Court fees exempted for Article 40.4 constitutional liberty claims but required for ordinary civil proceedings.

THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 425

[Record No. 2024/6852P]

BETWEEN

PATRICK McGREAL

PLAINTIFF

AND

BRIDIN CONCANNON AND MARIA BROWN

DEFENDANTS

______________________________________________________________

THE HIGH COURT

[Record No. 2024/6645P]

BETWEEN

PATRICK McGREAL

PLAINTIFF

AND

SAM (COURT SERVICES STAFF), COLIN (COURT SERVICE STAFF), KIM

DUFFY, (COURT SERVICE MANAGER), GARDA A, GARDA SHEEHAN, GARDA

C, JAIL GARDA SERGEANT, COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SIOCHANA,

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE COURTS SERVICES

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Cregan delivered on 7th July, 2025

Introduction

1. This judgment deals with the question of whether court fees are payable in respect of two sets of proceedings which have been issued by Mr. McGreal.

2. The first set of proceedings is McGreal v. Concannon and Brown (Record No. 2024/6852P) (“the first set of proceedings”).

3. The second set of proceedings is Mr. McGreal’s proceedings against various members of the Courts Service, the Garda Commissioner and various Gardaí (“the second set of proceedings”).

Background

4. The background to this application, in summary, is that Mr. McGreal presented his plenary summons to the Central Office in the first set of proceedings in October 2024. The Central Office refused to accept the plenary summons until he had paid the relevant court fees. Mr. McGreal was of the view that no court fees were payable. Mr. McGreal organised a group of his supporters to come to the Central Office, whilst he tried for a second time to get the Central Office to accept his plenary summons without payment of court fees. Officials from the Central Office then called members of the Garda Síochána who appeared, arrested Mr. McGreal, brought him to the Bridewell for a number of hours and subsequently released him. As a result, Mr. McGreal then issued his second set of proceedings against members of the Courts Service, members of An Garda Síochána and the Garda Commissioner. He sought to issue his plenary summons in these proceedings also without payment of court fees. Again, the Central Office rejected his application.

Plaintiff’s ex parte application on 14 October, 2024

5. As a result, Mr. McGreal made an ex parte application to the Chancery List which I heard on 14th October, 2024. In light of the submissions made by Mr. McGreal at that time, and on reading the ex parte docket and the affidavit of Mr. McGreal in respect of his intended proceedings, I formed the view that the intended proceedings against the Court Services staff, members of the gardaí, and the Garda Commissioner were “proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution” and were therefore an exception to the relevant statutory instrument dealing with the payment of court fees. As such, the second set of proceedings did not attract court fees at that point in time. I also made a similar order in respect of the intended first set of proceedings brought by Mr. McGreal against Ms. Concannon and Ms. Browne. I was however aware that this was an ex parte application and that I had not heard the other side. As a result, my order was to allow both plenary summonses to be issued without payment of court fees (subject to the right of the intended defendants to reply at a later stage).

6. The exact terms of the Orders in both sets of proceedings as perfected on 14th October, 2024, stated as follows: “And it appearing that the intended proceedings raise an issue pursuant to Article 40.4 of the Constitution and do not attract fees at this point in time (subject to the right of the Intended Defendants to reply at a later stage)”.

7. I also directed that Mr. McGreal could send the papers to the Central Office by ordinary prepaid post or registered post or by leaving them in the “drop-box” beside the Central Office.

The plenary summons in the first set of proceedings

8. In fact, the plaintiff only issued his plenary summons in the first set of proceedings against Ms. Brídín Concannon and Ms. Maria Browne on 22nd November, 2024. In this plenary summons, the general indorsement of claim states inter alia: “1. The plaintiff’s claim arises from serious breaches of statutory and constitutional law in the handling of an election civil bill notice of motion for judgment in default of appearance filed in Westmeath Circuit Court under case number 2024/129 and

2. The plaintiff also seeks compensation for violations carried out by the defendants including breaches of procedural rules, judicial misconduct and abuse of authority which have caused profound harm.”

9. The plenary summons then set out the plaintiff’s claim for damages for denial of justice, breach of constitutional rights, conflict of interest, judicial misconduct, emotional distress and reputational harm, violation of procedural rules, abuse of power, and unlawful conduct and corruption. The plaintiff’s total claim for damages was stated to amount to €5 million and the relief sought was stated to be “Declarations of unlawfulness for the defendant’s actions, damages totalling €5 million and any further relief this court deems appropriate to ensure justice.”

10. The plaintiff served the plenary summons on the first defendant on 26th November, 2024.

11. The plaintiff served the plenary summons on the second defendant Ms. Maria Browne on 20th December, 2024.

12. An appearance was entered on behalf of the second defendant on 3rd January, 2025 by Ms. Maria Browne, the Chief State Solicitor.

13. On 4th February, 2025, counsel for the defendants sought an extension of time for filing of appearances, which order was made by me.

14. An appearance was entered on behalf of the first defendant on 5th February, 2025 by the Chief State Solicitor’s Office (‘CSSO’).

15. The plaintiff has, since 4th February, 2025, on numerous occasions sought to challenge the validity of these appearances.

The plenary summons in the second set of proceedings

16. The plaintiff issued his plenary summons in the second set of proceedings on 13th November, 2024. The plenary summons was served on the Courts Service defendants on 13th November, 2024 and on the Garda Commissioner on 14th November, 2024.

17. An appearance was entered on 18th December, 2024 for the Courts Service defendants by Mason Hayes and Curran L.L.P. A copy of this appearance was sent to the plaintiff on 18th December, 2024.

18. An appearance was entered on behalf of the Garda Commissioner (the ninth defendant) on 13th January, 2025.

19. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants in the second set of proceedings is set out in his plenary summons. He alleges that the defendants have committed multiple breaches of his constitutional rights, including denial of access to the courts, unlawful obstruction of justice and obstruction of his attempts to file an affidavit. He also pleaded that the defendants engaged in false arrest, false imprisonment and assault and that he was subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment and breach of his personal integrity. He also alleges corruption, abuse of power, obstruction of justice, and human rights violations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. He also claims damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of his liberty, damages for assault, damages for constitutional violations and denial of access to justice and damages for emotional distress, humiliation and reputational harm. His total claim for damages is stated to be €4.2 million. Plaintiff’s application on 21 January, 2025 in both sets of proceedings

20. On 20th December, 2024, the plaintiff left a copy of motion papers - in which he sought an order setting the matter down for trial – in the “drop-box” outside the Central Office. The plaintiff was informed by the Courts Service that the motion papers which he sought to file could not be accepted for a number of reasons including (i) the fact that an appearance was filed on 18th December, 2024 for the first, second, third and tenth defendants and (ii) that if he was seeking judgment in default of appearance, Order 13 rule 2(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts (‘RSC’) requires a written notice to be served on the defendants confirming the plaintiff’s intention to proceed in default of appearance.

21. On 21st January, 2025, the plaintiff made ex parte applications to me in both sets of proceedings for short service of a notice of motion seeking to have both sets of proceedings set down for trial, on the basis that no appearances had been entered by any of the defendants within the time prescribed under the Rules of the Superior Courts. I granted him liberty to issue and serve his Notice of Motion returnable before me two weeks later on 4th February, 2025.

22. I would emphasise that Mr. McGreal was seeking such an order in circumstances where he had issued a plenary summons but not a statement of claim. Thus the usual steps in the pleadings had not been taken (i.e. statement of claim, request for particulars, replies for particulars, defences, discovery, etc). The hearing on 4th February, 2025 in respect of both sets of proceedings

23. The matter appeared before me again on 4th February, 2025. On that day, the plaintiff brought a notice of motion seeking the reliefs set out above.

24. This application was grounded on an affidavit of Mr. McGreal. In his affidavit, sworn on 28th January, 2025 Mr. McGreal stated that he served the plenary summons on the first defendant on 26th November, 2024 and on the second defendant on 20th December, 2024

25. He stated that the period of time allowed for an appearance had expired, in respect of the first defendant, on 5th December, 2024, and that the time for entering an appearance for the second defendant had expired on 29th December, 2024 and that no appearance had been entered by either of the defendants within the time prescribed under the Rules of the Superior Courts. In the light of that, the plaintiff sought an order setting the proceedings down for trial.

26. It should be noted that there was a considerable lapse of time between 14th October, 2024 – when I made the order permitting the plaintiff to proceed without the payment of court fees on an ex parte basis – and the next time the matter was before the Court on 4th February, 2025. Moreover, at the hearing on 4th February, 2025, at which counsel for the defendants both appeared, the plaintiff made vociferous and repeated objections to the fact that:

(a) the defendants had not filed appearances or had filed late appearances which were invalid;

(b) the defendants were not properly before the Court; and

(c) counsel had no right to represent the defendants before the Court.

27. Having heard all sides, I made an order, as is routine in such cases, extending the time for the filing of appearances, in both sets of proceedings by the defendants. This was without prejudice to the argument, made in particular, by counsel for the Courts Service defendants, that they did not need such an order as they were not late filing their appearances.

28. As the substance of the plaintiff’s motion was to seek to have the proceedings set down for trial, and as this motion needed to be heard, I directed the defendants in both sets of proceedings to file replying affidavits in this motion and adjourned the matter for two weeks until 19 February, 2025.

29. The plaintiff also brought ex parte applications on 4th February, 2025 before the Court, to strike out the appearances entered by the defendants on the basis of unlawful representation of them by the CSSO. This related to the plaintiff’s complaint that he has sued Ms. Concannon and Ms. Browne in their personal capacity and they were not entitled to use state-funded solicitors to represent them and/or to enter appearances on their behalf. I gave the plaintiff liberty to issue a Notice of Motion in similar terms to the ex parte docket, to be brought before the Court on 19th February 2025. He also complained that Mason Hayes and Curran, a firm of solicitors, could not file an appearance for the defendants they represented because they were a firm, an L.L.P, not an individual solicitor. He said that only a named solicitor – not a law firm or government department – could enter an appearance under Order 12 rule 6 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. As such, he said the defendants were not properly represented and had not entered valid appearances. This issue has still to be considered by me.

30. Indeed it is a feature of both sets of proceedings that the plaintiff repeatedly brings numerous ex parte applications at almost every hearing, many of which are clearly attempts to get the Court to revise directions or orders already made.

The Defendants’ response in first set of proceedings

31. The defendants in both sets of proceedings filed replying affidavits contesting the plaintiff’s motion.

32. Mr. John Hiney, a practising solicitor employed in the Chief State Solicitor’s office, filed a replying affidavit dated 17th February, 2025 on behalf of both defendants, i.e. Ms. Concannon (who is the county registrar for Westmeath and also the electoral returning officer for County Westmeath) and Ms. Browne (who is the Chief State Solicitor). Mr. Hiney stated that he made this affidavit for the purpose of opposing the plaintiff’s motion in which the plaintiff sought to have the proceedings set down for trial. Mr. Hiney stated that the plaintiff’s application was “misconceived, irregular and an abuse of process”.

33. At para. 6 of his affidavit Mr. Hiney states that, although the plaintiff had not yet delivered a statement of claim, Mr. Hiney understood that the plaintiff’s action arose out of alleged conduct on the part of the defendants in connection with Circuit Court proceedings issued by the plaintiff (record number 129/2024). He exhibited a copy of these Circuit Court proceedings.

34. The Civil Bill issued in those proceedings was in the following form:

The Circuit Court

Midland Circuit County of Westmeath

Election Civil Bill

In the Matter of Local Elections (Petitions and Disqualifications) Act, 1974 Between Patrick McGreal Plaintiff and Westmeath County Council, Returning Officer for the Local Election in Westmeath, The Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage, The Minister for the Environment and the Attorney General Defendants

35. This election Civil Bill was issued on 20th June, 2024. In para. 1 of the endorsement of claim the plaintiff pleads “On June 7th, 2024 thousands of asylum seekers and refugees throughout Westmeath and indeed Ireland were allowed to vote by the government of the 23rd Dail. This action violated Article 16.1.2 and Article 28.A.4 of the Constitution of Ireland which require that the right to vote for any person must be determined by law.”

36. The plaintiff sought orders declaring that the inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees in the voting process for the local election in Westmeath was unconstitutional and invalid, and other reliefs.

37. Mr. Hiney also states in his affidavit that the plaintiff’s motion was issued even though the plaintiff gave no warning of his intention to do so, – contrary to his obligations under Order

13 rule 2(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts.

Affidavits sworn by defendants in second set of proceedings

38. Ms. Kim Duffy, Principal Registrar of the High Court, swore a replying affidavit on behalf of the Courts Service defendants in the second set of proceedings.

39. Ms. Duffy states at para. 8 of her affidavit: “Insofar as these proceedings concern the Courts Service, I understand that the plaintiff’s complaint concerns a dispute as to the requirement for court fees to be paid pursuant to S.I. 492/2014. In that connection, the plaintiff attended at the Central Office on 9th October, 2024 and 11th October, 2024 and disputed that fees were required to be paid pursuant to S.I. 492/2014 in respect of proceedings he wished to file. Owing to disturbances that arose as a result of this issue the plaintiff was escorted from the Central Office on both dates by An Garda Siochana. On 14th October, 2024, the plaintiff attended at the Central Office in the company of 25 to 30 people and attempted to gain access to the office. Owing to the risk this group presented to the Court Services staff, the group was not permitted to gain entry and members of An Garda Siochana again attended. For the avoidance of doubt the Courts Service denies any and all wrongdoing alleged by the plaintiff.” (Emphasis added)

40. She states at para. 9: “As a consequence of these disturbances I was obliged to write to the plaintiff on 14th October, 2024 advising him that to protect the safety and welfare of employees of the Court Services and other users of the Central Office, going forward, the Court Service would receive documentation from the plaintiff by post or by leaving same in the drop box outside the Central Office only.” (Emphasis added).

41. In her letter of 14th October to Mr. McGreal Ms. Duffy states as follows:

“Dear Mr. McGreal,

I am writing to you regarding recent attendances at the Central Office of the High Court and in particular your behaviour and the manner in which you conducted your business. Members of staff working in this office frequently meet with challenging situations but there is a level of behaviour by users which is totally unacceptable. Your recording of members of staff without their consent and posting of these images and videos on social media platforms amount to such conduct. On 11th October, 2024 you posted on your social media platforms material ahead of your attendance at the High Court on 14th October, 2024 that you intended to arrest named individuals and escort them into custody. Following your recent posts online as to how you intended to conduct yourself it was necessary to request An Garda Siochana to maintain a presence in or around the Central Office for the safety of all users. As well as being a service provider the Courts Service is an employer. As such it owes the duty of care both to at common law and statute to all of its employees. As a consequence of its obligations it cannot permit staff who provide the service to be put in peril by any service user. I do not consider that I can ask or expect any member of staff of the public Central Office to deal with you in person. Your behaviour and the manner in which you continue to conduct yourself and your business in person in the Central Office is quite simply unacceptable. It is putting the safety and welfare of staff and other users at substantial risk”. (Emphasis added)

42. She indicated that documents in future would only be accepted by post.

43. It goes without saying that this behaviour by Mr. McGreal is utterly unacceptable. I am of the view that any repetition of this or similar behaviour would be grounds for striking out his proceedings as being an abuse of process. This was the first abuse of process by Mr. McGreal.

44. Ms. Duffy also stated that by his motion seeking to set the matter down for trial, the plaintiff, in effect, is seeking judgment in default of appearance otherwise than in accordance with the procedure provided for in Order 13 RSC. The defendants stated that this was procedurally irregular and not envisaged in the RSC.

45. The Courts Service defendants stated that Order 13 RSC entitles a plaintiff to seek judgment in default of appearance against a defendant, but in advance of so proceeding, the plaintiff must serve a notice in writing on the defendant confirming his intention to proceed in default of appearance and consenting to the late entry of an appearance within 28 days of the date of the letter. Despite the fact that the plaintiff was advised of this, the plaintiff failed to serve such a notice. In those circumstances the defendants say that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought in the notice of motion.

46. Counsel for the Courts Service also stated that there was no requirement to seek an extension of time where the appearance was filed on 18th December, 2024 and no order seeking judgment in default of appearance had been granted or even sought by the plaintiff. Affidavit of John Hiney on behalf of Garda Commissioner in second set of proceedings

47. Mr. Hiney also swore an affidavit on behalf of the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, the ninth defendant in these proceedings.

48. Mr. Hiney set out his view that the plaintiff’s approach to these proceedings is misconceived, irregular and an abuse of process.

49. Mr. Hiney states: “Owing to disturbances that arose as a result of this issue the plaintiff was escorted from the Central Office on both dates by members of An Garda Siochana. On 14th October, 2024, the plaintiff attended at the Central Office in the company of approximately 30 people and attempted to gain access to the office. Owing to the risk this group presented to the Courts Service staff, the group was not permitted to gain entry and members of An Garda Siochana again attended”.

50. The general approach of all defendants in both sets of proceedings is that the plaintiff’s application to have the matter set down for trial is procedurally irregular and inappropriate, that it is prematurely and improperly brought and is not in accordance with the Rules.

Events between 4th February and 11th February, 2025

51. Subsequent to the hearing on 4th February, 2025, after I made my orders extending the time for the filing of appearances by the defendants, the plaintiff indicated that he intended to challenge the validity of my order. Indeed, that same day, the plaintiff sent an email to the Chief State Solicitor’s Office – on the afternoon of 4th February, 2025 - stating that the plaintiff intended to appear before the High Court the next day to address what he claimed was an “unlawful disregard” of the Rules of Court. In this email he indicated that no defendant had legally entered an appearance (which he said was a breach of Order 12 rule 2), and that no solicitor was legally on record (which he said was a breach of Order 12 rule 6).

52. The plaintiff indicated that he would be returning before me on 5th February, 2025 seeking orders striking out the appearances and claiming that I had disregarded statutory rules which he said “is a serious abuse of judicial authority”.

53. The Chief State Solicitor’s Office responded to his email by stating that the motions before the Court on 4th February, 2025 had been adjourned to 19th February, 2025 and that in the event that Mr. McGreal was unhappy with the court orders, it was open to him to appeal these to the Court of Appeal.

54. Mr. Hiney in his affidavit sworn on 17th February, 2025 at para. 14 states as follows: “I say further that in a post on the social media site known as X, published at 10.12 pm later that same evening [i.e. on 4th February 2025] the plaintiff (whose name and photograph appear above the post) described as ‘corruption’ the proceedings of that morning before this honourable court criticising the second defendant for the entry of her appearance ‘where she is personally accused of criminal wrongdoing’ and further criticising the second defendant for having entered an appearance on behalf of the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana in the aforementioned proceedings bearing record number 2024/6654”.

55. In this post on X Mr. McGreal states: “Today the sheer level of corruption on display in the High Court would make you sick. The court allowed Maria Brown, Chief State Solicitor to enter an appearance on behalf of herself in case where she is a person accused of criminal wrongdoing. Not only that Mason Hayes and Curran LLP – a limited liability Partnership – was permitted to enter an appearance for four of the other defendants despite no identifiable solicitor being named on record.” Towards the end of the post on X, Mr. McGreal states: “This is what corruption looks like. State employees using public resources to defend public servants in criminal matters. A High Court judge disregarding statutory rules enacted under Article 15 of the Constitution”.

56. By email on Saturday 8th February, 2025, the plaintiff indicated he intended to appear before the Court again on Tuesday 11th February, 2025 stating that my order of February 4th 2025 was made without jurisdiction.

57. Mr. McGreal sent a similar email to the CSSO on Monday 10th February, 2025 and again on the morning of Tuesday, 11th February, 2025.

Threat to arrest High Court judge

58. On 11th February, 2025 Mr. McGreal sent an email to the Central Office for the attention of the Chancery registrars stating as follows:

“Dear Chancery,

I write to formally notify you that I will engage directly with the judge pursuant to Article 34.1, Article 35.2, Article 40.1 and Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland. As of this correspondence, I will no longer exchange any information or details with your office and will be disengaging from further communications. Should the judge fail to adhere to the rules today, I will formally request that a member of An Garda Siochana place him under arrest for violations of statutory law.

Yours sincerely,

Patrick McGreal.”

59. I should add that, in my view, the threat by Mr. McGreal to put a serving judge of the High Court under arrest simply because he disagrees with such a judge’s interpretation of procedural law, in circumstances where he has recourse to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and indeed where he has filed appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, is nothing short of disgraceful. It is not only a gross over-reaction to the procedural issues at stake in the proceedings, it is a clear attempt to intimidate a sitting High Court judge hearing his case. It is manifestly an abuse of process.

60. I should also add that Mr. McGreal has form in this regard. It appears that he attempted to arrest the District Court judge in Mullingar on 26th November, 2024 and as a result, he himself was arrested by the Gardaí and put into prison for a few hours. I am aware of this because Mr. McGreal made a separate ex parte application to me on 27th March 2025, in the matter of intended proceedings between Mr. McGreal and the Garda Commissioner, for an order that his intended proceedings were proceedings under Article 40.4 and therefore exempt from court fees. Having considered the draft plenary summons in those proceedings, I acceded to that application on 27th March, 2025.

The hearing of 11th February, 2025

61. On 11th February, 2025 the plaintiff again complained to me about the orders made on 4th February, 2025 and again made submissions about the validity of the appearances filed in both sets of proceedings. I indicated to Mr. McGreal that if he wished to appeal my order to the Court of Appeal in relation to the late filing of appearances, he was free to do so.

62. It is also clear that the defendants brought the attention of the plaintiff and the Court to the decision of Hogan J. in the High Court in Aron Gokul et all v. Aer Lingus [2013] IEHC 432 in which Hogan J. concluded at para. 20: “It is clear, therefore, from the foregoing analysis that this Court does enjoy a wide power to extend time in respect of time limits prescribed by rules of court pursuant to

O. 122, r.7 and that O. 12, r. 2A(a) cannot in any event be construed as if it had erected a jurisdictional bar precluding a defendant from defending the proceedings simply by reason of the fact that an appearance had not been filed within the eight day period prescribed by the Rules.”

The plaintiff’s appeals

63. On 12th February, 2025, the plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court arising from my orders of 4th February, 2025 extending the time for the filing of appearances.

64. On 13th February, 2025, the plaintiff also lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal arising from my orders of 4th February, 2025, extending the time for the filing of appearances.

Hearing on 19th February, 2025

65. On 19th February, 2025, the plaintiff brought yet more ex parte applications seeking orders that I set aside my orders of 4th February, 2025 (extending the time for the filing of appearances) as being unlawful and ultra vires the Rules of the Superior Courts. He also sought declarations that the defendants were in default of the Rules of the Superior Courts as they failed to enter an appearance within eight days and an order striking out the appearances.

66. Having heard all parties on this matter, I struck out the plaintiff’s applications on the grounds that these were matters for the Court of Appeal and/or were not appropriately before the court.

Other decisions on court fees

67. In the meantime, another application came before me on 6th February, 2025 entitled Murphy v. Gloster and Others (Record No. 2024/7121 P) in which the plaintiff in those intended proceedings made a similar application to me, on an ex parte basis, for leave to issue a plenary summons without payment of the court fees. In the course of this application, the

decision of Mr. Justice Humphreys in McGreal v. Minister for Housing [2024] IEHC 728 was brought to my attention. Having considered this decision, and the statutory instrument in more detail, I gave an ex tempore decision in Murphy v. Gloster [2025] IEHC 171 refusing the plaintiff’s application and concluding that court fees would have to be paid.

68. Mr. McGreal also made another ex parte application to me in March, 2025 in the matter of intended proceedings between him and Mr. Derek Bunyan and the Courts Service. I concluded that Mr. McGreal had to pay court fees in that case.

Hearing of 26th March, 2025

69. Prompted by the above matters, when Mr. McGreal’s two sets of proceedings came before me a few days later on 26th March, 2025, I indicated to the parties that I wished to hear argument from both sides, (as the defendants were now represented on this matter), on the issue of whether court fees were payable in both set of proceedings.

70. Mr. McGreal took umbrage at this suggestion and somehow sought to argue that this matter had already been decided by me and that it was not open to the court to revisit it. He also sought to suggest that it was somehow unfair of me to request that the defendants argue this point before the court. I do not accept either of these submissions. In my view, it was clear from my orders made on 14th October, 2025 in both sets of proceedings, that my orders were made on an ex parte basis only, and that at some stage, both sides would have to be heard on this matter. In fact what happened was that Mr. McGreal made so many vociferous and repeated objections to the entry of the appearances, to late appearances, to every order that was made by the court, to the alleged unlawful nature of the Chief State Solicitor’s Office defending public servants, that this issue was drowned out in the noise. It was however an issue which always required to be revisited and re-argued in full with both sides present.

71. I indicated on that day, that the issue of whether court fees should be paid was the first issue on which I wanted to hear the submissions of both sides. I therefore directed the defendants to file legal submissions within a period of weeks and that the plaintiff in turn should file replying legal submissions within a further period. I then adjourned the matter for mention before me until 21st May, 2025. The hearing of 21st May, 2025.

72. When the matter was listed before me on 21st May, I expected to be told that the parties were ready to proceed with the application to consider whether court fees were to be paid and to give it a hearing date. Instead Mr. McGreal issued two more ex parte applications seeking to set aside my order of 26th March, 2025 – as being ultra vires – and to uphold my order of 14th October, 2025 without hearing the other side. Indeed Mr. McGreal engaged in a long and disputatious complaint about every aspect of the case so far. At a certain stage, he simply continued to speak over both counsel and indeed the court. On numerous occasions I asked Mr. McGreal to be quiet to allow the other parties to be heard - and indeed to allow me to be heard. However he persisted in his haranguing and constant interruptions of counsel for the defendants and of the court. It was not possible to properly conduct the hearing before the court. So I rose for five minutes to allow Mr. McGreal to consider his position and to allow him to calm down.

73. When I resumed however, Mr. McGreal continued to harangue the Court and counsel for the defendants insisting that their appearances before the Court were unlawful. In the circumstances, it was impossible for me to proceed with this hearing any further. I indicated on a number of occasions to Mr. McGreal that if he persisted in this course of action, that I would strike out not only the motions but both sets of proceedings as an abuse of process. However this did not seem to deter him. Eventually I had to abandon the hearing and to indicate to both parties that as it was impossible to continue the hearing because of Mr. McGreal’s conduct, I adjourned the matter for two days, until Friday when I hoped that calm would prevail. This was Mr. McGreal’s third abuse of process. The hearing on Friday 23rd May, 2025.

74. I resumed this matter on Friday 23rd May, 2025. This hearing was more satisfactory. I indicated to Mr. McGreal that the proper sequencing of various matters which were before the Court were:

(a) to hear the issue about whether court fees were payable on these proceedings and that this would be heard on Tuesday 3rd June, at 2pm; and that

(b) after this application had been heard and decided, that his applications seeking to complain about the illegality of the appearances and the illegality of the solicitors acting on behalf of the defendants would then be considered.

74. I also indicated that the two ex parte applications which Mr. McGreal had brought dated 21st May, 2025 were not properly speaking ex parte applications at all, but rather legal submissions in respect of the issue as to whether court fees applied to the proceedings.

75. In the circumstances I adjourned his ex parte applications dated 21st May, 2025 (in both sets of proceedings) to the hearing of the application about court fees, (Tuesday 3rd June, 2025). I also indicated to all parties that I would regard the grounding affidavit of Mr. McGreal as being, in substance, his legal submissions, as it was clear that Mr. McGreal had failed to comply with my order directing him to file legal submissions, in the proper form, by the relevant date.

76. I thought that Mr. McGreal understood quite clearly what my orders and directions were. Unfortunately, that proved not to be the case.

The hearing on 28th May, 2025

77. On 27th May, 2025 Mr. McGreal emailed two more ex parte applications to the Chancery registrar and stated that he intended to make these applications before me on the following day. Mr. McGreal duly made these applications before me on 28th May, 2025.

78. These ex parte applications related to matters already decided by me. One of these applications was to apply for an order striking out the phrase “subject to the right of the intended defendants to reply at a later stage” from my order of 14th October 2024 on the grounds of ultra vires. He also sought an order striking out the defendant’s legal submissions.

79. I had read both ex parte dockets and grounding affidavits in respect of them before the Court sat at 11am on Wednesday 28th May, 2025. I indicated this to Mr. McGreal. Despite this Mr. McGreal insisted on reading out his ex parte dockets and affidavits, as some of his supporters were in court. I indicated to him that that was a complete waste of court time as I had read all the relevant papers. I did however permit him to read out, in full, one of his ex parte applications.

80. In discussion with Mr. McGreal, I indicated to him that, in my view, all of the matters which he was raising in his two ex parte applications were, in substance, legal submissions in respect of the application as to whether court fees were payable in respect of both sets of proceedings. I indicated to him that it seemed to me that, as such, these ex parte applications were misconceived and not properly brought. I indicated that I would not be granting the orders sought. Mr. McGreal then resumed his practice of constantly interrupting and haranguing the Court in respect of a number of matters. Again I indicated to Mr. McGreal that I would not countenance this sort of conduct and I rose for a few minutes.

81. Mr. McGreal then asked how I could decide the matter without seeing his sworn affidavit. I accepted this point but I indicated that I had read his unsworn affidavit and I asked him (a) whether his sworn affidavit differed in any material respect from his unsworn affidavit and/or (b) to hand in a copy of the sworn affidavit to the Court so that I could read it.

82. However Mr. McGreal then engaged in further obstructive tactics in (a) refusing to answer the question as to whether there was any material difference between his sworn and unsworn affidavit, despite numerous requests by me to him to do so and (b) refusing point blank to hand in the sworn affidavit to read despite my numerous requests to do so. I indicated again to Mr. McGreal that I regarded this as a further abuse of process and that if he continued in this vein, I would regard his conduct as an abuse of process.

83. I then indicated to Mr. McGreal that I wished to give an ex tempore decision on this application but I was unable to do so because he constantly interrupted me. At that point I indicated to Mr. McGreal that I was going to call a Garda to the Court to have him removed as he was preventing me from giving my ex tempore decision. I rose for a few moments to allow for a Garda to be called.

84. When I came back into the courtroom, I asked Mr. McGreal to allow me to give my ex tempore decision on his two applications but he persisted in interrupting me on the approach which I was taking to these applications. I asked the Garda to remove him but as it appeared that Mr. McGreal was then beginning to argue with the Garda, I indicated that, in order to avoid a further confrontation, and escalation of the situation, as I could not give my ex tempore

decision in court, I would give it at a later date. I rose from the court unable to deliver my ex tempore decision in the manner which I had wanted to do, and intended to do.

85. I regard this as wholly unacceptable conduct and as a fourth abuse of process by Mr. McGreal.

The hearing on 2nd June 2025

The issue in this application – does the plaintiff have to pay court fees on both sets of proceedings?

86. Just to recap: the Central Office indicated to the plaintiff in both sets of proceedings that court fees were payable. The plaintiff made an ex parte application to the High Court on 14th October, 2024 for an order that court fees were not payable and I made an order on an ex parte basis that no court fees was payable in respect of either set of proceedings – subject to the right of the defendants to argue the matter at a later date. On 26th March, 2025, I directed the defendants in both sets of proceedings to prepare written submissions on the question of whether court fees were payable by the plaintiff. The defendants complied with these directions and both prepared detailed legal sets of submissions. The plaintiff was also directed to file legal submissions but he did not do so. Instead he filed an ex parte docket and a grounding affidavit which set out, in substance, his legal arguments as to why no fees were payable. I have had regard to these documents, when considering Mr. McGreal’s argument as why fees were not payable, for the purposes of this judgment.

The applicable legal principles

87. Section 65(1) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 provides that: “It shall be lawful for the Minister for Justice, by order made with the consent of the Minister for Finance, to prescribe, and from time to time as occasion requires, vary or otherwise revise the fees to be charged in the several offices established by the Court Officers Act, 1926 (No. 27 of 1926), as amended by subsequent enactments (including this Act), and the persons by whom and the occasions on which such fees are to be paid and the officers by whom and the manner in which such fees are to be collected.

88. The relevant statutory instrument on this issue is Statutory Instrument No. 492/2014 - Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court (Fees) Order 2014 (which came into effect in October, 2014 and, according to which fees are currently paid.

89. Section 3 of S.I. 492/2014 provides as follows: “There shall be charged in the offices attached to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the President of the High Court and in district probate registries, in respect of each item set out in column (1) of each Part of Schedule 1, the fee set out in column (2) of the Part concerned opposite the mention of the item.” (BC to check)

90. Section 5 of the statutory instrument provides for exceptions and provides as follows: “No fee shall be payable under this Order in connection with—

(a) proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution,”

91. The central question therefore which I have to decide is whether either of Mr. McGreal’s proceedings are “proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution”.

92. Article 40.4 of the Constitution provides as follows: “1. No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.

2. Upon complaint being made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court or any judge thereof alleging that such person is being unlawfully detained, the High Court and any and every judge thereof to whom such complaint is made shall forthwith enquire into the said complaint and may order the person in whose custody such person is detained to produce the body of such person before the High Court on a named day and to certify in writing the grounds of his detention, and the High Court shall, upon the body of such person being produced before that Court and after giving the person in whose custody he is detained an opportunity of justifying the detention, order the release of such person from such detention unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with the law.

3. Where the body of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained is produced before the High Court in pursuance of an order in that behalf made under this section and that Court is satisfied that such person is being detained in accordance with a law but that such law is invalid having regard to the provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall refer the question of the validity of such law to the Court of Appeal by way of case stated and may, at the time of such reference or at any time thereafter, allow the said person to be at liberty on such bail and subject to such conditions as the High Court shall fix until the Court of Appeal has determined the question so referred to it.

4. The High Court before which the body of a person alleged to be unlawfully detained is to be produced in pursuance of an order in that behalf made under this section shall, if the President of the High Court or, if he is not available, the senior judge of that Court who is available so directs in respect of any particular case, consist of three judges and shall, in every other case, consist of one judge only.

5. Nothing in this section, however, shall be invoked to prohibit, control, or interfere with any act of the Defence Forces during the existence of a state of war or armed rebellion.

6. Provision may be made by law for the refusal of bail by a court to a person charged with a serious offence where it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent the commission of a serious offence by that person.”

93. It is common case that Mr. McGreal is not currently in detention and therefore the habeas corpus procedure set out under Article 40.4.2° and Article 40.2.3° is not applicable.

94. Likewise it is clear that Article 40.4.4°, Article 40.4.5° and Article 40.5.6° are not at issue in this application.

95. The sole issue is whether either of the proceedings issued by the plaintiff fall within the meaning of Article 40.4.1° of the Constitution which, as set out above, states that “No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law”. The analysis of the plenary summons in the first set of proceedings

96. In order to consider whether the plaintiff’s first set of proceedings can avail of the exception set out in Section 5 of the statutory instrument, the plaintiff must establish that his proceedings are “proceedings under Article 40.4.1 of the Constitution”. In order to do this he must establish that these proceedings, in substance, are concerned with a claim which he is making that he has been deprived of his personal liberty, otherwise than in accordance with law.

97. In order to consider this matter it is necessary to consider the nature of the plenary summons in the first set of proceedings.

98. The plaintiff’s plenary summons in the first set of proceedings states at para. 1: “The plaintiff’s claim arises from serious breaches of statutory and constitutional law in the handling of an election civil bill notice of motion for judgment in default of appearance filed in Westmeath Circuit Court under case no. 2024/129.

2. The plaintiff’s seeks compensation for violations carried out by the defendants including breaches of procedural rules, judicial misconduct and abuse of authority which have caused profound harm.”

99. The plenary summons then sets out what is stated to be “compensation breakdown” in which the plaintiff seeks damages for denial of justice in breach of constitutional rights, including the defendants’ failure to comply with Order 58 rule 5 of the Circuit Court Rules, and subsequent actions by Ms. Concannon which, he said, violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6, Article 34.3 and Article 40.4 of the Irish Constitution. He claims that “these breaches caused significant prejudice against me and undermine the judicial process depriving me of access to justice”.

100. At para. 2 he says that “Bridin Concannon while acting as county registrar and a named defendant failed to disclose her conflict of interest ruling against me in breach of natural justice and the principle of nemo judex in causa sua.

101. He also said that the “unlawful striking out of my motion coupled with the failure to follow procedural rules has impacted my personal and professional life significantly”.

102. At sub-para. 4, his section of Compensation Breakdown, he pleads “the failure of Maria Brown chief state solicitor to comply with procedural guidelines under O.55 r.5 and her continued participation in the case were unlawful and contributed to the miscarriage of justice”.

103. He also pleads that Ms. Concannon and Ms. Browne acted unlawfully, breaching multiple sections of the Criminal Justice (Corruption Offences) Act, 2018 and the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud) Offences Act, 2001.

104. Finally, he seeks declarations of the unlawfulness of the defendants’ actions, and damages totalling €5 million, for the harm caused by the breaches of constitutional and statutory law, denial of justice, emotional distress and reputational harm.

105. Most fundamentally, it appears that the substance of the plaintiff’s case in the first set of proceedings is:

1. that Mr. McGreal issued a local election petition by means of an election civil bill in the Midland Circuit, County of Westmeath on 20th June, 2024, about alleged voting irregularities in the election of 7th June, 2024 and, in particular, claimed that thousands of asylum seekers and refugees throughout Westmeath and Ireland were allowed to vote by the government of the 33rd Dáil in violation of Article 16.1.2° and Article 28.8.4° of the Constitution;

2. that the inclusion of asylum seekers and refugees in the voting process for the local election in Westmeath was unconstitutional and invalid;

3. that an appearance was entered on behalf of the third, fourth, and fifth defendants to this civil bill, (i.e. the Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage, the Minister for the Environment, and the Attorney General) on 1st July, 2024 by Ms. Maria Browne, Chief State Solicitor, solicitor for the defendants;

4. that Mr. McGreal then brought a motion for judgment in default of appearance against the defendants dated 4th July, 2024; and

5. that the plaintiff’s application for judgment in default of appearance was struck out and that this was improper and unlawful.

106. The plaintiff’s claim in the first set of proceedings appears to be about how his proceedings in the Circuit Court were handled. Thus, at the very first paragraph of his plenary summons, the plaintiff states that his claim arises from serious breaches of statutory and constitutional law in the handling of an election civil bill/notice of motion for judgment in default of appearance filed in the Westmeath Circuit Court under case number 2024/129. In particular it appears to be that Mr. McGreal is complaining that because Ms. Concannon was both (i) a county registrar dealing with motions for judgment in default of appearance and (ii) the Returning Officer and a named defendant in the election civil bill, she was acting in breach of the principle Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua, in dealing with his motion for judgment in default of appearance against all defendants.

107. The plaintiff’s claim against Ms. Browne in the first set of proceedings appears to be that she failed to enter an appearance within the time allowed to do so by the rules.

108. It is clear from other documents exhibited by the plaintiff that his motion for judgment in default of appearance in the Circuit Court proceedings came before the County Registrar of the Midland Circuit (County of Westmeath-Mullingar) – Ms. Brídín Concannon – on 9th September, 2024. The County Registrar struck out the plaintiff’s motion as against Westmeath County Council , the Minister for Housing, the Minister for the Environment and the Attorney General.

109. However the plaintiff’s application against the Returning Officer (Ms. Concannon) was not struck out by Ms. Concannon but was instead transferred to the Judge’s List on 12 November, 2024. I do not know on what basis this was transferred but it was possible that Ms.

Concannon was aware that she could not deal with it as she was a named defendant. In any event, it is difficult to see on what basis the plaintiff is attacking Ms. Concannon’s actions as being contrary to the rule Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua when she did not deal with the motion herself.

110. It is also noteworthy that the plaintiff did not appeal the County Registrar’s decision to the Circuit Court Judge, as he should have done, but instead issued these High Court proceedings.

111. The plaintiff’s plenary summons in the first set of proceedings may turn out to be successful or unsuccessful. That is not an issue I have to consider at the moment. The only issue I have to consider is whether the first set of proceedings are, in substance, proceedings under Article 40.4.1° of the Constitution (i.e. whether they are proceedings which, in substance, relate to the deprivation of Mr. McGreal’s personal liberty, otherwise in accordance with law).

112. Mr. McGreal’s case in the first set of proceedings is that because his motion for judgment in default of appearance was struck out, he was deprived of his right to access to justice and as such deprived of his liberty under Article 40.4.1°. This argument only has to be set out in such terms to realise that it is simply unsustainable. He was not deprived of his liberty because his motion was struck out; he was not imprisoned; he was not unlawfully detained. He brought a procedural motion; it was struck out. He has a right of appeal to the Circuit Court judge from the decision of the County Registrar (which he has not taken) and, from there, a further right of appeal to the High Court. The first set of proceedings however could not, in any way, be regarded as a deprivation of his liberty.

113. It is crystal clear, based on the nature of Mr. McGreal’s plenary summons, that his first set of proceedings have nothing to do with the deprivation of his personal liberty. Mr. McGreal has not been deprived of his personal liberty in any respect by the actions of Ms. Concannon or Ms. Browne. Even if the plaintiff is successful in his High Court proceedings against Ms.

Concannon and Ms. Browne, it would at most mean that he would obtain declarations that they had acted unlawfully and perhaps in breach of various statutory and/or procedural requirements. I am satisfied therefore that the plaintiff’s first set of proceedings could not be described as “proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution”.

114. I have also considered the judgment of Humphreys J. in McGreal v. The Minister for Housing, Local Government and Heritage of Ireland (No. 2) [2024] IEHC 728.

115. As Humphreys J. stated at para. 6 of his decision: “There is no cheat sheet to circumvent the legal system. Using magic words or adding ‘Article 40.4’ to the top of the page doesn't turn a motion into an application under that provision if it would not otherwise be so.”

116. I agree with Humphreys J. when he stated that a plaintiff cannot simply label the proceedings as being Article 40.4 proceedings in order to circumvent the requirement to pay fees on proceedings and to claim an entirely unreasonable exemption from fees when, in substance, they are not.

117. Mr. McGreal also exhibited a document entitled“The Rise of a Nation and the Soul of Personal Liberty” which seeks to trace the concept of personal liberty from 1916 to date, within Ireland. Despite the research exhibited in this document, it is not particularly relevant to any of the issues which I have to determine. It sets out a concept of “liberty” which is overly-broad and bears no relation to the concept of liberty as that term has to be understood within the meaning of Article 40.4.1°. Mr. McGreal sought to argue that the concept of personal liberty at Article 40.4.1° of the Constitution does not simply mean being in detention or imprisonment or being deprived of one’s personal freedom in the strict sense of the word but included a much broader concept of personal liberty to be free to do, or say, certain things and/or to live one’s life in precisely the way one wished to live one’s life. I do not agree with this submission.

118. Article 40.4.1° deals with deprivation of personal liberty save in accordance with the law. Whilst this concept of deprivation of personal liberty save in accordance with law should be given a broad meaning (to include any form of alleged unlawful detention, or alleged unlawful imprisonment or alleged unlawful confinement), it cannot be interpreted in a manner in which there is no detention, imprisonment, or confinement and to give the concept of “liberty” an overly broad meaning.

119. In the circumstances, it is clear that the first set of proceedings do not fall under the exception set out at Section 5 of Statutory Instrument 492 of 2014. Therefore Mr. McGreal has to pay the court fees in respect of all documents which he has filed in these proceedings. The plenary summons in the second set of proceedings – the proceedings against the Courts Service, members of An Garda Síochána and the Garda Commissioner.

119. I turn now to consider whether Mr. McGreal’s second set of proceedings could be regarded as “proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution”. The second set of proceedings is quite different. It is clear from Mr. McGreal’s affidavit that he appeared at the Central Office with a view to issuing his first set of proceedings and the Central Office staff refused to deal with him and called members of the Gardaí. He also says in his affidavit that he was then arrested, detained in the Bridewell and subsequently released.

120. In the second set of proceedings – against members of the Courts Services and members of An Garda Síochána, the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, and the Chief Executive Officer of the Courts Services, the plenary summons states that: “The defendants in the execution of their duties have committed multiple breaches of my constitutional rights as guaranteed under the Constitution of Ireland. Specifically these breaches include but are not limited to:

1. Unlawful obstruction of justice, denial of access to the courts and obstruction of my attempt to file an affidavit under Article 40.4;

2. Violations of Article 6, 34.3, 35.2, 40.1, 40.3 and 40.4 of the Constitution infringing upon my rights to equality, liberty and access to justice.”

121. He also pleads at para. 4: “The defendants engaged in false arrest, wrongful detention and physical assault without lawful basis constituting breaches under the Non-Fatal Offences Against The Person Act, 1997 specifically s.15 (False Imprisonment) and ss. 2 and 3 (Assault Causing Harm)”.

122. At para. 5 of the plenary summons the plaintiff pleads: “The defendants subjected me to inhuman and degrading treatment including invasive searches, detention in unsanitary conditions and physical and verbal intimidation.”

123. The plaintiff also claims damages for false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty and pleads: “I was wrongfully detained and deprived of my personal liberty multiple times by the defendants without any lawful cause. This extended deprivation of my freedom, coupled with the degrading and hostile conditions I was subjected to, represents a profound violation of my rights under Article 40.3 and Article 40.4 of the Irish Constitution”.

124. Again, I reiterate that the plaintiff’s claims in the plenary summons may be successful or not successful at the trial of the action. That is not a question I have to decide now.

125. The only question I have to decide now is whether these proceedings could be regarded as proceedings under Article 40.4.1° which, as stated above provides: “No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.”

126. The defendants sought to argue for an overly-restrictive interpretation of the meaning of “proceedings under Article 40.4”. The defendants sought to argue (i) that the only exemption from fees in the statutory instrument is Article 40.4; (ii) that this must refer, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, to Article 40.4.2° and Article 40.4.3° (i.e. the habeas corpus provisions). In other words the defendants sought to argue that the only exemption from the payment of court fees was in respect of habeas corpus proceedings.

127. I do not agree with this submission. In my view, it ignores entirely any other proceedings which might be brought in respect of Article 40.4.1° — which might seek declaratory or other relief in which the plaintiff claims that he has been deprived of his liberty save in accordance with law, in circumstances where it is neither necessary nor appropriate to bring a habeas corpus application. There is nothing in the wording of Section 5 of the Statutory Instrument 492 of 2014 which would justify a reading of “proceedings under Article 40.4” to restrict it to habeas corpus proceedings and to exclude any declaratory or other proceedings brought in respect of Article 40.4.1°.

128. Much of the defendants’ submissions proceeded on the assumption that it was clear that Article 40.4 referred just to the habeas corpus provisions. It is clear however from Article 40.4.1° that this is not so. One can imagine all sorts of cases in which a plaintiff might seek a declaration – even after he had been released - that he had been deprived of his liberty otherwise than in accordance with law. There is clearly an analytical distinction between Article 40.4.1°

– which encompasses habeas corpus proceedings and non-habeas corpus proceedings in respect of personal liberty – and Article 40.4.2° and Article 40.2.3° which relate solely to habeas corpus applications. I am satisfied therefore that the defendant’s submissions in this regard are not well founded.

129. It is also of note that the previous statutory instrument dealings with fees – S.I. 341 of 1989 – expressly exempted from court fees any documents filed in “connection with habeas corpus proceedings, extradition matters, bail, etc”(emphasis added), whereas the phrase in S.I.

492 of 2014 uses the broader phrase, “proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution” (emphasis added).

130. In my view, whereas the 1989 statutory instrument limited exemptions from fees to habeas corpus applications, the revised statutory instrument, 492/2014, by using the phrase “proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution” meant, and was intended to mean, all proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution, including, but not limited to, habeas corpus proceedings. In other words, the new statutory instrument is more broadly worded and includes an exemption from fees for any proceedings in which persons might issue proceedings in relation to their personal liberty – including seeking declarations that their personal liberty had been infringed contrary to Article 40.4.1°.

131. Counsel for the defendants relied on Cahill v. Governor of Curragh Military Detention Barracks [1980] ILRM 191 and indeed Re Application of Gallagher [1996] 3 IR 10 and submitted that these decisions drew attention to the danger of debasing the informal procedure allowed under habeas corpus. I have read and considered these decisions and, in my view, they are not relevant to this application. It is an agreed fact that the plaintiff is not bringing an application for habeas corpus. He is not in detention, let alone unlawful detention. However he says that he was unlawfully arrested, he was unlawfully detained, he was unlawfully deprived of his liberty, otherwise than in accordance with law, and he seeks declarations to that effect and damages in respect of these alleged constitutional breaches.

132. There is no reason, from first principles, to restrict the meaning of “proceedings under Article 40.4” only to proceedings under Article 40.4.2° and Article 40.4.3° (i.e. habeas corpus proceedings). There is nothing in the statutory instrument which would justify such an interpretation.

133. It is clear that a central issue in the plenary summons in the second set of proceedings is that the plaintiff is pleading that he was deprived of his liberty in an unlawful manner and that he was wrongfully detained and falsely imprisoned.

134. I am satisfied therefore, that the plaintiff’s plenary summons in the second set of proceedings is for a declaration that he was deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law, and damages.

135. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s second set of proceedings are proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution, being proceedings in which he seeks declaratory relief and breaches of Article 40.4.1° and damages for breach of his constitutional rights. As such they are an exception to the requirement to pay court fees under S.I. 492 of 2014.

136. I would therefore conclude that the plaintiff does not have to pay any fees in respect of the second set of proceedings.

Plaintiff’s ex parte application on 4th July, 2025

137. I should also record in this judgment that the parties were informed on Thursday 3rd July 2025 that I would give my judgment on Monday 7th July, 2025 at 2pm. Despite this, Mr. McGreal made two more ex parte applications to me on Friday 4th July 2025 to be allowed to file additional submissions on his concept of personal liberty. I refused this application for a number of reasons including:

(i) the plaintiff already had significant time to file legal submissions between 26th March and 2nd June and he failed to do so;

(ii) I regarded his previous affidavits as his legal submissions;

(iii) it would be unfair to the defendants to allow him to file additional submissions at this late stage; and

(iv) having perused his affidavits, it appeared to me to be no more than an expansion of his ideas on personal liberty, an argument which I have already rejected in this judgment.

Conclusion

138. I would therefore conclude as follows:

(1) the plaintiff’s first set of proceedings are not proceedings within Article 40.4 of the Constitution; therefore they are not exempted from statutory instrument 492/2014 and the plaintiff must pay the relevant fees in respect of these proceedings;

(2) the plaintiff’s second set of proceedings are proceedings under Article 40.4 of the Constitution; as such they do come within the statutory exemption from the payment of fees and the plaintiff does not have to pay fees in respect of these proceedings.

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