High Court dismisses judicial review application for conviction appeal due to lack of arguable legal grounds.

THE HIGH COURT

[Record No. 2024 821 JR]

[2025] IEHC 458

BETWEEN

PATRICK O’MALLEY

APPLICANT

AND

COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

PROSECUTIONS, MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Bolger delivered on the 12th day of August 2025.

1. This application for leave to seek judicial review was on notice to the respondents on 14 July 2025. On that date, I confirmed my decision to refuse the applicant’s application for leave. This judgment sets out my reasons for that decision.

Background

2. The applicant was convicted in the District Court on 7 July 2021 of a s. 2 assault on the mother of his estranged wife on 5 April 2020, in respect of which a fine was imposed. The applicant appealed to the Circuit Court. His appeal was adjourned by the Circuit Court six times to allow the applicant to take various steps and/or to fix dates, on 10 February 2023,

3 April 2023, 12 June 2023, 28 July 2023, 26 September 2023 and 12 October 2023. The appeal was eventually heard in the Circuit Court on 22 March 2024. On that occasion the applicant sought a further adjournment because of other judicial review proceedings he has instituted and a Circuit Court appeal, all of which are currently in the High Court. Those matters relate to civil proceedings between the applicant, his wife and her mother (the victim of the applicant’s assault the subject matter of the Circuit Court appeal).

3. The applicant seeks certiorari of the decision of the Circuit Court to convict the applicant of a s. 2 assault and to affirm the decision of the District Court. He also seeks damages. The applicant says he was denied fair procedures and treated unlawfully by the Circuit Court Judge, in particular in the refusal of the applicant’s application to adjourn the hearing of the appeal on that date. The applicant is also critical of other decisions made by the Circuit Court on previous occasions, but it was the decision to convict on 22 March 2024 that he seeks leave to quash.

The Hearing

4. I have reviewed the transcript of the impugned hearing that took place on 22 March 2024. The Circuit Court Judge repeatedly asked the applicant to explain why the other (civil) proceedings prevented the criminal appeal from being heard on that date. The applicant gave vague answers that did not address the questions at all and told the Circuit Court Judge that he would not engage with the appeal if the Circuit Court Judge proceeded to hear it. The applicant referred to transcripts that he said were now before the High Court in his judicial review application and his Circuit Court appeal. Those transcripts did not include the hearing before the District Court and the s. 2 assault matter which the Circuit Court Judge was attempting to deal with on the applicant's appeal. The applicant claimed transcripts have been falsified, which he said was a matter now before the High Court. The applicant claimed that if the Circuit Court Judge proceeded with the appeal, that matters before the High Court would be prejudiced. This claim was made despite the fact that any of the applicant’s matters before the High Court are civil rather than criminal cases.

5. The Circuit Court Judge concluded that no reasons had been identified for him not to proceed with the criminal appeal and he therefore determined to hear the appeal. The Circuit Court Judge invited the applicant to highlight any points in any transcripts that were inaccurate, if it was relevant to his appeal. The applicant declined and instead chose to leave the court following what appears to have been a relatively lengthy engagement with the judge on the points set out above.

6. The Circuit Court Judge then heard evidence in the applicant’s absence and proceeded to affirm the District Court order.

Decision

7. There is no basis whatsoever to find that the applicant’s rights were breached or ignored in any way. The Circuit Court Judge repeatedly allowed the applicant to identify the basis for an adjournment and made every attempt to understand how civil proceedings before the High Court by way of judicial review and a Circuit Court appeal, could prevent the impugned appeal from going ahead. The applicant’s responses were vague, generic and at times irrelevant.

8. Despite the applicant’s civil cases having been before the High Court on a number of occasions prior to the impugned hearing before the Circuit Court, before a number of different High Court judges, at no time was any stay put on the matter put before the Circuit Court which led to the impugned decision.

9. The applicant asserted in submissions to this Court that he was ill on the day of the Circuit Court hearing. At no time during his lengthy engagement with the Circuit Court Judge (as recorded in the transcript furnished to this Court) did the applicant refer to any issue with his health. The applicant has never sought to rely on any medical evidence whether before the Circuit Court or this Court. His unvouched assertions of ill health made before this Court do not assist his application.

10. I rely on the dicta of Charleton J. in Esmé v. Minister for Justice and Law Reform [2015] IESC 26 in which he stated:

“Any issue in law can be argued: but that is not the test. A point of law is only arguable within the meaning of the relevant decisions if it could, by the standards of a rational preliminary analysis, ultimately have a prospect of success. It is required for an applicant for leave to commence judicial review proceedings to demonstrate that an argument can be made which indicates that the argument is not empty. There would be no filtering process were mere arguability to be the test without, at the same time, taking into account that trivial or unstatable cases are to be excluded: the standard of the legal point must be such that, in the absence of argument to the contrary, the thrust of the argument indicates that reasonable prospects of success have been demonstrated. It is still required to be shown that a prima facie legal argument has been established. In terms of evidence, the requirement for a prima facie case is regarded as that which ‘if not balanced or outweighed by other evidence, will suffice to establish a particular contention’; Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edition) volume 11, paragraph 767. In terms of law, the test is no different: it is a point of law which if not balanced or outweighed by other principles will suffice to establish the contention. This is the filter, which the leave application is designed to be, in order to ensure that there is sufficient reason to disrupt administrative decisions and to litigate them.’”

11. It is very clear that the low bar of arguability as established in G v. DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374 has not been established here. I am satisfied that the Circuit Court Judge acted properly, carefully and lawfully. No basis for challenging the legality of his decision has been identified.

12. I refuse leave to the applicant to seek certiorari of the decision of the Circuit Court of 22 March 2024.

Indicative view on costs

13. As the applicant has been unsuccessful in his application which was heard on notice to the respondents, my indicative view on costs is that the respondents are entitled to their costs to be adjudicated upon in default of agreement. I will put the matter in before me at 10am on 15 October 2025 for the making of final orders.

The applicant represented himself. Counsel for the respondents: Leanora Frawley BL.