High Court adjusts estate accounts to credit assets and deny solicitor fees as estate expenses.

THE HIGH COURT

[H. Sp. 2024/24]

[2025] IEHC 424

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF MATHEW

STEPHEN CONNOLLY, LATE OF “BELAIR” WESTMINSTER ROAD, FOXROCK, COUNTY DUBLIN, DECEASED AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH CONNOLLY, LATE OF “BELAIR” WESTMINSTER ROAD, FOXROCK, COUNTY DUBLIN, DECEASED AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION MADE BY DAVID DILLON AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE DECEASED PURSUANT TO ORDER 3 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS BETWEEN DAVID DILLON PLAINTIFF AND MATHEW JAMES CONNOLLY DEFENDANT JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Stack delivered 23 July, 2025.

Introduction

1. This is an application pursuant to Order 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts for:

(i) An order pursuant to Order 3, rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts approving the final distribution intended to be made to the Respondent herein in satisfaction of his distributive share in the estates of Matthew Connolly and Elizabeth Connolly, both deceased, in accordance with the estate accounts prepared by O’Hanlon Tax Limited dated 20 June 2023 and any updated distribution account;

(ii) In the alternative to the foregoing, an order pursuant to Order 3 rule 6 of the Rules of the Superior Courts determining the correct and appropriate sum to be paid to the Respondent herein in satisfaction of his distributive share in the estates of Matthew Connolly and Elizabeth Connolly, both deceased, having regard to the estate accounts prepared by O’Hanlon Tax Limited dated the 20 June 2023 and any updated distribution account;

(iii) If necessary, an order pursuant to Order 3 rule 4 of the Rules of the Superior Courts directing the applicant to complete the administration of the estates of Matthew Connolly and Elizabeth Connolly, both deceased, by making distributions to each of the residuary beneficiaries in accordance with the estate accounts prepared by O’Hanlon Tax Limited dated 20 June 2023 and any updated distribution account;

2. The applicant is the son-in-law and the sole proving executor of the two above-named deceased, Elizabeth and Matthew Connolly.

3. Mrs. Elizabeth Connolly died on 22 September, 2015, leaving her last Will dated 14 July, 2005, in which she nominated the applicant herein, and his son, Mark, as her executors, and devised and bequeathed: a. her shares in Drimnagh Industries Limited to Ronan;

b. her shares in Connolly Shoe Company (C) Limited and Connolly Estates Limited to Ronan; c. her shares in Leinster Shoes Limited to the respondent.

4. After making pecuniary bequests in favour of her grandchildren, she left the residue of her estate to her husband, Matthew. The net value of her estate is approximately €6 million, and it included the family home known as “Bel Air”.

5. A Grant of Probate in her estate issued to the applicant in his sole name on 1 February, 2018, the rights of the other executor being reserved.

6. Mr. Matthew Connolly died on 23 January, 2016, aged 97, leaving his Last Will dated

9 October, 2015, in which he nominated the applicant and the respondent as his executors, left a series of pecuniary legacies to his grandchildren, and bequeathed: a. his shareholding in Connolly Shoe Company (C) Limited to Ronan; b. his shareholding in Connolly Brothers Dun Laoghaire Limited, Leinster Shoes Limited and Connolly Estate Limited to the respondent herein; and c. his shareholding in Drimnagh Industries Limited to his daughters, Ann and Carol, in equal shares.

7. He left the residue of his estate to his four children in equal shares.

8. On 9 December, 2021, a Grant of Probate issued to the applicant in his sole name, the rights of the respondent being reserved. The net value of his estate, which included the residue of his wife’s estate, was approximately €7.25 million. As it formed part of the residue, the applicant has assented to the vesting of Bel Air in the names of the four residuary legatees as tenants in common.

9. I am referring to approximate figures only given the dispute about the precise value of each estate.

10. There is no issue about the validity of either Will, and in particular, it is accepted that the late Mr. Connolly did not suffer from any incapacity prior to his death.

11. As can be seen from the precise relief sought, the applicant seeks approval of the sum which it is proposed to distribute to the respondent, the other beneficiaries having accepted the sums notified to them in satisfaction of their share in the residue of their father’s estate. Those sums were calculated on the basis of accounts prepared by specialist accountants who, in turn, prepared the accounts on the basis of instructions given by the applicant. The applicant, in turn, has presumably given those instructions on the basis of the information available to him and - it would appear from the evidence - on the basis of certain agreements between the residuary legatees as to how some of the assets of the estate, notably the late Mrs. Connolly’s jewellery and that portion of the lands in Glengarriff known as “The Dell” were to be treated for the purposes of the administration of the estate.

12. The accuracy of the accounts is not accepted by the respondent who claims that the executor has withheld assets to the value of €1,033,875.50 from the estate. This sum is the total of nine items identified by the respondent at para. 36 of his affidavit of 16 July, 2024, and these were the nine issues which were the subject of submissions at a two day hearing in March, 2025. The ninth issue, relates to a joint account held in the name of Matthew Connolly, deceased, at 100/101 Grafton Street, Dublin 2. The address on this account is apparently the respondent’s home address. It became clear at hearing that both parties should have an opportunity to deliver further affidavits relating to that account. Both parties have delivered further affidavits and, while further information may be required before I can decide the precise relief to be granted, I am in a position to deal with the majority of the objections raised by the respondent to the estates accounts.

13. I would like to state clearly at the outset that no monies have been wrongfully withheld from the estate and that most of the sum of €1,033,875.50 alleged to have been withheld never formed part of the estate of either deceased.

14. Other issues have fallen away. In the case of “Bel Air”, where there has been a dispute as to the proper valuation of that property, the dispute has been avoided - or at least postponed

- by the decision to assent to the property to the four siblings in specie.

15. The SA2 filed in the estate of Mr. Connolly, deceased, and exhibited in these proceedings, states that Ronan will benefit to the tune of €1.3m from his will, Carol and Ann will receive assets to the value of €1.475m each, and the respondent will receive almost €2m. These bequests will be subject to taxation in the usual way.

16. Before dealing with the nine issues raised by the respondent about the administration of the estate by the applicant, it is firstly important to note the jurisdiction of the court.

Jurisdiction of this Court

17. Order 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986, as amended, provides for the determination of various matters by special summons, including the following: “(1) The administration of the real or personal estate of a deceased person, or the administration of the trust of any deed or instrument save where there is a charge of wilful default or breach of trust.

(2) The determination of any question affecting the rights or interests of any person claiming to be creditor, devisee, legatee, next-of-kin or heir-at-law of a deceased person, or cestui que trust under the trust of any deed or instrument, or claiming by assignment or otherwise under any such person.

…

(4) A direction to any executors, or administrators or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their character as such executors or administrators or trustees (including the furnishing and vouching of accounts).

(5) The approval of any sale, purchase, compromise, or other transaction in connection with the administration of any estate or trust.

(6) The determination of any question arising in the administration of any estate or trust or the ascertainment of any class of creditors, legatees, devisees, next-of-kin, or others.”

18. Order 3 essentially restates the jurisdiction which was apparently introduced in the mid- 19th century whereby an originating summons procedure could be used “under which individual questions could be submitted to [the Court of Chancery]…”: see: the discussion of the history of the procedure at para. 53-02 of Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate, 22nd ed. (London, Sweet and Maxell, 2023). The relief sought by the applicant therefore clearly falls within Order 3 of the Rules.

19. Estate accounts have been prepared by specialist accountants. These accounts were sent to the four residuary legatees on 6 July, 2023, and they were informed that it was proposed to make a distribution of nominated amounts to each of them in part satisfaction of their share in the residue of their father’s estate, and each of them was asked to sign a Confirmation and Indemnity. Carol and Ann were informed that they would receive €683,928.25, and Ronan was to receive €653,928.25.

20. The respondent refused to give a Confirmation and Indemnity, both as a matter of principle and on the basis of the nine objections considered in this judgment. The applicant says the objections are not well founded and also submits that an indemnity is required given the respondent’s consistent objections to the manner in which the applicant has sought to administer both estates and in view of the fact that the respondent has various complaints about the applicant, who formerly practised as a solicitor, and about other professionals engaged as part of the process of the administration of the estates to a number of regulatory bodies. Some of these complaints are referred to further below. However, in the absence of receipt of a Confirmation and Indemnity, he has thought it best to apply to court so that the distribution takes place on foot of an Order of the court.

21. Before proceeding to consider whether the applicant may distribute the sums identified or any updated distribution amount to the respondent, it should be noted that the applicant proposes to reduce the sums payable to each beneficiary by €31,881.75 for two reasons. First, it is proposed to retain the sum of €120,000 to meet further potential litigation costs (Issue 8, below) and, secondly, the applicant proposes to pay his solicitors’ legal costs incurred in dealing with the respondent’s complaint of the solicitors acting on behalf of the applicant in connection with the administration of the estate to the Legal Services Regulatory Authority (“LSRA”) complaint, resulting in a further reduction of each beneficiary’s share by €1,881.75 legal costs (Issue 6, below).

22. In essence, although the other three beneficiaries have accepted the distribution figures notified to them, it is also accepted that those figures may require further adjustment in light of the outcome of this application.

23. The respondent submits that Ann signed her receipt and indemnity under duress. He also makes a similar complaint on behalf of his brother, Ronan. Both Ronan and Ann are fully capable adults and neither of them has raised any objection to the Confirmation and Indemnity which they have signed. The respondent has no authority or standing to object on their behalf. This complaint is unfounded.

24. I turn now to consider the nine objections raised by the respondent to the proposed distribution amounts.

Issue 1: Elizabeth Connolly’s rings (€25,000)

25. There are three rings, one of which, a diamond solitaire (referred to on occasion by the respondent as a diamond sapphire ring, which appears to be incorrect) has been valued at €15,000. In total, the three rings are worth €25,000.

26. There is a dispute about how these items should be dealt with and specifically whether they fall into the estate or were gifted before death, and, if so, to whom. However, it appears from a note written by Ann which is exhibited to the latest affidavit filed by the applicant, and the correctness of which I therefore assume he accepts, that all three rings were in the possession of Mrs. Connolly on her death and were subsequently recovered from her safe and an agreement was reached between her four children as to how these items and, it would appear, some of her other jewellery, was to be divided up. That would suggest that the three rings (and possibly some other jewellery) formed part of the estate of Mrs. Connolly, deceased, and passed to her husband on his death as part of the residue of her estate. As her four children are the ultimate beneficiaries of the jewellery as their father’s residuary legatees, there is nothing particularly surprising about the fact that it seems that all four of them agreed to distribute the jewellery by agreement between them. However, the legal effect of that agreement is in dispute.

27. Jewellery is personalty and, as such, ownership of it is usually effected by transferring possession of it. As the applicant has exhibited a note to the effect that the jewellery was in Mrs. Connolly’s possession when she died, and indeed that she had refused to indicate to whom each piece should go, it follows that the jewellery went into her estate and ultimately devolved on her four children as part of her estate.

28. As a result, the amounts accounted for should be adjusted accordingly and the Notes to the Estate Accounts amended to remove the present note to the effect that the jewellery cannot be gathered in and/or is not in the estate.

29. I would add that it seems that the respondent only raised the jewellery as an issue in 2023, shortly before the preparation of the Estate Accounts. In particular, it seems that neither he nor Ann raised any issue at the time the inland revenue affidavit (CA24) was being prepared for their mother’s probate. In any event, the issue is raised now.

30. On a side issue, Ann also appeared at one time to be of the view that the rings should be dealt with solely as an asset in Mrs. Connolly’s estate, but that is wrong in law as, if the rings formed part of Mrs. Connolly’s estate, her husband would have been entitled to them as part of the residue of his wife’s estate, and thereafter they would have to be treated as an asset in his estate. However, unless Mr. Connolly facilitated the agreement between his children as to what was to happen to the jewellery, in which case I think the agreement is evidence that Mr. Connolly gifted the jewellery to his children (and possibly other family members) in his lifetime, nothing turns on that for the purposes of this judgment.

31. However, if the situation cannot be construed as a gift by Mr. Connolly to his children, as I think is more likely, then the rings in question form part of the residue of Mr. Connolly’s estate and should be gathered in. It should also be noted that the proving executor has the power to appropriate any individual pieces of jewellery to any of the individual residuary legatees as part of their share of the residue: s. 55 (1) of the Succession Act, 1965.

Issue 2: EBS account in the joint names of Elizabeth Connolly and Ronan Connolly (€58,000)

32. This was a joint account, number ending -5542 held with the EBS in the joint names of Ronan Connolly and his mother and which, at the date of Mrs. Connolly’s death, had a balance of €58,000. This has subsequently been reduced by payment of certain expenses identified in the estate accounts.

33. It appeared to the executor at first that Ronan Connolly was entitled to this in his own name by way of survivorship and that it didn’t go into Mrs. Connolly’s estate. However, Ronan Connolly volunteered at a family meeting in Bel Air on 11 January, 2017, that his name was on the account only for convenience and the money was his mother’s. Accordingly it went into her estate. The balance in this account is accounted for in the accounts of the estate of Elizabeth Connolly, deceased and the expenses drawn from it are also identified. The remaining balance is assigned to Ronan’s share of the residue in his father’s estate.

34. The objection of the respondent is to the effect that it should not remain in that account, and instead, should go into the executor’s account and then onwards for distribution. This is a technical objection and is, in my view, without substance. As long as the monies are accounted for, it makes sense that, having been accounted for as an estate asset, they will simply go towards Ronan’s share. It is just a matter of convenience not to transfer the money out of Ronan’s name and then back to him as part of his share. There is full transparency as it has been fully accounted for. There can be no valid objection to distribution on foot of the accounts on this basis.

Issue 3: Glengarriff – plot of lands on mainland known as The Dell (€20,000)

35. An island in Glengarriff was transferred to Ronan in the lifetime of his father. It seems

– possibly through a conveyancing error – that the associated plot of land on the mainland (known as “The Dell”) was omitted from the voluntary transfer or conveyance to Ronan. This is a small plot where one can park a car or moor a boat and merely provides access to the island. The Dell seems, in fact, to be essential to the full use and enjoyment of the island which has been transferred, because it facilitates access by allowing Ronan to park his car while he is on the island, and to moor the boat by which I understand access is gained to the island when he is not there.

36. The respondent agrees that it was his father’s intention to gift it to Ronan in the first instance and indeed the respondent acknowledged this in writing to the family solicitor in an email dated 23 April, 2019. In that email, at paragraph 8, he specifically acknowledges that it was his father’s intention that Ronan should get Glengarriff “in it’s (sic) entirety”. In fact, he sought confirmation “without equivocation” that neither estate had any lien or ownership of it and – although his terminology is somewhat inaccurate on this last point - that the title of the entire of the Glengarriff property had been transferred to Ronan. He also states in his second replying affidavit that he does not doubt that it was his father’s intention to transfer the entire of the lands in Glengarriff to Ronan.

37. In any event, the respondent appears to have changed his mind about the entitlement to The Dell. He now says that the Dell should go into the estate, after which it should be valued, and Ronan be given the option to buy it. His stated position on affidavit is that it may well have been a conveyancing error in the course of the original transaction but that it is now in the ownership of his father’s estate.

38. The three other residuary beneficiaries agree that it was their deceased father’s intention to transfer the Dell along with the island to Ronan, and, as I understand it, are happy that the applicant would execute a Deed of Rectification so as to include The Dell in the Deed of Transfer executed in his lifetime by the late Mr. Connolly.

39. The notes to the estate accounts state that, not only was the transfer of the island to Ronan perfected, but a signed transfer of The Dell to Ronan is also in existence. However, I have not seen this transfer. If a Deed of Transfer of The Dell was signed by the late Mr. Connolly before he died, then it may be that Ronan is now entitled to be registered as owner. On execution of a transfer by the transferor, the transferor (and his successors and assigns, which would include his personal representative) are bound by the transfer and the transferee has an equity in the lands which binds all but a transferee for value: see Camiveo Ltd. v. Dunnes Stores [2015] 2 I.R. 698, which related to a transfer for value, but the reasoning of which would appear to apply to a voluntary transfer where it has been executed as a deed by the transferor. But as I have only seen the note to the accounts, and not the Deed of Transfer itself, it is not possible to determine the state of the title to The Dell.

40. However, if the late Mr. Connolly did not sign such a Deed, the better view is that The Dell probably goes into his estate, albeit that the applicant, as the sole proving executor, is entitled to appropriate The Dell to Ronan’s share of the residue. In essence, this would mean, as suggested by the respondent, having the plot valued and reducing the monetary payment to Ronan by the value of The Dell.

41. I will hear the parties as to whether any relevant Deed of Transfer should now be put on affidavit so as to correctly assess whether or not The Dell forms part of the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased.

Issue 4: Account with Leeds Building Society (€727,524.22)

42. A statement dated 16 May, 2016, discloses a balance of €727,524.22 standing to the credit of Mr. Connolly, deceased, as of 7 December, 2015 with the Irish branch of Leeds Building Society. There is a letter from this institution dated 16 May, 2016. It encloses an instruction from the late Mr. Connolly in late 2015 telling them to put the account in the sole name of another person. They have redacted the name of that person, in accordance with the usual duty of confidentiality owed by a bank to its customers. There is no information to suggest that the person nominated by Mr. Connolly is any of the four siblings.

43. The respondent hasn’t made a coherent objection to the exclusion of this asset from his father’s estate. He points out that there was a very large balance in the account until shortly before his father’s death, although about two thirds of that sum was only transferred into the account on 5 December, 2015. Indeed, the respondent appears to have some knowledge of this matter as he deposes in his second replying affidavit to the fact that the sum of €468,248.79 was transferred from a Nationwide UK (Ireland) account on 7 December, 2015. On that same day, the deceased instructed Leeds Building Society to transfer the account into the name of a third party this was done by 10 December, 2015.

44. The late Mr. Connolly apparently knew by December, 2015, that he was dying. This appears to be the basis on which the respondent suggests in one of his affidavits that this was a gift conditional on death, and refers to donatio mortis causa. However, he does not disclose any factual basis for this assertion.

45. Of more immediate relevance, in my view, is the fact that the respondent did not inform the applicant of this potential asset of the deceased until 2023. Moreover, it is unclear how the respondent came to have the bank statement which he exhibited to his replying affidavit. There is no footer at the end of the page or anything to indicate that the document finishes on that page. It therefore appears to be an incomplete copy of the statement. It is not clear how the respondent came by this statement or why an incomplete copy has been exhibited.

46. The reason I refer to that is that the respondent makes repeated complaints throughout his affidavits that Carol told him on 6 January 2020 at a family meeting at the Royal Marine Hotel in Dún Laoghaire that she was aware of all of the late Mr. Connolly’s accounts. He seeks to infer from this that Carol and the applicant were therefore aware that the estate was entitled to the balance on this Leeds account but wrongfully excluded it from the schedule of assets. In my view, this is a fallacy.

47. First, there is no context given for this statement and it cannot be inferred from it that this account was deliberately excluded from Mr. Connolly’s statement of assets by the applicant. In fact, the applicant has said quite clearly on affidavit that the existence of this account was first disclosed to him on 14 July, 2023. This is troubling, because, as the applicant has made clear in his email correspondence with the respondent, he can only know of all of the deceased’s assets if he is told by the deceased’s children what they know of their parents’ affairs.

48. There is no precise mechanism by which a legal personal representative can establish the financial institutions with which a deceased banked prior to death. Usually, they discover from the deceased’s papers, are aware from their own knowledge of a deceased’s affairs, or are told by beneficiaries who are close family members and have reliable knowledge of the affairs of a deceased. It is very unclear to me why the applicant was not told of this account until mid- 2023. It appears that it was the respondent who gave this information to the applicant and it is not clear why he did not do so for some years after administration of the estate had commenced.

49. I am not drawing any inference from this other than that, if the respondent had information about the assets of the deceased, then he should have made that known to the applicant. In the case of a bank account, and particularly if bank statements are available, it is a simple matter to identify the account by branch and number (or by IBAN) and to furnish any statements in one’s possession. On the evidence as it stands, it does not appear that the respondent was forthcoming about this account and, while it appears that it does not form part of the late Mr. Connolly’s estate, insofar as the respondent believed that it did, it was incumbent on him to furnish to the applicant such information as he had in a clear manner. It appears instead that he has tried to insinuate that the applicant and his wife were withholding assets from the estate when in fact it appears that they did not know of this account and the respondent did not tell them about it.

50. This leads to the second, and more important, point. From the information put on affidavit by the respondent, the deceased – for whatever reason – gifted the balance in this bank account to an unidentified person some months before he died. Insofar as Carol did not regard this as an asset in the estate of the deceased, therefore, she seems to have been correct.

51. On the basis of the respondent’s affidavits, I do not see any basis for questioning the applicant’s view that the balance on this account does not form part of the estate.

Issue 5: Distribution of dividends in Drimnagh Industries Ltd (€60,000)

52. This company has declared dividends in the sum of €60,000 since the date of death of Mr. Connolly, deceased, which the applicant intends to distribute to Ann and Carol on the basis that the late Matthew Connolly left his shares in this company to Ann and Carol in equal shares. The respondent objects to this, and submits that the estate is entitled to the income on the shares pending distribution and that the go into the residue.

53. In passing, I note that there has been no objection taken relating to the bequest of the shares in this company in Elizabeth Connolly’s will or indeed to any other shares bequeathed by either deceased in specie.

54. The dividends declared by Drimnagh Industries Ltd. between the dates of death and the distribution are accounted for in the estate accounts. This appears to have been done by the applicant on the basis that the respondent claimed that this income went into the estate and therefore formed part of the residue of the late Matthew Connolly, of which of course he is a beneficiary. However, while they have been accounted for in the estate accounts, it is proposed to distribute these sums to Ann and Carol.

55. On this issue, it seems to be well settled that the income from a bequest in specie accrues to the legatee: see Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate, 22nd ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2023) at para. 70-02: “Income and accretions, in the absence of other directions, pass to a specific legatee or devisee as from the date of the testator’s death, even if the legatee or devisee’s interest is contingent or future, but not if it is merely a pecuniary legacy or there are protective trusts.”

56. See also Ranking, Spicer and Pegler’s Executorship Law and Accounts 21st ed., (London, H F L (Publishers) Ltd., 1971 and 1972, at pp. 381-2, where it is stated that any rent from real property or dividends declared in respect of shareholding where these accrued after the date of death, or indeed any progeny of livestock (where these are the subject of a specific legacy) born after the death of the deceased, all accrue to the legatee: citing Sleech v. Thorington (1754) 2 Ves. Sen. 563; Pollock v. Pollock (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 329, and Lancefield v. Iggulden (1875) L.R. 10 Ch. 136). Beneficiaries of a bequest in specie are entitled to the income or accretions thereon from the date of death. Income on the residue, while not payable until the residue is ascertained, then accrues to the residue.

57. There is a good reason for this: if the estate itself were to be entitled to income on specific legacies, it would be in the interests of the residuary legatees to delay probate and to gather income from the estate to the detriment of the person who was entitled to the property in specie. The slow progress of the administration of these estates is a clear example of the injustice that would accrue to a beneficiary if there were a delay in transferring the shares in specie as this would create an incentive for a residuary legatee to obstruct the timely administration of the estate.

58. Dividends declared on the shares after the date of death therefore accrue to Ann and Carol as legatees and the respondent is wrong in law on this point. The accounts correctly record that each of them is entitled to €30,000 by way of dividends declared on the shares bequeathed to them in specie.

Issue 6: Costs incurred by solicitors for the proving executor in defending a complaint made by the respondent to the LSRA (€7,146.30)

59. The respondent refers to the sum of €15,495.30 in his grouing affidavit in respect of “Legal Fees – LSRA, etc”. However, the invoice in evidence for this item is in the sum of €7,146.30.

60. The estate’s solicitors seek an indemnity from the estate in the amount of the sum of €7,146.30, being the fees incurred by them in dealing with a complaint made against them by the respondent to the LSRA. The question here is whether this is a legitimate estate expense.

61. The essential basis of the respondent’s complaint was that Reddy Charlton LLP would not meet with him or respond to his queries. However, he was not their client. It is therefore unsurprising that the LSRA decided on 28 March, 2022, that the complaint was inadmissible as being frivolous or vexatious, namely, that the facts alleged, even if proved, could not result in a finding against the legal practitioner under Part 6 of the 2015 Act. The essential reason for this was that the respondent was not a client of Reddy Charlton LLP who were acting for the applicant. The respondent’s legal rights were not infringed by the action of the applicant in applying for a Grant of Probate in his sole name and it was open to the respondent to consider his alternative legal remedies and also to seek his own legal advice. The letter of 29 March, 2022, notifying the respondent of the decision informed him that, while he did not have a right of appeal, he could apply to the Ombudsman for a review of the procedures applied by the LSRA in reaching its decision. It does not appear that the respondent ever did this.

62. The applicant relied on Mussell v. Patience [2018] EWHC 430 (Ch.), [2018] 4 W.L.R.

57 (at para. 12 ) in which the High Court of England and Wales approved the statement in Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks, Executors, Administrators and Probate, 20th ed. (2013) at para. 63-26 that a legal personal representative “is entitled to be allowed all expenses that have been properly incurred by him in the conduct of his office, except those that arise from his own default.” That case is also persuasive authority for the proposition that, provided the invoices raised properly relate to the administration of the estate, they are allowable as an expense in the estate accounts. Judge Matthews, sitting as a High Court judge, stated: “14. In my judgment, whatever the position on detailed assessment of costs, in relation to accounting to his or her beneficiaries for what has been done with the estate, an executor has only to show (1) that the sum concerned was indeed spent, and (2) that it was spent in the fair execution of the estate administration.

15. The former will normally be demonstrated by a document (“the voucher”) showing payment or receipt. The latter will normally be demonstrated by a document such an invoice referring to the executor as such, to administration of the estate or to some good or service having a connection with the estate (eg repairs to estate property). It will of course be open to the beneficiaries to rebut the inference in either case, but unless and until some other evidence is adduced by the beneficiaries to that end, the executor in my judgment need to nothing more.”

63. In this case, the respondent complained the solicitors acting for the proving executor to the LSRA in relation to their conduct in the course of the administration of the estate. However, this was not an expense incurred by the legal representative in connection with the administration of the estate. While possibly frustrating for the solicitors involved, given that the complaint was found to be frivolous and vexatious, the possibility of being complained is now part and parcel of legal practice and, although dealing with such a complaint can be stressful and very time consuming, the cost of dealing with a complaint to the LSRA is essentially an overhead to be borne by the legal practitioner in question as one of the expenses now involved in legal practice.

64. I am therefore of the view that this is an expense incurred by Reddy Charlton LLP as legal practitioners and not an expense incurred in the course of administration of the estate.

Issue 7: Legal fees incurred in respect of exercise of power of sale (€3,444.00)

65. There is a further issue relating to legal fees which arises. An invoice from Messrs. Orpen Franks in the sum of €3,444.00, which includes VAT and counsel’s fees, is claimed by the respondent not to be a legitimate estate expense.

66. This relates to Mrs. Connolly’s estate and, specifically, advice taken by the applicant as her executor relating to his power of sale. It appears that the respondent was anxious that Bel Air, which passed from the residue of Mrs. Connolly’s estate to the residue of her husband’s estate, would be sold in accordance with a conditional offer for its purchase.

67. The respondent says this was “wasteful” and asserts that legal advice was not required and that the matter could have been resolved by consensus among the beneficiaries. As a result, he says that this expense should not be allowed as an estate expense.

68. In my view, given the total breakdown in the relationship between the parties and the complete distrust that the respondent has of the applicant, repeatedly expressed in correspondence over the entire period for which the administration of the estate has been ongoing, it is fanciful to say that consensus could have been reached.

69. It was perfectly prudent of the sole proving executor to take legal advice while considering the exercise of his power of sale in relation to Bel Air. Although any dispute as to the precise amounts is a matter for a legal costs adjudicator rather than for the Court, it is notable that the fees are modest, having regard to the value of the estates generally and in particular having regard to the values of the estates in issue here.

70. However, the key point is that the fees relate to advice on exercise by the proving executor of his power of sale and are a legitimate estate expense which may be paid out of the estate.

Issue 8: Proposed contingency fund in the sum of €120,000

71. The applicant proposes to hold back the sum of €120,000 to deal with potential future legal costs and litigation. He says this is required given the respondent’s track record of failing to agree the accounts, which has necessitated this application, and his propensity to make complaints against professionals retained to deal with the estates, many of which have been dismissed as inadmissible and none of which has been found by the relevant professional body to be substantiated.

72. The respondent’s objection to the contingency fee is two-fold. First, he refers to a spreadsheet which was not on affidavit but which was handed in loose at the hearing. As far as I am aware this was produced by or on behalf of the applicant in order to explain to the beneficiaries how the proposed distribution to them was calculated. This spreadsheet sets out the amount of the indemnity and then breaks it down into four sums of €30,000 to be deducted from the amount to be distributed to each of the residuary legatees. However, the software package also seems to have produced an overall total of €240,000 being the sum of €120,000 plus the four sums of €30,000.

73. Nevertheless, it is absolutely apparent from the figures that the sum of €30,000 only has been deducted from everyone’s share and the respondent does not actually dispute the headline figures distributable to each of the beneficiaries (save insofar as the issues dealt with in this judgment are concerned) before the €30,000 is deducted. That being the case, it is very obvious that the only reductions made in respect of the contingency fee is a single sum of €30,000 from each share, and not two sums of €30,000 as the respondent contends. This is, in my view, a spurious objection.

74. The respondent’s other objection to the contingency fund is a bare assertion of dishonesty on the part of the applicant which I have no hesitation in saying has not been substantiated. There is simply no basis for saying that the applicant would hold money back and never pay it over. It is abundantly clear from the affidavits filed that the respondent is quick to assert fraud and dishonesty on the part of others. He has, as already alluded to, complained the applicant and the firm of which he was a founder to the LSRA and the Law Society, respectively. He has complained the solicitors dealing with the administration of the estate to the LSRA, who dismissed his complaint as inadmissible. The respondent’s dissatisfaction with the various decisions by which his complaints were dismissed as inadmissible are all expressed in intemperate terms.

75. The respondent has also impugned the competence of the accountants who prepared the estate accounts. He has even made serious and completely unfounded allegations against the officer in the Probate Office who issued a subpoena to require the late Mr. Connolly’s family solicitors (who ultimately did not deal with the administration of the estate) to produce the original will of the late Mr. Connolly so as to allow the applicant to take out a Grant of Probate. It will be recalled that that Grant did not issue until more than five years after the death of the deceased and it seems that the subpoena procedure was necessary to permit the Grant to be extracted and the administration of the estate to take place.

76. The Court of Appeal (per O’Moore J.) has recently reiterated that allegations of fraud should not be made lightly and should be substantiated by cogent evidence: Howley v. McClean [2025] IECA 77. The allegation that the applicant would simply retain the contingency fund even if it was not required to meet apprehended future legal expenses is without foundation and is directly contrary to assurances given to the beneficiaries by the applicant’s solicitors.

77. This is quite simply an unfounded allegation of dishonesty on the part of the respondent. There is no basis whatsoever for questioning the sensible approach of retaining a retention fund – and it is not a significant sum in the context of the overall value of the estates in question – or for the assertion that it will be unlawfully withheld by the applicant or his solicitors.

78. No legitimate objection has been raised to the provision in the estate accounts of a contingency fund.

Issue 9: AIB account, Grafton Street (€7,637.59)

79. A statement dated 1 December, 2017, in the name of the late Matthew Connolly and issued to the respondent’s address shows a balance of €7,637.59 standing to the credit of the deceased on that date. This comprises the sum of €4,422.27 which is apparently the proceeds of the Irish Life account together with a refund from Revenue.

80. The applicant submitted that this account was in the control of the respondent and the applicant proposed to deduct a sum of €4,422.27, which is what he believed to be the balance in the account from the respondent’s share of the residue to reflect this.

81. It transpired at the hearing that this was a joint account opened by the applicant and the respondent. The respondent exhibited an application form dated 15 June, 2016, which was signed by both the applicant and the respondent. There seems to be confusion on the part of the applicant here as to how this account came to be opened and he seems mistakenly to have believed that the respondent alone had access to it.

82. I will hear the parties on whether this account should now be closed, the funds in it transferred to an executor’s account maintained by the applicant, and the appropriate adjustments made to the accounts.

83. On a related note, it appears that the applicant is in possession of recent cheques in nominal amounts relating to Verizon and PTSB shares, which are made out in favour of Mrs. Connolly. The respondent is not Mrs. Connolly’s nominated executor, and while the sums are trivial, as this is still occurring nearly ten years after Mrs. Connolly’s death, these shareholdings should come under the control of the applicant as Mrs. Connolly’s sole proving executor.

84. I will give time to the respondent also to disclose the information within his control on affidavit, and I will hear the parties on the precise order that should be made.

Conclusion on the issues for determination

85. The accounts should be adjusted to take account of the matters the subject of this judgment. In particular: i. The value of Mrs. Connolly’s jewellery (not just the three rings in question) should be credited to her estate and, consequently, to the estate of her husband; ii. The EBS account now in Ronan’s sole name has already been credited to the estates of his parents but it may be necessary to identify the up to date balance; iii. If there is no deed of transfer of The Dell executed by the late Matthew Connolly, deceased, in his lifetime, its value should be credited to his estate; iv. There is no evidence that the balance (if indeed any now remains) in the Leeds Building Society ever formed part of the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased; v. Carol and Ann are entitled to the dividends on the shares left to them in specie;

vi. The fees charged by the applicant’s solicitors in connection with the complaint made by the respondent to the LSRA cannot be deducted as an estate expense; vii. The legal fees charged in relation to the proposed sale of Bel Air are a legitimate estate expense; viii. It is sensible to establish a contingency fund and there is no basis whatsoever for alleging that the applicant or his solicitors will wrongfully retain it; ix. The current balance in the AIB account, 100/101 Grafton Street, to be ascertained and credited to the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased. x. The estate accounts should show a credit for the cheques made out to Mrs. Connolly, deceased, for nominal amounts relating to shares in Verizon and PTSB to be given to the estate.

86. In addition, as the applicant is the sole proving executor, the balance in the AIB account in 100/101 Grafton Street should be transferred into his sole name and that account should be closed. Given the breakdown in the relationship between the applicant and the respondent, and given that only the applicant has extracted a Grant of Probate, good practice would dictate that the applicant should have control of this estate asset.

87. Furthermore, the applicant should inform Verizon and PTSB that he is the sole proving executor of the late Mrs. Connolly and should deal with these shareholdings accordingly. The respondent should deliver up to the applicant any cheques made payable to the late Mrs. Connolly so that the applicant can lodge them to the appropriate account.

88. I will list the matter before the end of the legal year in order to make such orders as may be appropriate on foot of this judgment and, if possible at this point, to deal with costs.