High Court imposes €30,000 fine for contempt of court after defendant breached injunction in IPTV copyright case.

THE HIGH COURT

COMMERCIAL-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY

[2025] IEHC 465

[Record No. 2025/2704P]

BETWEEN

SKY UK LIMITED

PLAINTIFF

AND

DAVID DUNBAR

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Mark Sanfey delivered on the 20th day of August, 2025.

Introduction

1. This judgment concerns applications by the plaintiff for judgment in default of defence and also for committal of the defendant which, for reasons I shall outline below, are the sole remaining issues in the proceedings. The matter was heard by me on 29 July 2025. The defendant attended voluntarily at the hearing, and was represented by solicitor and counsel, as was the plaintiff.

2. The application for committal is based primarily on the breach by the defendant on 21 May 2025 of an order made by me on 16 May 2025 and perfected on 19 May 2025 (“the order”). The defendant accepts that he failed to obey the order, and consented on 29 July 2025 to certain reliefs sought by the plaintiff on foot of a motion for judgment returnable on the same day as the application for committal. Effectively, the judgment awarded to the plaintiff brings the substantive proceedings to an end, save for the application for committal.

3. The plaintiff is a UK-based company which broadcasts TV and radio channels by satellite transmission to receivers installed in homes and via set top boxes across Ireland and the UK. Most notably the channels include Sky Cinema and Sky Sports channels. The plaintiff sells subscription services by which customers can gain access to such channels. The plaintiff is the sole owner of the broadcast copyright in the content transmitted by the plaintiff in the UK and Ireland.

4. The plaintiff alleged in the proceedings that the defendant has provided an internet protocol television (“IPTV”) service called “IPTV is Easy”, and has “[w]rongfully, unlawfully, without the consent or license of the Plaintiff, and in breach of the Plaintiff’s copyright… provided infringing IPTV services and/or subscriptions … to customers including live streams of all of the channels included in Sky’s television subscription services in Ireland and the UK, including the Plaintiff’s live sports and cinema broadcasts” [para. 14, statement of claim]. The defendant accepts the substance of these allegations.

The Proceedings and Orders

5. The proceedings were initiated by plenary summons on 16 May 2025, and on that date the plaintiff made an application to this court on foot of an ex parte docket which set out various reliefs sought by the plaintiff. In summary, the plaintiff sought an order compelling the defendant to cease all acts infringing or facilitating the infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright; the plaintiff also sought relief of an Anton Piller nature allowing persons nominated by the plaintiff to attend on behalf of the plaintiff at the defendant’s home to inspect, detain and preserve hard drives or other devices used to effect the alleged infringement. The plaintiff also sought various orders compelling the defendant to cooperate with the plaintiff’s representatives and provide them with information, devices or other property which would elucidate the nature and extent of the defendant’s activities. The plaintiff sought Mareva relief which would restrain the defendant from dealing with his assets “until such time as the Court shall deem meet or pending further Order of the Court” [para. 9, ex parte docket].

6. The application was grounded upon the affidavit of Damien Gilmore sworn on 15 May 2025. Mr. Gilmore is the “Anti-Piracy Investigations Manager” for Ireland employed by Sky Subscribers Services Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff. His affidavit set out in considerable detail how the defendant came to the plaintiff’s attention, and the steps which were taken by the plaintiff to investigate the defendant’s activities. Mr. Gilmore described the defendant, at para. 53 of his affidavit, as “an IPTV Reseller, who sells IPTV subscriptions to his customers, and to sub-sellers who sell subscriptions on his behalf, for a cut of the profit. The Defendant provides his customers with (a) details of the apps to download onto a streaming device (e.g. an Amazon Fire stick) and (b) personalised login details for the apps. Via these apps, the end-user has access to thousands of TV channels from Ireland, UK, Europe and beyond”. Further affidavits were sworn by Colin Hulme, a solicitor based in Scotland, who provided details of his firm’s work with the plaintiff in Scotland in relation to search and seizure orders. Sean McElligott, a partner in the plaintiff’s solicitors, also swore an affidavit addressing the necessity for Anton Piller relief.

7. Mr. McElligott referred at para. 19 of his affidavit to certain safeguards which are necessary to protect a defendant’s interests where an Anton Piller order has been granted, and on behalf of the plaintiff confirmed at para. 20 that certain undertakings were offered in relation to damages and the retention and safe custody of articles, files, devices, documents and/or other property taken by or delivered to the plaintiff pursuant to the court order. Mr. McElligott also averred that courts “usually require that the execution of the Order is supervised by an independent solicitor experienced in the area” [para. 23], and nominated for this purpose Mr. Philip Andrews, a practising solicitor and founder of Andrews Law. In this regard, Mr. McElligott also prepared a list of suitably qualified solicitors from whom the defendant might wish to seek legal advice, to be presented to the defendant so that he could take legal advice as soon as possible [para. 26].

8. Having heard the application, the court was satisfied to make orders, the relevant portions of which are as follows: “IT IS ORDERED pursuant to s.45 Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 and/or the inherent jurisdiction and/or inherent powers of this Honourable Court that the hearing of the within proceedings be otherwise than in public pending further Order AND IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant his servants or agents:

a) Immediately cease all acts which infringe or which facilitate infringement of the Plaintiff’s broadcast copyright whether through the provision of IPTV services or otherwise AND IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant do forthwith:

b) Allow the persons detailed in the Appendix hereto to enter onto the Defendant’s property at 18 Manor Crescent, Roxborough Manor, Co. Wexford Y35 K28R on

21 May 2025 between the hours of 9am and 6pm for the purposes of taking all steps necessary for the inspection, detention, removal, and preservation (including creating an image of the contents of all software (including panel software), hard drives, digital media devices and any servers to which they are connected), copying material stored in any cloud storage facilities and changing the passwords or passcodes on any cloud storage facilities, servers or other devices to allow said images and copies to be made without the risk of deletion of any material of all documents, devices, and property which evidence infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright and/or the Defendant’s profit therefrom

c) Provide the persons detailed in the Appendix hereto with access to information stored on any servers, computers, laptops, tablets, smartphones, computer discs, tapes, drives, memory cards, memory sticks, CDs, DVDs, removable storage devices, media accessed on hosted online servers and cloud-based storage facilities (including but not limited to any personal email accounts) or other computer readable media owned or used by the Defendant by supplying or providing the means to overcome any and all security mechanisms (such as passwords and two-factor authentication methods) inhibiting access thereto

d) Allow the persons detailed in the Appendix hereto to remain in the property until such time as the search is complete, including allowing them to continue the search on subsequent days if necessary

e) Inform the persons detailed in the Appendix hereto immediately of the whereabouts of all documents, devices, and property which evidence infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright and/or the Defendant’s profit therefrom

f) Provide the persons detailed in the Appendix to this Order with a list of the names and addresses and other contact details including telephone numbers, email addresses and/or online aliases of any persons to whom the Defendant, or any of his servants or agents, has given access to any of the documents, devices, and/or property which evidence infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright and/or the Defendant’s profit therefrom

g) Preserve all documentation, devices, and property, whether stored in computer database or held in hard copy, which refer to or concern in any way the claimed acts of infringement the subject matter of the proceedings, and not to part with the possession, custody or control of any such documents and/or property (otherwise than in accordance with the terms of any Order of this Honourable Court) and not to hide, modify, alter, deface, cancel, destroy or otherwise tamper with any such documents and/or property pending the determination of the proceedings herein

h) Refrain from removing or in any way disposing of, reducing, transferring, charging, diminishing the value thereof or otherwise dealing with all or any of his assets wheresoever situate save and insofar as necessary for normal day-to-day expenses and for the purpose of taking legal advice, until such time as the Court shall deem meet or pending further Order of the Court”.

9. It was ordered that Mr. Andrews “be directed to supervise the execution of the Orders herein and to prepare a report detailing the execution of the Orders herein…”. The defendant was ordered not to disclose “to any persons other than his legal advisors any of the information contained in the redacted portions of the affidavits of Damien Gilmore, Sean McElligott and Colin Hulme, and the exhibits thereto, until further Order…”. The plaintiff was given liberty to issue and serve a notice of motion seeking entry to the commercial list and a further motion seeking interlocutory injunctive and related relief returnable for 26 May 2025. The court listed the matter for mention on Thursday 22 May 2025 so that the court could be apprised as to how the orders were carried into effect on 21 May 2025.

Events of 21 May 2025

10. By an affidavit of 22 May 2025, Mr. Andrews, the solicitor appointed by the court to supervise the execution of the order of 16 May 2025, set out what occurred on that date. He described arriving at the defendant’s property as set out in the order (“the premises”) at 11.16am on Wednesday 21 May 2025. A man opened the door and confirmed that he was the defendant. Mr. Andrews avers that he introduced himself and explained that he had been appointed by the court as an independent solicitor to ensure fairness and reasonableness of the process of the execution of the order. He explained to the defendant that the plaintiff had obtained the order entitling the persons listed in the appendix to the order to enter and inspect the premises in the context of the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant was in breach of the plaintiff’s copyright. Mr. Andrews explained to the defendant that the persons accompanying him were the persons named in the appendix, and those persons introduced themselves to the defendant.

11. According to Mr. Andrews, the defendant “appeared to remain composed”, but “asserted that he would not permit entry to the Premises if [a member of An Garda Síochána] was not present” [Paras. 5 - 6, affidavit]. Mr. Andrews confirmed that no member of An Garda Síochána was present “as the Order was made by [the court] in the context of civil proceedings”; however, the defendant did not permit entry to the premises. Mr. Andrews avers that he explained the nature of the order to the defendant in layman’s terms and emphasised the seriousness of the matter, explaining that refusal to comply with the order would likely be considered as contempt of court, “… and that there could potentially be significant penalties including potential imprisonment” [para. 8].

12. Mr. Andrews avers that the defendant “confirmed his understanding of the Order and the context, however, again he refused to permit us access to the Property”. He avers that he explained to the defendant that “…the Court had been persuaded by the nature of the Plaintiff’s evidence that there was likely to be further evidence in the Premises which would corroborate the allegations being made by the Plaintiff in the proceedings”, and “that the Court had been satisfied that there was a risk that such evidence would be destroyed if notice of the Order had been given to the Defendant in advance. I explained that it was for those reasons that this Honourable Court had made the Order granting the persons listed in the Appendix access to the Premises, and that there could be penalties for not granting such access as ordered by the Court” [para. 9]. Notwithstanding these efforts, the defendant “repeated that he would not grant access to the premises…” [para. 10]. Mr. Andrews made some further attempts to explain “in layman’s terms” that the order authorised access to the premises. He avers that he served the defendant with a “Book of Papers For Service” prepared by the plaintiff’s solicitors; he opened the book and showed the defendant the copy of the order and explained the order to him in layman’s terms. Mr. Andrews avers that he “explained to the Defendant that the Order imposed obligations on him not to destroy any evidence or tip-off any of his agents as to the terms of the Order” [para. 11].

13. Mr. Andrews avers that the defendant accepted the book, but reiterated that he would not permit Mr. Andrews or his colleagues access to the premises. Mr. Andrews avers that the defendant “confirmed to me that he understood the consequences of his ongoing refusal to allow us access to the Premises … I again informed him that his refusal could be considered a contempt of court and potentially lead to imprisonment. The Defendant said that he was aware that he could be in contempt of court but, notwithstanding that he would not permit us to access the premises” [para. 14]. Mr. Andrews offered to provide the defendant with a list of three solicitors. He says that the defendant confirmed that he had a solicitor, but did not offer the name of that solicitor, and again refused entry to the premises.

14. Ultimately, Mr. Andrews formed the view that further discussion with the defendant was unlikely to be fruitful, and reminded the defendant that the order included “very clear obligations on the Defendant not to destroy, tamper, or interfere with any assets or evidence that might serve as corroborating evidence of the Plaintiff’s allegations in the proceedings, or to tip off any of his agents as to the terms of the Order” [para. 18]. The defendant confirmed that he understood but that he would not allow Mr. Andrews or his colleagues to enter the premises.

15. Mr. Andrews avers that he made a second attempt to execute the order. At approximately 16.50pm, he returned to the premises with other persons listed in the appendix to the order. He again engaged with the defendant, who said that he had not yet spoken to his solicitor, and that until he did so, he would not permit entry to the premises. Mr. Andrews pointed out that the matter was due to come before the court on 22 May 2025 at 10.30am, and that the plaintiff would be applying to issue and serve a notice of motion seeking an attachment and committal order against the defendant. Mr. Andrews explained what this meant, and in particular that it “could potentially lead to imprisonment in the event that he failed to purge his contempt of court” [para. 22].

16. Mr. Andrews avers that at approximately 16.53pm, “…we departed the Defendant’s property, when it became clear that no further progress could be made” [para. 24].

The Subsequent Applications to Court

17. On 22 May 2025, the plaintiff appeared before the court to update it as to what had occurred the previous day. On the application of the plaintiff, the order pursuant to s.45 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 was lifted with immediate effect. At the request of the plaintiff, the court ordered that the plaintiff be at liberty to issue and serve a notice of motion for attachment and committal returnable for Monday 26 May 2025. Appropriate orders were made in relation to the service of this motion.

18. The motion for attachment and committal of the defendant duly issued on 22 May 2025. It was grounded upon the affidavit of Mr. Andrews, and further affidavits from Mr. Gilmore and Mr. McElligott. Mr. Gilmore swore an affidavit on 22 May 2025 in relation to the monitoring by the plaintiff of the “IPTV is easy” app and the Telegram support group to which he had referred at para. 59 of his affidavit of 15 May 2025. Telegram is a messaging app, and Mr. Gilmore had referenced the group as being “a collection of customers [the defendant] has acquired where he manages renewals, technical issues and service updates personally through his Telegram user “087 690 0140”. This group currently has 543 members…”. Investigations by the plaintiff’s investigators suggested that, by the afternoon of

21 May 2025, the IPTV is Easy app was no longer operational. Likewise, by 13.59pm on 21 May, the plaintiff’s investigators “observed that the Telegram group had disappeared, and that he could no longer access the group in his list of Telegram groups, nor could he see the messages in the group” [para. 11].

19. At para. 13 of his affidavit of 22 May 2025, Mr. Gilmore avers as follows: “I say and believe the Defendant, by terminating subscriptions and, ostensibly deleting the Telegram group, is clearly taking steps to hide or destroy evidence of his IPTV service. It remains unclear, whether the Defendant terminated the subscriptions of all his customers, or only a portion of the customers, and similarly, whether the Telegram group was deleted, or if the Defendant simply removed a portion of the customers, perhaps having identified the covert identity created on behalf of the Plaintiff. In light of the Defendant’s actions Sky no longer has any way of assessing whether the Defendant’s IPTV service remains operational.”

20. Mr. McElligott swore a further affidavit on 22 May 2025. Mr. McElligott had been present when Mr. Andrews attempted to gain access to the property on 21 May, and confirmed Mr. Andrews’ account of his engagement with the defendant. He expressed his view that the defendant was in contempt of the order of 16 May 2025, “…and further knows that he is in contempt of the said Order, as it was explained to him that refusing the parties identified in the Appendix to the Order access to his property would constitute a contempt of the said Order” [para. 30].

21. On 26 May 2025, the court admitted the proceedings to the commercial list, and permitted the defendant to file and deliver an affidavit by 1pm on Friday 30 May 2025. The matter was listed for mention on Tuesday 3 June 2025. The defendant was ordered to appear before the court in person. Subsequently, a firm of solicitors entered an appearance for the defendant on 28 May 2025.

The Defendant’s Affidavits

22. Subsequent to the court’s order of 26 May 2025, the defendant swore three affidavits in response to the attachment and committal application: these were sworn on 3 June 2025,

18 June 2025 and 1 July 2025.

23. At para. 3 of the first affidavit, the defendant apologises to the court for “the manner in which I responded to the attempts made by and on behalf of [the plaintiff] to execute the Order of this Honourable Court dated 16 May 2025”. At para. 4 he states as follows: “It has been explained to me by solicitor and counsel that in refusing to allow the Defendant to execute the Order of this Honourable Court dated 16 May 2025 on Wednesday, 21 May 2025, I failed to comply with the Order and that failure is an extremely serious matter having regard to the solemn nature of the Court Order. I am extremely anxious to purge my failure to comply with the Order.”

24. The inference which the defendant invites the reader to draw from this paragraph is that it was not until he was informed by his solicitor and counsel that he realised that his refusal to allow the plaintiff to execute the order of the court was a failure to comply with that order and that this was “an extremely serious matter”. This is inconsistent with the firm view expressed by Mr. Andrews and Mr. McElligott that the consequences of refusing to allow the plaintiff’s representatives access to the premises were clearly explained to him “in layman’s terms”, and were understood by him. He refers in the affidavit to inviting the plaintiff, through his solicitor, to attend on the premises so that he could “make over to the [Plaintiff] any device in my possession that may progress their investigation” [para. 5]. He notes that the plaintiff rejected this approach, as the view of the plaintiff was that “…given that I had over a week during which I could have destroyed any relevant evidence, it would be insufficient for the purpose of purging my contempt to merely allow the Defendant to carry out the search now” [para. 6].

25. The defendant then went on to deal with specific enquiries which had been raised by the plaintiff’s solicitors by letter of Monday 26 May 2025. These particulars sought by the plaintiff included particulars of the way in which the defendant operated his IPTV service, the identities of the parties who supplied him with access to the service, and the identities of those who sold or redistributed services on his behalf, as well as the identities of his customers. In this regard, he indicated that he was unable to provide a list of customers; that he had approximately 15 resellers, none of whom were known to him personally, although he listed their Telegram screen names “as I recall them”, but said that he no longer had access to his Telegram account. He identified “MBM” (“My Boom Media”) as the supplier of the service which he sold to customers, stating that “[t]heir reseller’s Discord, which I was a member of, had 3 server owners, 16 staff members and approx. 300+ resellers reselling directly for MBM. I have never met the owner of this service in person. I was recommended to him by a reseller I had met in a telegram group called “IPTV Resellers Market” in 2020. We got to chatting and he agreed I could begin to purchase services off him for resale” [para. 10].

26. The defendant answered queries in the letter of 26 May 2025 in relation to documentation relating to infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright and the manner in which he was paid for his services. The letter also included in a schedule “precise details of matters that need to be addressed in detail by the Defendant in his affidavit … [f]ull details of the nature, scope and extent of his infringing activities is required and … we would expect that the affidavit be as exhaustive as possible in terms of setting out both (i) the information and other evidence which could have been preserved had the Defendant complied with the Court’s Order dated 16 May 2025; and (ii) all actions which the Defendant has taken on and since 21 May 2025 which involved or may have involved a breach of any element of the Court’s Order dated 16 May 2025.”

27. The defendant provided a response to the various queries set out in the schedule.

28. More information was given in the defendant’s affidavit of 18 June 2025. At para. 4 of that affidavit, he avers as follows: “Regrettably, on the 21 [May] 2025, your Deponent, in a state of panic, as a result of the attendance of agents of the Plaintiff outside my home in their attempt to execute the High Court order, did not give them access.”

29. The defendant goes on to aver as follows: “5. I say that I then immediately and without the benefit of legal advice, reinstalled windows on my desktop computer, thereby reformatting the computer. The effect of this action was to delete all data contained on the computer’s hard drive. Your Deponent now realises and acknowledges that this action was performed in contravention and contempt of an Order of this Honourable Court …”

30. At para. 8 of that affidavit, the defendant acknowledges terminating his Telegram account, “…which had the effect of deleting all message history …”. He acknowledges also that he deleted his primary group for communicating with his resellers (“Dave and Ange’s Reseller Group”), and the “IPTV is Easy customer group”, which he says was his primary group for communicating with his customers. He gives further information in relation to the Telegram group of which he was a member, but to which he no longer has access as a result of deleting his account.

31. At para. 12 of his affidavit, he acknowledges that, in the immediate aftermath of the plaintiff’s representatives attending at his home, he “contacted and sought the advice and assistance of MBM (the service provider) via Discord’s raise a ticket system. Your Deponent was immediately blocked, removed from all groups mentioned and both my and my customer’s [sic] access to the panel and the service was immediately cut off. I was removed from every other communication channel linked to the provider relating to the copyright infringing services.”

32. At para. 19 of his affidavit, the defendant gives an estimate of income generated by him between 2018 and 2024, which amounts to €455,000. The defendant goes on to provide detail – in as far as he is able – in relation to resellers with whom he worked, and the names of his customers [paras. 21 - 22]. He then avers, at para. 23 of his affidavit, that “since the within proceedings commenced before this Honourable Court, your Deponent has become the victim of credible threats to both the physical welfare of your Deponent as well as your Deponent’s family …”.

33. The defendant swore a third affidavit on 1 July 2025. This was a response to the plaintiff’s letter of 20 June 2025 raising specific queries in relation to a number of matters, much of it in relation to financial information. At para. 22 of his affidavit, he avers as follows: “At Hyundai Bolands in Wexford on 20th February 2025, I placed a deposit of €5121.00 through a card payment from my Revolut Account at the car sales location for a 2022 Black Santa Fe (Reg 221WX231). I followed this up with a further transaction from the account of €40000 and then an additional €300 (My 2011 Renault scenic had zero trade in Value after being originally valued at 300 when arranging the sale). This brought the car purchase to €45421.00. This car has since been sold on 19th June at SMC Car sales in Naas, at a considerable loss, to raise funds to fund the case currently before this Honourable Court, after repayment of debts to family members who had provided me with funds initially, as I have no other means at this time to fund the case.”

34. At para. 46 of his affidavit, the defendant revises his figures for profit between 2018 to 2024 slightly to give an increased figure for 2023 and 2024, resulting in a total income from resellers and service users who bought directly from the defendant for the period 2018- 2024 of €480,000.

35. Having given responses to a further schedule attached to the letter from the plaintiff’s solicitor of 20 June 2025, the defendant concludes his affidavit by offering assistance to the plaintiff “where possible in walking them through the information that I have provided and answering any questions to the best of my ability”. He emphasises that he is “seeking to engage completely and transparently” [paras. 50 – 51].

36. As regards his financial situation he says that “I do not have the means to continue with a long legal action and have indicated to my representation that I will not have the means to enter a Defence in this case and intend not to. My financial position outlined in the supporting documents will reflect this … My position in my job is under review given the negative publicity released in recent days. I can soon see a situation where I may be unemployed, which will further reduce my ability to pay for legal representation, costs or any subsequent damages awarded by the court. This is assuming my contempt of the High Court Order can be purged or purged enough to avoid a committal to imprisonment…” [paras. 51 – 53].

The Present Application

37. The parties appeared before the court on 3 July 2025, and had agreed a proposed timetable in respect of the hearing of the attachment and committal motion. It was also indicated on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff wished to issue a notice of motion for judgment in default of defence, given the defendant’s assertion that he did not intend to defend the proceedings. Accordingly, the court made orders for exchange of affidavits and submissions, and it was ordered that the present application would be heard on 29 July 2025.

38. The plaintiff submitted that it required to deliver an amended notice of motion for attachment and committal which would take account of the information which the defendant had supplied in his three affidavits to the court. The defendant accepted that this was appropriate, and an amended notice of motion issued on 8 July 2025. This was grounded upon a third affidavit by Mr. Gilmore sworn on 8 July 2025. In the event, the defendant swore a brief replying affidavit on 16 July 2025.

39. The grounds set out in the notice of motion on foot of which the plaintiff sought the committal of the defendant were as follows: “a. By reason of his breach of an Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Sanfey made on the 16th day of May 2025 and perfected on the 19th day of May 2025 (the “Order”) by:

i) Breaching the Order that … the proceedings be otherwise than in public by, inter alia, informing the persons who supplied the Defendant with infringing material via Discord and/or any other persons otherwise howsoever of the existence of the fact that the Plaintiff was seeking to execute Anton Piller relief.

(ii) Refusing to allow persons detailed in the Appendix to the Order to enter onto the Defendant’s property at 18 Manor Crescent, Roxborough Manor, Co. Wexford on 21 May 2025 at approximately 11.16, in breach of paragraph b) of the Order.

(iii) Again refusing to allow persons detailed in the Appendix to the Order to enter onto the Defendant’s property on 21 May 2025 at approximately

16.50 in breach of paragraph b) of the Order.

(iv) Failing to provide persons detailed in the Appendix to the Order with access to information in breach of paragraph c) of the Order.

(v) Failing to allow persons detailed in the Appendix to the Order to remain in the property in breach of paragraph d) of the order.

(vi) Refusing to inform persons detailed in the Appendix to the Order of the whereabouts of all documents, devices, and property which evidence infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright, in breach of paragraph e) of the Order.

(vii) Refusing to provide persons detailed in the Appendix to the Order with a list of names, addresses, and other contact details of persons to whom the Defendant had given access to documents, devices, etc which evidence infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright, in breach of paragraph f) of the Order.

(viii) Failing to preserve all documentation, devices, and property which refer to or concern the Defendant’s infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright in breach of paragraph g) of the Order.

(ix) Actively taking steps to hide, modify, alter, deface, cancel, destroy and/or tamper with evidence in breach of paragraph g) of the Order.

(x) Actively taking steps to remove and/or dispose of, reduce, transfer, diminish and/or otherwise deal with the Defendant’s assets beyond that which is necessary for normal day-to-day expenses and for the purpose of taking legal advice, in breach of paragraph h) of the Order, including, inter alia, converting his Revolut account balance into Bitcoin and transferring that balance to an undisclosed account; transferring the balance of his Binance account to an undisclosed account; and selling his Hyundai Santa Fe with registration 221-WX-231.

(xi) Disclosing to Mr. Thomas Quigley information contained in redacted portions of the affidavits of Damien Gilmore, Sean McElligott and/or Colin Hulme, and/or the exhibits thereto, in breach of the Order.

b. By reason of his contempt of the court by:

(i) Lying and/or lying by omission and/or providing incomplete, false and/or misleading information in his affidavit sworn and filed on 03 June 2025.

(ii) Lying and/or lying by omission and/or providing incomplete, false and/or misleading information in his affidavit sworn on 18 June 2025 and filed on 27 June 2025.

(iii) Lying and/or lying by omission and/or providing incomplete, false and/or misleading information in his affidavit sworn on 1 July 2025 and filed on 4 July 2025.”

Affidavit Grounding the Contempt Application

40. In his affidavit of 8 July 2025 grounding the amended application, Mr. Gilmore provided more detail of the basis upon which an order for the attachment and committal of the defendant was sought. At para. 14 of his affidavit, he suggested that there were seven grounds of contempt:

(1) refusal to allow access to the premises on 21 May 2025;

(2) alerting MBM to the existence of the Anton Piller Order, which the plaintiff maintains was a “breach of the in camera rule, and also led to very substantial destruction of evidence”;

(3) “Destruction of evidence”: the plaintiff alleges that the defendant “proactively destroyed evidence, by shutting down Telegram and other social media accounts, closing his Revolut account, and reformatting his PC…”;

(4) “Doctoring Binance Account Statement”: Mr. Gilmore avers that the defendant “has admitted to having “obscured” an entry on the Binance Account Statement exhibited to his Second Affidavit, which he tried to pass off as true and accurate evidence, and by which he attempted to conceal a breach of the Mareva Order…”;

(5) “Dissipating funds from Revolut account”: Mr. Gilmore avers that “[t]he Defendant converted the balance of his Revolut account into Bitcoin and then transferred that Bitcoin to an unidentified account, in breach of the Mareva Order…”;

(6) “Selling car in breach of Mareva Order”: Mr. Gilmore avers that the defendant “has admitted to selling his Hyundai Santa Fe car, which he purchased for EUR 45,451.00 in February 2025, at a loss. By selling his single most valuable unencumbered asset the Defendant has engaged in a further breach of the Mareva Order…”;

(7) “Disclosing Confidential Information to Thomas Quigley”: according to Mr. Gilmore, Thomas Quigley, who was one of the defendant’s resellers, advised the plaintiff that the defendant showed him a book of affidavits prepared by the plaintiff’s solicitors which included unredacted material, in contravention of an order of this Court compelling the defendant not to disclose information in the redacted portions of the affidavits of Damien Gilmore, Seán McElligott and Colin Hulme to anyone other than his legal advisers.

41. At paras. 56 to 92 of his affidavit, Mr. Gilmore sets out at length the circumstances of each of the foregoing matters and the reasons for the plaintiff’s conclusions that they each constitute an instance of contempt of court.

42. In relation to the alleged “tipping off” of MBM, Mr. Gilmore avers that the defendant shared confidential details of the plaintiff’s operation with MBM by way of a telephone call made on the Discord app which led directly to the destruction of evidence to which Sky was entitled under the Anton Piller Order including access to and screenshots of the plaintiff’s IPTV panel; loss of the email addresses for all of the defendant’s end users; loss of access to all servers for IPTV-related activities due to this being shut down by the provider and server owners; and loss of access to the MBM Discord Group and access to any of Mr. Dunbar’s tickets relating to MBM [see para. 60].

43. The plaintiff contends, on the basis of admissions by the defendant, that he reformatted his desktop PC, thereby destroying any information on that device. He closed and deleted his Telegram account; at para. 8 of his second affidavit, the defendant admits deleting the two Telegrams groups which were his primary groups for contacting resellers and customers. The plaintiff refers to the defendant admitting in the annex to his first affidavit to “routinely deleting text messages and emails”, and further contends that the defendant has not responded to a request from the plaintiff for a step-by-step account of the actions he took to destroy evidence subsequent to the service on him of the order of the court on 21 May 2025 [para. 66, affidavit].

44. The plaintiff interrogated records supplied by the defendant in relation to his Binance account, discovering that the defendant had access to the account on 21 May 2025 “seven times between 15.33 and 19.59” [para. 69, affidavit], and overall on 31 occasions between being served with the order and 18 June 2025, the date to which it would appear the Binance statement of account was prepared. In a letter of 20 June 2025, the plaintiff’s solicitors expressed “serious concerns that Mr Dunbar has modified the Binance Account Spreadsheet in order to conceal the amount he withdrew from the account on 21 May 2025.” The defendant subsequently admitted at para. 11 of his third affidavit that he “attempted to obscure” the fact that he had sent funds from his Binance account on 21 May 2025 to an unidentified account in the amount of 319.84 USD.

45. Mr. Gilmore concludes as follows in relation to this issue: “78. Mr Dunbar lied on affidavit, provided false evidence in the form of the doctored Binance Account Statement exhibited to his Second Affidavit, and attempted to pass that false evidence off as a true statement of account, with the clear intention of misleading both Sky and the Court. On foot of this, it is unfortunately clear that Mr Dunbar is perfectly willing to lie on affidavit and the credibility of all evidence provided by Mr Dunbar across his three affidavits is therefore in doubt. That Mr Dunbar would willingly lie on affidavit in the context of an ostensible attempt to purge his admitted contempt of Court unfortunately evidences his complete contempt of, and disregard for, this Court’s Orders and the entire Court process.”

46. At paras. 86 to 89 of his affidavit, Mr. Gilmore refers to the sale by the defendant of his car, which the plaintiff contends was a breach of the Mareva order. The defendant referred to this at paras. 20 to 22 of his third affidavit, claiming that the sale of the car “at a considerable loss” was carried out “to raise funds to fund the case currently before this Honourable Court, after repayment of debts to family members”. The plaintiff complains of the absence of any evidence of the price for which the car was sold, or accounting for how the proceeds were disbursed.

Financial Information

47. In his third affidavit, Mr. Gilmore gives considerable detail in relation to Sky’s interrogation of the financial information furnished by the defendant. The plaintiff contends that the defendant received payment from customers through Revolut or PayPal; the defendant exhibited some Revolut statements from 2021 to 2025 which suggested that he was receiving payment from customers up until 20 May 2025 through this medium. In his third affidavit, the defendant admitted to closing his Revolut account on 22 May 2025, the day after the attendance by the plaintiff’s representatives at his premises. The plaintiff states that the defendant “provided limited PayPal statements with his Second Affidavit”, having used that system also for payments from customers.

48. The defendant admitted to using Binance, a cryptocurrency exchange, as part of his activities. The plaintiff complains that, while certain documentation relating to the defendant’s account history from 16 December 2022 was made available, the “Binance wallet transaction history” was not provided. From the information provided, the plaintiff determined that three accounts in particular had transferred money for “large total sums” to the defendant’s Binance account. The defendant however claimed in his third affidavit not to be able to provide any information as to the identity of the sender in any of these three instances; the plaintiff considered that it is “unbelievable that Mr Dunbar cannot recall the owners of and the purpose behind, at the very least, the three source addresses above from which he has received between 35 and 88 transfers over the past 2.5 years” [para. 24].

49. The findings from the evidence to which Mr. Gilmore avers in his affidavit are summarised as follows at paras. 49 and 50 of the plaintiff’s written submissions: “49. …[I]n the affidavit of Damien Gilmore, sworn on 08 July, under the heading “Financial Information”, Mr. Gilmore provides a very thorough analysis of the many shortcomings of the financial information which the Defendant has provided for the purpose of purging his contempt. He identifies, inter alia, €21,124 in transfers to accounts in the Defendant’s name from his Revolut account that he has failed to account for; €40,521 in payments into the Defendant’s PTSB joint current account from at least one other account in the Defendant’s name that he has failed to account for; €48,470 in cash lodgements to the PTSB joint current account that the Defendant has failed to account for; €26,230 in payments from “CT Worldpay AP” into the PTSB joint current account that the defendant has failed to account for; €66,698.65 transferred from, and €38,185.27 transferred to, an account called “INET 24 Fr 6569” that the Defendant has failed to account for; and a Reddit post from the Defendant’s account on 1 February 2025 where the Defendant says he has “about 50ish k put away for college” for his children that the Defendant has failed to account for.

50. Mr. Gilmore then goes on to detail an investigation of the Defendant’s gambling accounts. Incredibly, the Defendant has placed 180,865 bets on Bet365, and Mr. Gilmore avers that the total stakes placed add up to €1,114,125.43, generating returns of €1,143,952.95, across a period from 24 August 2022 and 19 May 2025. The Defendant withdrew €105,535 from his Bet365 account between October 2023 and May 2025, of which €29,081 has been transferred to undisclosed accounts. Further, of the €74,250 withdrawn from the Defendant’s Boylesports account, approximately €5,000 of that is unaccounted for in the accounts provided to date by the Defendant. The Defendant also appears to maintain a [Ladbrokes] betting account that he has failed to disclose.

51. The scale of the Defendant’s gambling, together with the large sums of money moving to and from the Defendant’s accounts, and to and from undisclosed accounts, are inconsistent with the Defendant’s (unexplained and uncorroborated) contention that his total profits from 2018 to 2024 are in the order of €480,000 from his copyright infringing activities. The Defendant had the opportunity to address these inconsistencies in his affidavit of 16 July 2025, but incredibly he says nothing at all about the allegation that he has further bank and betting accounts that he has failed to disclose.”

The Defendant’s Fourth Affidavit

50. The defendant swore a fourth affidavit in response to the contempt application and the third affidavit of Mr. Gilmore. The text of the affidavit is barely two pages long. The affidavit is notable for its almost complete lack of engagement with the detail of Mr. Gilmore’s affidavit.

51. At para. 5 of his affidavit, the defendant draws attention to the apology in his first affidavit “for the manner in which I responded to the attempts made by and on behalf of [the plaintiff] to execute the Order of this Honourable Court…”, and his acknowledgement at para. 4 of that affidavit of his failure to comply with the order, the seriousness of that failure, and the fact that he was “extremely anxious to purge [his] failure to comply with the Order”. He also refers to para. 5 of his first affidavit, in which he instructed his solicitors to write – on

29 May 2025 – to the plaintiff’s solicitors inviting them to attend at his home “for the purposes of carrying out the Anton Piller Order”.

52. At para. 7 of his affidavit, the defendant avers as follows: “I say that I have endeavoured to provide the Plaintiff with as much information as possible through my three previous Affidavits to remedy the damage caused by my admitted breach of the said Order of this Honourable Court and so purge my contempt. I say that I have explained on Affidavit why I sold my car. I say that I am unable to respond to the matters referrable to Thomas Quigley because they are being relayed to me second hand and include supposition and deduction by Mr Gilmore.”

53. I should say that, in relation to the “matters referrable to Thomas Quigley”, I do not accept that, because what Mr. Quigley said is being relayed “second hand” to the defendant, he is “unable to respond” to what Mr. Gilmore says. The allegation is that he showed Mr. Quigley documents in contravention of the court order; if he did not, he can certainly aver as to his own actions, and deny the allegation. However, at the hearing before this Court, the defendant’s counsel suggested that the defendant “loses nothing by raising this point because he has already accepted he breached the order in terms of … showing matters that were subject to the in camera order to other people…” [pp. 94 - 95, transcript].

54. The defendant refers to his consenting to judgment, averring that he has “consented to the Plaintiff circumventing of the Rules of this Honourable Court and proceeding to issue a Motion for Judgement in Default of Defence on the 8th July 2025, one day before the Plaintiff delivered its Statement of Claim” [para. 8]. The defendant goes on to explain the basis upon which he is consenting to judgment. The defendant’s concluding paragraph is as follows: “12. I say that I have fully accepted my breaches and have attempted to purge my contempt. The Plaintiff, notwithstanding my admissions and attitude to the substantive proceedings, is proceeding with the application to make a finding of criminal contempt in respect of me and to impose punitive orders upon me. I say that this Honourable Court should take all of the aforementioned matters into account in its assessment in any fine which it may choose to ley [sic] upon me for my admitted breach.”

The Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment

55. The plaintiff issued a motion for judgment in default of defence on 8 July 2025, the defendant having indicated that he would not oppose the making of orders in this regard. The motion was heard by me at the outset of the hearing on 29 July 2025.

56. The plaintiff had sought an order pursuant to Order 27, Rule 9 of the Rules of the Superior Courts for judgment in default of defence. The defendant did not agree to a general order being made in these terms, nor would he consent to the plaintiff’s claim for aggravated and/or exemplary damages. The plaintiff did not press this claim; as counsel for the plaintiff remarked during the hearing: “…[H]aving regard to the Defendant’s disclosed means, it doesn’t appear to the Plaintiff that there would be much utility in pursuing a punitive and exemplary damages, or an aggravated and exemplary damages award if it’s not going to be possible for the Plaintiff to recover even the €480,000 to which the Defendant has consented. It appears to the Plaintiff that it isn’t going to be possible to recover the entirety of the €480,000, plus, of course, whatever amount of costs there will have been incurred. You know at a conservative estimate those would be in and around €100,000, having regard particularly to how expensive an Anton Piller Order is to execute retaining the services of an independent tech team and an independent solicitor to attend. So, for that reason alone, I’m not pursuing the claim for aggravated and exemplary damages. It's not at all to be…taken as any indication from the Plaintiff that this is not a case that would otherwise warrant aggravated and exemplary damages…” [pp.16-17, transcript].

57. Accordingly, on the application of the plaintiff and with the consent of the defendant, orders in terms of the notice of motion were made as follows:

2. A declaration that the Plaintiff’s copyright has been infringed by the Defendant;

3. Without prejudice to the relief at 2 above, a declaration that the Plaintiff’s broadcasts have been disseminated by the Defendant without authority.

4. An order for damages, pursuant to s.127 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (as amended) or otherwise howsoever in the sum of €480,000….

7. Orders granting permanent injunctions in the following terms:

(a) An order compelling the defendant to permanently disable all means provided through or by Internet Protocol Television services and/or subscriptions (the ‘Infringing Services’) which provide access to copyright content owned or controlled by the plaintiff, including (without limitation) the Sky Channels (details of the Sky channels are appended hereto).

(b) An order compelling the Defendant to permanently cease all activities and involvement with the Infringing Services and never again make available infringing copies of content or broadcasts owned and/or controlled by the Plaintiff.

(c) An order compelling the defendant to immediately and permanently cease operation or development of any IPTV panel, server, repository, add-on, website, system or software similar to the Infringing Services, or otherwise operate or develop any IPTV panel, server, repository, website, system or software usable to facilitate infringement of content or broadcasts owned and/or controlled by the Plaintiff.

(d) An order permanently restraining the Defendant from taking any steps, directly or indirectly, to release publicly, distribute, transfer, or give away, any source code, object code, other technology, domain names, brands, assets, or goodwill in any way related to the Infringing Services.

(e) An order compelling the Defendant to immediately and permanently cease all advertising, promotion, and/or other public communications regarding the Infringing Services and/or any related services, including but not limited to removing all related websites, social media accounts, and pages and terminating all related advertising accounts.

9. Costs in favour of the plaintiff to be adjudicated in default of agreement.

The Respective Legal Positions

58. The plaintiff proffered extremely detailed written submissions in advance of the hearing. Before addressing the alleged acts of contempt, the submissions addressed in some detail the procedural requirements of an application for contempt, and the court’s jurisdiction upon a finding of contempt. These very helpful submissions were supplemented with admirable clarity at the hearing of the application by Theo Donnelly BL, counsel for the plaintiff.

59. The submissions of the defendant were notable for their brevity. It was noted that the plaintiff, at para. 12 of its submissions, stated that “…[t]o his credit…the Defendant does not dispute having done any of the actions he is accused of which Sky contends constitute a contempt of court, save that he suggests he cannot respond to the final point, regarding the disclosure of confidential information to Thomas Quigley.” The defendant remarks at para. 6 of his written submissions that this is “a significant acceptance by the Plaintiff”.

60. The defendant states at para. 8 that “no issue is taken by the Defendant with the procedural steps taken by the Plaintiff…”. The defendant goes on at para. 12 to confirm that no issue is taken with the plaintiff’s view of the court’s jurisdiction to deal with the finding of contempt. In particular, the defendant welcomed the plaintiff’s view that “[i]t is a matter entirely for the Court as to what punishment is deemed appropriate to address the Defendant’s actions…”, and that “Sky does not offer any view on what order the Court ought to make to punish the Defendant’s conduct…” [para. 67, plaintiff’s submissions].

61. The defendant’s written submissions proceed on the basis that a fine is the appropriate sanction. The defendant draws attention to remarks I made at a directions hearing in the matter on 3 July 2025, in which I expressed the view that the contemplated contempt of court motion was made for a punitive rather than a coercive purpose, and said the following: “If the defendant acknowledges that he [breached the order] of this Court I am looking for a sanction that will be proportionate to what he actually did and that will reflect the court’s displeasure at its orders being breached and a fine is the most obvious way in which one would seek to register that displeasure. If the means of the defendant are such that that is not possible, the Court may be compelled to look for other ways to levy a punitive sanction” [p.9 lines 4 to 12, Transcript].

62. At the outset of the hearing on 29 July 2025, I raised the fact that the defendant’s submissions, having quoted my remarks, proceeded on the basis that a fine was the appropriate sanction. Counsel for the defendant, Darren Lehane SC, readily acknowledged that “the Court was very clear at the directions hearing that nothing was decided until it was decided…” [p. 5, lines 22-24, transcript]. Counsel clarified that it was not suggested that the court had “already determined” that a fine was the appropriate sanction, but that it was submitted by the defendant that a fine was appropriate in all the circumstances.

63. The written submissions of the defendant reiterate the points made in the defendant’s fourth affidavit, and emphasise the consent of the defendant to a decree of €480,000, which in the words of Mr. McElligott at para. 17 of his affidavit of 8 July 2025, “…represents a real, tangible, and achievable relief to the Plaintiff…”. The defendant also references the minimisation of time, cost and expense which his approach has afforded the plaintiff.

The Court’s Jurisdiction in relation to a Finding of Contempt

64. As indicated above, the defendant takes no issue with the observance by the plaintiff of the requirements for issue and service of a motion for attachment and committal. It is accepted that a penally endorsed copy of the order was served on the defendant by Mr. Andrews on 21 May 2025. Service of the amended notice of motion for attachment and committal and of the motion for judgment has been established by the affidavit of Seamus Whelan on behalf of the plaintiff, and the defendant takes no issue in this regard. An order of attachment by this Court is not necessary, as the defendant has attended voluntarily before the Court on a number of occasions, and for the hearing of the present application.

65. The defendant, in his written submissions, declines to address paras. 14 to 25 of the plaintiff’s written submissions, as “no issue is taken by the Defendant with the jurisdiction of the court…” [para. 12]. It is appropriate however, before considering the application of the law to the facts of the present matter, to refer to the principles which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction.

66. The plaintiff’s submissions cite the distinction drawn by Ó Dálaigh CJ in Keegan v. De Burca ([1973] IR 223 at 227) between criminal contempt and civil contempt; in Laois County Council v. Hanrahan [2014] 3 IR 143, Fennelly J., citing with approval the dicta of Ó Dálaigh CJ, stated at para. 49 of his judgment as follows:

“The law with regard to contempt of court has traditionally made a clear distinction between criminal contempt, on the one hand, and civil contempt, on the other. The object of criminal contempt is punitive; it is to uphold the law generally and the authority of the courts. The object of civil contempt is coercive: it is to enable one party to litigation to ask the court to compel another party to obey an order of the court which the first party has obtained. These categories are not entirely mutually exclusive but they are still the basic guide.”

67. Fennelly J. went on at para. 56 of his judgment to note that “…[i]n more recent times, the courts have identified a hybrid type of case, a case where an application is made on the civil side for attachment and committal that the court decides that the behaviour of the respondent calls for the imposition of punishment over and above the coercive purpose of the application…”. The court cited with approval the following passage from Finnegan P. in Shell E&P Ireland v. McGrath & Ors [2007] 1 IR 671 at para. 37: “On a review of the cases I am satisfied that committal for contempt is primarily coercive, its object being to ensure that court orders are complied with. However in cases of serious misconduct the court has jurisdiction to punish the contemnor. If the punishment is to take the form of imprisonment then that imprisonment should be for a definite term. Insofar as Ó Dálaigh C.J. in Keegan v. de Burca [1973] I.R. 223 and in In Re Haughey [1971] I.R. 271 held that the objective in imposing imprisonment for civil contempt was coercive and not punitive, I have regard to the facts of each of those cases. In each case he was concerned with criminal contempt and for that reason I regard his definition of civil contempt to be obiter; while the definition was sufficient for his purposes it is not completely accurate. More accurate is the proposition in Flood v. Lawlor [2002] 3 I.R. 67 which left open the question as to whether civil contempt is exclusively, as distinct from primarily, coercive in nature.

In Ross Co. Ltd. v. Swan [1981] I.L.R.M. 416, O’Hanlon J. was of the view that in an appropriate case the court must exercise its jurisdiction to commit for contempt not merely for the primary coercive purpose but in order to vindicate the authority of the court and in which case the court has jurisdiction to make a punitive order. His approach is supported by the cases which he mentions, Yager v. Musa [1961] 2 Q.B.

214 and Danchevsky v. Danchevsky [1975] Fam, 17. It is also supported by Jennison v. Baker [1972] 2 Q.B. 52, Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Amusement Caterers (Peckham) Ltd. [1964] 1 Ch. 195 and by the passage which I quoted from Halsbury.”

68. Fennelly J. referred to the dicta of Finnegan P. in Shell at para. 39 of his judgment in Shell where he said “…[c]ommittal by way of punishment likewise should be the last resort. It should only be engaged where there has been serious misconduct. In such circumstances it can be engaged in order to vindicate the authority of the court. In litigation concerning exclusively private rights this will usually occur only at the request of the plaintiff…where the interest of the public in general is engaged or where there is a gross affront to the court it would be appropriate for the court to proceed of its own motion to ensure that its orders are not put at nought…”

69. At para. 59 of his judgment, Fennelly J. summarised “the principles affecting the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish in cases of civil contempt” as follows: “i) It will normally be a matter for the court to decide of its own motion whether the case is one which justifies the imposition of punishment, which may be a fine or a term of imprisonment, although there may be cases involving matters of purely private interest where the court may be invited to exercise the jurisdiction,

ii) The circumstances justifying the imposition of punishment will almost always include an element relating to the public interest, including the vindication of the authority of the court. The object is punishment, not coercion.

iii) A court should impose committal by way of punishment as a last resort. The contempt must amount to serious misconduct involving flagrant and deliberate breach of a court order. Mere inability to comply will not amount to serious misconduct.

iv) Committal by way of punishment inherently relates to conduct which has already taken place, not to future conduct. A person cannot be punished for his future conduct: that would involve preventive detention.

(v) any imprisonment must be for a fixed term.”

70. In the same case, McKechnie J., having discussed the court’s power to punish a person for a breach of a court order – as opposed to sanctioning that person with a view to coercing compliance with the order – commented as follows at para. 133: “The type and nature of conduct which might give rise to the court's decision to penalise on a civil contempt motion may take many forms. Generally however only conduct which can properly be termed as “serious” or “outrageous” or “wilful” or “deliberate” or as constituting a “gross affront” to the integrity of the court will justify intervention in this way.”

Analysis

71. Firstly, it is clear that if this Court makes an order against the defendant, whether by way of a fine or a term of imprisonment, the purpose of such an order would be punitive rather than coercive. This is because the plaintiff, having obtained declaratory orders acknowledging its rights, injunctive orders prohibiting any continuance or repetition of the activities of which it complains, an order for €480,000 in damages, and an order for the costs of the proceedings, regards the proceedings as at an end.

72. The plaintiff has however invited the court to consider whether the defendant should be punished for clear and admitted breaches of the order of this Court of 16 May 2025, and what the plaintiff contends are instances of lying to the court and/or providing incomplete, false and/or misleading information. The plaintiff accepts that it is a matter entirely for the court to decide whether punishment is warranted or what that punishment should be, although it is clear from the affidavit of Mr. Gilmore and the submissions of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is of the view that the defendant’s actions or inactions identified by the plaintiff as instances of contempt of the court’s order could certainly warrant the imposition of punitive sanction by the court.

73. The caselaw clearly establishes that a contempt of court must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In an application where the facts were contested, this might give rise to procedural difficulty as to how the application might be conducted. As Clarke CJ commented in RAS Medical Limited v. The Royal College of Surgeons of Ireland [2019] 1 IR 63: “88. Where a party wishes to assert that evidence tendered by an opponent lacks either credibility or reliability, then it is incumbent on that party to cross-examine the witness concerned and put to that witness the basis on which it is said that the witness's evidence should not be accepted at face value. It is an unfair procedure to suggest in argument that a witness's evidence should not be regarded as credible on a particular basis without giving that witness the opportunity to deal with the criticism of the evidence concerned. A party which presents evidence which goes unchallenged is entitled to assume that the evidence concerned is not contested. However, there may, of course, be legitimate debate about whether the evidence, even if accepted so far as it goes, is sufficient or appropriate to establish the facts necessary to resolve the case in favour of the party tendering the evidence in question…

92. But it is frankly not appropriate for parties to enter into controversy as to the facts contained either in affidavit evidence or in documents which are admitted before the court without successful challenge, without exploring the necessity for at least some oral evidence. If it is suggested that there are facts which are material to the final determination of the proceeding and in respect of which there is potentially conflicting evidence to be found in such affidavits or documentation, then it is incumbent on the party who bears the onus of proof in establishing the contested facts in its favour to use appropriate procedural measures to ensure that the potentially conflicting evidence is challenged. Where, for example, two individuals have given conflicting affidavit evidence and where it is considered that a resolution of the dispute between those witnesses is necessary to the proper disposition of the case, then there has to be cross-examination and the onus in that regard rests on the party on whom the onus of proof lay to establish the contested fact.”

74. In the present case, the approach adopted by the defendant towards the plaintiff’s application means that the procedural difficulty does not arise. With the exception of his point that he cannot address the allegation that he disclosed confidential information to Thomas Quigley, the defendant does not dispute any of the plaintiff’s allegations as regards breach of the order of 16 May 2025 and, as the plaintiff points out at para. 12 of the written submissions, “…has admitted the majority of the acts of which he is accused. He appears to dispute whether these acts amount to contempt deserving of punitive sanction, but he doesn’t dispute having done them, and he doesn’t dispute knowing the significance of his actions at the time when he carried them out.”

75. Notwithstanding this characterisation of the defendant’s position by the plaintiff, the written submissions on behalf of the defendant suggest that the defendant regards a punitive sanction as inevitable. At para. 7, the defendant submits that “[t]he issue for determination at the hearing of this application therefore becomes … one of assessing the appropriate level of punitive sanction”, and goes on to suggest at para. 13 that “the appropriate punitive sanction is … a fine …”, and further suggests at para. 14 that “…in assessing the level of the fine, this Honourable Court should take into account a number of mitigating measures”, which are then set out over the succeeding paragraphs.

76. It is clear that the court has power to impose a punitive sanction for a contempt of court established beyond a reasonable doubt where the contempt may be characterised in the terms suggested by McKechnie J. in Hanrahan as “serious” or “outrageous” or “wilful” or “deliberate” or as constituting a “gross affront” to the integrity of the court. The acts of the defendant must be judged against these criteria.

77. There can be no doubt that the defendant wilfully and deliberately refused access on two separate occasions to Mr. Andrews and his team on 21 May 2025. He did this having been properly served with the order of this Court, and having had the order – and the consequences of disobeying it – explained to him a number of times in layman’s terms. He proceeded to alert his supplier of the IPTV service, MBM, to the situation, thereby breaching the confidentiality of the order and facilitating the destruction of evidence. The defendant proceeded to destroy further evidence by reformatting his computer and closing down his Telegram accounts.

78. On 21 May 2025 and subsequently, the defendant dissipated assets in contravention of the order. He acknowledges at para. 6 of his third affidavit that, at the request of MBM, he transferred all of the contents of his Revolut and Binance accounts to an address nominated by MBM. He says that the call to MBM was made “in a state of panic”, and implies that the lives of himself, his wife and children were threatened if he “did not delete all information and/or provided information to investigators or the police…”. He claims to have received a small number of further anonymous threats by text and phone calls.

79. It is not disputed by the defendant that he breached para. (h) of the order – see para. 8 above – by selling his car, which Mr. Gilmore characterised at para. 88 of his third affidavit as the defendant’s “most valuable unincumbered asset”. Neither is it necessary to come to a

conclusion about the defendant’s interaction with Mr. Quigley to arrive at a finding that the defendant disclosed confidential information in contravention of the order, the defendant’s interaction with MBM being particularly notable in this regard.

80. As regards the doctored Binance statements, Mr. Donnelly on behalf of the plaintiff characterised this in his oral submissions as “the provision of false evidence rather than prevarication or refusing to provide information…[it] is not so much an act of contempt as it is an act of perjury” [p.49, lines 8 to 13, transcript].

81. There can in my view be no doubt, based on the detailed evidence on behalf of the plaintiff which the defendant does not contest, that the defendant, on being presented by Mr. Andrews on 21 May 2025 with the court’s order and having it explained to him, engaged in conduct which was in deliberate and wilful disobedience of the court’s order. There is no inference available other than that the defendant did so with the intention of breaching the court’s order and frustrating its intended effect. The defendant was advised to take legal advice, and even presented with a list of solicitors who could give him specialised advice. However, there is no suggestion that the defendant sought such advice, notwithstanding that he had the consequences of non-compliance with the order explained to him by Mr. Andrews.

82. The defendant has professed himself to be “extremely anxious to purge [his] failure to comply with the Order” [para. 4, first affidavit]. He has responded to the queries raised by the plaintiff and supplied substantial information about his operation over the course of his affidavits. However, this exercise is severely hampered by the absence of records of the defendant’s activities, caused by the destruction by the defendant himself of those records. In particular, despite exhaustive investigations, the plaintiff has been unable to get an accurate picture of the dispersal over years by the defendant of very substantial sums of money generated by his activities.

83. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts set out in the notice of motion – see para. 39 above – at paras. 8 (i) to (x) were perpetrated by the defendant and that, in all the circumstances, such acts must be viewed as serious, deliberate, wilful, and as a gross affront to the integrity of the court. The court’s disapproval must in my view be expressed by the imposition on the defendant of a punitive sanction.

84. I do not propose to express a view on the instances set out at para. (b) of the notice of motion, i.e., allegations of lying and/or providing incomplete, false or misleading information. It is true that the financial information supplied by the defendant in his affidavits is incomplete and unsatisfactory, a situation largely accounted for by the defendant’s own actions in destroying his records. However, in order to make findings as to whether the defendant was lying or deliberately misleading the court, there would have to be an inquiry into the mens rea behind the alleged acts of contempt. The defendant’s position is that he is “seeking to engage completely and transparently” [para. 51, third affidavit]. The facts relating to those allegations are not uncontested. In those circumstances, and given my finding in relation to the acts at para. (a) (i) to (x) of the notice of motion and the desirability of bringing the proceedings to an end, I do not propose to consider further the matters at para. (b).

Mitigation

85. The defendant, in his fourth affidavit and written submissions, refers to a number of “mitigating measures” which should be taken into account by the court. He contends that he has “fully accepted” his breaches of the order and that he has attempted to purge his contempt [para. 12, affidavit], in particular by endeavouring “to provide the Plaintiff with as much information as possible through his Affidavits…” [para. 18, written submissions]. While the defendant certainly has provided much information, this is against the background of his having taken actions in contravention of the order which make impossible the retrieval of sufficient information to give a full perspective on his activities.

86. The defendant also draws attention to the manner in which he consented to judgment in favour of the plaintiff, thereby saving considerable costs and court time. While the defendant does deserve some credit for this, the defendant is in effect making a virtue of necessity; it is difficult to see the plaintiff’s ultimate success in the action as having been other than inevitable.

Sanction

87. As Fennelly J. stated in Hanrahan, the appropriate sanction in the case where a punishment is warranted for civil contempt is either a fine or a term of imprisonment.

88. In Shell E&P Ireland Ltd, Finnegan P. commented that “committal by way of punishment…should be the last resort” [para. 39, p.687]. I agree with this view; if the imposition of a fine punishes the contemnor effectively and adequately, it is to be preferred to a term of imprisonment.

89. However, the effectiveness and adequacy of a fine in the present case are open to question. The court’s view of the suitability of the fine is complicated by a lack of clarity around what the defendant has done with the proceeds of his illegal activities. The defendant’s failure to provide comprehensive and clear explanations of what has become of such income has given rise to suspicion on the part of the plaintiff that monies have been “salted away”, out of reach of the plaintiff. The lack of explanation of the extraordinary amounts channelled by the defendant through betting accounts, and statements such as that by the defendant on Reddit that he had “about 50ish k put away for college”, have only deepened this suspicion.

90. The defendant implies that he has little by way of financial resources, such that he required to sell his relatively new car in order to finance his defence of the proceedings. At para. 53 of his third affidavit, he states that “…[m]y position in my job is under review given the negative publicity released in recent days. I can soon see a situation where I may be unemployed, which will further reduce my ability to pay for legal representation, costs or any subsequent damages awarded by the court…”. However, notwithstanding that the defendant acknowledged in his fourth affidavit sworn on 16 July 2025 that he would consent to judgment, he gave no indication of whether he had sufficient or any funds to be able to discharge the amount of the judgment, let alone the award of costs to the plaintiff and any fine imposed by this Court.

91. It seems to me that the averments in the defendant’s fourth affidavit in particular are carefully chosen. On the one hand, if it were intimated that the defendant could readily discharge the damages and costs to the plaintiff, that might suggest that he has substantial resources and has earned greater income than the €480,000 to which he admits. On the other hand, if the defendant were to accept that he does not have the resources to discharge the damages and costs, much less a fine imposed by the court, it might be that the court would take a view that there was no practical alternative to imposing a term of imprisonment.

92. There are certainly cogent arguments in favour of the imposition of a term of imprisonment by way of punishment of the defendant for what are undoubtedly wilful and serious incidences of contempt of court. This option would avoid any uncertainty as to whether a fine could be discharged by the defendant. The defendant would serve a defined term; case-law brought by the plaintiff to the attention of the court, such as Crystal Mews Ltd. v. Metterick & Ors [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch), O’Shea v. The Governor of Shelton Abbey [2015] IEHC 620 and Flood v. Lawlor [2002] 3 IR 67, suggests that courts have generally imposed terms of two to three months as punishment for contempt of court, although of course the length of the term is a matter for the court and entirely dependent on the circumstances of each case.

93. A term of imprisonment would reflect the need to punish an affront to the authority of the court and of the State itself. As McKechnie J. put it in Hanrahan at paras. 123 to 124 (p.181), “…the public as a body, has a significant interest in upholding the propriety of the constitutionally based system of justice and law… [the court will] be motivated not simply by a desire to maintain its own authority but also by an obligation to vindicate the interests of the public…”.

94. Having said that, it must be acknowledged that imprisonment of the defendant confers no tangible benefit on the State, which will be put to the expense of funding the defendant’s stay in prison.

95. As the imposition of a term of imprisonment is a last resort, the court must examine whether a fine would be an adequate and effective option. It seems to me that the court must take into account the overall circumstances of the matter and, in particular the extent to which the proceedings have impinged on the defendant’s life and circumstances.

96. In this regard, it seems that the following matters are relevant:

• due to the award of damages and costs, the defendant now owes over €0.5m to the plaintiff;

• the plaintiff is likely to proceed to execution of its judgment against the defendant’s assets;

• the plaintiff may avail of a range of options, including examination of the defendant in court, to determine the extent of the defendant’s assets and whether or not assets exist which have not been identified by the defendant;

• the defendant considers that he is at risk of losing his job;

• the defendant avers at para. 23 of his second affidavit that he “has become the victim of credible threats to both the physical welfare of [the defendant] as well as [the defendant’s] family…”;

• while counsel for the plaintiff indicated that he had “no instructions” as to whether the plaintiff would seek to promote or encourage a criminal prosecution of the defendant, but that the court’s order in respect of the present application would be “the end of the matter” – see transcript p.111 in this regard – the possibility that the defendant may be prosecuted for criminal offences, whether under the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (as amended) or otherwise, cannot be ruled out;

• in a case involving an extensive operation with substantial undisclosed profits, it may be anticipated that the Revenue Commissioners may seek to carry out their own investigation into the defendant’s affairs.

97. In addition to the foregoing, and while the defendant must be regarded as the sole author of the misfortune which has come his way due to these proceedings, the court is not insensible to what must be an enormous level of upheaval, upset and stress caused to the defendant and in particular to his family by virtue of the exposure of his activities by the plaintiff.

Conclusion

98. Taking all of the circumstances of the matter into account, I consider that the imposition of a fine on the defendant is sufficient punishment, and I will impose a fine of €30,000 on the defendant, to be discharged by 31 October 2025. I note the acknowledgement of the High Court (Nolan J.) in Board of Management of Wilson’s Hospital School v. Burke (No. 3) [2025] IEHC 104 and (No. 4) [2025] IEHC 208 of the right of the State to take appropriate steps to recover such a fine if it is not paid.

99. I want to make it very clear however that the sentence imposed by this Court should not be taken as one which is likely to apply to any party in the future who disregards and frustrates orders of this Court in circumstances similar to those in the present case. The defendant has come very close indeed to being sent to prison; future contemnors in similar circumstances should consider that they may not be so fortunate, as every case depends on its own facts.

100. Finally, as para. 34 of Mr. Gilmore’s first affidavit makes clear, the plaintiff was alerted to the defendant’s operation by means of a simple tip-off passed on to the plaintiff by the Federation Against Copyright Theft. The plaintiff followed up this tip diligently and thoroughly, ultimately leading to the present proceedings and application. Any persons currently conducting similar illegal operations, or contemplating the provision of such services in the future, should consider carefully how vulnerable such operations are to discovery and exposure, with potentially calamitous consequences for the operator.