High Court dismisses media publisher's application to access anonymized court pleadings under s.27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008.

THE HIGH COURT [2025] IEHC 453 2023 2800 P BETWEEN

A AND B

PLAINTIFF

AND

E, C and D

DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Nolan delivered on the 17th day of July 2025

1. This is an application brought by Mediahuis, a publisher of national media including the Irish Independent and the website ‘Independent.ie’, for certain orders in relation to the above-entitled proceedings.

2. Initially, the Applicant seeks the right to make representation in relation to two orders of court made pursuant to s.27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous provisions) Act of 2008, made by Egan J. and by Ferriter J., granting anonymity to the Plaintiffs.

3. The precise reliefs they seek are set out in a Notice of Motion dated the 12th of March 2025 and are as follows:

i. A direction that the Plaintiffs disclose to the Applicant the pleadings and proceedings herein are sufficient to establish the evidential basis for the Plaintiffs application pursuant to Section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008.

ii. Alternatively, any necessary directions to enable the Applicant to have sufficient information to show cause in relation to the Plaintiff’s application pursuant to s.27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008.

iii. If necessary, to discharge or vary the order of this honourable court of Mr.

Justice Ferriter.

The Affidavits

4. The application is grounded upon an affidavit of Mark Tighe, senior news reporter of the Applicant. Mr Tighe explains that the Applicant requires additional information in relation to the proceedings and the rationale for the court orders, so that the Applicant is in a position to understand the basis on which the court has exercised its jurisdiction and to consider if necessary making submissions between the interests sought to be protected on the one hand and the freedom of the press and the constitutional guarantee of open administration of justice on the other.

5. Mr Tighe asserts that the impact of the order is that the proceedings are now entirely removed from public view such that the public is not aware of any developments in the case and any resolution of the case will not be known, contrary to the ordinary requirements that settlements involving minors are adjudicated in public before the courts.

6. Mr Tighe says that on a particular date he became aware from a public court list that a person had issued proceedings against the First Named Defendant. That is the same day that Egan J. made the first order in this case. He then goes on to name two people and a case number, together with the name of the solicitors acting for the Plaintiffs. He saved a screen shot of it which he exhibited. He then says that he intended to attend and report on the proceedings,. He then says, however, that the public interest aspect is in a sense incidental to the issue of the administration of justice in public.

7. Mr Tighe says that a colleague attempted to call the solicitors but was served with a court order. He then exhibits some of the correspondence between the parties, which I will deal with below. He says that the information provided does not allow the Applicant to determine the basis on which the order had been obtained and to determine whether the extent of the restrictions are proportionate. He requested a copy of the pleadings and the underlying affidavit seeking the reporting restrictions, but this was refused.

8. Mr Tighe noted that there was engagement between his counsel and senior counsel for the Plaintiffs from which some further information was furnished, which he describes as being helpful.

9. Mr Tighe asserts that some lesser form of restriction on reporting in the proceedings could be sufficient to protect and vindicate the rights and interests of the person involved, including a more limited restriction on reporting the diagnosis of the person.

10. The Plaintiffs have chosen not to swear any affidavits in relation to the matter but their counsel has plenty to say in opposition in relation to them.

The Orders

11. As I set out above, there were two orders made in this case, the precise wording of which are relevant to this decision. The first order of Egan J., reads as follows:

“It is ordered pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this court and section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 that publication or broadcast of any matters relating to the proceedings which would or would likely to identify the second name plaintiff who suffers from a medical condition will be prohibited up to and including [a particular date] pending the matter being before the court again on [that date] and it is ordered that the names of both the plaintiffs and the defendant in the within proceedings are hereby anonymised up to and including [a particular date] pending the matter being before the court again on [that date.] And it is ordered pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this court that the within matter be hidden from public viewing on the court service website up to and including [a particular date] pending the matter of being before the court again on [that date].

Liberty to the plaintiffs to notify any necessary media outlets by telephone of the within order being made.”

12. The second order was made by Ferriter J.

13. The relevant part of the order reads as follows:

“It is ordered pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this court and section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008 that the publication or broadcast of any matter relating to these proceedings which would or would likely to identify the second name plaintiff who suffers from medical condition be prohibited until further order. and it is ordered pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this court that the names of both the plaintiffs and the three defendants herein in the within matter be hereby anonymised to read “A and B v E, C and D".

And it is ordered that the intended plaintiffs be at liberty to issue proceedings against the intended defendants herein and that the title thereof to read “A and B v E, C and D”.

And it is ordered pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of this court that the publication of any matter that would identify the parties to the within proceedings and the intended proceedings remain hidden from public viewing on the court service website until further order.”

14. From the above, it is clear that the court orders were made on the basis of two separate jurisdictions, the first being the inherent jurisdiction of the court but the second, far more importantly, was made pursuant to s.27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008.

Section 27 of the Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2008.

15. The section reads as follows:

“27.—(1) Where in any civil proceedings (including such proceedings on appeal) a relevant person has a medical condition, an application may be made to the court in which the proceedings have been brought by any party to the proceedings for an order under this section prohibiting the publication or broadcast of any matter relating to the proceedings which would, or would be likely to, identify the relevant person as a person having that condition.

(2) An application for an order under this section may be made at any stage of the proceedings.

(3) The court shall grant an order under this section only if it is satisfied that— i. the relevant person concerned has a medical condition, ii. his or her identification as a person with that condition would be likely to cause undue stress to him or her, and iii. the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice.

…

(7) Each of the following persons who publishes or broadcasts any matter in contravention of an order under this section (including any such order as varied on appeal) is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding €25,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or both: (a) if the matter is published in a newspaper or periodical, any proprietor, editor or publisher of the newspaper or periodical; (b) if the matter is published otherwise, the person who publishes it; (c) if the matter is broadcast, any person transmitting or providing the programme in which the broadcast is made and any person having functions in relation to the programme corresponding to those of an editor of a newspaper.

…

(10) This section applies to civil proceedings that are either— iv. brought on or after the commencement of this section, or v. pending on the date of such commencement.”

16. In this case, none of the parties appealed the order and the first issue to be addressed was whether or not the order could be challenged without being appealed by the Applicant. I am satisfied, however, that a correct reading of the statute means that it is only the parties to the order who have the right of appeal, per se.

The Correspondence

17. As I set out above, the correspondence between the parties dealt with the request by the Applicant for access to the pleadings and the legal basis on which the order was sought. In response, the Plaintiff’s solicitors noted that the order of Ferriter J. was made pursuant to section 27. In a letter, the Applicant’s solicitor, quoting the provision, noted that in certain circumstances it may be that the nature of the proceedings and/or the medical condition, mean that very little can be published but this is a fact specific test to be applied by a publisher or broadcaster under threat of criminal sanction if they err. He also pointed out that under the inherent jurisdiction and the decision of Gilchrist, (see Gilchrist v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] 2 IR 284) interference with the administration of justice must be kept to a minimum.

18. In response, the Plaintiff’s solicitors noted that if the Applicant was going to bring the matter before the High Court, they could be breaching the court order. This prompted another letter, from the Applicant’s solicitor saying that they had very little information on which to assess whether the order was necessary or justified. The Applicant was not provided with any explanation and reserved its position to bring the matter before the court to seek direction in respect to the issue. This gave rise to a response which has become important in the context of the submissions made.

19. By further letter, the solicitors for the Plaintiff wrote back stating that they had provided sufficient explanation. The High Court was satisfied to grant an order pursuant to s.27, prohibiting the identification of the person, on the basis of the affidavit evidence before it in relation to their diagnosis and the likely adverse impact on them of being publicly identified as a person suffering from a medical condition.

20. The last paragraph reads as follows:

“The substance, merits and or wider considerations of the dispute the subject matter of the contemplated proceedings was or is not particularly relevant to the question of whether this person suffers from a medical condition and ought not to be identified.”

21. It goes on to say:

“. …Information may enter into the public domain in due course if a Court hearing occurs in future. If a hearing occurs, it will be in public and while the identities of the parties cannot be reported or broadcast the general public will remain entitled to know the other details of the case and the nature of the dispute.”

22. In its submissions, the Applicant places great emphasis on the third paragraph. Mr. Freeman BL says that it is, in fact, a form of admission that the person's medical condition is not to the fore in the case. He suggests that if this is the case, then it is quite possible that with, appropriate but lesser, reporting restrictions, the person's medical condition may not have to be referred to. Counsel for the Plaintiff sees the letter in a different light. I shall return to this conflict.

The Applicant’s Submissions

23. Not surprisingly, Article 34 of the Constitution is foremost in the submissions of the Applicant. For sake of completeness, it reads as follows:

“Justice shall be administered in courts established by law by judges appointed in the manner provided by this constitution, and, save in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law, shall be administered in public.”

24. This article should also be seen in the context of Article 40.6.1, whereby the State guarantees liberty for the exercise of certain rights subject to public order and morality including, the right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions. The guarantee of press freedom is more directly expressed in the Irish text which reads “those organs will preserve their rightful liberty to express opinions, including criticisms of government policy.”

25. The Applicant accepts that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrict the reporting of proceedings in court in the absence of an express legislative provision. In particular, Mr. Freeman refers to the principles as set out by O'Donnell J. (as he then was) in Gilchrist, which are as follows:- i. “The Article 34.1 requirement of administration of justice in public is a fundamental constitutional value of great importance.

ii. Article 34.1 itself recognises however that there may be exceptions to that fundamental rule.

iii. Any such exception to the general rule must be strictly construed, both as to the subject matter, and the manner in which the procedures depart from the standard of a full hearing in public.

iv. Any such exception may be provided for by statute but also falls under the common law power of the court to regulate its own proceedings.

v. Where an exception from the principle of hearing in public is sought to be justified by reference only to the common law power and in the absence of legislation, then the interests involved must be very clear, and the circumstances pressing.

vi. If it can be shown that justice cannot be done unless a hearing is conducted other than in public, that will plainly justify the exception from the rule established by Article 34.1, but that is not the only criterion. Where constitutional interests and values of considerable weight may be damaged or destroyed by a hearing in public, it may be appropriate for the legislature to provide for the possibility of the hearing other than in public and for the court to exercise that power in a particular case if satisfied that it is a case which presents those features which justify a hearing other than in public.

vii. The requirement of strict construction of any exception to the principle of trial in public means that a court must be satisfied that each departure from that general rule is no more than is required to protect the countervailing interest. It also means that the court must be resolutely sceptical of any claim to depart from any aspect of a full hearing in public. Litigation is a robust business. The presence of the public is not just unavoidable but is necessary and welcome. In particular, this will mean that even after concluding that the case warrants a departure from that constitutional standard, the court must consider if any lesser steps are possible such as providing for witnesses not to be identified by name, or otherwise identified or for the provision of a redacted transcript for any portion of the hearing conducted in camera.”

26. The Applicant says that even when an order has been made pursuant to a legislative provision, that is still open to be tested and to this extent, points to the decision of the Supreme Court in Irish Times v. Ireland [1998] 1 IR 359, a case relating to reporting restrictions put in place during a trial in the Circuit Criminal Court, the Supreme Court recognised that a party who is subject to such an order has a right to make submissions and representations. In particular, the Applicant relies upon the view is of Denham J. (as she then was) who said at page 400:

“In addition, when the issue is a ban such as in this case the test should be applied after hearing evidence and submissions from the parties and any relevant representatives.

This was not done, a further breach of constitutional procedures. The evidence in this case on which the learned trial judge decided to ban contemporaneous reporting falls far short of evidence establishing a real risk.”.

27. This view is supported by the case of Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited, Examiner Publications (Cork) Limited, Radio Telefís Éireann and The Irish Times Limited v. Anderson [2006] IEHC 62, [2006] 3 IR 341 (“Anderson”), a case in which a District Court judge imposed reporting restrictions in a criminal prosecution, where the court recognised that the media have an entitlement to be heard in relation to reporting restrictions.

28. The Applicant urges the court to consider that the orders which have been made in this case are in essence ex parte orders and that pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal in Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd v. I.A [2020] IECA 19, any order made on an ex parte basis must be considered to be provisional and therefore, there is an entitlement to apply to set aside the order enjoyed by the person against whom it is made and points to the views of Murray

J. where he observed:

“The decision in Anderson requires that the decision imposing reporting restrictions not be final, because it is subject to the possibility that the media organisations will exercise their right to apply to set it aside.”

29. The same point was made by Birmingham P. in DPP v. H [2020] IECA 321 where he emphasised that the media, as parties significantly affected have a right to apply for a variation of the order that has impacted upon them.

30. However, it must be noted that these cases all related to reporting restrictions of a trial of a criminal nature. While clearly the same rules apply to civil cases, what we are dealing with in this case is of a very different character. There is no trial scheduled to be heard in this case any time soon, and indeed it is worth noting that the Applicant has waited two years to bring this application before court. Further, it has been emphasised by Counsel for the Plaintiffs, and indeed in the correspondence, that this case will be heard in public.

31. The Applicant also brought the court to the case of Medical Council v. Bukhari [2022] IEHC 723, which concerned an application by the Medical Council for suspension of a medical practitioner under s.60 of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007. Section 60(2) of that Act provides for an application for a suspension to be heard “otherwise than in public unless the Court considers it appropriate to hear the application in public.” When a Mediahuis journalist was not permitted to attend the adjourned hearing of the Medical Council’s application, Mediahuis brought an application for the hearing of the s.60 application to be in public. That application was successful for the reasons set out by Barniville P. in his judgment including, prior publication and publicity of certain matters.

32. Thus, the Applicant says that it is a matter of fundamental principle that a media organisation can apply to a court where a reporting restriction has been imposed. This is the case even if there is a statutory provision, since cases involving a statutory provision must be seen through the prism of Gilchrist.

33. In discussion with the court, Mr. Freeman suggested that the best way that this could be achieved would be a rehearing of the application, with the Applicant present and if necessary, making submissions. This would clearly involve the Applicant having access to the pleadings and any medical evidence which was before Ferriter J. when he made his order.

The Plaintiffs’ Submissions

34. Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiffs says that the Applicant has fundamentally misunderstood of the effect of section 27. Counsel for the plaintiffs says that the case law to which the Applicant refers to was either before the Oireachtas introduced the section or deals with cases where there has been no statutory empowerment to make the order. Once the Oireachtas intervened, he describes this as being “a whole new ball game.” To that extent, Counsel for the Plaintiffs brings the court to what he regards as being the seminal case, which is not referred to at all in the submissions of the Applicant, namely the Supreme Court decision in the case of DF v. The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána and Others [2015] 2 I.R. 487.

35. In that case the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that s.27 of the Act of 2008 was an express, legislative exception to the general rule of a hearing in public, as contemplated by Article 34.1 of the Constitution, in that it provided for a limited departure from the norm, provided that the particular terms of the section were judicially adjudicated to have been met.

36. In that case, the plaintiff, a severely autistic 27-year-old man, was arrested after a public order incident. He brought proceedings for damages for false imprisonment, assault, battery and other reliefs. He brought a motion pursuant to s.27 of the Act, seeking an order preventing his identification. That order was refused in the High Court by Hogan J., and it was from that

decision that the matter came before the Supreme Court.

37. Bearing in mind that Hogan J. had refused the application, Charleton J., who gave the

decision of the court, noted that all the previous decisions were in the absence of an express legislative exception prescribed in Article 34, but here it was different since there is legislation providing for a limited departure from a full open hearing as contemplated by Article 34.1, provided particular terms are judicially adjudicated to have been met. He said as follows:-

“The Oireachtas has fulfilled its function of determining whether it is appropriate that, and in what circumstances, a party to proceedings, plaintiff or defendant, applicant or respondent, or a witness or prospective witness, is entitled to be seen by the public in court, observed by and reported on by the press but, exceptionally, is to be kept unidentified in any written judgment of the court or in media reports. This minor and exceptional departure from open reporting is possible once a series of statutory tests have been met. That is different to the exercise of a jurisdiction dependent solely on Article 34.1 which is not informed by the legislation contemplated by the Constitution”.

38. He noted that s.27 of the Act has not been challenged as to its constitutionality.

39. He went on to quote M A R A (Nigeria) (An infant suing by her mother and next friend O A) v The Minister for Justice and Equality & ors [2014] IESC 71:

“in exceptional cases, for good reason that take account of the sensitivities of particular kinds of litigation, recognising that without privacy within court proceedings people would be inhibited to such a degree that the right to litigate would be strongly threatened, the Oireachtas is entitled to require the court proceedings be private.”

40. Counsel for the Plaintiffs also argues that this application was premature. He challenges the motivation behind the application, but I am satisfied that it is done in the public interest.

41. In reply, Mr. Freeman relies upon the correspondence, and it seems to me that before I progress to giving my decision in relation to the matter, that I should deal with that correspondence and a particular letter sent on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Discussion and Decision

42. The aforesaid letter has been interpreted by the Applicant as meaning that the medical condition of the second named Plaintiff is not to the fore in the case itself. On that basis, therefore, it may be possible to be able to report the matter without referring to their medical complaint. I disagree. It seems to me that it would set at nought the whole purpose of bringing the application under s.27, if in some way it could be circumvented by not referring to the second named Plaintiff’s medical condition. Firstly, I have no idea what the medical condition is but from the correspondence it is clear that the second named Plaintiff is a vulnerable person. It is not just the medical condition that is at issue, but the publication of the fact of the litigation and its inter play with that medical condition. Further, in my view, the order clearly implies as much where it says that “publication or broadcast of any matters relating to the proceedings which would or would likely to identify the second name plaintiff who suffers from a medical condition will be prohibited.”

43. I do not interpret the letter in the way that the Applicant does. While in hindsight it may have been drafted in somewhat clearer terms, the import that I take from it, is that it is informing the recipient that the court was of the view that the second named Plaintiff suffered from a medical condition and that their identification would have a likely adverse impact upon them if publicly identified as such a person. On that basis the order was made.

44. I do not know what the litigation is about, although it does seem that the Applicant does. All I do know is that the letter cannot be seen as being some form of concession as to the second named Plaintiff’s medical condition or to the fact that that condition is not of the utmost importance in the context of this case. Otherwise not only would the judge not have made the order, but he would not have extended the order, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court, in the manner that he did, so that the ability to somehow identify the second named Plaintiff by putting the pieces together, could arise.

45. Having dealt with the letter, I now move to the fundamental aspect of this case. I accept in full the principles enunciated by O'Donnell J. in Gilchrist. But they have to be seen in the context of the type of cases to which they relate. Those cases related to trials and orders which were made to prohibit trials being held other than in public. The Applicant says that it is a matter of fundamental principle that a media organization can apply to a court where a reporting restriction has been imposed. This is the case even if there is a media restrictive statutory provision, since such cases must be seen through the prism of Gilchrist.

46. While some of the case law to which I have been referred is of a similar nature, it is only the case of DF which is specifically to point. DF relates to litigation in which the plaintiff was seeking an order under s.27, in precisely the same terms as the Plaintiffs in this case. While the objecting party is different, it does not mean that the principles set out in that decision are not applicable in this case. They clearly are but the restriction is a minor one. Counsel for the Plaintiffs has conceded that the trial will be held in public.

47. It seems to me that s.27 is indeed a game changer. The Oireachtas has considered the implications of the constitutional imperative that cases should be held in public unless “in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law.” This is such a case.

48. The Gilchrist principles acknowledge that the administration of justice in public is a fundamental, constitutional value of great importance. It also acknowledges that there may be exceptions to that fundamental rule. It notes that such exceptions must be strictly construed both as to subject matter and the manner in which the procedures depart from the standard of a public hearing. It notes that such exceptions may be provided by statute but also falls under the common law power of the court to regulate its own procedures, also known as the court’s inherent jurisdiction. That is precisely what occurred here.

49. Most importantly however, principles (v), (vi) and (vii), all deal with cases where there was no existing statutory power. Principle (v) deals with an exception by reference only to the common law power, in the absence of legislation. Principle (vi) seems to be of a similar character. It says that where it can be shown that justice cannot be done unless a hearing is conducted other than in public. But this is not a case in which justice will not be done in public, it will be done in public. What we are dealing with here, is simply a reporting restriction and not the hearing of the case in camera or in chambers. That principle goes on to say that it may be appropriate for the legislature to provide for the possibility of a hearing other than in public and for the court to exercise that power in a particular case if satisfied it is a case which presents those features which would justify a hearing other than in public. As I say that is not the same as this case.

50. Finally, principal (vii) deals with the requirement of strict construction of any exception to the principle of trial in public in that any departure must be no more than is required to protect the countervailing interest. While of course the court must be resolutely sceptical of any claim to depart from the norm, the Oireachtas has decided that parties are entitled to seek an order under s. 27, so long as the court is satisfied as to the three criteria.

51. It is worth repeating the criteria; firstly, the relevant person has a medical condition, secondly, that their identification as a person with that condition would likely to cause undue stress to them and finally, that the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice.

52. What the Applicant seeks is the re-running of the application, with them acting as some form of legitimus contradictor and to that extent, seeks an order that the Plaintiffs furnish their pleadings and evidence so that it can consider whether there was sufficient evidence for the Plaintiffs application pursuant to s.27, or to show cause, as it puts it.

53. No matter how important the role of the media is in society, it does not act as a court. It is not up to the Applicant to consider whether there was sufficient evidence for the application. That is the role of the court. There is no obligation on the part of any litigant to furnish their pleadings or evidence in a case to a third party or to the media. However, given that the court was satisfied that the second named Plaintiff had, and presumably still has, a medical condition and that their identification as a person with that condition would likely cause undue stress to them, it would be somewhat bizarre to direct the disclosure of their pleadings and evidence, since to do so would increase the risk that they could become identified as such.

54. This court is not in a position to say what the evidence is, and all this court can do is assume that judges “appointed in the manner provided by the constitution”, to quote the article, have applied the law in the correct manner. Therefore, this court must conclude that there was evidence before Ferriter J. that the second named Plaintiff had and still has a medical condition, that their identification as a person with that condition would be likely to cause undue stress to them and that the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice.

55. If the orders sought were made and the pleadings in evidence were furnished to the Applicant and the court directed that the application be reheard, that potentially could give rise to a set of circumstances where the Applicant may wish to put forward its own medical evidence. If it did not, then it would presumably either have to accept the medical evidence or somehow argue to the court that it is not of such a nature that it would be proportionate to apply the reporting restrictions. All of this is most unsatisfactory and was not what was envisaged in the legislative provision. As Charleton J. said in D.F., it is a “minor and exceptional departure from open reporting… once a series of statutory tests have been met”.

56. While the order was granted on an ex parte basis, that is not, in itself, enough, for this court to somehow overturn it. The Defendants have chosen not to appeal it. Therefore, as far as the parties to the case are concerned, they are satisfied with it. The jurisprudence referred to in relation to the status of an ex parte order is Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd v IA, Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd v IA [2020] IECA 19, again another criminal trial, and again a case in which s. 27 had no application. The order in this case has to be seen in the context of the section, as Charlton J. put it “on its own terms”. To that extent therefore, it is not a true or classic ex parte application. It is an application in which the court is invited and must consider and test the criteria set out in the section.

57. The suggestion that the court should direct that the pleadings and the evidence be furnished with a third party, seems to me to be novel. No authority has been put before the court to the effect that the media are entitled to access to the pleadings or the evidence before a trial for the asking. There may be such a case in the future, and therefore I shall leave it to another court to decide the issue.

58. I do not accept that it is up to the Applicant to determine whether the restrictions are proportionate. The third criteria which the court has to consider is the interest of justice. That is where the court determines whether the restrictions are proportionate or not and that is what it did.

59. The Applicant submits that the proceedings are now entirely removed from public view such that the public is not aware of any developments or resolution of the case, contrary to the ordinary requirements that settlements involving minors are adjudicated in public before the courts. But that is the whole point of s.27, it is a reporting restriction. Every day in the court lists, reporting restrictions are put in place so that developments in the case are not reported, for very good reason. The reason being, as is set out in the section, namely that the person has a medical condition and that their identification as a person with that condition would likely to cause undue stress to them.

60. The trial will be in public and therefore the order would not be prejudicial to the interests of justice. As Charleton J. said, the section either applies or it does not. Ferriter J. was satisfied that the order should be made based upon the evidence put before him. It is not for this court to double guess the decision of the learned judge.

61. In all those circumstances, it seems to me that I must refuse the application.