High Court refuses leave for judicial review due to excessive delay and weak underlying case against state bodies.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 503

[Record No. 2024 1243 JR]

BETWEEN

NATHAN LEAHY, ELEANOR LEAHY, AND FERENC FEKETE

APPLICANTS

AND

THE MEDICAL COUNCIL OF IRELAND, THE HEALTH INFORMATION AND QUALITY AUTHORITY, THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE HEALTH SERVICE EXECUTIVE, THE MINISTER FOR HEALTH AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger delivered on the 17th day of September 2025.

1. This is the applicants' application for leave to seek judicial review on notice to the respondents. For the reasons set out below, I am refusing leave.

Background

2. This application was moved by the second applicant on behalf of the first applicant who is her adult son who has additional needs. The third applicant is the second applicant's husband and the first applicant's stepfather.

3. The applicants' statement grounding the application for judicial review sets out the reliefs sought in narrative terms, including a number of matters that could never be granted by a court. The reliefs are set out in less detailed form in the notice of motion as follows:

“5. An order of Certiorari quashing the findings/ decision of the Medical Council of Ireland and the Health Information Quality Authority.

6. An order of Mandamus compelling the respondents to fulfil their duties and correct the abuse and inhumane harm caused. That they act in accordance with the law.

7. And/or a declaration, recognising and admitting the suffering experienced by us the applicants and the inherent loss due to this. Provide immediate relief and remedies, in the form of apology, compensation, mediation and the implementation of the Meenan report

8. And/or an Injunction to the same effect instructing the respondents to uphold, protect and reinstate the applicants rights in all areas. To provide them with the information, closure and assistance they need through mediation as the applicants intend to publish their experiences and struggles.”

4. The only reliefs that could be granted by a court is that of certiorari, as long as it was sought in relation to an actual decision. Insofar as certiorari over the decision is sought, it seems to be in relation to the following decisions:

(1) A report of the Health Information and Qualitative Authority (HIQA), the second respondent, of 8 May 2015.

(2) The decision of the Medical Council, the first respondent, in relation to the complaint of the second applicant dated 1 September 2019 in relation to events surrounding the birth of the first applicant in 2003.

5. The Council’s Preliminary Proceedings Committee (PPC) decided on 27 April 2021 that there was not sufficient cause to warrant further action in relation to the complaint. By letter dated 21 June 2021 the Medical Council advised the second applicant that the decision of the PPC had been considered by the Council on 17 June 2021 and the Council had decided no further action should be taken.

6. A number of replying affidavits were filed on behalf of the respondents. The respondents asserted that the proceedings were hopelessly out of time. The second applicant replied by affidavit sworn on 9 June 2025 and filed on 19 June 2025 in which she sought to set out why each of the respondents had been joined and reiterated various issues she had with the decisions of the first and second respondents that she wished the Court to quash. Her affidavit did not address her delay in bringing the proceedings or seek to furnish any reason for the delay or any reasons for the Court to extend time, other than a brief point at paragraph 6(g) that the Medical Council did not inform her of the right to a review. What right she is referring to is unclear. The second applicant also refers to her own medical conditions. I do not consider her references to medical conditions (which are not supported by medical evidence) could constitute a basis for an extension of time where the evidence clearly confirms that she and the first applicant were able to bring a number of other claims against the respondents and other bodies, at the same time as these proceedings were allowed to become time barred.

7. The other reasons for the delay that were identified by the second applicant in her pleadings are equally non-compelling. She seeks to rely on issues in relation to her complaints to the Medical Council including allegedly doctored notes and the failure of the respondents to comply with procedures. Those alleged matters were within her own knowledge since as early as 2011 and therefore are matters that were within her control during the relevant time. She seeks to rely on her lack of legal representation, but this did not prevent her from engaging in multiple claims between 2011 and 2024, including as a litigant in person. The second applicant makes many more allegations of wrongdoing, but they all seem to go to her underlying complaints against the first and second respondents rather than seek to explain why the Court should exercise its discretion to grant what would be a very substantial extension of time.

Time

8. These proceedings seek to squash one decision made almost 10 years ago and another made almost 4 years ago, both of which relate to the circumstances of the birth of the first applicant in 2003, over 20 years ago. The proceedings are hopelessly out of time and absent the most exceptional of circumstances (such as applied in M. O’S v. Residential Institutions Redress Board [2018] IESC 61, 2019 1 ILRM 149) time should not be extended. In accordance with the decision of Murray J. in Arthrophram v. HPRA [2022] IECA 109, for the Court to extend time, there must be reasons given to objectively justify the delay that are sufficient to justify the extension sought and take account of any prejudice to the respondents or third parties.

Prejudice

9. I am satisfied that prejudice would be suffered here if time was to be extended. The second respondent has identified their current lack of records due to their policy of destroying records after such a long lapse of time. One of the doctors about whom the second applicant complained to the Medical Council has already identified the difficulties caused by the lack of time in responding to the complaints made against them. The Medical Council has identified difficulties in investigating a complaint about the first applicant's birth that was not made until some 16 years thereafter.

Strength of the underlying case

10. In addition, the court can consider the underlying strength of the case in determining whether or not an extension of time should be granted. The claims made by the applicants are extremely vague and unwieldy, in which it is difficult to locate errors of law or lack of fair procedures, albeit the second applicant clearly disagrees with the decisions made by the Medical Council and the views expressed by HIQA. The applicants have not even sought specific relief against the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents. I am not satisfied that a sufficiently strong underlying case has been established such that the considerable delay here might be excused or time extended.

Litigation restraint order

11. The first and second applicants are subject to a litigation restraint order (LRO) arising from their litigation relating to the circumstances of the first applicant's birth in 2003. As this application relates to the responses of state bodies since that time, Gearty J. allowed the application for leave to proceed notwithstanding the LRO in place, but in her decision of

10 February 2025, made it clear (at paragraph 1.5) that the LRO might in itself raise issues relevant to the exercise of this Court's discretion in determining the application for leave. The LRO is part of the relevant circumstances the Court must take into account, as is the finding of Hyland J. in her decision of 29 November 2024 imposing the LRO, that the first and second applicants had engaged in a pattern of repeated litigation raising the same issues. It is an additional factor operating against granting the extension of time to seek the leave sought.

Decision

12. I am refusing this application for leave for the reasons set out above, including that the proceedings are hopelessly out of time and no or no sufficient compelling reasons have been identified to persuade the Court to extend the time, taking account of, inter alia, the weaknesses of the underlying case, the prejudice that would be caused to the respondents and third parties and the LRO that is already in place.

Indicative view on costs

13. In accordance with s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, as the applicants have not succeeded in securing leave on notice to the respondents, my indicative view on costs is that the respondents are entitled to their costs. I will hear the parties in relation to costs and any other final orders. I will put the matter back in before me at 10am on 17 October 2025.

The applicants represented themselves.

Counsel for The Medical Council: Úna Cassidy BL

Counsel for HIQA: Brian Gageby BL

Counsel for the third, fourth, sixth and seventh respondents: Conor Duff BL Counsel for the HSE: Hugh McDowell BL