High Court dismisses plaintiff's strike-out application against solicitors for professional negligence claims.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 472

[Record No. 2024 7010 P]

BETWEEN

ANDREA MONARCA

PLAINTIFF

AND

HAYES SOLICITORS LLP

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger delivered on the 26th day of August 2025.

1. This is the plaintiff's application to strike out the defendant's defence as disclosing no reasonable grounds of defence and/or constituting an abuse of process.

2. The plaintiff has issued proceedings against the defendant for damages for professional negligence arising from what the plaintiff says was negligence, breach of duty, breach of fiduciary duty and reputational harm caused to him when the defendant represented him in legal proceedings brought and settled against his former employer (hereinafter referred to as “the original claims”).

Application to strike out proceedings

3. An application to strike out proceedings involves a jurisdiction to be “sparingly exercised”, as pointed out in Keohane v. Hynes [2014] IESC 66, where the Court said such an application “is not a means for inviting the court to resolve issues on a summary basis”.

4. The plaintiff asserted that the onus of proof in his proceedings does not rest with him, in reliance on the LSRA’s referring, with what he suggests was approval, to his issues with his former solicitors being in the High Court, which he said establishes the merit of his complaints against the defendant. That is not so. As a plaintiff, the burden of proving his case to the court rests on him, just like any plaintiff in civil proceedings seeking damages for negligence, breach of duty etc. Observations made by the LSRA cannot dilute that obligation, other than insofar as the plaintiff may seek to make that part of his case at trial. For the purpose of this interlocutory application, the burden of proof in the substantive case continues to rest on the plaintiff. This is significantly different to the position of the defendant who only has to defend whatever claim the plaintiff succeeds in making, whether by preventing the plaintiff from discharging their burden of proof or where the plaintiff does discharge the burden on him, by the defendant disproving the case the plaintiff has made.

5. The plaintiff, in asserting that the defence fails to disclose any reasonable grounds of defence and/or constitutes an abuse of process, relies on his version of events which he (inevitably subjectively) says proves that his original claims were mismanaged by the defendant. The plaintiff may argue for his version of events to be preferred when it comes to running the trial, but for the purpose of the within application to strike out the defence, the Court must accept the facts as asserted by the defendant. The plaintiff patently does not do so and instead repeatedly seeks to challenge the defendant’s version of events that they assert in their defence.

6. In urging his version of events on the Court as the correct version, the plaintiff relies on, inter alia, documentary evidence including emails and other correspondence. Such documents do not prove themselves and may require to be proved at trial. Evidence may also be required, whether elicited directly or on cross examination, in order to demonstrate the context of those documents. At this preliminary stage in the proceedings, the plaintiff cannot expect the Court to simply prefer his version of what are disputed circumstances, over the defendant’s pleaded version of them, in order to strike out the defendant’s pleaded version of those disputed circumstances.

7. The plaintiff criticises the defendant’s defence for putting him to proof of the validity and/or merits of his original claims. In doing so, the plaintiff seems to misunderstand the need to take the defendant’s evidence as pleaded at their highest in his application to dismiss the defence. The plaintiff asserted that because the defendant advised him that he should bring the original claims, that the defendant must admit the validity of those claims and that the plaintiff cannot be required to prove that part of his case that he asserts were valid and valuable claims. That is not so. The fact that the defendant advised the plaintiff in relation to statutory employment claims against his former employer and agreed to represent him in those claims before the Workplace Relations Commission, does not in itself mean that the defendant is required to admit the validity of those complaints in professional negligence proceedings the plaintiff has now taken against them.

8. Even if the substance of the original claims were valid (which is not a matter for this Court in the within application pursuant to which the Court must take the defendant’s pleaded case at its highest), it does not follow that those claims were worth the cumulative maximum awards that the legislation allows the WRC to make under each and every one of the statutory and other claims that the plaintiff was advised to bring. Nevertheless, that is what the plaintiff has claimed as damages in his proceedings, including 260 weeks remuneration pursuant to what he refers to as his protected disclosure 1 - penalisation claim, an additional 260 weeks for what he refers to as his protected disclosure 2 - unfair dismissal, an additional 104 weeks for his discrimination (disability and nationality) claim, an additional

104 weeks for his bullying/equality/defamation claim and a separately calculated €1,740,000 for what he refers to as Civil Liability and relevant Employment Acts claims that he links to a PIAB application for damages for personal injuries. The defendant has denied those particulars of loss and damage and the plaintiff asks this Court to strike out that denial as bound to fail, as it contradicts the defendant’s previous estimates and legal precedents. This is not a proper basis for striking out the defence to a claim that seeks damages in an amount representing many multiples of the plaintiff’s previous annual employment package.

9. The plaintiff also claims that the defendant failed to advise him on certain litigation options that he says were open to him, including an application for interim relief to the Circuit Court pursuant to his claims under the Protected Disclosures Act. These claims may need to be teased out at trial, again with the possibility of expert evidence, but they do not, in themselves, establish that the defendant’s denial of wrongdoing disclose no reasonable grounds of defence and/or constitute an abuse of process.

10. A further claim that the plaintiff seems to assert cannot be disputed or denied by the defendant arises from his criticism of the defendant’s failure to ensure that he received a reference from his former employer as part of the terms of settlement on which he was advised by the defendant. The defendant denies that they failed to negotiate a fair settlement or advised the plaintiff to accept an inadequate settlement and other related allegations of negligence in relation to the terms of settlement. The terms of settlement did not include a reference and the plaintiff accepts that he read the terms before signing them. He also accepts that he never instructed the defendant to seek a reference as part of that settlement. The plaintiff says he trusted the defendant and that he understood his reputation would be protected. He does not establish a basis for what he seems to assert was his entitlement to a reference or how the defendant could have compelled his former employer to furnish him with a positive reference that would have protected his reputation.

11. There is no automatic entitlement in law to a reference and where a reference is furnished, there may be legal obligations owed to third parties. The issue of a reference, or lack thereof, is an issue on which either or both parties may choose to adduce expert evidence at trial. The fact that the former employer did not furnish a reference could not be construed as such an obvious breach of duty on the part of the plaintiff’s then solicitors, that the defendant is to be denied their right to put those matters at issue in defending the claims made against them.

12. The plaintiff clearly believes in his claims, both against the defendant and his original claims against his former employer, to the point of taking the view that his claim of negligence against the defendant is so obvious as to require no process of proof or permit no challenge from the defendant. This is simply not so. The plaintiff’s belief in his case does not entitle him to strike out the defence without the defendant being afforded the opportunity to put the plaintiff to full proof, including, if necessary, seeking discovery against him, crossexamining him and, if appropriate, adducing their own evidence to establish what they say is the truth of their denials of the allegations of wrongdoing that have been made against them.

13. It is not necessary to outline in this judgment all of the individual pleas in the defence that the plaintiff says should be struck out. Suffice to say that the plaintiff’s case is devoid of any legal or evidential basis, displays a fundamental misunderstanding both of the scope and purpose of pleadings and of the need to take the defendant’s pleaded case at its highest in an application to dismiss pleadings. It falls well short of the high level of proof required for the Court to exercise its rarely exercised jurisdiction to strike out all or part of a defendant’s defence.

14. I, therefore, dismiss this application in its entirety.

Indicative view as to costs

15. As the plaintiff has failed in his application to strike out the proceedings, my indicative view on costs in accordance with s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 is that the defendant is entitled to the costs of this application. I will consider whether a stay should be put on execution of those costs pending the resolution of the proceedings. I will put the matter in at 10am on 15 October 2025 for the making of final orders in relation to this application and to fix a date for the hearing of the other parts of the defendant’s applications for particulars and for discovery, if necessary.

The plaintiff acted for himself.

Counsel for the defendant: Patricia Hill BL