. 326, 347): “Bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of this case, I am assessing ordinary and aggravated compensatory damages in the sum of €60,000 for the conscious and deliberate and unjustified breach of the plaintiff’s right to privacy and the undoubted and significant distress caused to the plaintiff as a result of that breach. The blatant use of unlawfully obtained transcripts of telephone conversations is such that it seems to me that it could not be condoned in any way whatsoever. The behaviour of the defendant in making use of such material is, in my view, nothing short of outrageous. It will be seldom that a court will award punitive or exemplary damages. However, bearing in mind the comments of Finlay C.J. in [Conway v Irish National Teachers’ Organisation [1991] 2 I.R. 305], it seems to me that this is one of the rare occasions when the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s conduct in all the circumstances of the case should be marked by awarding such damages. In all the circumstances of this case it seems to me that the appropriate sum to award in respect of punitive damages for the conduct of the defendant in making use of transcripts of telephone conversations obtained unlawfully is the sum of €30,000. Accordingly, there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of €90,000.”

(49) Of course, the invasion of privacy in Herrity was particularly outrageous, not least given that it was committed by a powerful newspaper for commercial gain. This private and intimate information was thereby communicated to a wide audience and, of course, this did not happen in the present case. It must furthermore be acknowledged that Mr. McCartan’s conduct stopped following a court order and to that extent Ms. Sullivan’s rights have already been vindicated by judicial decision. Yet the outrageous conduct of the defendant cannot be ignored, nor are the grave breaches of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be lightly overlooked.

(50) In the circumstances, I consider that the present case is somewhat closer to Raducan in terms of the effects on the plaintiff’s life and welfare, even if the breaches of constitutional rights in the present case were more sustained and had a longer duration. In these circumstances I will award the plaintiff the sum of €15,000 by way of general damages.”

49. In Sullivan v Boylan & Ors (No.2) [2013] IEHC 104, [2013] 1 I.R. 510, Hogan J. also discussed the issue of exemplary damages and stated as follows at paragraph (51) of his judgment:

“In Conway v Irish National Teachers’ Organisation [1991] 2 I.R. 305,

317 Finlay C.J. envisaged that exemplary damages could be awarded in addition to compensatory damages where it was appropriate “to mark the court’s particular disapproval of the defendant’s conduct in all the circumstances of the case.” Given all that I have said in both the first judgment and in this judgment regarding the oppressive, arrogant and contumelious behaviour of Mr. McCartan, just as in Herrity, it is entirely appropriate that exemplary damages should be awarded. Here I propose to follow the example of Dunne J. in Herrity and to award the plaintiff by way of exemplary damages 50% of the sum awarded as compensatory damages, i.e., the sum of €7,500.”

50. Whilst I find that the actions of Mr. Davis intimidated and harassed Ms. McGinn and were such as to entitle her both to an award of a sum of general damages and exemplary damages, they do not amount to the same outrageous behaviour which was found by the High Court in Sullivan v Boylan & Ors where Hogan J., in his first judgment, Sullivan v Boylan & Ors (No.1) [2012] IEHC 389, described the actions of the debt collector in that case as “contemptible, irresponsible and outrageous” which sought to “harass, bully, defame, vilify and intimidate” and “to all but imprison her in her own home” and was “behaviour which in a civilised society cannot be tolerated for an instant and it represents conduct which this Court cannot and will not allow.” The issue in Sullivan v Boylan & Ors involved the actions of a debt collector which a contractor had engaged in a dispute as to whether certain contracted works in a house extension had been carried out, or whether certain additional work had to be performed over and above that which had originally been contracted for.

51. The evidence given by the second named plaintiff before me included her making reference to a number of screenshots and text messages sent to her by the defendant which caused her to be intimidated and harassed.

52. For example, a screenshot of a video taken on or about Monday 3rd April 2023 contained a text message, both of which were sent by the defendant to the second named plaintiff which stated “What were you doing at the back of my horse box yesterday there [sic.] wire gone missing [sic.] it was there Saturday” which was replied to by the second named plaintiff as follows “Lifting the gate off the hedge” and “Are you accusing me of stealing your wire ?”1

53. A screenshot of a video showing the second named plaintiff placing blocks of wood into a wheelbarrow taken on 13th April 2023 was sent to the plaintiff with the following text message: “With what logs you have took this evening and over the last week or so if you were to buy the logs it [sic.] probably be same price as 2 rolls of barb wire to fence your Boundry between you and Mr. Gill trap I have already asked you do you fancy it [sic.] the cameras are working great aren’t they”.

54. Again a screenshot photograph taken on or about 14th April 2023 of the second named plaintiff putting blocks of wood into a wheelbarrow with a text message stating “Are they new tracksuit bottoms” and “I had to put a new lock on the gate I forgot to leave new key out for you so use the bottom gate for the moment” were sent by the defendant to the second named plaintiff. The reply from the second named plaintiff was: “You can leave it in the letterbox. As soon as possible please.”

The contents of the text messages are quoted verbatim.

55. Mr. Davis represented himself. He did not give or call evidence but made submissions and in the course of doing so, referred to a number of what he stated were copies of text messages, some dating back to 2021, which he submitted confirmed that there were friendly relations between himself and the second named plaintiff and which he submitted indicated, for example, that the plaintiffs’ neighbours were agreeable to him putting up fences to mark their respective boundaries.

56. At the time when Mr. Davis was legally represented, in addition to his denials, he also pleaded a counterclaim in his formal Defence which inter alia stated that by reason of representations and assurances made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was estopped from denying the defendant’s equitable interest at the two fields; that the plaintiffs made clear and unequivocal representations to him that the defendant was to be granted a 10-year leasehold interest for the ‘McGinn’s Field’ in exchange for consideration of €50,000 and that in reliance on these representations, the defendant acted to his detriment by investing substantial time and financial resources in the property; he further pleaded that it would now be unconscionable for the plaintiffs to deny the defendant’s interest in the property and the defendant sought a declaration that he had a proprietary interest in the property or alternatively was entitled to compensation for the alleged detriment suffered in reliance on the Plaintiff’s submissions.

57. Having regard to the evidence which has been adduced and the facts which I have found, and also taking into consideration the respective submissions made by and on behalf of the parties, I find there is no basis to the defendant’s counterclaim or to the plea of estoppel.

58. Further, I do not accept the submission made by Mr. Davis that the purpose of placing the cameras in such a position was to provide security for the plaintiffs on their own lands or that the motivation for doing so was in some way altruistic. The cameras were placed on the plaintiffs’ lands without their permission or consent and were camouflaged. The second named plaintiff’s evidence was that, in her view, the cameras were placed to monitor her movements and the sending to her of the screenshots of videos taken of her had the effect of intimidating and harassing her.

59. The defendant’s sheep remain grazing on the plaintiffs’ fields notwithstanding that he has no permission and he has been requested to remove his sheep but has failed to do so.

60. I accept the evidence of Rory O’Connor, Engineer that the three sheds constructed on the lands are a visual eye-sore and are of little value save for firewood and scrap.

61. Further, having regard to the position that applies to conacre and agistment agreements, that a person with grazing rights, even under a temporary agistment contract not for a fixed term, is entitled to reasonable notice of its termination so as to be able to remove his animals from the land, the notice period given by the plaintiffs to the defendant in this case was a reasonable one: Albert Power, Intangible Property Rights in Ireland (Second Ed., paragraph 20.19, p.421), referring to Plunkett v Heeney (1904) 4 NIJR 136).

62. In this case, the Notice of Termination dated 22nd May 2023 stated that “the notice period of 40 days will allow you remove your animals and associated items/objects and is both adequate and reasonable, particularly in the light of your continued grievous breaches of the verbal agreement of July 2020 and your ongoing harassment of Ms. McGinn. If you fail to vacate the McGinn Land and remove your animals and associated items within 40 days, the McGinns will be forced to initiate Circuit Court ejectment proceedings and/or seek injunctive relief against you and this letter will be relied upon costs”.

63. I shall dismiss the defendant’s defence and counterclaim and grant the plaintiffs the following reliefs outlined in the proposed orders set out below.

PROPOSED ORDERS

64. Accordingly, I shall, in the circumstances, dismiss the defendant’s defence and counterclaim and grant the plaintiffs the following reliefs:

(i) An Order for the plaintiffs’ possession of the two fields situate within the land at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226 and more particularly described in the plaintiff’s Equity Civil Bill and Indorsement of Claim dated stamped 12th October 2023;

(ii) An Order directing the defendant, his servants and agents to vacate forthwith the two fields situate within the land, and including the two fields, at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226;

(iii) An Order directing the defendant, his servants and agents to remove forthwith from the two fields situate within the land at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226 all livestock, animals, vehicles, equipment, sheds and structures and all items which the defendant brought onto the two fields within a period of two months from the date of the making of this court order;

(iv) An Order restraining the defendant, his servants or agents and all persons acting in concert with them and all persons having notice of the making of the orders herein from trespassing on the lands, including the two fields situate within the lands at Hanlon’s Lane, Tiknock, County Dublin, Folio DN 1226;

(v) An Order that the second named plaintiff do recover from the defendant the sum of €8,000 in damages and €2,000 in exemplary damages which sum is to be off-set by the sum of €1,000 in respect of the fencing and other works carried out by the defendant.

65. I shall adjourn the matter to Wednesday 8th October 2025 at 10:30 to address the question of costs.

CONLETH BRADLEY

Friday 19th September 2025