High Court dismisses judicial review where planning permission refusal was based solely on missing documents, not planning merits.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

THE HIGH COURT PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW Record No: 2024/690 JR

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 50, 50A and 50B OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000, AS AMENDED

Between:

AILSA SEXTON Applicant and

AN BORD PLEANÁLA Respondent and

FINGAL COUNTY COUNCIL Notice Party

JUDGMENT OF MR JUSTICE DAVID HOLLAND, DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON 31 JULY 2025

Contents

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 2

DEVELOPMENT PLAN........................................................................................................................................... 5

MS SEXTON’S PLANNING PERMISSION APPLICATION ......................................................................................... 7

FINGAL COUNTY COUNCIL DECISION .................................................................................................................. 8

MS SEXTON’S APPEAL TO THE COMMISSION...................................................................................................... 9

COMMISSION’S INSPECTOR’S REPORT .............................................................................................................. 11

COMMISSION’S IMPUGNED DECISION .............................................................................................................. 12

THE LAW ............................................................................................................................................................ 12

Interpretation of Planning Decisions ............................................................................................................. 12

s.34(10) PDA 2000 ......................................................................................................................................... 13

Konisberry...................................................................................................................................................... 13

Demonstration & Satisfaction ....................................................................................................................... 15

DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................................................... 16

Mobile Home ................................................................................................................................................. 16

Equestrian Elements but not the Dwelling.................................................................................................... 16

Interpretation of Impugned Decision and Adequacy of Reasons ................................................................. 17

Failure to Submit Particular Documents, S.131 & 132 PDA 2000 & Possible Further Planning Application 19

DECISION ........................................................................................................................................................... 20

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

INTRODUCTION

1. Not without appreciable regret, I will dismiss these proceedings. What follows here are my reasons for so doing.

2. On 5 January 2023, the Applicant, Ailsa Sexton, submitted a planning application1 to Fingal County Council (“the Council”) for development of a 4.79 ha site, of which she is the owner, at Wyanstown, Oldtown, Co. Dublin (“the Site”). Broadly, the “Proposed Development” had two elements – stabling for horses and other facilities for an equestrian business (“the Equestrian Element”) and an associated dwelling for Ms Sexton from which she would run the business (“the Residential Element”). The equestrian business is envisaged as a small-scale riding school, livery and sport horse breeding and training. Essentially, Ms Sexton invoked a Development Plan policy favouring permission of one-off rural housing for applicants bona fide intending to operate home-based businesses requiring a rural location and which would contribute to the rural environment. Ms Sexton and her planning application satisfied many of the relevant Development Plan criteria.

3. Inter alia, the planning application asserted that

“This proposal is prompted by Ms. Sexton's need to attend this farm daily, to spend many hours on this land when doing so and to attend to her animals on a constant and indeed, on an immediate basis. It is imperative that for this business to operate on a commercial footing and provide an income for the applicant, a house must be erected thereon to secure and protect valuable items and to facilitate animal husbandry, especially when mares are in foal. Indeed, the lack of on-site accommodation would make it virtually impossible for the proposed operation to succeed at the scale envisaged as it would require multiple trips daily to and from a dwel1ing elsewhere, in order to care for animals on the site'.

4. However, as is often the case in a judgment such as this, it will perforce address itself primarily to asserted deficiencies in Ms Sexton’s planning application by reference to the applicable Development Plan criteria - as it was those alleged deficiencies which underlay the Impugned Decision by the Respondent (“the Commission”), partly refusing her planning application.

5. In more detail, the application was for permission for the following:2

A. The temporary relocation of an existing mobile home on the land and its temporary retention for eighteen months from the date of any grant of planning permission;

B. The retention of an existing building containing 10 stable cubicles and lunging ring;

C. The retention of an existing septic tank and the provision of a new percolation area;

D. The retention of an existing well;

1 F23A/0003.

2 I have rationalised the description slightly without changing meaning.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

E. The closure of an existing entrance and the creation of a new access with a slightly re-configured driveway to an equestrian farmyard, which is to be retained;

F. The erection of a two-storey dwelling containing three bedrooms, a combined living/dining room, a combined kitchen/ breakfast/sitting area and ancillary hallway, utility and toilet accommodation on the ground floor and an office at first floor level;

G. Erection of new stable block with 8 cubicles;

H. The use of the overall property for equine purposes; and

I. All associated site works including paddock fencing and post and electric cabling.

6. In passing I record, in light of the retention applications and what photographs in the planning application disclose to be a substantial stable block already on the Site, that Ms Sexton’s business plan records that “The Wyanstown property was purchased for €260,000 with a further €75,000 spent on development to date.” And the planning application discloses that there has been no previous planning application on the site. However, that passing observation does not bear on my decision.

7. It is of some relevance to note that the planning application addressed Ms Sexton's co-ownership of a marital home in this area (Belinstown Lodge) as, in the context of her marital separation, not disqualifying her from benefitting from the Development Plan rural housing policy – giving examples of other planning decisions. However it does not, in that particular context, address Ms Sexton's means of funding her proposed enterprise.

8. The Council refused permission.3 Ms Sexton appealed. The Commission’s inspector recommended that permission be granted. On 2 April 2024, the Commission, by its Impugned Decision - what it calls a “split” decision,4 and in partly disagreeing with the inspector,

• Granted permission for the Equestrian Element.

• Refused permission for the Residential Element – i.e. both the relocation and temporary retention of the mobile home and the construction of the dwelling.

9. In these judicial review proceedings, Ms Sexton seeks to quash the Impugned Decision – but only as to the refusal of permission for the Residential Element. While four grounds are pleaded on which certiorari is sought, counsel for Ms Sexton very fairly, and in my view correctly and accurately, opened his case by saying: “This is a reasons case”. More specifically, Ms Sexton says that the Commission gave inadequate reasons for disagreeing with its inspector. He closed his case by saying that he was “hanging my hat” on the reasons issue.

10. Grounds 1 and 4 as pleaded are avowedly reasons grounds – based respectively in the common law rules as to reasons and statutory requirements as to reasons (s.34(10) PDA 20005). Counsel for Ms Sexton

3 The Council briefly appeared by counsel at the trial but did not participate.

4 ABP-316032-23.

5 Planning and Development Act 2000 as amended.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

very fairly agreed that Grounds 1 and 4 could be considered as one. Both Grounds 2 and 3, insofar as they plead the irrationality of the Impugned Decision, are essentially premised on the inadequacy of the Board’s reasons.

11. Ground 3 also asserts the “imposition of an undefined and impossible standard” and “an arbitrary and non-statutory threshold”. This was not really pursued at trial – though it was in Ms Sexton’s written submissions. As to that, I am satisfied that:

• It is premised on a misconception that planning decisions cannot be based on qualitative evaluative planning judgements by reference to non-quantified or non-numerical standards such as “long term commitment”. On the contrary, while some planning standards are quantified, many are not and evaluative, qualitative judgements are stock in trade of proper planning practice. Of many possibilities one need only instance judgements as to such as visual impact and architectural quality.

• The relevant Development Plan standards which were applied (and which I describe below) are entirely proper, comprehensible and capable of lawful application to the facts and circumstances disclosed in a planning application. Apart altogether from the absence of a challenge to the validity of the Development Plan in those regards, I am satisfied there is nothing in that element of Ground 3.

12. Accordingly, I will take up Counsel’s invitation, and treat this as a reasons case – which is how it was argued by both parties at the hearing.

13. Essentially, the Commission says that when the Impugned Decision is considered in context - in particular in light of the Council’s decision - and to adopt a phrase deployed by Hogan J in Killegland,6 “no one could really have been in any doubt as to the reasons given” for the Impugned Decision. In similar vein, it cites Leefield7 - also a case in which the Board had rejected its inspector’s advice. Inter alia, Birmingham J observed that reasons should provide a certain minimum standard of practical enlightenment as assessed from the perspective of an intelligent participant in the process, aware of the broad issues involved. More recent cases frame that requirement as for the “main reasons on the main issues” and perhaps the word “minimum” might not latterly be used. But insofar as relevant to this case, the broad thrust of Leefield remains valid – that of practical enlightenment of an informed intelligent participant by reference to the purpose of reasons as stated in Mulholland.8 On the facts, Birmingham J found that “an informed reader of the reasons and consideration section would be left in no doubt” as to what the Board’s reason were. Connelly9 and Killegland10 are authority that, subject to the proviso that a party cannot be expected to trawl vast documentation in search of reasons, reasons can be found anywhere that can be reliably identified as supplying them and are to be discerned on a conspectus of the reliable materials. In Crekav,11 Barniville J

6 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council & Giltinane [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 §69.

7 Leefield Ltd v An Bord Pleanála & O’Flynn Construction [2012] IEHC 539, {2012] 12 JIC 0404.

8 Mulholland v An Bord Pleanála [2006] 1 IR 453. Kelly J. indicated that what was required of reasons was that they would be sufficient to (1) give to an

applicant such information as may be necessary and appropriate for him to consider whether he has a reasonable chance of succeeding in appealing or

judicially reviewing the decision, (2) arm the applicant for such hearing or review and, (3) enable the applicant to know if the decision maker has

directed its mind adequately to the issues which it was required to consider, (4) put the courts in a position to review the decision.

9 Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 3 IR 751, Clarke CJ p778.

10 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council & Giltinane [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 §71.

11 Crekav Trading GP Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 400.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

encompasses these concepts in stating that “the adequacy of the reasoning must be assessed from the viewpoint of a reasonable observer carrying out a reasonable enquiry”. And, as Hogan J says in Killegland, “If the search required were to be excessive, then the reasons could not be said to be reasonably clear.”

14. A sequential view of the relevant information will assist in discerning in this case the adequacy or otherwise of the reasons given by the Board for the Impugned Decision.

DEVELOPMENT PLAN

15. When the planning application was made, the Fingal Development Plan 2017 applied. By the time of the Board’s decision, the Fingal Development Plan 2023 applied. It is agreed that there is no material difference between them. So it suffices to cite only the relevant content of the latter as follows:

“3.5.15.5 New Housing for the Rural Community other than those who are Actively Engaged in Farming New dwellings will be considered in areas of Fingal which have a RU or GB zoning objective for members of the rural community who are not involved in farming.

Objective SPQHO81 – RU12 and GB13 lands Permit new rural dwellings in areas which have zoning objectives RU or GB on suitable sites where the applicant meets the criteria set out in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Criteria for Eligible Applicants from the Rural Community for Planning Permission for New Rural Housing iv. A ‘bona fide’ applicant who may not already live in the area, nor have family connections there or be engaged in particular employment or business classified with the local needs criteria, subject to the following considerations:

• Such applicants will be required to satisfy the Council of their long-term commitment to operate a full-time business from their proposed home in a rural area, as part of their planning application.

• The applicant will outline within a submitted Business Plan how their business will contribute to and enhance the rural community and will demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that the nature of their employment or business is compatible with, and addresses and satisfies local needs, and will protect and promote the rural community.

• The applicant will satisfy the Council that the nature of their employment or business is dependent on its location within the rural area so as to discourage applicants whose business is not location dependent.

• The applicant will demonstrate their commitment to the proposed business o through the submission of a comprehensive and professionally prepared Business Plan, and

12 Zoning Objective ‘RU’ Rural is to Protect and promote in a balanced way, the development of agriculture and rural-related enterprise, biodiversity,

the rural landscape, and the built and cultural heritage.”

13 Green Belt zoned lands.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

o through submission of legal documentation that they have sufficient funding committed to start and operate the business.

• Applicants whose business is not location-dependent will not be considered.

Verifiable documentary evidence to demonstrate compliance with Table 3.5 will be required in all planning permission applications for a new house in the open countryside including a sworn affidavit by the applicant stating that the applicant conforms to the requirements of the objective.”14

§14.12.8 of the Development Plan requires that “Applications must demonstrate full compliance with all relevant requirements set out under Chapter 3 and Table 3.5”. 15

The equivalents in the 2017 Development Plan of Objective SPQHO81 and Table 3.5 were Objective RF39 and Table RF03.

16. Notable here are the clear obligations imposed on the planning applicant of verifiable demonstration of various matters to the satisfaction of the Council. And the requirement of a verifying affidavit is notable as highly unusual (at least in my experience) in a development plan objective.

17. As to Fingal's Rural Housing Policy, the Commission’s inspector informatively notes that as to lands such as the Site under “strong urban influence”, “a key challenge is to ensure a balance between facilitating those with a genuine need to reside in rural Fingal while managing urban generated demand” and the policy is based on requirements for a “demonstrable economic or social need to live in a rural area”.

18. It bears observing that this is, in a sense, an unusual development plan provision in that it invokes the capacity and intention of the applicant for planning permission to effect the permitted development and to personally continue its use indefinitely thereafter. These are not issues which a planning authority normally considers in deciding a planning application. Insofar as they interrogate the personal circumstances and intentions of the planning applicant, they could be viewed as an exception to the general principles referred in Flanagan,16 Griffin,17 and Killegland18 - that planning decisions should generally be blind to issues of ownership and the identity of the owner (or intending developer) of lands and personal considerations generally. Indeed, and as it happens, Griffin was a case in which the applicant had been granted planning permission to construct a house on farmland which he used for horse breeding purposes. The permission was quashed as having taken irrelevant considerations into account – personal considerations affecting the applicant, including that the applicant found it attractive and almost essential to live on his holding and that the breeding of livestock was of national importance. But, as was said in Pat O’Donnell,19 cautioning against sweeping statements deeming personal considerations irrelevant in planning decisions and as Hogan J noted

14 Emphases added.

15 Emphasis added.

16 Flanagan v Galway City and County Manager [1989] IR 66.

17 Griffin v Galway City and County Manager, High Court, 31 October 1990.

18 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council & Giltinane [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 §84.

19 Pat O’Donnell & Co v Dublin City Council & Uniphar [2024] IEHC 671.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

in Killegland, the principle is “general”, not exhaustive. It does not take a sociologist or an anthropologist to

discern the concerns underlying and purposes motivating development plan policies as to rural housing - one-off rural housing in particular - and the reasons for relatively exceptionally permitting it despite the strong policy tide in favour of compact residential development. Accordingly, the identity of and verifiable development intentions of the planning applicant may prove properly relevant to planning applications for permission for such developments. C O'C 20 is an example of a case in which considerations personal to a planning applicant – including whether she had a definable social or economic need to live in the locality - were at play. In any event, the Development Plan policy at issue in this case is not impugned – which observation is not to be taken as implying that it might arguably have been impugned.

MS SEXTON’S PLANNING PERMISSION APPLICATION

19. Ms Sexton’s planning application was made for her by a planning consultant. Notably, his report recites the relevant development plan content, including the development plan requirement that “[t]he applicant will demonstrate their commitment to the proposed business through the submission … of legal documentation that they have sufficient funding committed to start and operate the business.” For reasons not made known to me, the application did not enclose an affidavit by Ms Sexton deposing that she conforms to the requirements of relevant development plan objective – which affidavit, as has been seen, the development plan required. Neither did the Ms Sexton’s planning report address the question of the possession of or access to “sufficient funding … to start and operate the business”.

20. The planning application included various appendices21 – including a business plan as required by the Development Plan. Unsatisfactorily, the business plan does not on its face identify its author or its author’s competence to prepare a business plan. For all that, and on a brief lay appraisal, it seems well-prepared and nothing now turns on any authorship or competence issue. It budgets that Ms Sexton will run the business full-time and initially employ two part-time staff – one to support livery and schooling and the other in breeding and sales. The planning application envisaged that Ms Sexton will run the business “with the assistance of part-time, or casual labour, as and when required.” Notably however, and as to Ms Sexton’s funds to “start and operate the business”, the business plan says only that she “will fund the development costs estimated at €280,000 from her own resources”. It records those costs to consist of €200,000 to build the “home and cement block and tack room” and the remainder as development costs of stables and a practice ring.

21. It is clear that, for reasons not made known to me, the planning application did not enclose any document which could sensibly be described, in terms of the development plan requirement, as “legal documentation that they have sufficient funding committed to start and operate the business.”

20 C O'C v An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 70, [2021] 2 JIC 1005.

21 Also, CRO Details, a letter from an accountant confirming only that accounting services had been bespoken, insurance information, horse passports

and various documents relating to equestrian expertise and certifications of competence. The passports are very poorly reproduced – to the point of

illegibility as exhibited - and the Council’s planner considered that they did not show Ms Sexton to own the horses to which they related.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

FINGAL COUNTY COUNCIL DECISION

22. The Council, by decision dated 28 February 2023, refused permission for the entirety of the Proposed Development for four reasons stated in the Council’s Planner’s Report - also dated 28 February 2023. That report had recommended that permission be refused. Those reasons included the following:

“1. The subject site is within the 'RU' zoning objective under the Fingal Development Plan, 2017 2023, the objective of which is to 'protect and promote in a balanced way, the development of agriculture and rural-related enterprise, biodiversity, the rural landscape, and the built and cultural heritage' and in a 'Rural Area under Strong Urban Influence' in the Sustainable Rural Housing Guidelines for Planning Authorities' (DoEHLG, 2005).

It is national policy in such areas under urban influence, as set out in National Policy Objective 19 of the National Planning Framework to facilitate the provision of single housing in the countryside, based on the core consideration of demonstrable economic or social need to live in such rural areas under urban influence.

The applicant is seeking a dwelling in the rural area on the basis of 'bona fide' applicant - i.e.

paragraph (iv) of Table RF03/0bjective RF39(iv) of the Fingal Development Plan 2017-2023. This category of rural generated housing need applies to a person who may not already live in the area, nor have family connections there or be engaged in particular employment or business classified with the local needs criteria, but who intends to operate a full-time business from their proposed rural home, as part of their planning application.

Objective RF39 (iv) requires the applicant to submit a range of documentation including a detailed and comprehensive Business Plan and legal documentation which demonstrate o their long term commitment to operate a full-time business from their proposed rural home, o that the nature of their employment or business is compatible with and addresses and satisfies local needs and will protect and promote the rural community, o and that sufficient funding is in place to commence and operate the proposed business.

Insufficient documentation in this regard has been provided and therefore the requirements of Objective RF39(iv) have not been satisfied.

The proposed development would contravene materially the rural settlement strategy of the Fingal Development Plan 2017-2023 specifically paragraph (iv) of Table RF03/Objective RF39 (iv), would be contrary to the Ministerial Guidelines and to the over-arching national policy in the National Planning Framework.

The proposed development would, therefore, be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.

4. The mobile home If permitted would set an undesirable precedent for other similar development, which would cumulatively be harmful to the amenities of the area and be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.”22

22 Layout changed for ease of reading. The Council’s refusal was also based on a view that the buildings would be visually obtrusive and the scale of the

stabling had not been justified. But those reason are not here relevant.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

23. I am satisfied that the reasons stated by the Council planner and adopted by the Council in its

decision refusing permission, are illuminated by the Council planner’s report. That report adverted to the relevant content of the planning application and the relevant development plan policy and concluded that:

“the Information provided lacks sufficient detail to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the applicant's compliance with the criteria in this regard. It Is considered that on the basis of the information submitted with the application, the applicants have not satisfied the council of:

(a) Their long term commitment to operate a full-time business from their proposed home in a rural area, as part of their planning application. The Planning Authority notes that it would appear that the business is not currently operating and the applicant has not clearly demonstrated their ownership of any horses.

(b) How the business will contribute to and enhance the rural community, and that the nature of their employment or business is compatible with, and addresses and satisfies local needs, and will protect and promote the rural community.

(c) The nature of their employment or business Is dependent on its location within the rural area.

(d) The applicant has not submitted legal documentation that they have sufficient funding committed to start and operate the business.

In addition, it ls considered that insufficient verifiable documentary evidence has been submitted to demonstrate compliance with Objective RF39 and a sworn affidavit by the applicant stating that the applicant conforms to the requirements of the objective has not been submitted. Furthermore, the applicant would appear to currently co - own a property known as Belinstown Lodge. Clarity would be required in this regard in order to demonstrate that the applicant has a need for a new rural dwelling.

The applicant ls also seeking permission for the temporary relocation and temporary retention of an existing mobile home which occupies the land, for a further period of eighteen months from the date of any grant of planning permission. Details of the intended user of this mobile home has not been indicated. The Planning Authority considers that if the applicant was the intended user of this mobile home and was deemed to qualify for a rural dwelling having demonstrated compliance with the Rural Settlement Strategy of the Fingal Development Plan 2017 -2023 the retention of the existing mobile home, on a temporary basis may be considered acceptable.”

MS SEXTON’S APPEAL TO THE COMMISSION

24. Ms Sexton’s planning consultant appealed the Council’s refusal to the Board by letter dated 13 March 2023. Counsel for the Board describes this as her “second bite at the cherry” – an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies in the application which the Councils’ planner had identified. Understandably, the appeal emphasises the positive and plan-complaint aspects of the planning application and the Proposed Development. But counsel for the Commission says that notably, instead of attempting to remedy the

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

deficiencies, the appeal merely “doubled down” on the adequacy of the original application. In my view, that is a fair observation.

25. As to rural housing policy and justification of the proposed equestrian facilities23 the appeal misconstrues the Council as having considered “that Ms. Sexton does not have a 'long term commitment to operate a full time business from their proposed home”, that the development would not 'contribute to and enhance the rural economy' and that the proposed activity is not appropriate in the rural area. The Council reached no such conclusions. It merely concluded that Ms Sexton had failed to demonstrate and thereby satisfy the Council of such a commitment and that the development would “contribute to and enhance the rural economy” and was appropriate to the area – as the development plan required her to do. On this misconceived basis, the appeal criticises the Council’s failure to investigate the application and seek further information.

26. Oddly however, in light of this criticism of the Council by the planning consultant, the appeal does not supply the further information which it asserts the Council ought to have sought and which, one must assume as the premise of the criticism, Ms Sexton would have provided in reply. The appeal merely invokes the business plan already sent to the Council, as demonstrating that “for a reasonable income to derive from this small-scale full-time business, a certain number of stables must be provided”. The appeal asserts that Ms Sexton’s “financial arrangements were tacitly endorsed by the Council”. I asked counsel for the Commission what this last phrase meant. He said he had no idea. Neither, I am afraid, do I. And counsel for Ms Sexton did not shed any light on that issue.

27. The only additional information in the appeal, of present relevance are unverified and uncorroborated assertions that:

• “her considerable financial investment in this venture, both existing and proposed, are clearly indicative of her intention to operate a commercial equestrian business on this landholding …”.

• The justification (for the equestrian business) “which is sought by the Council is connected with these monetary arrangements (which stem from the Appellant's recent separation).”

28. Notably for present purposes, and no explanation was proffered in this regard, Ms Sexton’s appeal did not include an affidavit of the kind required by the Development Plan. Nor, as the Commission points out,24 did it include legal documentation confirming that she had sufficient funds committed to start and operate the business. I can only speculate as to the reasons for these omissions – the necessity to address which had been made clear by the Council. To any extent they were understandably informed by confidentiality concerns relating to her separation, that was not made apparent in the appeal and, no doubt, some form of verifiable assurance could have been obtained in terms satisfactory to the Commission yet not breaching any binding obligations of confidentiality. But as it was, the appeal simply ignored these issues

23 §§3(i) and 3(iii) of the appeal.

24 Commissions’ written submissions §45.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

despite the fact that they had explicitly underlain the Council’s decision to refuse permission. That is difficult

to understand and, as I say, no explanation was proffered.

29. Finally as to the appeal, it states that “the final reason for refusal, which relates to the acceptability of the Appellant's mobile home, can be instantly dispensed with through the imposition of a condition as part of a grant of planning permission requiring this feature to be removed.” As will be seen, this concession is relevant to these proceedings.

COMMISSION’S INSPECTOR’S REPORT

30. The inspector reported on 13 July 2023.25 As has been said, he recommended that permission be granted. He recites the Council’s decision – though, it must be said, not in much detail. His assessment26 identifies “policy compliance” as a main issue in the appeal and says of the Development Plan that Table 3.5 and other provisions, as they relate to housing in the countryside, “are reasonable in the context of the site being within an under27 strong urban influence with the onus on the applicant to demonstrate why a positive consideration for a dwelling would be considered.” 28 He continues:

“7.3.7. Having reviewed the documentation as submitted and that as such applicants are required to satisfy the Council of their long-term commitment to operate a full time business from their proposed home in a rural area, the applicant submitted a Business Plan and other documentation demonstrating long association to the equine industry and that the nature of their employment or business is compatible with, and addresses and satisfies local needs, and will protect and promotethe rural community. It is not clear as to how the documentation is deficient and the planning authority did have an opportunity to request further information. I therefore consider that the appellant has complied with national and CDP policy and subject lo meeting development management standards the equine business to the retained and proposed is acceptable.”

31. Of course it was, in a general sense, open to the inspector to take the view that the documents proffered by Ms Sexton satisfied the development plan requirements. But the specific comment, in the explicit context of the planning authority’s having had opportunity to seek further information, that “[i]t is not clear as to how the documentation is deficient” is difficult to understand given the Council had explicitly instanced the absence of the required affidavit and the required demonstration, to the Council’s satisfaction and by legal documentation, that Ms Sexton had “sufficient funding committed to start and operate the business.” I confess to the expectation that the inspector’s assertion of lack of clarity as to the Council’s assertion of documentary deficiency would have engaged, however briefly, with the specific deficits the Council had identified.

25 The Council made a submission dated 11 April 2023 in the Appeal. Recitals apparent, it said only that “Having examined the appeal documents

lodged on 13th of March 2023, the Planning Authority has no further comments to make in relation to the proposal An Bord Pleanála is requested to

uphold the decision of the Planning Authority.”

26 §7.0.44.

27 Sic.

28 §7.3.6. Emphasis added.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

COMMISSION’S IMPUGNED DECISION

32. I have outlined the Commission’s decision above. Here I will confine myself to recording its reasons for refusing permission of the residential element. They were as follows:

“1. The mobile home, if permitted would set an undesirable precedent for other similar development, which would cumulatively be harmful to the amenities of the area and would, therefore, be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.

2. The applicant had not provided adequate documentation which demonstrated their long term commitment to operate a fulltime business from their proposed rural home, therefore failing to meet the necessary requirement. The proposed development would materially contravene the rural settlement strategy in the Fingal Development Plan 2023-2029 specifically 3.5.15.5 Table (iv). The proposed development would, therefore, be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area.

In deciding not to accept the Inspectors recommendation, the Board were mindful of the totality of the information on file and the absence of sufficient information to support the applicant's contention that the nature of the employment would sustain full time employment.”

THE LAW

Interpretation of Planning Decisions

33. Planning decisions must be interpreted as a whole, in context, pragmatically and where reasonably possible as valid rather than invalid. There are many cases to these effects. It suffices to cite Mulloy:29

“It is clear that one should read planning decisions not as if a statute but “in the round”, in a “way that makes sense”30 and avoid a “legalistic over-analysis”31 with a view to validating rather than invalidating them where possible.32 They are given an objective, purposive, contextual and commonsense/pragmatic, rather than a technical, interpretation.33 The approach is “careful but not legalistic”34 and they are “not to be read narrowly and restrictively”.35 These approaches follow from and are aspects of the XJS36 principles that such decisions should be construed not as complex legal documents drafted by lawyers but as an intelligent layperson without training in law or planning

29 Mulloy v ABP & Knockrabo Investments 2024 IEHC 86 §81.

30 Re Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann [1977] 12 JIC 1402, 1975 WJSC-HC 633 (Unreported, High Court, 14th December, 1977; OA v International Protection

Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 100, §13.

31 MR v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2020] IEHC 41 – the phrase is from a heading in the judgment rather than the operative text but

accurately describes the gravamen of that text.

32 Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 390 §28.

33 Camiveo Ltd v Dunnes Stores [2019] IECA 138 (Court of Appeal, Costello J, 9 May 2019) §33; Ardragh Wind Farm v An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 795.

34 Dublin Cycling Campaign CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 587 §30.

35 Clonres CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 303 albeit speaking of development plans, the same general principle applies; cited in Ballyboden TTG v

ABP & Shannon Homes [2022] IEHC 7 §120.

36 In re XJS Investments Ltd [1986] IR 750.

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

would understand them. And such a person “is capable of resolving inconsistencies, errors, contradictions and the like in and between planning documents”.37

s.34(10) PDA 2000

34. S.34(10) PDA 2000, as relevant, provides that a decision on a planning application by a planning authority or by the Commission on appeal,

“(10) (a) … shall state the main reasons and considerations on which the decision is based ….

(b) Where a decision … by the Board ... to grant or to refuse permission is different, in relation to the granting or refusal of permission, from the recommendation in — (ii) a report of a person assigned to report on an appeal on behalf of the Board, a statement under paragraph (a) shall indicate the main reasons for not accepting the recommendation in the report or reports to grant or refuse permission.”

Konisberry

35. Ms Sexton emphasised Konisberry,38 in which Bradley J reviewed the caselaw39 on s.34(10)(a)&(b) PDA 2000 and as to the law of reasons more generally. I gratefully adopt that review and need not repeat it. I will attempt to summarise his views below and in doing so incorporate some further observations of my own in accordance with views expressed in Killegland,40 O’Donnell41 and Coolkill,42 citing, variously, MRRA,43 FC,44 Duffy45 Weston,46 Marques47 and Grassridge:48 a. The requirement of adequate reasons for a decision “arises as a matter of justice” and the underlying objective is fairness. The more specific objectives are to enable the loser to:

• Know if the Commission has directed its mind adequately to the issues it has to consider.

37 Environmental Trust Ireland v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 540 §174.

38 Konisberry v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 194.

39 Key Cases Cited included, Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752, [2018] 2 ILRM 453; Killegland Estates Limited v Meath County

Council [2023] IESC 39; Náisiúnta Leictreach Contraitheoir Éireann v Labour Court [2021] IESC 36, [2021] 2 ILRM 1; Balz & Heubach v An Bord Pleanála

and Cork County Council and Cleanrath Windfarms Ltd [2019] IESC 90, [2020] 1 ILRM 36; Sliabh Luachra Against Ballydesmond Windfarm Committee v

An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 888; Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 2 IR 752, [2018] 2 ILRM 453; Mallak v Minister for Justice Equality

and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59, [2012] 3 IR 297; Meadows v Minister for Justice [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 IR 701; Rawson v Minister for Defence [2012]

IESC 26; EMI Records (Ireland) Limited v Data Protection Commissioner [2013] IESC 34; Oates v Browne [2016] IESC 7, [2016] 1 IR 48; Crekav v An Bord

Pleanála [2020] IEHC 400; Mulholland v An Bord Pleanála (No.2) [2005] IEHC 306, [2006] 1 IR 453; O’Neill & Ors v An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 356,

[2021] IEHC 58; Flannery & Ors v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IEHC 83; Murphy ’s Irish Seafood Ltd v Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine [2017]

IEHC 353; Clonres CLG v An Bord Pleanála [2021] IEHC 303; West Wood v An Bord Pleanála [2010] IEHC 16.

40 Killegland v Meath County Council [2022] IEHC 393.

41 [2024] IEHC 671.

42 Residents of Coolkill v An Bord Pleanála & Midsal Homes [2025] IEHC 265 §142. 43MRRA v An Bord Pleanála & Lulani [2022] IEHC 318 §64.

44 FC v Mental Health Tribunal [2022] IECA 290.

45 Duffy v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 558.

46 Weston v An Bord Pleanála [2010] IEHC 255.

47 Marques v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 16.

48 Grassridge v Dún Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2024] IEHC 669.

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• Assess whether there is any reasonable chance of successfully judicially reviewing the

decision.

• Arm themselves for such a review.

• Give sufficient information to enable the court to review the decision.

b. The pith of the duty seems to me to lie in the requirement that, as a matter of objective and practical common-sense, the reasonable, intelligent, informed participant in the process must not be left in any real doubt as to what were the Commission’s main reasons on the main issues. Reasons must be clear and cogent. Roache49 has held that “If it is broadly clear why a view is preferred in arriving at a

decision, the requirement for reasons identified in Connelly and applied in case law since is satisfied ”.

c. There is a singular responsibility on a decision-maker of meaningful engagement – to clearly show that relevant submissions were addressed and explain why they were not accepted. As has been said, reasons are for losers.

d. Capturing precisely what the appropriate level of reasoning looks like in a decision is easier to assert as a principle than to describe as a function. The degree of reasoning required to be made evident in the decision is caseand context-specific. Reasons must be “adequate to the situation” and “there is a balance to be struck. It is of course ultimately a question of substance and not form, and there must be an element of common sense and practicality in approaching the question of adequacy of reasons”. I repeat my reference to Killegland50 and Leefield51 as to the usefulness of asking the question whether, on a conspectus of the relevant materials, the informed intelligent participant in the process has in reality been left in doubt as to the main reasons on the main issues.

e. Reasons for a decision may be derived in a variety of ways, including, for example, from a range of documents or from the context of the decision - subject always to the requirement that the reasons must be actually readily ascertainable. As I have put essentially the same proposition, citing Connelly52 and Killegland,53 - subject to the proviso that a party cannot be expected to trawl vast documentation in search of reasons, reasons can be found anywhere that can be reliably identified as supplying them and are to be discerned on a conspectus of the reliable materials. Further, reasons may be obvious “by reference to the process which has led to the decision such that neither of the parties could be in any reasonable doubt as to what the reasons were” – EMI Records.54 And they may be “implicit from the context” – McGowan.55 Carrownagowan56 is authority that “reasons don’t have to be set out in extenso in a decision. They can be found in other documents where that arises as a matter of express provision or implication.”

f. On differing from its inspector, the Commission has an enhanced duty to give reasons. It must set out simply and in a clear and meaningful way, its main reasons for not accepting the inspector’s recommendation and do so in sufficient detail to enable an interested person to know why the

49 Roache v An Bord Pleanála [2024] IEHC 311, §116.

50 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council & Giltinane [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 §69.

51 Leefield Ltd v An Bord Pleanála & O’Flynn Construction [2012] IEHC 539, {2012] 12 JIC 0404.

52 Connelly v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IESC 31, [2021] 3 IR 751 Clarke CJ p778.

53 Killegland Estates v Meath County Council & Giltinane [2023] IESC 39, [2023] 12 JIC 2109 §71.

54 EMI Records v The Data Protection Commissioner [2013] IESC 34 §6.9.

55 McGowan v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 405 §54 (vi).

56 Carrownagowan Concern Group v An Bord Pleanála (No.3) [2024] IEHC 549 §69.

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Commission differed from the inspector. There are two main reasons for this enhanced duty: first, as the Commission rejects the inspector’s reasons, it must state reasons of its own; second, the Commission is expected to engage with the inspector’s rationale.

g. s.34(10)(a)&(b) taken together require the Commission to locate its reasoning for differing with its inspector as part of its main reasons and considerations at that point in its decision. I respectfully say that I do not understand s.34(10)(a)&(b) or this observation by Bradley J to detract from the principles that, on the significant provisos stated above, reasons may be found anywhere.

36. As Ventaway57 was a case in which the planning authority’s reasons were considered to illuminate the Board’s, it resonates with the present case. The following appear:

• “The problem for the applicant is that the reasons don’t have to be found in the board order. They can be found in the supporting documentation. For good measure the board references the city council conclusions, although that could be inferred anyway58 ... So the rationale was sufficiently apparent.”59

• “The key point is that reasons can be found outside of the text of the decision itself. … if we confine the reasons to the decision itself, they aren’t hugely specified, but read in the context of… the [Council’s] planner’s report, the reasons are a lot clearer” As in Killegland60 … nobody could be in any real doubt as to what the reasons were.”61

Demonstration & Satisfaction

37. As will have been noticed, the Development Plan requires that Ms Sexton “demonstrate” and thereby “satisfy” the Council, and by extension the Commission, of certain matters.

38. To demonstrate something is to go beyond mere assertion – one must not merely say what is so but show it to be so. And as has been seen, the Commissions’ decision was not that matters required to be demonstrated were not so – it was that Ms Sexton had not shown them to be so.

39. As to whether the Commission is legally entitled to be “satisfied” in this regard, the law is clear: the resultant opinion must be bona fide held, factually sustainable, not unreasonable and intra vires – Re M McD62 and Pilkington.63 That opinion is reviewable, as to merit, only for irrationality. Such a challenge is not

57 Ventaway Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 406 §79 & 91.

58 Emphasis added.

59 §79.

60 Killegland Estates Ltd v Meath County Council [2023] IESC 39 (Hogan J).

61 §91.

62 Re M McD – The Child & Family Agency v I McD [2024] IESC 6 §95 – citing “the seminal judgments to this effect of O’Higgins C.J. in The State (Lynch)

v. Cooney [1982] IR 337 at 361 and that of Blayney J. in Kiberd v Hamilton [1992] 2 IR 257 at 265”.

63 Pilkington v Offaly County Council [2024] IEHC 121 §54.

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mounted here but as will be seen, Ms Sexton’s planning consultant has mischaracterised the Board’s

decision such that the concepts of demonstration and satisfaction have required brief mention here.

DISCUSSION

Mobile Home

40. The mobile home issue does not seem to me to ground certiorari. I confess that I am somewhat unclear to that it was really pressed but it was at most a minor issue at trial. And, as the Council noted, “[d]etails of the intended user of this mobile home has not been indicated.” But even assuming Ms Sexton would live in it temporarily while the house was built, that purpose disappeared once permission for the house was to be refused. Clearly, in that context and on the planning application as made, there was no prospect of her indefinitely residing in the mobile home.

41. More importantly, as the appeal had in effect invited a refusal of permission for the mobile home, it is difficult to see that reasons for such refusal were required. If I am wrong in that, I cannot see that the discretionary remedy of certiorari could issue by reason of a refusal which the appeal had all but conceded.

Equestrian Elements but not the Dwelling

42. It may at first seem strange that the Equestrian Elements were permitted and the Residential Elements rejected. Ms Sexton’s written submissions describe that as “inconsistent and irrational”. However, I accept that the Equestrian Elements were assessed and permitted on their ordinary planning merits and without regard to Ms Sexton’s personal circumstances. And, of course, Ms Sexton does not seek to upset their permission. However, the relevant development plan policy was specifically a housing policy. As the Commission submits, it is directed at whether to permit houses not businesses.64 Its purpose was in considerable part to restrain urban-generated development of one-off rural housing which lends itself to “unsustainable patterns of development, detracting from this important reserve and placing excessive strain on the receiving environment.”65 It was only as to the housing issue that the unusual requirements I have earlier described arose as to Ms Sexton’s capacity and commitment to operate the business from the dwelling. But for those requirements such considerations were legally irrelevant. It was as to her demonstration of that capacity and commitment that the Commission considered Ms Sexton to have fallen short. It is understandable therefore, at least as a matter of its internal logic, that the Impugned Decision permitted the Equestrian Elements but refused permission for the dwelling.

64 Written Submissions §67.

65 Development Plan §3.5.15, “Housing in Rural Fingal”.

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Interpretation of Impugned Decision and Adequacy of Reasons

43. Having set out above the applicable legal principles as to interpretation of planning decisions and as to statement of reasons for planning decisions, including reasons for disagreement with planning inspectors, it seems to me that their application to the facts of this case can be fairly briefly achieved.

44. First, and as has been said, citing Mulloy,66 the Impugned Decision must be interpreted as a whole, in context, pragmatically, not narrowly or legalistically and, where reasonably possible, as valid rather than invalid. By the relevant content of the Impugned Decision, the Commission:

• Asserted that Ms Sexton had not provided documents adequate to demonstrate her long-term commitment to operate a fulltime business from her proposed rural home.

• In this regard, expressly found material contravention of the “necessary requirement” of Development Plan §3.5.15.5 and “Table (iv)”. This latter should have cited ‘Table 3.5 (iv)’, but no one can have been misled.

• Recorded that, in disagreeing with the inspector, it had had regard to “the totality of the information on file” and the absence of sufficient information to confirm that the equestrian enterprise would sustain full time employment.

45. I confess to regarding the invocation of “the totality of the information on file”, at least in the absence of more specific reference to particular file content, as little more than the “administrative throat clearing” charitably dismissed in Balz.67 On different facts – on larger and more complex files – such an incantation might draw the Commission too close to the wind. But this was not a large or complex file and there was no vast quantity of documentation to be trawled. The Council’s decision, including its planner’s report, was well within scope of the reasonable inquiry which, according to Crekav, may be expected of Ms Sexton in her seeking to ascertain the reasons for the Impugned Decision. I do not consider that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the incantation imperils the legality of the Impugned Decision.

46. On a pragmatic, non-legalistic reading in the context of what preceded it in the text of the Impugned

Decision and in the Council’s decision, and reading it with a view to its validity, I hold that the Commission’s

reference, in explaining its difference with its inspector, to the absence of “sufficient information to confirm that the equestrian enterprise would sustain full time employment”, as read with the reference to the failure to demonstrate her long term commitment to the business, sufficed to encompass and invoke the failure, identified by the Council, to submit the necessary affidavit and demonstrate that Ms Sexton was in funds to start and operate the business. These points are made in the Commissions’ written submissions68 which correctly describe the Council’s decision as “relatively straightforward to understand”.

47. By way of checking, standing back as it were and taking an overview, I consider that Ms Sexton was not in any reality left in doubt as to the main reasons for the main issues as they bore on the substance of

66 Mulloy v ABP & Knockrabo Investments 2024 IEHC 86.

67 Balz v An Bord Pleanála [2019] IESC 90 (Supreme Court, O'Donnell J, 12 December 2019).

68 §§12, 14 & 36 – 3, 44.

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the Impugned Decision and on the Commission’s disagreement with its inspector. I do not and need not state that I would have taken the same view – that is irrelevant to the legality of the Impugned Decision.

48. Given an averment by her planning consultant, it is important to be clear what the Impugned

Decision does not say. He deposes that “[a]lthough the Board has indicated that this operation would not be sufficient to sustain full-time employment, no evidence has been adduced to support this opinion and I do not consider that An Bord Pleanála has provided a reason, as required under the planning code, which supports this conclusion.” The Statement of Grounds repeats the error: “[a]lthough the Board has indicated that this operation would not be sufficient to sustain full-time employment, no evidence whatsoever has been adduced to support this view and it has not provided a planning reason, as required under the planning code, to support this conclusion.” The Commission drew no such conclusion and had no obligation to adduce any evidence. The averment and the plea warp the obligation of demonstration imposed by the Development Plan on Ms Sexton – not on the Commission. I do not suggest that these errors were deliberate. But they must be corrected. The Commission merely concluded that Ms Sexton had not demonstrated to its satisfaction that the equestrian enterprise would sustain full time employment. In that context, the plea that the Business Plan, “has not been challenged” is misconceived. Apart altogether from the fact that the Board does not “challenge” materials in considering planning applications, the business plan simply did not purport to provide any evidence of funds to hand – even on Ms Sexton’s analysis, there was nothing in it to “challenge”.

49. It seems to me that the obligation of engagement with the inspector’s rationale must be viewed in the context that the inspector provided little, if any, rationale for his disagreement with the Council and for his view that the documents supplied were adequate to the requirements of Objective SPQHO81 and Table

3.5 of the Development Plan. In that sense and as to the Commission’s disagreement with the inspector, there was little rationale with which to engage. That might prove a problem for the legality of a decision impugned in another case. But it is not a problem in this case by reference to the practical question whether Ms Sexton was left in real doubt as to the main reasons for that disagreement.

50. Remembering that the inspector was disagreeing, in turn, with the Council, though not elucidating his rationale for doing so, it becomes obvious that the Commission was presented with two views and chose the Council’s over the inspector’s. Further, it is obvious by reference to the requirements of Objective SPQHO81 and Table 3.5 of the Development Plan, and:

• On considering the Council’s decision, that its view was that the required affidavit and documentary evidence of commitment of funds to start and operate the business were missing.

• On considering the planning application, that the Council’s view was in substance correct – the documents were indeed missing.

• On considering Ms Sexton’s appeal to the Commission, that she had failed to remedy that deficiency.

51. Accordingly, on a conspectus of the materials and without any need to trawl vast documentation, it can be said that the Commission’s main reasons on the main issues, as to both the substance of its decision

Sexton v ABP & Fingal CC [2025] IEHC 449

and its disagreement with its inspector, were ascertainable, clear and cogent. It follows that the proceedings must be dismissed.

52. However some more should be said. Unlike many which come before the Commission, this was not a large or complex file. As can be seen from the second next preceding paragraph, it has been possible to clearly state the Commission’s reasons in a brief paragraph. While it does not bear on the legality of the Impugned Decision, I cannot refrain from observing, as to good practice, that such a brief and clear statement on the face of the Impugned Decision might very well have avoided the present litigation. If not legally imperative, it is at least desirable practice that, at least where they can be succinctly stated, reasons be stated on the face of the decision. That said, I have found the reasons adequate in law. As that is a finding grounded in the practical conveyance of meaning, it follows that, the result apart, Ms Sexton must also shoulder considerable responsibility for the present litigation.

Failure to Submit Particular Documents, S.131 & 132 PDA 2000 & Possible Further Planning Application

53. The refusal here was grounded in essence in the failure to submit particular documents. Without pleading or alleging legal error in that regard, counsel for Ms Sexton in argument was critical of the Commission and the Council – saying she was never asked for them. That is not so. She was asked for them. She was asked explicitly by the terms of the Development Plan and implicitly, but perfectly clearly, in the Council’s decision. It is entirely unclear why Ms Sexton’s appeal did not mend her hand in those regards.

54. Under ss.131 and/or 132 PDA 2000, the Commission could have asked Ms Sexton to supply the documents if “of opinion that, in the particular circumstances … it is appropriate in the interests of justice to”69 do so. It did not. Amongst the exhibits is an internal Commission memo recording that no s.131 request was necessary. It discloses no reasons for that view. There was some attempt at trial to mobilise an assertion of legal error by way of want of reasons in this respect. It did not feature in Ms Sexton’s written submissions and, in any event, I reject it as unpleaded. The Grounds did include a narrative assertion that it would have been “especially fair” of the Board to seek further information. But in argument no fair procedures ground was in any substance pursued – in my view correctly.

55. However, it seems reasonable to infer that the decision not to seek further information was informed by the view – taken by the inspector – that the documents supplied by Ms Sexton sufficed. As we know, the Commission, later took a different view. But having done so it did not, as it could have done, revisit the possibility of a s.131/132 request. I enquired why not and, despite instructions being sought, received no real answer. The Commission stood on the legality and breadth of its discretion that regard, as it was, in law entitled in strictness to do - as recognised in cases such as East Coast Transport.70 But I think I may be permitted some observations as to the Commission’s practice in this case.

69 s.131. Insofar as there is a necessity to distinguish the s.131 power as to information from the s.132 power as to documents, I am satisfied that

nothing turns on any such necessity here.

70 East Coast Transport Ltd v An Bord Pleanála [2019] IEHC 866, [2019] 12 JIC 1803.

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56. While personal considerations are ordinarily irrelevant to the substance of a planning decision, they may on occasion and in some degree inform the fairness of its processing to decision. And in this case, as we have seen, personal considerations were properly relevant - even to the substance of the decision itself. It is clear from the file that Ms Sexton’s application, though minor in the great scheme of the Commission’s operations, was of particular importance to her and had arisen in circumstances which could readily be construed as likely to have been stressful, unfortunate and as appreciably bearing on her future wellbeing. There is room for some humanity and practicality in decision-making. As I have said, this was far from a large or complex file. True, it would have been to give Ms Sexton a third bite at the cherry, but even so it is difficult to see what disadvantage there would have been to the Commission in briefly putting back the file to allow the simple and practical course to be taken of requesting the documents in question. The Board’s argument that the simpler option was that she could start all over again by making a new planning application was, in context, quite unconvincing. That would, I accept, be simpler from the Commission’s point of view – it cleared the file. But clearly and objectively, having regard to the burden of a new application on Ms Sexton, the Council and, quite possibly again, the Commission, by far the simpler option was a s.131/132 notice on the basis of which the relatively simple documents required would, or for that matter would not, have been produced in fairly short order and to no real inconvenience to the Commission. However, I emphasise that these observations relate to issues of practice and not to the legality of the Impugned Decision.

57. As has been seen, the Commission’s reasons for refusing permission for the dwelling were confined to the want of documentary proofs and so were not based on conclusions as to the planning merits or otherwise of the Proposed Development having regard to the Development Plan rural housing policy. As I have said, it is not without some regret that I consider myself obliged to dismiss these proceedings. In that context and from a practical perspective, it is some consolation to note that, as the Commission acknowledged in argument on foot of authority it helpfully drew to my attention, the circumstances here seem adequately analogous to those identified by Barr J in Reidy71 as to permit Ms Sexton to make a fresh application for permission for the Proposed Development, accompanied by the requisite documents which were missing from the current application. Whether such an application will succeed on its planning merits is, of course, not for me to anticipate.

DECISION

58. For the reasons I have given, these proceedings will be dismissed.

David Holland 31/7/25

71 Reidy v An Bord Pleanála [2020] IEHC 423 §57 et seq.