High Court dismisses bankrupt plaintiff's standing claim and strikes out proceedings against Official Assignee and solicitors.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 488

Record No. 2024/2030P

BETWEEN

JOHN GAYNOR

PLAINTIFF

AND

SHERIDAN QUINN SOLICITORS, ROBERT MARREN & COMPANY SOLICITORS,

ELIZABETH BELTON, CLARK HILL SOLICITORS,

OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE MICHAEL IAN LARKIN/DENNIS RYAN,

NORTH PROPERTY AUCTIONEERS, PAUL MOFFIT, TERESA MOFFIT

AND MICHAEL MURTAGH

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Kennedy delivered on the 12th day of September 2025.

1. This judgment concerns two duelling applications. One, issued by the fourth and fifth named defendants (“the Applicants”), seeks orders dismissing the proceedings on the basis that: (a) the plaintiff, as a (discharged) bankrupt, does not have standing to issue or continue these proceedings; or (b) in the alternative as against the Applicants, they disclose no cause of action, are frivolous & vexatious and bound to fail. The Applicants also seek an order pursuant to the court's inherent jurisdiction, restraining the plaintiff from issuing further proceedings against the applicants, their servants or agents, save with the prior permission of the President of the High Court. The plaintiff's counter motion seeks converse reliefs; (a) orders confirming his right to a hearing of his claim, and, pursuant to O.122 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”), allowing the proceedings to go for hearing and/or striking out the defendant's application on the grounds that the defendants have failed to comply with the RSC; and (b) a declaration that the plaintiff does possess standing in these proceedings. I will strike out the countermotion without further ado. It should never have been issued. All points raised will be addressed on the Applicants’ motion. If the Applicants succeed, the countermotion must fail. If their motion fails, the countermotion is unnecessary. Either way, it is redundant, achieving nothing other than to increase costs and complications. Irrespective of the outcome of the substantive motion, the Court should not entertain such futile and unnecessary applications and the parties bringing unnecessary applications must bear their costs.

2. I explain below why I have decided to dismiss the proceedings. In short, throughout the entire bankruptcy process the plaintiff has refused to accept his adjudication and its consequences. That is the basis on which he now asserts the Official Assignee (in administering the estate) and its solicitors (in acting on the latter’s instructions) are guilty of, inter alia, fraud. As a matter of law, he is not entitled to make this argument. His claims as against the Official Assignee and his solicitors disclose no cause of action, amount to an abuse of process and are bound to fail. His pre-adjudication claims, which are the essence of his case, have vested in the Official Assignee in any event. The proceedings are as frivolous as they are misconceived and unsustainable. My reasons for those conclusions are detailed below.

The Issues

3. The issues which I need to determine are whether I should dismiss the plaintiff’s claims (“the Claims”) on the basis that; (a) as a bankrupt, he has no standing to pursue them (against any defendants); (b) the Claims against the Applicants are unstatable, vexatious, bound to fail, or an abuse of process. The Claims concern earlier, ruinous, litigation unsuccessfully initiated by the plaintiff, resulting in his own adjudication as a bankrupt after protracted legal battles with, firstly, his ex-wife and her lawyers (the third and second defendants respectively), and, secondly, the first defendant, his solicitors in those proceedings (“the Matrimonial Proceedings”) who pursued him for costs, resulting in his bankruptcy.

The Parties

4. As well as naming the protagonists in the Matrimonial Proceedings as the first three defendants in these proceedings, he also named the Applicants - the Official Assignee and his solicitors – as the fourth and fifth defendants and an auctioneer appointed by the Official Assignee and third parties who bought assets from the Official Assignee as sixth to ninth defendants. (The Deputy Official Assignee is currently the acting Official Assignee. References below to the Official Assignee include him as well as former Official Assignees).

The Plenary Summons

5. In short, the plenary summons rehashes the substance, conduct and resolution of the Matrimonial Proceedings and his related dispute with his former solicitors, the first defendant, in respect of costs. The latter eventually sued him for unpaid fees, eventually securing the order a decade ago adjudicating him bankrupt due to his default in payment. His rejection of the 2015 Order of Adjudication is the flawed foundation of his claim in these proceedings. He seeks damages, including aggravated and exemplary damages, against multiple parties (his former wife, her solicitors, his former solicitors, the Official Assignee and his solicitor, the auctioneer and parties buying property from the Official Assignee) on the basis that he should never have been adjudicated bankrupt because he had paid what was due to the first three defendants under the relevant pre-adjudication court orders.

6. The claims in the plenary summons most specifically directed against the Official Assignee (and solicitors and auctioneers employed by him and counter parties who dealt with him in respect of the estate) rest on the same premise that the plaintiff should never have been adjudicated bankrupt because High Court orders, including on 8 December 2003, 21 June 2004,

12 July 2004, were “null and voidable with no legal effect." The gist of the plenary summons is that (a) he complied with all High Court orders and discharged all legal costs; (ii) he retains true title to his estate "stolen, taken, confiscated"; and (iii) the High Court departed from the Constitution and the rule of law by granting the Official Assignee’s solicitor and counsel an "unlawful injunction” for the sale of properties (in the course of the administration of the estate in bankruptcy). He says that the Applicants and, apparently, everyone who dealt with his bankrupt estate, conspired to act unlawfully or fraudulently. For example, he broadly accuses the Applicants and their agents of:

 conspiracy

 misfeasance in public office

 contempt of court

 unjust enrichment

 breach of his constitutional rights to property and of “international treaty obligations binding the State securing the rule of law”  fraudulent misrepresentation causing the courts to depart from the constitution and rule of law  champerty  malicious prosecution  breach of trust  breach of the European Convention of Human Rights and its protocols  breach of the Larceny Act 1916  interfering, obstructing and harassing family members when delivering unlawful documents and trespassing at the family home  breach of Fraud Act 2006  unlawful arrest and detention

7. Although his pleadings are not always clear, the plaintiff seeks injunctions, to restrain the Applicants from progressing the bankruptcy or dealing with his estate. The plenary summons also references the “Mental and physical health and of family members providing financial loans” and alleges, inter alia, trauma, stress, pain, suffering, hurt and referring to the impact of decades of litigation on him, his family, his reputation and his credit rating.

The Statement of Claim

The 24 page, beautifully handwritten, statement of claim is to similar effect: a. recounting alleged events in the Matrimonial Proceedings from 1990, giving his account of the outcome of hearings, including cost orders and criticising the first defendant, his solicitors, who he dismissed when the Matrimonial Proceedings were due to come on for hearing because he "became aware at this point [late 2000] that there was collusion, conspiracy and betrayal about to happen." b. taking issue with an order of Kinlan J following the June 2001 hearing, claiming that a resolution (including as to costs) was agreed with his ex-wife at that point but, because of his disagreement with his solicitor, he only discovered months later that the order did not reflect that deal. However, his solicitors told him it was too late to do anything about it as the time had expired for an appeal. He criticises his former solicitors and characterises the order as “a conspiracy act by both teams of lawyers by defrauding me in legal costs and what was agreed in the courts made by the court on equity proceedings". c. accusing the solicitors of making fraudulent claims against him and his family, and of fraudulent misrepresentation “causing the Courts to depart from the Irish Constitution and Rule of Law, he contends that, notwithstanding the first defendant’s enforcement proceedings against him and the orders obtained, he paid everything that was due, complied with relevant orders and should never have been adjudicated bankrupt but the facts regarding his payments and attempted payments were misrepresented in the bankruptcy proceedings.” d. Asserting that when the plaintiff undertook to show cause against his “unlawful” bankruptcy adjudication, he was blocked from lodging his documents and that the second defendant, his former wife’s solicitors "betrayed" him “with fraudulent claim for legal costs on both sides and also for equity proceedings"(sic). e. alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by the second defendant, apparently on the basis that they successfully pursued proceedings on behalf of their client contrary to the agreement reached, as a result of which their client was awarded €85,000 plus costs.

8. Most allegations in the statement of claim relate to alleged events predating his adjudication as a bankrupt; the claims also extend to unlawful imprisonment, unnecessary litigation, the unnecessary and unlawful bankruptcy adjudication and the unlawful forced sale of stolen property. Key allegations against the Applicants rest on the premise that they had no right to deal with his estate because he should never have been adjudicated bankrupt in the first place. The Statement of Claim alleges that:

a. The Official Assignee’s solicitors represented their client in the “unlawful adjudication in Bankruptcy” b. he instructed a new solicitor (post-adjudication) who “discovered grave legal improprieties of a fraudulent illegal crime involving [ his former solicitors, his ex-wife and her solicitors] causing unnecessary legal proceedings leading to bankruptcy and resulting in horrendous consequences” but the Official Assignees refused to cooperate with his new solicitor even though he notified them “of dishonesty, unacceptable legal conduct, fraudulent claims by failure to discharge information to the Courts when legally required and perverting the course of justice”.

However, his new solicitor died and his firm was no longer able to represent him. c. he was prevented from filing his papers on his appeal to the Court of Appeal as the Official Assignee’s solicitors deliberately omitted his bank exhibits which would have shown his compliance with the original c o s t orders in favour of the first and second defendants, the orders that led to his adjudication. d. the Applicants’ attempts to realise his estate were unlawful because “the adjudication of bankruptcy obtained was unlawful” rendering voidable the Official Assignee’s title on the family property.

He accused both applicants of fraud “by selling property held unlawfully by the Official Assignee in his possession and under his control”. e. the Official Assignee and his solicitor knew that the Official Assignee was unlawfully in possession of stolen property and his title was unlawful, null and voidable and breached the Fraud Act 2006. This was evident from bank statements furnished by the plaintiff that showed that he complied with all High Court Orders, discharging the legal costs, rendering “the adjudication in bankruptcy unlawful, it also showed that there were three or more Orders made on the same of proceedings and that all subsequent Orders were predicated and affirmed on fraudulent claims.” f. in the Supreme Court McKechnie J stated “that these practices by the Courts render proceedings unlawful null and void with no legal affect”. g. the Official Assignee was therefore guilty of fraud and abuse of his powers and position “by the malicious prosecution in the unlawful sale of our family property with a voidable title to [third parties, namely the seventh, eight and ninth defendants]”.

He was in breach of, inter alia, s.19 of the Fraud Act 2006, s.22 of the Fraudulent Title Deeds Act 1942 and s.11(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1988 “because the evidence shows [his] dischargement of High Court legal costs to [the first and second defendant].” h. the auctioneer acted on the Applicants’ instructions to sell property in the plaintiff's bankrupt estate notwithstanding the plaintiff’s notification that he disputed the validity of the Order of Adjudication. i. he suffered mental and physical suffering and incurred legal fees due to the foregoing actions. (Some allegations here relate back to the alleged deception of the third named defendant in the plaintiff's marriage on 31 July 1993 and to events predating the adjudication).

j. the appropriate remedy is for the Court

“… to rescind all contracts and other instruments granted to the lawyers by misrepresentation by not disclosing legal information before the courts. This failure by the lawyers caused the courts to the depart from the Irish Constitution and the Rule of Law granting the Official Assignee with a null and voidable title of the family property".

The Affidavits

9. The Official Assignee’s grounding affidavit stated that: a. The plaintiff was adjudicated bankrupt by order of Costello J on 7 December 2015. Consequently, his estate vested in the Official Assignee for his creditors’ benefit. On 23 January 2017, his bankruptcy was extended by Order for five years due to his non-cooperation with the bankruptcy process. While he was discharged from bankruptcy on 7 December 2021, his estate remains vested in the Official Assignee for his creditors’ benefit, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1988, as amended (“the 1988 Act”). b. these proceedings are one of several in which the plaintiff has challenged the Order of Adjudication.

His refusal to accept the order and its consequences has resulted in the Official Assignee having to seek injunctive orders against him. c. The 2015 order of adjudication was on foot of a petition issued by the plaintiff’s former solicitors, the first defendant. On 20 April 2016 O'Connor J dismissed his application to show cause against the Order of Adjudication. The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed on 10 October 2016 being out of time. On 6 December 2017 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. d. The plaintiff never provided a sworn statement of affairs.

The Official Assignee applied to extend the bankruptcy due to his refusal to recognise the adjudication and cooperate with the bankruptcy, The plaintiff sought to challenge the adjudication during the extension application. His bankruptcy was extended, and the Official Assignee's costs were granted as costs in the bankruptcy. e. By Order dated 29 April 2019 the High Court granted the Official Assignee possession and sale of the family home and his costs as costs in the bankruptcy. The plaintiff appealed that order, again attempting to challenge the adjudication.

At the 9 November 2020 hearing of the family home order appeal, he refused to move his application, and the appeal was dismissed, with an order granting the Official Assignee his costs.as costs in the bankruptcy. A Supreme Court determination dated 17 February 2021 refused leave to appeal. The Official Assignee has not yet enforced the Family Home Order, p r e f e r r i n g t o dispose of other assets first. At the outset it appeared that the debts could be covered by other assets. However, the plaintiff’s challenges have increased the Bankruptcy costs. f.

As a result of trespass and interference by the plaintiff, t he Official Assignee applied, inter alia, for orders restraining the plaintiff from trespassing and obstructing his taking vacant possession of and selling certain lands in County Westmeath. The plaintiff again sought to appeal the Order of Adjudication at the hearing of the injunction application. On 15 October 2021, Allen J granted the Official Assignee the reliefs sought and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to oppose the application on the basis of his assertion that he should never have been adjudicated bankrupt.

The Official Assignee's costs were granted as costs in the bankruptcy. As part of his appeal of the injunction order, the plaintiff again sought to challenge the adjudication. On 13 October 2022, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, granting the Official Assignee his costs as costs in the bankruptcy. g. It is evident that the plaintiff is again seeking to challenge the order of adjudication. The Statement of Claim repeatedly recounts his understanding of events that led to the making of the Order of Adjudication, his show cause hearing and takes issue with the debts proved in the Estate but the Official Assignee and his solicitors are not appropriate defendants to such matters.

h. While denying the plaintiff's allegations of, inter alia, fraud (on the basis that the adjudication is unlawful and any action taken by the Official Assignee in his bankruptcy is tainted), the plaintiff is not entitled to make argument and, since the Order of Adjudication and the time for appeal it has expired, the claims are frivolous, vexatious and bound to fail. i. The fourth defendant is the firm appointed by the Official Assignee in respect of the plaintiff’s bankrupt estate which has vested in the Official Assignee and its actions are taken on instruction and by necessity, to discharge the debts and costs of administering the Estate. Moreover, the plaintiff's claims concern the Estate, in relation to which he has no legal standing. j. The plaintiff continues to make unfounded allegations with regard to his appeal of the family home and injunction orders which appear to form the basis for his allegations of fraud against the Official Assignee, those applications having been previously detailed in his unsuccessful application for leave to appeal the family home order to the Supreme Court and in the context of plaintiff's unsuccessful appeal of the injunction order. Accordingly, the plaintiff is seeking to again attack the Order of Adjudication and its consequences, namely, that the Estate vested in the official assignee for the benefit of the creditors. He has exhausted all avenues available to appeal the adjudication. He does not have standing to issue proceedings concerning the Estate. k. Critically, the costs of seeking to prevent the plaintiff from interfering with the Estate or defending the unmeritorious litigation relentlessly pursued by the plaintiff, are borne by the Estate. The plaintiff has been warned in correspondence that he is depleting the sum that might have been available to him from the estate as a surplus. The Official Assignee hoped to avoid enforcing the Family Home Order but it may now be necessary to do so.

10. The Official Assignee’s affidavit exhibits the Applicants’ 21 May 2024 letter to the plaintiffs calling for these proceedings to be discontinued as they were bound to fail and would be prejudicial to the estate in bankruptcy. It stated: “… your adjudication in bankruptcy has been the subject of several applications brought by you before the High Court, the Court of Appeal and which you attempted to have heard by the Supreme Court, all of which have been unsuccessful. Your adjudication in bankruptcy stands and all avenues of appeal have been exhausted by you. Your refusal to accept your adjudication and the bankruptcy process has also resulted in the Official Assignee having to issue injunctive proceedings against you, in which he was successful in both the High Court and on your appeal to the Court of Appeal. The requirement for the Official Assignee, in the performance of his duties, to defend the applications brought by you and issue proceedings against you in the face of your non­cooperation and obstruction has resulted in significant legal costs being incurred, which are deducted from your bankruptcy estate. Al the time of your adjudication your bankruptcy estate was solvent. Amongst the last of the assets yet to be realised, and for which the Official Assignee is in possession of a Court Order sanctioning sale, is your family home. The Official Assignee has long since pleaded with you to cooperate with the bankruptcy process and to cease bringing applications, which are bound to fail and which will have a detrimental effect on your bankruptcy estate in terms of costs. It is ultimately for your benefit that the bankruptcy estate be finalised and closed. The Proceedings, dated 22 April 2024, do not disclose any factual basis for a reasonable cause of action against our clients. The proceedings are frivolous, vexatious and are bound to fail. Moreover, where your claims relate to assets of the bankruptcy estate, you do not have locus standi in respect of those assets which vest in the Official Assignee following your adjudication.

The Proceedings are simply a continuation of the attempts by you to frustrate the Official Assignee from recovering assets for the benefit of the creditors of your estate. Critically, the consequence of the Proceedings will serve only to increase the costs in your bankruptcy estate and prolong its administration”. The letter invited the plaintiff to discontinue, failing which the Applicants would issue the present application.

11. The plaintiff's affidavit (in support of his rebuttal motion) is similar to the statement of claim and advances various other unsubstantiated assertions of dubious relevance. It: a. expressed outrage at the outcome of the various legal proceedings, b. denied that he lacked standing c. claimed that the Applicants’ grounding affidavit and former affidavits “are essentially and fundamentally based on the crafting of a convincing narrative” by the first and second defendants, being the law firms which represented him and his former wife in the Matrimonial Proceedings and that the Applicants “have filed and lodged sworn affidavits from a perusal of books, documents and records from false fraudulent claims by Sheridan Quinn Solicitors and Robert Marren & Company Solicitors that all courts believe to be true and accurate". d. quoted alleged statements by he first defendants, in 2001 – 2002, claiming that they concealed payments by him in the proceedings prior to his adjudication, exhibiting bank statements in support of his contention; e. asserted, without giving details, that O’Moore J concluded that “the lawyers deliberately misled the Courts by concealing legal costs discharged by the Plaintiff in early proceedings”. f. Asserted that the Applicants “were fully appraised by the Plaintiff that [the first and second defendants] were guilty of misleading the Courts by deliberately concealing legal costs discharged for financial gains, beneficates and reliefs awarded by the courts.” (sic) g. Says that the concealment of the legal costs resulted in his unlawful adjudication of bankruptcy and provided the Official Assignee with fraudulent voidable title on the family property for the purpose of his selling the stolen property to others. h. Encloses correspondence with the Official Assignee informing the latter that he and his family had never agreed to the Order of Adjudication because the Courts were misled by the first defendant under oath, the plaintiff wished to appeal at all times, alleging that he had been repeatedly prevented from lodging his books on various occasions in the High Court and Court of Appeal and the bankruptcy proceedings were null and void because the first and second defendants had never divulged the legal fees received. He criticised the Official Assignee’s solicitors for misleading the Court by ignoring tlegal fees paid to the first and second defendants before the adjudication.

12. Because there is an issue as to the extent to which these proceedings are collateral attack on earlier proceedings, seeking to agitate matters which have already been conclusively determined it has been necessary for me to have regard to other orders and adjudications. However, I need only reference three of these: a. The 7 December 2015 Order of Adjudication confirms that the court was satisfied that all requirements of s.11 (1) 1988 Act had been complied with. Having considered the nature and value of the plaintiff’s assets and the extent of his liabilities and the other matters required on such applications it ordered that the plaintiff be adjudged bankrupt.

b. Although the plaintiff complains in these proceedings that the Official Assignee was treating certain property as part of his bankrupt estate which partly belonged to his sister, Feeney J rejected the contention of his sister’s interests in a 14 September 2009 judgment (in litigation between the plaintiff and the first defendant in these proceedings, [2009] IEHC 421). c. The Supreme Court determination dated 6 December 2017 observed that the plaintiff was “obviously aggrieved by the process that took place in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, but it is clear that the essence of his complaint lay in a judgment obtained by the respondents against him on the 8th December 2003… Neither the order for costs nor the certificate of taxation were the subject of an appeal or challenge. The [plaintiff] has referred to the order of the 8th December, 2003 as a fraud and he referred to forgery of the court order. If the original order was a ‘fraud’ or a ‘forgery’ as alleged by the [plaintiff], it is difficult to understand why that order was not appealed or challenged within the time limited for seeking to appeal the order or to have it set aside on the basis that it was a ‘fraud’ or a ‘forgery’. A judge in bankruptcy or indeed in other proceedings will not, in general, be in a position to go behind what appears on its face to be a valid judgment or court order. In circumstances where it appears no steps were taken by the [plaintiff] to have the judgment set aside on grounds of fraud, it is difficult to see any basis upon which the validity of the judgment could have been challenged in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings. It is not enough for an applicant for leave to this Court to simply make assertions or allegations of fraud in respect of what is on its face a valid Court order, without more.”

Legal Principles

The Consequences of the Order of Adjudication

13. The consequences of adjudication in bankruptcy are prescribed by s.44 of the 1988 Act:

“Vesting of Property in Official Assignee

44.—(1) Where a person is adjudicated bankrupt, then, subject to the provisions of this Act, all property belonging to that person shall on the date of adjudication vest in the Official Assignee for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt. …….

(3) The property to which subsection (1) applies includes—

(a) all powers vested in the bankrupt which he might legally

exercise in relation to any property immediately before the date

of adjudication;….” “Property”, as defined in s.3(a) “includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property, whether real or personal…”.

14. The effect of these provisions is to automatically divest a bankrupt, such as the plaintiff, of his property upon adjudication. By definition, a bankrupt no longer maintains any interest in the property, which includes land and property of every description and chose in action such as claims. The bankrupt’s property vests in the Official Assignee by operation of law.

15. Section 61 lists the Official Assignee’s functions and powers on such vesting including, under s.61(2), “to get in and realise the property, to ascertain the debts and liabilities and to distribute the assets in accordance with the provisions of this Act”. In aid of that function, s.61(3) (d) gives the Official Assignee the power “to institute, continue or defend any proceedings relating to the property”.

16. The Act makes clear that it is the Official Assignee’s function – not the plaintiff’s - to institute, continue of defend any proceedings which concern the bankrupt’s estate. Furthermore, the effect of s.85(3) is that all property unrealised at the time of the bankrupt’s discharge, remains vested in the Official Assignee for the creditors’ benefit. Once adjudicated bankrupt, and even when discharged, the Bankrupt no longer has the lright to pursue claims vested in or relating to his bankrupt estate. They vest in the Official Assignee.

17. The terms of the 1988 Act are clear and they are reinforced by the jurisprudence. In Heath v Tang [1993] 4 All ER 694 (“Heath”) the House of Lords dismissed a bankrupt’s attempt to appeal a judgment which grounded the adjudication– any such application had to be brought by his trustee in bankruptcy. Upon adjudication, the plaintiff had been divested of the interest in his property and liabilities and no longer had the legal standing to pursue the appeal. The Court held, at p.697, that: “…all other causes of action which were vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, whether for liquidated sums or unliquidated damages, vest in the trustee. The bankrupt cannot commence any proceedings based upon such a cause of action and, if the proceedings have already commenced, he ceases to have sufficient interest to continue them.”

18. Heath noted that all causes of action which were vested in the bankrupt at the date of adjudication vest in the trustee apart from certain causes of action personal to the bankrupt, such as defamation and assault. That narrow exception does not apply here.

19. Heath has been repeatedly endorsed by the Irish courts. For example, in AA v BA [2017] 3 IR 498, Charleton J stated that: “Causes of action sounding in damages that may benefit the estate of a bankrupt or may diminish it are under the control of the Official Assignee. … Displacing a bankrupt from control over his former assets and liabilities places him in a position where the net benefit of his estate is made available for distribution to creditors. That estate is not to be increased through legal actions to enforce debt, even those which may be characterised as straightforward, save in circumstances where the Official Assignee regards it as appropriate that an action be taken... This may be stated to be the principle of the separation of the estate of the bankrupt from his personal control. ”

20. The Official Assignee’s function is to collect and realise the property of bankrupt estates, Charleton J stating at p.550-551 that: “… control over the estate in bankruptcy is transferred from the bankrupt to the Official Assignee. Thereafter, under the authority of the High Court, and subject to the entitlement of interested parties to refer issues to that court, the function of the Official Assignee is to collect in the property of the bankrupt and to manage the estate in bankruptcy. Central to that role is the function vested in the Official Assignee to make decisions as to what litigation should be continued, commenced or compromised for the benefit of the estate in bankruptcy…it is for the Official Assignee to assess whether a substantial point has been raised which will have the probable effect of increasing the estate in bankruptcy. If such a prospect is genuine, and fact based, it is for the Official Assignee to consider pursuing it.”

Striking out Proceedings

21. O.19, r. 28 of the RSC provides that the Court may dismiss proceedings which disclose no cause of action: “(1) The Court may, on an application by motion on notice, strike out any claim or part of a claim which:

(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action, or

(b) amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, or

(c) is bound to fail, or

(d) has no reasonable chance of succeeding…

(3) The Court may, in considering an application under sub­rule (1) or (2), have regard to the pleadings and, if appropriate, to evidence in any affidavit filed in support of, or in opposition to, the application...”

22. The Court also has an inherent jurisdiction to strike out proceedings as frivolous, vexatious and/or bound to fail. As authorities such as Barry v Buckley [1981] IR 306 confirm, the jurisdiction prevents the abuse of the Courts’ processes. It should be exercised only sparingly and in clear cases but, if “the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's case must fail then it would be a proper exercise of its discretion to strike out proceedings whose continued existence cannot be justified and is manifestly causing irrevocable damage to a defendant.”

Orders restraining the Plaintiff

23. In McMahon v W.J. Law & Co, LLP [2007] IEHC 51 MacMenamin J summarised the principles regarding orders restraining lay litigant from issuing proceedings, at paras. 29-36. It is also a jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and among features identified by Ó Caoimh J. in Riordan v. Ireland (No. 5) [2001] 4 IR 463 as justifying such an order, or militating against the vacating of such an order already granted are: (a) The habitual or persistent institution of vexatious or frivolous proceedings against parties to earlier proceedings; (b) The earlier history of the matter, including whether proceedings have been brought without any reasonable ground, or have been brought habitually and persistently without reasonable ground; (c) The bringing up of actions to determine an issue already determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, when it is obvious that such action cannot succeed, and where such action would lead to no possible good or where no reasonable person could expect to obtain relief; (d) The initiation of an action for an improper purpose including the oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for the purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(e) The rolling forward of issues into a subsequent action and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings; (f) A failure on the part of a person instituting legal proceedings to pay the costs of successful proceedings in the context of unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions.

24. In Tucker v Havbell DAC [2023] IECA 24, the Court of Appeal upheld the making of an Isaac Wunder order. Butler J. observed:

“… the making of an Isaac Wunder order was a necessary and proportionate response both to the amount of litigation that had already occurred in respect of the property, the amount of litigation that remained extant notwithstanding the making of final orders and the likelihood that the appellant will continue to litigate those issues.”

The Parties’ Submissions

25. In addition to the points noted above, the Applicants submitted that: a. The plaintiff asserts very serious and unfounded claims of fraud and trespass against the Official Assignee for performing his statutory duties as Official Assignee in relation to the Estate on the basis that he should never have been adjudicated a bankrupt. He asserts similar claims against the Official Assignee’s solicitors, who act on the latter’s instructions, The Supreme Court held in Moffitt v Bank of Ireland (Unreported, Supreme Court, 19 February 1999), that a solicitor acting on instructions is merely discharging their professional duties to their client.

This cannot normally give rise to a cause of action by a non-client. b. The gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint is that he should not have been adjudicated, and Applicants cannot act on foot of his adjudication. However, the Applicants were not party to his adjudication in bankruptcy (which was granted on the first defendant’s application). The Official Assignee’s involvement was consequent upon the adjudication and in accordance with the 1988 Act. Both the plaintiff and the Official Assignee (and its solicitors) must comply with the Order of Adjudication.

They cannot go behind the Order of Adjudication, which subjects the Official Assignee to a statutory duty to realise assets for the benefit of the creditors. c. Although the dismissal jurisdiction should only be exercised sparingly, where there is no risk of injustice, in these proceedings the risk of injustice to the plaintiff would arise if the proceedings were to proceed since costs will likely be borne by the Estate which may necessitate the sale of the family home. d. The plaintiff makes serious unfounded allegations of, inter alia, fraud against the Applicants.

In Ó Siodhacháin v O’ Mahony (Unreported, Supreme Court, 7 December 2001), the Court held, in respect of a similar allegation of fraud against a solicitor simply acting on his clients’ behalf, that, even if proved, the acts alleged would not “substantiate so grave an allegation as an allegation of fraud against any person but particularly a solicitor and an officer of this court.” This case is similar. The Official Assignee and his solicitors are both officers of the court, respectively (and faithfully) implementing the Order of Adjudication and the Official Assignee’s instructions. e. the criteria for restraining the plaintiff from issuing fresh proceedings apply.

He shows no sign of ceasing in his unwavering and futile campaign to attack the Order of Adjudication and the officers of the court. Although he was not the party who initiating most of the various applications in the bankruptcy proceedings, overall circumstances and facts of the litigation should be taken into consideration when determining whether to grant an Isaac Wunder order. In Scanlon v Gilligan [2021] IEHC 825, multiple interlocutory applications were considered. Butler J, granting the order, noted that each application depended on its facts and the circumstances of the previous litigation:

“Whilst in general it will not be appropriate to make such an order against a litigant who has not previously instituted proceedings, this is not an invariable rule as the conduct of the litigant in the earlier proceedings may be such that they have de facto become the moving party in the unreasonable or unnecessary extension or prolongation of that litigation.” f. The reliefs sought in the pleadings are not causes of action known in law.

g. The Order of Adjudication stands. The effect of s.44 is that the Estate vested in the Official Assignee upon the plaintiff’s adjudication in bankruptcy. The claim relates to property, which forms part of the Estate. The plaintiff does not have the legal standing to issue these proceedings, which concern the property of the Estate, of which he has been divested by operation of law. h. The 2015 Order of Adjudication followed extensive litigation between the plaintiff and the first defendant, the petitioning creditor. It was made more than nine years ago, is final and, as a matter of law, cannot be challenged. i. The interests of justice lie in the Estate being concluded. The Official Assignee seeks to administer the estate and to return any surplus to the plaintiff. However, the latter shows no sign of accepting the Order of Adjudication and its consequences. The consequence of his unrelenting pursuit of matters already determined by the courts is the further depletion of the Estate, to his detriment and that of creditors. Unless he is restrained from issuing proceedings without the leave of the President of the High Court, the plaintiff is likely to continue to assert the same claims against the same parties which have already been the subject of extensive judicial determination and the costs of defending same will inevitably result in the sale of the family home.

26. The plaintiff’s oral submissions: a. retrace decades old grievances with his ex-wife which gave rose to the Matrimonial Proceedings b. retrace pre-adjudication issues outlined in his affidavit surrounding the alleged discharge of legal fees from his 2001 Matrimonial Proceedings. He says that he tried to pay the sums due, but the first defendant refused to accept payment, concealed this from the Court and instead pursued a well-charging order against him, which, he says, was discharged by March 2005. He also says he attempt to discharge other sums ordered by the court in continuing litigation, but the first defendant again refused payment and that this refusal and concealment constitutes contempt of court. c. reiterate his objection to his adjudication as a bankrupt in 2015, which he says was grounded on the notion he had failed to pay legal fees when this was not the case. (the plaintiff appeared to be under the misapprehension that in the absence of the order of adjudication in 2015 he would have had 12 years to settle the debt as there is a “12­year vacancy when a court doesn’t have to rule on a debt”. But there is no substance to that point). d. State (in response to the Applicants’ suggestion that plenary proceedings are not the correct avenue to challenge the 2015 adjudication) that the adjudication is bad law therefore is open to challenge at any stage. e. retrace his grievances with the dismissal of his appeal on 10 October 2016 of the High Court’s dismissal of his “show cause” application. He says the fourth defendants did not include documents in the books of appeal which demonstrated his attempts to pay the fees and that his attempts to furnish the papers on the day of the hearing were unsuccessful because it was a remote hearing during the Covid 19 restrictions, and he therefore was not prepared to proceed on that day. f. say that any claims taken on foot of the order of adjudication were fraudulent because the adjudication was obtained by concealment of his attempts to discharge the fees. He primarily accused the first and second defendants of fraud but also said that the Applicant’s were aware of the initial fraud and continued to act and this constituted fraud on their part.

g. allege collusion and conspiracy between the first and second defendants to defraud him. He grounds this submission on the basis that, when acting for him, the first defendant adjourned the hearing of one of his applications into the next legal term, he says that this moved the case from one court to another and that they were in contempt of court by doing so. h. say that a hearing to tax the legal costs for which he was liable should not have gone ahead because his then Senior Counsel was supposed to prepare a motion to stay the taxation but did not do so, with the result that the taxation proceeded. (Clearly there is no substance to this point. In the absence of a stay being sought and granted it was perfectly proper for the costs hearing to proceed, but in any event, the plaintiff can hardly resurrect this issue at this remove). i. say that the dispute and wrongful adjudication has had a traumatic effect on him and his family who have given him loans over the course of the litigation leaving them “beggars and paupers”. j. say that the Examiner’s Office overrode the bankruptcy court’s discretion by refusing to accept the form the plaintiff had been directed to file, instead telling him to file a different form though the plaintiff could not elaborate on this issue when asked by me at the hearing. k. say that in 2017, the plaintiff, when resisting the extension application, sought to offer his explanation of the whole event but Costello J did not accept it. l. Say that the Applicants’ replying legal submissions did not arrive within eight weeks of delivery of his statement of claim and therefore are inadmissible and should not be considered by the Court. m. said that O’Moore J from the Bench in other proceedings summed up the position as “that the lawyers deliberately concealed the costs that [the plaintiff] and his family” discharged. (However, he did not provide a meaningful date or reference for this alleged finding when I asked.)

Analysis

27. I have considered all points raised by the plaintiff in his pleadings, affidavit and oral submissions. Many points raised are manifestly mere assertions without substance and I will therefore confine this judgment to the core issues raised by the application.

28. The plaintiff has been agitating the same issues both before and since his adjudication. The courts have repeatedly rejected his attempts to do so but he has ignored those judgments. He is not entitled to do so. He is bound by final rulings which can only be revisited in exceptional circumstances. The broad and unsubstantiated assertions in his pleadings and affidavit fall far short of the standard required to reopen such final determinations.

29. The most obvious reason the proceedings must be struck out is that such claims have vested in the Official Assignee. The plaintiff is reagitating pre-adjudication claims against his former wife and both law firms which acted in the Matrimonial Proceedings and in the proceedings that led to his adjudication as a bankrupt. If there was any basis for such claims, they would form part of his bankrupt estate–such claims are vested in the Official Assignee for the benefit of the creditors. He has no legal standing to bring them (even if there was any merit to them, and I make no such finding). Therefore, s.44 of the 1988 Act precludes his attempt to pursue them, and such claims must be struck out on that ground alone.

30. The plaintiff also seeks to impugn the adjudication, family home and injunction orders. However, all avenues of appeal in respect of those orders were exhausted long ago. He is not entitled to mount a collateral attack on such judgments and orders. Such claims are an abuse of process, vexatious and bound to fail.

31. The plaintiff’s claims against the Official Assignee (and the solicitors and auctioneers he instructed and the parties he sold assets to in the performance of his statutory duty to administer the bankrupt estate) are parasitic on his pre-adjudication claims and his attack on the Order of Adjudication. They are all premised on his refusal to accept the validity of the order adjudicating him bankrupt. He regards the adjudication as having been fraudulently obtained by his former solicitors. On that controversial premise he makes the quantum leap that all other parties involved in the statutory administration of his bankrupt estate were acting unlawfully or even fraudulently. Such bizarre claims are untenable. The adjudication stands and must be respected. There is no basis for the plaintiff’s unjustified and irresponsible claims against the Official Assignee for performing his statutory duties. His claims against the solicitors and auctioneer who acted professionally and appropriately are equally unfair as are his claims against for third parties who dealt with the Official Assignee in good faith.

32. Insufficient particulars are provided of key allegations against the first defendant and the other parties to the Matrimonial Proceedings, nor are his assertions as to “findings” by O’Moore or McKechnie JJ explained or substantiated. Accordingly, the pleadings are deficient as they stand. Such deficiencies could theoretically be cured by an amendment if there was a factual basis for such amendments. However, amendments cannot cure these deficiencies both because of the legal standing issue, and because, even if there is any substance to them (which I have not determined) such claims are statute barred in any event. On his own account, the plaintiff became aware of the supposed misdeeds of other parties in the Matrimonial Proceedings as long ago as 2000 whereas these proceedings were issued in 2024. To the extent that his claims reflect the first and second defendants’ supposed nondisclosure of payments he made to them, resulting in his wrongfully adjudication in 2015 as a bankrupt, the plaintiff has consistently (and unsuccessfully) asserted that that was the position – there is no basis for an extension of the applicable limitation period.

33. I am satisfied that I should strike out the proceedings. Also, in view of the plaintiff’s repeated attempts to relitigate the same issue, to his own detriment as well as that of his estate in bankruptcy and his creditors and the proper administration of the bankruptcy, I will grant the orders sought to protect the Official Assignee and his solicitors from further unfounded litigation and to prevent any further ongoing attacks on the Order of Adjudication in litigation with any party. As well as striking out the proceedings I will make an order restraining the Plaintiff from commencing further proceedings against the Applicants, their servants or agents or from seeking to relitigate claims vested in the Official Assignee (or from seeking to relitigate the adjudication, family home or injunction orders against any parties) unless permission has first been obtained from the President of the High Court.

34. Although I do not expect him to agree, the orders I am making are in the plaintiff’s interests as much as those of the defendants and of his creditors. His misguided attempts to relitigate points which have no hope of success are delaying the bankruptcy, increasing the likelihood that it will be necessary to sell his family home and reducing the size of any surplus ultimately payable to him.

35. I will list the matter for final orders on 20 October 2025 at 10:45am.

APPEARANCES

Mr. John Gaynor, litigant-in-person, the plaintiff.

Mr. Edward Farrelly SC, instructed by Clark Hill Solicitors LLP, for the Applicants.